The 
problem of method 



I 



BY 

HOWARD SANDISON 

Department of Psychology, Indiana State Normal School 
TERRE HAUTE, INDIANA 



TERRE HAUTE: 
THE MOORE-LANGEN PRINTING COMPANY 

1909 



b I 05"! 



COPYRIGHT, 1904, BY 
HOWARD SANDISON 



UBKARY of CONGRESS 
Two OoDlfcs i^cOHi-Hd 

JUL 8 m^i^ 

Oopyrignt tntiy 
CLASa '^ AXc, --,. 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER I. 

PAGE 

The Psychological Pactor 5 

The Subjective Process 8 

The Objectifying Process 11 

The Subjectifying Process 17 

The Various Names of the Self 20 

CHAPTER 11. 

The General Nature of Knowing 24 

The Stages in Knowing 26 

Presentation 26 

Representation 27 

Thought 32 

Differentiation in Mental Acts 45 

CHAPTER III. 

Presentation 47 

Sensing 47 

General 47 

Special 48 

Sense-perception 49 

- Fused or Inimetliate Synthesis 52 

Analytic Perceiving 53 

Systematic Perceiving 53 

Perception of Space Relations 55 

Perception of Time Relations 57 

Illusion and Hallucination 58 

Apperceiving 61 

The Neural Stimulus to Sense-perception 65 

Educational Principles 66 

CHAPTER IV. 

Representation 71 

Memory 73 

Spontaneous Memory 73 



iv Contents 

PAGE 

The Process iu 74 

Voluntary Memory 78 

The Process in 79 

Systematic Memory 80 

The Process in 81 

Memory More Fundamental than Sense-perception 87 

Neural Basis of ISIemory 87 

Educational Principles 88 

Imagination 90 

Mechanical 90 

Productive or Separative 90 

Idealizing 96 

Imagination More Fundamental than Memory 105 

Neural Basis 106 

Educational Principles 130 

Language Activity 108 

The Act of Producing Language 110 

The Act of Interpreting Language 113 

Language Act More Fundamental than Imagination. 114 

Neural Basis 115 

Educational Principles 116 

CHAPTER V. 

Thought 118 

The Understanding 118 

Apprehension 120 

Distinction 121 

Classification 122 

Understanding More Fundamental than the Language 

Act 130 

Neural Basis 130 

Educational Principles 130 

Ratiocination 132 

Conception 132 

More Fundamental than Uu<ierstanding 146 

Neural Basis 146 

Educational Principles 147 

Judgment 158 

More Fundamental than (Conception 171 

Neural Basis 171 

Educational Principles 172 



Contents v 

PAGE 

Eeasoning 173 

Identification 176 

Induction 177 

More Fundamental than Judgment 179 

Educational Principles 179 

Deduction 180 

Less Fundamental than Induction 184 

Educational Principles 185 

Neural Basis of Eeasoning 185 

The Function of the Image 186 

CHAPTER VI. 

The Essential Idea of Method 190 

Method in the External 190 

Method in the Psychical 190 

Method in Education 192 

Method of the Teacher 195 

CHAPTEE VII. 

The Diflaculty of the Problem 203 

The Knowledge Required 204 

The Steps in Learning 206 

The Means 208 

CHAPTEE vixx. 

Special Method 219 

In Knowing a Particular Object 219 

The Process, and the Law of the Self 224 

The Three Views of Method 227 

CHAPTEE IX. 

Various Uses of the Term 229 

General Meanings 234 

Popular Uses 234 

Educational Uses 239 

Pedagogical Uses 243 

CHAPTEE X. 

Method in a Branch of Study 261 

The Essential Features 261 



vi Contents 

PAGE 

Method in Composition 263 

The Essential Features 263 

Illustration of the Mental Process • 265 

Mental Effects .267 

Course of Study in Composition 272 

Stages in Primary Grades 272 

Stages in Intermediate Grades 287 

Special Devices 304 

CHAPTER XI. 

Method in a Lesson 307 

The Subject Matter 307 

The Scope 308 

The Assignment 308 

The Purpose 309 

The Mental Steps of the Learner 309 

The Devices 311 

The Two Aspects of a Lesson. 313 

The Universal 313 

The Particular 319 

The Essential Elements in a Lesson 319 

CHAPTER XII. 

Principles of Teaching 335 

The Central Prin' l^Ie 335 

Subordinate Principles . 336 

Discussion of 336-384 

APPENDIX. 

I. Differentiation 387 

In Growth of Seed 387 

In Drop of Blood 389 

11. Act of Special Sensing 391 

III. Art of Study 394 

IV. Apperception 398 

V. Students' Reports on Voluntary Memory 401 

VI. Students ' Reports on Systematic Memory 406 

VII. Students ' Reports on Reasoning 408 

Series of Sentences in Language Work 414 

VIII. Outline for Report on Mental Process in Lesson 440 



PREFACE. 

This book expresses the thought that the characteristic 
process of consciousness is general method ; and that this 
process made particular by its adjustment to definite sub- 
ject-matter is special method. 

In setting forth the idea that the essential process of the 
self is the essential fact of method it becomes necessary to 
show that this process or law is manifested in a wide range 
of activities, as, in feeling, will and knowing; in each 
stage of knowing, as sense perception, memory, etc.; in 
the objective world, as in the activity of a plant ; in each 
branch of study ; in each lesson, etc. 

To do this brings about considerable repetition, since 
the one essential mode of activity is illustrated in each of 
these realms. Xo little repetition is involved, also, in 
considering the psychological activities first in their gen- 
eral aspect and later as to their special processes. 

The result is a book adapted not to general reading but 
rather to class room work. The fact that it is especially 
a working book gives rise to the large amount of working 
material both in the body of the book and in the Ap- 
pendix. 

The neural basis of the various mental activities is 
scarcely more than referred to. This reference is for the 
purpose of showing its place of treatment in a work on 



educational psychology and for the additional purpose of 
affording a basis for a fuller consideration. 

Acknowledgement is due to various departments of the 
Indiana State Normal School for aid in the preparation 
of this revision. 

The Department of Methods and Practice has offered 
valuable suggestions based upon the use of the former 
edition in class room work. 

The Departments of Physiology, Zoology and Botany, 
Geography, and Physics have contributed much of the 
illustrative matter in these subjects included in the vari- 
ous sections of the Appendix, which forms a valuable 
basis for the application of the general principles of 
Method. 

Other acknowledgments have been made from time to 
time in the body of the work. 



' ' The physiological study of mental conditions is thus the most 
powerful ally of hortatory ethics. The hell to be endured hereafter, 
of which theology tells, is no worse than the hell we make for our- 
selves in this world by habitually fashioning our characters in the 
wrong way. Could the young but realize how soon they will become 
mere walking bundles of habits, they would give more heed to their 
conduct while in the plastic state. We are spinning our own fates, 
good or evil, and never to be undone. Every smallest stroke of virtue 
or of vice leaves its never so little scar. The drunken Kip Van 
Winkle, in Jefferson's play, excuses himself for every fresh derelic- 
tion by saying, ' I won 't count this time ! ' Well ! he may not count 
it, and a kind Heaven may not count it; but it is being counted none 
the less. Down among his nerve-cells and fibres the molecules are 
counting it, registering and storing it up to be used against him when 
the next temptation comes. Nothing we ever do is in strict scientific 
literalness, wiped out. Of course this has its good side as well as its 
bad one. As we become permanent drunkards by so many separate 
drinks, so we become saints in the moral, and authorities and experts 
in the practical and scientific spheres, by so many separate acts and 
hours of work. Let no youth have any anxiety about the upshot of 
his education, whatever the line of it may be. If he keep faithfully 
busy each hour of the working day, he may safely leave the final re- 
sult to itself. He can with perfect certainty count on waking up some 
fine morning, to find himself one of the competent ones of his gener- 
ation, in whatever pursuit he may have singled out. Silently, between 
all the details of his business, tlie power of judging in all that class 
of matter will have built itself up within him as a possession that will 
never pass away. Young people should know this truth in advance. 
The ignorance of it has probably engendered more discouragement 
and faint-heartedness in youths embarking on arduous careers than 
all other causes put together." 

Psychology, (Briefer Course) page 149. James. 



The Problem of Method, 



Chapter I. 

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR. 

Method is, fundamentally, the psychological process in 
the learner's mind. In a more objective sense it is the 
external activity of learner and teacher, especially of the 
teacher, in bringing about the adjustment of the pupil's 
mind to the object to be known. 

Attention will first be given to the psychological pro- 
cess. 

In Psychology, as in all other branches of learning, the 
object studied is activity. 

The activity which is studied in Psychology is unique 
in that it can examine itself as it acts. It can be aware 
of its own changes as they occur. This characteristic, 
which is termed consciousness^ is its fundamental charac- 
teristic. The changes or states of this activity are com- 
pletely isolated or private. They exist directly to the self, 
but to no other self. 

The object or energy which Psychology investigates 
(mind) seems to be a unit or entity; a causal force; an 
activity which, by acting, brings new conditions into 
itself. It is the activity or object about which we care 
most, the one which we would least willingly lose; it is 
an activity which each person is noticing practically all 



6 The Problem of Method 

the time, and of which he knows a great deal ; it is the ulti- 
mate judge of everything and the guide of life; it is an 
activity characterized by law. 

The law or sameness which characterizes mental phen- 
omena may be expressed, in relation to the self as a whole, 
as follows : 

(1). The self as a unity or energy exists as a mere 
capacity^ as a potentiality. This may be said to be a con- 
dition of fused unity. . In a sense, the mind is "without 
form and void." 

Since the mind whenever aware of itself, always finds 
itself to be existing in a particular state, the potential con- 
dition referred to denotes some succeeding particular state. 
For example, a person may be engaged in knowing very 
tall l)uildings in New York City. This is the present par- 
ticular act. It may be assumed that the particular act 
which is to succeed the present one, is the act of thinking 
out the cause. This act has not occurred however, but the 
mind has the capacity for it. The act exists potentially. 
Thus, the first stage of every particular act is similar to 
the condition of a rootlet of a grain of wheat when the 
grain has not yet been planted. 

(2) . The self, aroused by the stimulating object, the 
unapprehended cause of the tall buildings, creates in itself 
a particular activity, i. e., the act of becoming aware of 
the cause. The result is separation, that is, the mind has 
been made different or other. This second stage is, there- 
fore, analytic, while the first was synthetic. The self when 
existing in the particular act of knowing the cause is dif- 
ferent from itself (a) in the potential condition and (b) 
from itself in any other particular state, as, for example, 
in the act of knowing the effect of such buildings. 

(3). The third stage is that in which the self be- 
comes negative in bringing to an end the particular act, as. 



The Problem of Method 7 

for example, the act of knowing the cause of the tall build- 
ings. The energy involved in the act of knowing the cause 
returns, as it were, to the potential condition. The po- 
tential condition is not, however, in all respects, the orig- 
inal one, or progress would be absent. The new potential 
condition contains a tendency to reconstruct the act of 
knowing the cause of the tall l)uildings on a slighter 
stimulus than the original one. This new condition is 
synthetic but the synthesis is mediated instead of fused, 
that is, it is a synthesis modified by a previous analysis or 
experience. 

This law or sameness of process which marks the activ- 
ity of the mind is spoken of as "the characteristic cycle of 
consciousness," on page 59 of Angell's Psychology. 

The foregoing signifies that the self, in the process of 
education, gradually gives to itself its own definite traits 
or characteristics, by producing them out of its native but 
undeveloped capacity. This principle of education is an- 
nounced by Rosenkranz in "Philosoph}^ of Education,'- 
page 26. 

One may make the princii)le more real to himself, and 
understand more fully its universality, by considering 
thoughtfully "The Rhythm of Motion," in First Princi- 
ples, by Herbert Spencer, 250-271 ; the process in the seed, 
in the amoeba, in the object expressed by the sentence, in 
a drama, or in au}^ other form of fiction. 

The second stage in the process of mind also exhibits 
law or sameness. This stage — the particular act — may 
be— 

Subjective or Feeling. 

Objectifying or Will. 

Subjectifying or Knowing. 



8 The Problem of Method 

The Suhjective Process. 

Feelino- is the element of consciousness which indicates 
the value of the present particular state of the self in re- 
lation to the racial habits or in relation to the ideals of 
the self. These ideals may be, for example, the ideal as to 
efficient bodily condition, the ideal of intellectual progress, 
the ideal of art or beauty, the social ideal, the moral ideal, 
and the religious ideal. 

The ideal as to bodily condition is the ideal of a self 
whose body is adjusted to the environment, skillful in its 
special vocation, and capable of manifesting adequately 
the mental states of the self. 

The intellectual ideal is the ideal of a self constantly 
developing in a knowledge of the universe. 

The tTsthetic ideal is the ideal of a self capable of ap- 
preciating beauty, natural and artistic, and of adequately 
expressing the universal in particular forms. 

How may the social, moral, and religious ideals be 
stated? 

The process in feeling involves (1) the existence of a 
habit or an ideal; (2) the existence of a particular mental 
state; (3) awareness of the relation of the particular 
mental state to the habit or ideal, and (4) a subjective 
response characterized by tone^ that is by pain or pleas- 
ure. This mental response is called feeling, and it indi- 
cates the value for the self, of the jDarticular mental state 
indicated by "(2)." 

The feeling arising on account of the relation of a par- 
ticular act, mental and physical, to the racial habit is 
called Emotion. An emotion is a hereditary feeling which 
accompanies an instinctive activit3^ In James' Psychol- 
ogy it is said that "an emotion is a tendency to feel char- 
acteristically when in the presence of a certain object in 



f 



The Problem of Method 9 

the environment." An instinct and an emotion are alike 
in that each is a psycho-physical process, but the instinct 
is primarily the physiological aspect and the emotion is 
the psychological. For example, in the emotion of anger 
the process is as follows: (1) the person becomes aware 
of some interfering object, as, some expression or act, (2) 
there is immediately a physical change, as, disturbed 
breathing, irregular circulation, tense and rigid condition 
of the muscles of the hands and face, (3) the initiation by 
these muscular changes of afferent neural currents, re- 
sulting, (4) in an affective response in consciousness 
known as anger. In the case of anger, as of all other emo- 
tions there is an interruption of the orderly rational pro- 
cedure of consciousness. The rational mental activity 
which was in progress has become futile. For an ample 
treatment of the emotions see Psychology by William 
James, pp. 373-390 and Psychology by James R. Angell, 
pp. 315-339. 

The process in intellectual feeling is as follows: (1) 
the self possesses the ideal of itself, as knowing every- 
thing, as constantly progressing in knowledge, (2) the 
self learns some new fact, as for example, the reason 
each state has two senators, (3) there is at once a con- 
sciousness of the relation of this new knowledge to the 
intellectual ideal — a relation of harmony, of furtherance, 
(4) the self in response, and as a sign of value, produces in 
itself a pleasurable intellectual feeling. Any intellectual 
feeling may be emotional. 

The process in aesthetic feeling is similar: (1) The 
mind has an ideal of itself as adjusted to all beauty, as 
comprehending the beautiful, (2) it becomes conscious 
of some particular object which adequately manifests a 
universal, (3) there arises a consciousness of the harmony 
of the particular condition to the aesthetic ideal, a har- 



10 The Problem of Method 

mony which holds as to the particular object and as to 
the particular condition of the mind, (4) the self responds 
with an aesthetic feeling. 

It is to be noticed that a feeling arises on account of 
the consciousness of the relation of the particular mental 
condition to the ideal of the self. This indicates the great 
value of adequate ideals. 

It would be of advantage to work out the social, moral, 
and religious ideals and the process in social, moral and 
religious feeling. 

Is the law^ of the total self which has been indicated in 
its general form manifested in the activity of the self 
known as feeling? Is there present the potential or syn- 
thetic stage, the stage of analysis or separation, and the 
stage of re-unification or mediated synthesis? 

The law of the self as specialized in the process of 
feeling involves only the second stage of the law of the 
self as a whole, i. e. only the particular act. In this stage, 
it is some act of feeling, as sympathy, joy, anger. Does 
this single act manifest in its own special way the stages 
of the law ? It exhibits these stages but not in the identi- 
cal form in which they are revealed in the law of the total 
self. The self as feeling does not have mere capacity as 
the first stage because it is existing in a particular act of 
feeling, as, for example, admiration of The Angelus. But 
this feeling is at first immediate or undifferentiated. Since 
the picture is being known as a whole the feeling of ad- 
miration relates to it as an un-analyzed object. The separ- 
ate, distinct characteristics of the picture are not being- 
known and hence the feeling is rather one of presentiment ; 
of admiration for it as an undifferentiated object. Many 
persons, in the study of art, never pass beyond this first 
stage of immediate appreciation. They often fear that 



The Problem of Method 11 

a study of a work of art will intellectualize it to such a 
degree that the feeling of appreciation will disappear. 

If, however, the object is really artistic an analytic 
study of it which would clearly reveal the artistic dis- 
tinctions would enhance the feeling of appreciation. This 
higher appreciation, i. e., the admiration of each of the 
separate characteristics which contribute to its nature as 
a work of art is the second stage of feeling, the stage of 
analysis. In this analytic stage there is admiration, one 
by one of the separate artistic characteristics discovered 
by the intellect. What are these characteristics in the 
Angelus ? 

There is, however, a higher stage of the feeling. This 
is admiration for the artistic unity which the various 
items of variet}^ in the object express and for the fitness 
of each particular characteristic of the object to aid in 
revealing the central meaning of the work of art. This 
third stage of feeling is an appreciation of the harmony 
in the object. It is synthetic, but it is not the immediate 
synthesis of the first aspect of feeling. In an adequate 
study of an object the mind responds with (1) a feeling of 
it, as a whole, as unanalyzed, (2) with a feeling con- 
cerning its analytic aspects, and (3) with a feeling ap- 
propriate to it as an organized whole. 

The Ohjectifying Process. 

The second large process of consciousness is the act of 
objectifying or will. The idea to be objectified may be 
that— ^ 

Of some object of utility, as, the cotton gin, the 
Brooklyn bridge, the Constitution of the United States. 

Of an idealized activity, as the spiritual condition ex- 
pressed in "The Chambered Nautilus." 

Of a form of conduct or behavior. 



12 The Peoblem of Method 

Of these three the last has been selected for a brief con- 
sideration because of its explicit manifestation of the 
process in education. 

Behavior always implies a criterion to which one is to 
conform. This is the reason that any human activity may 
become moral. 

The first stage in behavior is that in which the criterion 
seems to be externally imposed, as the regulation of the 
home, the rules of school, the Ten Commandments. 

The second stage in behavior is that in which the criter- 
ion is subjective only. This is the realm of conscience. 
If conscience is irrational obedience to it can not be justi- 
fied. If it is universal it will ultimately become institu- 
tional and thus pass over into the third class of criteria. 
Paul persecuted the Christians in obedience to his con- 
science. But his conscience was irrational because if made 
universal in its application it would have meant that 
every one was to be persecuted for his religious belief by 
every one who did not believe in the same way. The con- 
science of the East Indian impelled him to bury the living 
wives with the dead husband, but the conscience of the 
British officer commanded the abolition of the custom. In 
order to be a true guide the conscience must be educated 
and thus made universal. 

The third stage in behavior is that in which the criterion 
is subjective-objective, thus possessing the form of univer- 
sality. The criterion may become subjective-objective in 
either of two ways — 

1. By having the one who obeys the criterion a par- 
ticipant in the creation of it. 

2. By having the one who obeys it, study the criter- 
ion until he sees the rational ground for it. In this way 
he takes it up into his consciousness and recreates it, as it 
were. For example, if the Jews had assembled in con- 



The Problem of Method 13 

vention, and under free discussion, had formulated and 
adopted the Ten Commandments as a criterion of con- 
duct, the Ten Commandments would have been a subjec- 
tive-objective criterion produced in the first way. After 
the Ten Commandments had been promulgated they could 
have been rendered subjective-objective to any individual 
Jew by having him study the reason underlying them 
until he justified them in his own reason. He would thus 
have recreated them, and, in a sense, would have become 
the producer of them. In these ways the regulations of 
the home, the rules of school, the rules of base ball, lawn 
tennis, the by-laws of an organization, a party platform, 
the customs of society, the rules of business, the creed or 
discipline of a church, and the laws of the state become 
subjective-objective criteria. 

These stages of activity constitute the principle of dis- 
cipline or government. 

An act of will or of objectification, since it is a particu- 
lar act of the mind, will reveal the general law of the self. 
It will be in a special form, however. As in the case of 
feeling the first stage will not be one of mere potentiality, 
since a particular act is actually occurring. The first 
stage will be strongly marked by potentiality, however. 
That is, it will be a stage of indistinctness, of immediacy. 
The second aspect of the act of will is analytic and the 
third synthetic. The synthesis of this last stage is medi- 
ated, that is, it has arisen through analysis. Taken as a 
whole, howeA^er, an act of will is separative or analytic, 
since it renders the environment different or other. 

The potential or fused stage of will, the analytic stage 
and the stage of mediated S3^nthesis may be observed in 
any given act of will. Let it be assumed, for example, 
that a student in his reading notices the sentence — "His 



14 The Problem of Method 

reply was absurd," and concentrates his attention espe- 
cially upon the word "absurd." 

1. He recognizes its general meaning, but becomes dis- 
tinctly aware that he does not know the literal meaning. 
This, i. e., the discovery of a deficiency, is the first pro- 
cess in an act of will. 

The mental state is not merely intellectual. There is 
present also a slight feeling of dissatisfaction on account 
of the lack, an affective element, and also an impulse to be 
free from the lack, a volitional element. This impulse is 
inhibited. 

2. At, practically, the same time the student idealizes 
himself as free from the lack, as knowing the literal mean- 
ing. This object is satisfying and is responded to by a 
feeling of satisfaction, the affective element, and by the 
impulse to place himself in the condition of knowing the 
literal meaning. This impulse is inhibited. 

3. There is now present the conflict in the self known as 
desire. It includes consciousness of the present condition 
and its opposite, accompanied by feelings of satisfaction 
and dissatisfaction and appropriate impulses. The pre- 
sent condition, i. e., a lack of the knowledge of the literal 
meaning of the word "absurd" is seen to be not without 
its advantages. For example, it does not require the 
abandonment of the special work which is in progress, and 
an effort in a new direction. Often a student defers or 
omits altogether the search for the exact meaning of a 
word in order to continue the special problem in hand. 
It hence arises that both the real and the ideal are at- 
tractive. The various impulses are inhibited, 



The Problem of Method 15 

The general nature of desire is well expressed in the 
following — 

Of all the myriad moods of mind 

That through the soul come thronging, 
What one was e 'er so dear, so kind, 

So beautiful as Longing? 
The thing we long for, that we are 

For one transcendent moment, 
Before the Present, poor and bare. 

Can make its sneering comment. 

Still through our paltry stir and strife 

Glows down the wished Ideal. 
And Longing molds in clay what Life 

Carves in the marble Eeal. 
To let the new life in, we know, 

Desire must ope the portal; — 
Perhaps the longing to be so 

Helps make the soul immortal. 

—James 'Russell Lowell. 

4. The conflict is between the impulses to have the 
present condition continue anci the impulses to have the 
idealized condition become actual. 

The mental assertion that one or the other of these shall 
be made real is the process of will known as choice. The 
process within choice is (1) consciousness of the ideal of 
the self, (2) comparison of each of the two desired ob- 
jects with this ideal, (3) judgment as to which of the 
desired objects is the more in harmony with the ideal, (4) 
the assertion that that desired object which is now ideal 
shall be made real. The choice has now been made, but 
the impulses are inhibited, especially the impulses for the 
rejected desired object. 

5. But the desired object has been chosen merely. It 
has not been made actual. The next process in the act of 
will is that of imagining the means. The student may, for 
example, imagine himself as asking some one who is pres- 
ent, for the literal meaning, as walking quite a distance, 
finding and using an unabridged dictionary, or as at- 
tempting to decide upon the literal meaning by consider- 



16 The Problem of Method 

ing the parts of the word as found in other English 
words, as "abduct." 

6. The process of choice arises again with reference to 
the means, as previously with reference to the desired ob- 
jects. Let it be assumed that the student by relating each 
means to the ideal of life, to the establishing of habits, 
etc., finally selects the actual examination of the diction- 
ary as the means. The steps in the process of choice are 
the same as those previously noted. 

7. Meantime the impulses toward action have been in- 
hibited. The selection of definite means also tends to fur- 
ther inhibit certain impulses. The next step, however, in 
the act of will is that of releasing or giving freedom to all 
impulses in harmony with the aim of knowing the literal 
meaning of the word "absurd" by means of an examina- 
tion of the word in the dictionary. This release, there- 
fore, occurs by a direct fiat of the mind. 

8. This freedom of the impulses gives rise to the out- 
ward, and the mental action necessary to make the student 
acquainted with the literal meaning, as passing from the 
room and along the hall to the dictionary, opening the 
dictionary, finding the word "absurd" under the letter 
"a," noticing the explanation within the brackets, until 
it is made evident that the word literally signifies from 
deafness^ and implies that an absurd answer is one with 
as little reason in it as there is in a reply made by a deaf 
person. 

The student has now made real the ideal of himself 
which he imagined in the second step. 

Does this process of will manifest the law or sameness 
of the self by exhibiting a fused, potential stage, an an- 
alytic stage and a stage of mediated synthesis? 

There is in this act of will and in every such act con- 
siderable differentiation before the stage of thinking out 



The Problem of Method 17 

the means. In the stage of desire which is a stage of con- 
flict this is especially marked. Notwithstanding this the 
act is largely potential or fused from the first through the 
stage of choice. It then becomes anah^tic or separative. 
There must be an analysis of the chosen object in order to 
become aware of the separate, appropriate means. 

Finally the act becomes synthetic, in the form of im- 
mediate synthesis by the act of cancelling all means except 
one, releasing the inhibited impulses, thus making the 
chosen object, which is an ideal so long as merely chosen, 
actual. When it becomes actual it is consciously united 
with the self becoming an element of its experience. 

The Suhjectifying Process. 

This is the process of knowledge or of scholarship. It 
implies that the Infinite consciousness and the finite con- 
sciousness have each passed from the potential condition 
into the stage of distinction, or the separative stage. To 
exist in this second -stage is to objectify. The Infinite 
consciousness has objectified itself in suns, stars, clouds, 
plants, animals, i. e., in the universe of nature. The finite 
consciousness has objectified itself in the arts, in ma- 
chinery, in means of communication, in books, and in all 
kinds of manufactured objects. Scholarship consists in 
rendering subjective these two great realms— the world 
of nature and the world of man. Each object in either 
of these realms is essentially the self. It is the self ob- 
jectified. Its essence is the process of the self involved 
in the objectification. The essence of the cotton gin 
is the process of Eli Whitney's mind in creating it. It 
is not alien to him, and hence not to mankind. The 
self of the most immature mind is essentially reflected in 
the cotton gin. It is the acme of scholarship to possess 
the tendency to apprehend intelligence, purpose or the 



18 The Problem of Method 

process of the self as the essence of the object. To dis- 
cover the self in an object does not mean that a subjective, 
introspective ego is actively present in the object as in the 
animated bod}^ The meaning is that the rational process 
of consciousness is reflected in the object. The rational 
process involves essentially a consciousness of limit or de- 
fect, idealization of a new condition lacking the limit, 
desire for the new condition, choice of the reality of the 
new condition, creation of the new condition. To become 
aware of the reason for the web feet in the swan is to dis- 
cover the self in the object. It is to comprehend the pro- 
cess of intelligence in the Infinite consciousness which, 
through the process of evolution, gave rise to that struc- 
ture in the swan. 

An act of knowing, because of the fact that it is a state 
of consciousness, will manifest the law of the total self, 
but in a special form since, in knowing, the aspects of the 
total law all appear in the second stage of the mind's total 
action, that is, in a particular act of knowing. Since the 
act is a particular act which is actually occurring the 
stage of mere potentiality, of mere capacity to know has 
been transcended. The stage of potentiality w^as actual 
just before this particular act which is assumed, occurred. 

The first aspect of the particular act of knowing is 
analogous to the stage of potentiality because of its in- 
definiteness. In any particular act of knowing, the mind 
first becomes aware of the object indistinctly, as a whole. 
So far the awareness is largely potential. 

Let it be assumed that the particular act is one of 
knowing a given water pitcher. In the first stage the 
knower is merely aware of it as a whole. He knows that 
it is a water pitcher, is conscious slightly of its material, 
color, shape, size, shape of handle, of lip, etc. All this 
is a stage of potentiality to a certain extent because there 



The Problem of Method 19 

is much indistinctness. The characteristics of the object 
are largel}^ fused. This is the first stage in every act of 
knowing, and it is, practically, identical with the first 
stage in the law of the total self. On this important trait 
of consciousness is based the principle of pedagogy ex- 
pressed by the statement that the child should first be 
given the opportunity to become aware of the object as a 
whole. 

The second stage in every act of knowing is that of be- 
coming aware analytically, that is, distinctly, of all, or at 
least of the main characteristics of the object. In the act 
of knowing the water pitcher the observer, having be- 
come conscious of it as a whole, concentrates attention, 
for example, upon the size of the pitcher. This is closely 
studied, until clearly known. It will be estimated, and 
then measured by tape line, by rule, and by various liquid 
measures until the idea of its size is definite. Similar at- 
tention will then be given to the shape, to the color, to the 
material, to the shape of the handle, etc. This is the 
stage of separation or analysis, and resembles the second 
condition in the activity of the self as a whole, i. e., its 
process of creating in itself a particular act, which act 
separates the self from its potential condition and from its 
condition when existing in any other special act. 

The third stage in knowing is one in which the mind be- 
comes aware of the unity of all the diverse parts and at- 
tributes. It is a stage of reunifying, of mediated syn- 
thesis. The object is not permitted to exist in an analyzed 
form. The work in analysis was merely a part of a pro- 
cess in attempting to discover the organized unity of the 
object. This stage of synthesis is double. 

(1). It is, in the first place, an unconscious syn- 
thesis gradually occurring through the whole of analytic 
work, without any purpose to have it so. The mind syn- 



20 The Problem of Method 

thesises as it analyzes. For example, if it abstracts any 
attribute, as the shape of a pitcher handle, it instantly re- 
identifies the characteristic with the rest of the object. If 
the color of the pitcher is abstracted, the mind, after 
contemplating it, so as to become fully acquainted with its 
exact nature, re-identifies this attribute by knowing it as 
belonging to the whole object. Thus step by step, as the 
analysis is occurring, a corresponding process of synthesis 
is taking place. This process of synthesis, in itself, gives 
unity to the object. 

(2). There is, hoAvever, a higher and more thought- 
ful synthesis. This second form of synthesis is purposive. 
The various steps in the process are somewhat as follows : 

(a). The mind has previously become conscious 
of the purpose of the pitcher, and again gives attention to 
its function with special emphasis. 

(b). It reconsiders, for example, the attributes of 
color and shape which it had previously abstracted. 

(c). It regards these two characteristics in the 
same act of consciousness, thus discriminating them. 

(d). It then relates each of these attributes to the 
purpose of the pitcher, and discoA^ers that these are alike, 
though different, each contributing to the accomplishment 
of the purpose. 

Thus step by step, each attribute is examined and re- 
lated to the purpose. This completes the stage of syn- 
thesis, and gives a systematized knowledge of the object. 
It thus appears that the law of consciousness is mani- 
fested very definitely in a particular act of knowing. 

The Various Names of the Self. 

The energy, which reveals itself in acts of feeling, will- 
ing, and knoAving, is variously named, and it has come 
about in the history of the race that these special names 



The Problem of Method 21 

are supposed to represent special entities, i. e., separate 
objects. This, hoAvever, is at least subject to question. It 
seems more re i ouable to view these names as signifying 
various cayahiliiies of the one energy or entity. 

This is not peculiar, however, to a psychical object. 
Material objects often have various names to represent 
the various relations under which they are considered. 
For example, a well known piece of money is spoken of 
under several different terms, each different term repre- 
senting exactly the same object, but emphasizing some 
special relation of it. This is shown in the terms, dime, 
ten cent piece, ten cents, coin, silver coin, change. 

The same person is often represented by different names. 
These different names do not signify different objects. 
They signify one and the same object, considered, how- 
ever, in different relations. For example, one person may 
be spoken of in the terms — president, chief-executive, 
commander-in-chief, tax-payer, citizen, voter, father, 
husband, patriot. The same total object is expressed by 
each term, but a peculiar relation is, at the same time em- 
phasized. This is true of the subject or energy, (mind) 
which reveals itself in acts of feeling, willing, and know- 
ing. 

1. This single energy is spoken of as the psycho- 
physical organism when the dual nature of the person is 
signified together with the inter-action of the psychical 
and physical elements. 

2. The same object is termed consciousness when the 
physical factor is practically ignored and the psychical 
factor is thought of as being aware of some object, as of a 
door, and as knowing at the same time its own act of 
knowing. When the energy is spoken of as consciousness, 
the assumption is, that the energy (mind) , produces a par- 



22 The Problem of Method 

ticular act which is at first regarded as different, and is 
then discovered to be the same as the actor. 

3. This same energy has the term mind^ or the term 
intelligence applied to it when it is regarded as an ac- 
tivity which discovers meaning. When consciousness is 
looked upon as creating in itself, a particular mental state, 
as reacting past experiences, and as discovering the mean- 
ing of the present mental state by relating it to these past 
experiences, the i^rm. mind or intelligence is appropriate. 

4. The term self is also used to designate the same 
object. This is to indicate that the mind can change, and, 
at the same time, be aware of these changes which are 
occurring. A plant changes or has experiences, but is 
not aware of these changes as they are occurring. There- 
fore, the plant can not be spoken of as a self. If sud- 
denly the plant, which is putting forth leaves, could be 
aware of the fact of putting forth leaves, it would there- 
upon become a self, and could be educated. 

5. The word ego also names this energy which has 
been -spoken of as consciousness, mind, self. This word 
indicates that the self is an independent existence, having 
a personality of its own, and that the speaker knows him- 
self as the object spoken of. 

6. The word soul is also used to denote the same psy- 
chical energy as that denoted by the terms that have been 
given. It emphasizes, however, a special relation. It 
indicates that the self exists in conjunction with the phy- 
sical organism, and is yet separate or distinct from it. 
It refers specially to the mind or self, but indicates unity 
with the body. 

7. The word subject has often been employed to de- 
note the self. It indicates that the mind or self is the 
cause of its own activities, and that its special acts, which 



The Problem of Method 23 

are looked upon as objects, are effects of its activity as 
subject. The word subject indicates that the mind as a 
unit underlies and gives unity to its activities or phe- 
nomena. 

8. The psychical energy is also denoted by the word 
spirit. This indicates the same object expressed by the 
terms ego, self, mind, soul, etc. Its special function is to 
emphasize the fact that the mind is not subject to mechan- 
ical laws, that it is not material in its nature. It is also 
intended to express the idea that the self is capable of 
higher forms of activity than sense-perceiving, remember- 
ing, and imagining. It refers somewhat to the idealizing 
activities of the self. It denotes its ability to inter-pene- 
trate and refine its lower modes of activity by directing 
them to moral and religious ends. 

It will be helpful to the student to think out the ad- 
vantage which comes to the educator by recognizing the 
fact that these various terms denote one and the same 
object, while emphasizing the various characteristics be- 
longing to the object. 



24 The Problem of Method 



Chapter II. 



THE GENERAL NATURE OF KNOWING. 

It may contribute to a clear knowledge of the stages in 
knowing, to refer to the sense in which the words object 
and image are used. 

In general usage the word, '^object," signifies a space- 
occupying existence, as a tree, a chair, a cloud, etc. In 
psychology, the term is used not only to signify existences 
of this kind, but to denote any existence Avhatever, phy- 
sical or psychical, possible or impossible. It is used to 
express that which is being attended to by the subject or 
mind. Whatever is set over against the self as actor is 
an object. If, for example, the self examines its own ac- 
tivity, the activity which is examined is an object, while 
the activity of examining is subject. Even the most fleet- 
ing psychological or philosophical phenomenon is an 
object. 

The term "image," also has its narrower and wider 
significance. In the narrower sense, it denotes a mental 
state which signifies a space occupying object, but when 
the state is called an image^ the significance is not regard- 
ed. The image is the mental state as form. In this 
sense, it is regarded as the mental transcript or picture of 
the object. In psychology, however, the word has not 
only this meaning, but also an additional one. The term 
signifies the special mental state at any given instant. The 
particular mental condition at any time, following one 
mental state and preceding another, and characterized by 



The Problem of Method 25 

a certain definiteness of detail, intensity, etc., is an image, 
even if it signifies an abstract object. The mental state 
denoting diversity, patriotism, infinity, etc., is termed an 
image in psychology. The word, "image" signifies any 
mental state whatever regarded as existence, the meaning 
being ignored. The object denoted by the image may be 
material or immaterial. The image is merely the exis- 
tence aspect of an idea. 

In other words, the image is the particular state consid- 
ered without reference to its meaning. 

No image is single. It alwa3^s consists of various ele- 
ments appropriate to the corresponding attributes of the 
object. These elements are not directly observable in 
untrained introspection. Their existence is revealed by re- 
flection concerning the meaning of the mental state, re- 
flection showing that each image must contain in itself 
mental characteristics or elements capable of denoting the 
various parts and attributes of the object. 

Assume, for example, that a person writing at a table 
in a room hears the sound expressed by "la" uttered bj^ a 
child's voice in the hall at the left. The mental image 
of the writer denoting this object, namely, the sound ut- 
tered by the child, is characterized by certain mental ele- 
ments. The sound, which is the object being known, is 
known as consisting of the two sounds expressed by "1" 
and by "a." The tone in the sound is that peculiar to a 
child's voice. The sound occurs in the hall at the left of 
the writer. When this sound occurs, the mind of the 
writer constructs in itself a particular mental state or 
image appropriate to the object. This image is without 
definite meaning. As complete it has in it the following 
elements: The element denoting the sound expressed by 
the letter "1," the element denoting the sound expressed by 
the letter "a," the element denoting the tone peculiar to 



26 The Problem of Method 

the child's voice, the element denoting the fact that the 
sound is at the left, the element denoting that the sound 
is in the hall, and the element denoting that the sound is 
occurring now. Of course these elements of the image are 
not sejDarate mental states as the parts of a broken line 
would be separate lines. The meaning which this ex- 
planation attempts to give, is that the particular mental 
state or image possesses peculiar characteristics appro- 
priate to the various parts and attributes of the object. 

The Stages In Knowing. 

In entering upon a study of knowing, i. e., of the pro- 
cess of rendering the objective existence subjective, it is 
to be noticed that the mind as a knowing activity exhibits 
certain stages, marked by development. 

1. Presentation. 

The first complete stage is sense- perception. This has 
least recognition of the self as the essence of the object. 
In every act of sense-perception there is involved (1) the 
self as an energy, (2) the process in the particular act, 
and (3) the object perceived as present. The sense-per- 
ceptive act is one of fusion in that the object perceived 
is regarded as entirely different from the self, there being 
no recognition that the object is an objectification of the 
self; in that neither the self as an energy nor the special 
process in the particular act is in consciousness. In sense- 
perception the mind is engrossed with the object as some- 
thing quite distinct from the self. This mode of activity 
is known as presentation. 

The first subordinate stage in presentation is sen- 
sation. This is the process of becoming aware of the 
entire environment as an indistinct whole. In the form 
of successive and simultaneous sensations the mind re- 



The Problem or Method 27 

spends to the various characteristics of the present objects. 
All sensations with their corresponding attributes are 
given slight attention, but there is no special emphasis 
or selection. 

In sensation the mind is rather under the domination 
of the external world, although each sensation is a mani- 
festation of self-activity, in that the self created it out 
of itself. It is not received. 

The second subordinate stage is perception. In per- 
ception the mind withdraws its slight attention from all 
attributes or objects being sensed except one. It concen- 
trates its energy upon this one object, dwelling upon it 
until it has created a distinct image of the object. The 
self projects this image. That is, it interprets the image 
to signify the object as present. 

The third subordinate stage in presentation is apper- 
ception. Perception is separative. It distinguishes the 
object from the fused environment and the special act of 
perception from the condition of the self in sensing. 
Apperception is, however, a unifying process. It unifies 
the idea of the present object with kindred ideas or ten- 
dencies which are already elements or constituents of the 
organized self. The present idea may be that signifying 
a present white grape, (the first one known.) In ap- 
perception this idea is identified with and differentiated 
from already existing ideas of grapes and of other fruits. 
This process gives organization to newly created knowl- 
edge. 

2. Representation. 

The process of subjectifying has as its second prom- 
inent stage representation. This is more nearly a recog- 
nition of the self in the object than is presentation be- 
cause, the object being absent, the mind tends to consider 



28 The Problem of Method 

itself as the producer of the image of the object. The 
object is still, ho^Yever, regarded as distinct from the 
self. There is no consciousness that the process of the 
self is the essence of the real object. There is, however, 
a knowledge of a certain degree of identity. The image, 
which constitutes one element of the self, is known to be a 
psychical recreation of the object. Thus a kind of super- 
ficial identity is felt. 

The mechanical stage of representation is memory. In 
memory the mind interprets the image to denote a particu- 
lar object, not present now but once present. It is spon- 
taneous, voluntary or systematic. 

Spontaneous m^m^ory exhibits the potential stage of 
consciousness. The elements in the process are fused or 
indistinct, and there is no contradiction in the self. 

Voluntary meinory manifests the second or separative 
stage of consciousness. It involves a contradiction in the 
self in that there is an effort to direct and stimulate the 
spontaneous activities. The mind discovers that, at the 
time, it is unable to act in the direction desired. There is 
thus, division in the self. Voluntary memory is based 
upon the act of forgetting, the negative aspect of memory. 

Systematic memory is a remembering which involves 
both the voluntary and the spontaneous process. This 
form of remembering includes all that is signified b}^ the 
term mnemonics from its superficial to its rational aspects. 
The self always has a mnemonic system of its own and the 
value of this system depends on the degree of culture. Sys- 
tematic memory is not merely a mnemonic system. It is 
far more. It is a remembering planned before hand in 
order to enable the self to react voluntarily the beginning 
element in the process. This beginning element then stim- 
ulates the spontaneous process. 



The Problem of Method 29 

A higher form of representation is iniaginatioii. The 
freedom of the self begins to appear distinctly in imagina- 
tion. Not only does the mind recognize itself as the pro- 
ducer of the image, but it also discovers that to a degree it 
recreates in a new form the object itself. 

In imagination the mind interprets the image which it 
has produced in itself, to signify a particular object, not 
present at the time and never present. 

The process of imagination has several forms, as the 
mechanical, the separative and the creative or poetic. 

The mechanical imagination may relate to present ob- 
jects or to absent objects. For example, Avhile engaged 
in considering an object which has just been sense-per- 
ceived, the self ma 3^ modify one or more of the elements in 
the sense-i^erception image, as, the element denoting the 
roughness. This changes the image to an imagination 
image, and the image is interpreted to denote a smooth 
object of the kind under consideration. The object will be 
known as not present at the time and as not at any time 
present. 

A similar change may be brought about by the self when 
it is engaged in remembering an object. The object of 
memory may be a field of green Avheat. While existing in 
the act of remembering, the mind may reconstruct the 
memory image so that it is the image of a field of ripened 
wheat. This image is interpreted to signify a particular 
object not at an}^ time present. 

The separative or productive imagination is so termed 
for the reason that the self creates the image of a given 
object, as of a word or of some externality in a product of 
art, and then interprets the image to denote, not the object 
which has been imaged, but instead, a separate object. 
For example, a person may create the image of the ex- 



30 The Problem of Method 

pression, "It was the great hall of William Kufus," and 
interpret the image to signify not this expression, but 
rather quite a separate object, namely, a large hall in 
London, as not at any time present to the person who is 
imagining it. This form of imagination is very prominent 
in history, geography, discourse, etc. It is also called 
constructive imagination. 

The second form of separative imagination is concerned 
directly with the externalities of ordinary pictures, and of 
works of art, as, products in architecture, sculpture, paint- 
ing, etc. For example, let it be assumed that a person has 
constructed the image of the marble which has been chis- 
eled into shape of a hand in the statue of Minerva. The 
mind instead of interpreting this image to denote the ac- 
tual marble so shaped, interprets it to signify the actual 
hand, as an object not now present, and never present. 

The imaghiafion is also creative,' tohich includes aes- 
thetic or poetic^ the volitional and the intellectual. The 
first will here be briefly illustrated by reference to lan- 
guage. 

In very early stages the child uses the same word for 
two different objects, not knowing that the objects are dif- 
ferent. Since the impression is the same as that previously 
experienced, he assumes the object to be the same. Thus 
if the child calls the moon a lamp^ his language is not fig- 
urative. He assumes it to be a lamp, since the impression 
is similar to that experienced when looking at a lamp. In 
the same way a little child calls any man father. 

A second stage in language is that in which the meta- 
phor is created. There is, first, the existence of a dim 
conception, as, for example, of something that is protec- 
tive. This is then differentiated into two clear concep- 
tions, as for example, into the idea of the advantage and 
protection belonging to one if the spirit is characterized 



The Problem or Method 31 

by a godly disposition and on the other hand into the idea 
of a shield as protecting the body. The third notion is 
that of the identity of the two objects. This is ex- 
pressed in the form of the metaphor, as "God is a shield." 

The next stage in the development of language is that 
which gives rise to the simile. Here the discrimination is 
greater than in the metaphor. The two objects are seen 
clearly to be different and yet an identity is discovered. 
The expression is, "God is like a shield." 

The fourth stage in the development of language is 
one that gives rise to prose. In this case there is no con- 
sideration of two objects, but merely of an object and its 
attribute, as "God protects." 

In general the creative imagination is that form of 
mental activity in which a spiritual condition is exhibited 
in terms of the physical. 

Under representation there is a third stage involving 
both memory and imagination, and even higher forms of 
knowing. It is a mode of consciousness in which the 
transition to thought is made. It involves the consid- 
eration of language or signs in general. The term often 
used for this mental process is interpretation. Interpre- 
tation, however, indicates one-half only of the language 
process^ i. e., that process in Avhich — 

Language already existing is observed. 
The content or meaning is remembered, imagined or 
conceived and 

The language is judged to signify the content. 

The other process in language is creative. It is as fol- 
lows: 

The mind constructs an idea. 

It imagines or remembers language adapted to this 
idea. 

It judges this language to signify the idea. 



32 The Problem of Method 

A good term for the complete process is the language 
act. 

3. Thought. 

The third and most important stage in the process of 
subjectifying is thought. Thought is that mode of activ- 
ity in which the self discovers its own process to be the 
essence of the object. In the process of thought the mind 
becomes aware of its essential identity with the object. 
Although it is not obvious, nevertheless any process of 
answering the question, "Wh}^?" is a process of discerning 
the intelligence manifested in the object. If one by study 
answers the question, "Why has the orange a rind?" he 
puts forth the act of finding the process of self in the 
orange. That is, he becomes conscious of Intelligence in the 
structure of the orange. In thinking, the mind has its 
own process as its object, although its object seems to be 
something else. 

To become conscious of the reason for the stopper in an 
ink bottle is to comprehend the intelligence which is mani- 
fested in the stopper, the significance of it. The stopper 
is an object of meaning. This is to say that it is the ob- 
jectification of a volitional process. Before the existence 
of the stopper a conscious process substantially as follows 
occurred : 

A person became aw^are that the ink in the receptacle 
with no covering evaporated too rapidly, received too 
much dust and was likely to be lost through the overturn- 
ing of the receptacle. 

He idealized or imagined a condition in which these 
things could not occur. 

He experienced some degree of mingled pain and 
pleasure on account of the consciousness of the contrasted 
conditions. 



The Problem of Method 33 

He desired the idealized condition. 

He chose to produce it. 

He thought out the process of producing it ; that is, 
he constructed the notion of the stopper and of the pro- 
cess of creating it. 

His purpose and intelligence having given freedom 
to the appropriate impulses he put forth the series of 
actions necessar}^ to produce the stopper. 

He judged and accepted the result. 

In this sense the stopper is an objectification of the 
process of the self. When the stopper is sense-perceived, 
remembered or imagined, this process is not known and 
perhaps, not even felt. At least, the idea of the presence 
of the self in the object is very implicit. To thinh the 
stopper, however, is to create the notion of the process of 
mind as being in the object and as being its essence. 
Thought discovers the intelligence under the object. In 
the process of thought the self faces its own process and 
identifies the process with itself. 

There are degrees in the clearness with which this is 
done. 

The first and lowest stage of thought is called under- 
standing. This is the dim knowing of the process of the 
self as the essence of the object. It is an indistinct con- 
sciousness of intelligence or meaning as the reality of the 
object. The peculiarity is that it fails to realize that the 
the object has within it a process or energ}^ which creates 
and organizes it. To the understanding, the object is or- 
ganized from without ; the distinctions of the object are 
externally imposed. They do not, to the understanding, 
arise from a generic force within the object. 

Still the process of understanding is a process of think- 
ing, because there is some consciousness of meaning or re- 



34 The Problem of Method 

lation, or of the ego as the essence of the thing under- 
stood. 

Understanding is marked by three stages. 

The first stage is apprehension. In this stage the mean- 
ing is grasped in a fused or indistinct way. 

Apprehension is rather a feeling of meaning. This is 
indicated by the popular use of the word. 

The second stage is that of distinction. This stage is 
separative. In it the mind analyzes or isolates in order to 
remove the indistinctness of apprehension. The subordi- 
nate processes in distinguishing are abstracting^ discrim- 
inatiyig and comparing. Comparing is a separating or 
distinguishing which has an element of unifying in it. It 
is therefore the basis and the transition to classification. 

Classification is the third stage of the process of under- 
standing. It also has subordinate stages Avithin it. 

The first is identifying. In this act the mind unifies the 
object with a class on the basis of the indistinct meaning 
already discerned. This act is sometimes termed general- 
izing because it indicates a somewhat superficial consid- 
eration. The word generalizing is, however, usually re- 
stricted to the act of discovering a general truth in the 
inductive process. 

The second is classing the object with its causes and 
effects. This unifies it with two classes — causes and ef- 
fects. Hence this stage is separative. 

The third is unifying the object with its own inner law 
or organizing energy. This process is the discovery of 
the structural principle of the object, but the mind as 
understanding becomes aware of it merely as a passive at- 
tribute, and not as a genetic, inner force giving rise to all 
the distinctions in the object. 

The second stage of thought is sometimes termed ratio- 
cination. It is the distinguishing process of the mind as 



The Pkoblem of Method 35 

a thinking activity. It is the separative stage growing 
out of the stage of fusion or potentiality represented by 
understanding. This stage of thought differs from the 
previous stage in that the energy ^producing the object and 
its details is regarded as withhi the object. 

When the mental process manifests development, a new 
term is required to denote the differentiation. The word, 
"understanding," signifies a mental process which termi- 
nates in a knowledge of the central meaning of the object, 
regarded as merely there, but not as giving rise to the ob- 
ject and its differentiations. As the self develops, this 
central characteristic, which the mind has discovered in its 
act of understanding, appears to the self as a generic en- 
ergy. This is really consciousness of the general or uni- 
versal as manifested in the particular which it has pro- 
duced. The object known constitutes, therefore, the true 
individual. If this awareness of the unity of the generic 
activity with the particular which it produces is somewhat 
potential, with the emphasis upon the general, and with 
the distinction between the general and the particular 
rather implicit, the act is conceptive; if the distinction is 
explicit and the awareness of the two clearly distinct 
aspects is definite, the act is one of judgment; if in dis- 
covering the unity of the two aspects the awareness is 
deeper than a consciousness of the unity, in that it in- 
cludes also, and mainly, a knowledge of the ground or rea- 
son of the unity, the activit}^ is that of reasoning. In case 
the ground, or mediating principle, is the uniformity of 
the process of the generic force, which has been discovered 
in the particular object, or in a number of such objects, 
the reasoning is inductive. If the mediating principle is 
the identity of the characteristics of the class with each 
particular of the class, the reasoning is termed deductive. 

To designate the common characteristic of these four 



36 The Problem of Method 

stages of becoming conscious of the generic in its relation 
to the particular, the term, "ratiocination," is employed. 
By some psychologists, the words, "elaboration" and "re- 
flection" are used in a somewhat similar sense. The word, 
"ratiocination" emphasizes the idea of a generic energy 
which is productive of the object and also of the differ- 
ences in it and in the class. The category of the mental 
process denoted by this term is difference while that be- 
longing to the act of understanding is identity. It is true 
that in understanding an object its distinctions are dis- 
covered, but they are regarded as imposed mechanically, 
or from without, while the differences recognized in ratio- 
cination are known as arising from the creative energy 
which gives origin to the object itself. In ratiocination 
the idea of an object is regarded as that which gives it 
being and which accounts for all of its parts, attributes 
and relations. The term has its root in the Latin word, 
"ratio," which signifies reason. John Stuart Mill limits 
the term to the process of necessary inferences because he 
is unwilling to admit that ratiocination is, properly speak- 
ing, reasoning. If the process of ratiocination is to be 
thought of as including reasoning, it is, on the other hand, 
to be distinguished from that higher stage of thought 
known as reason^ intuition or insight. Sir William Ham- 
ilton's notion of the process of ratiocination is referred to 
in "Fleming's Vocabulary of Philosophy," page 334. The 
word is not extensively employed in psychological writ- 
ings. Notwithstanding this fact, it is here used because it 
seems best suited to express in one comprehensive unity 
the processes of conception, judgment, inductive and de- 
ductive reasoning, as activities of recognizing the identity 
of a particular with a universal which is the generic aspect 
of the particular. In "Angell's Psychology ^^'' page 216, 
one form of the word is employed as shown by the fol- 



The Problem of Method 37 

lowing: "Beyond this we can say very little, save that 
there seems some reason to believe that all the more 
reflective and ratiocinative forms of thought process 
involve in an important way the action of the Flechsig 
association centers." The term is rarely used in common 
speech and in current general writings. In this respect, 
it differs distinctly from the great mass of terms employed 
in the science of psychology. Such terms as desire, mem- 
or}^, conception, distinction, etc., belong to the everyday 
speech of the people, in all ranks of life. In consequence 
of the lack of exactness which belongs to the science of 
psychology, as compared with the exactness of other 
sciences, the terms in psychology are mainly those of com- 
mon usage, and it is only occasionally, in order to express 
definite distinctions as they arise, that strange terms which 
are held to be especially suitable, are emplo3'ed. There is 
not, in psychology, that elaborate development of tech- 
nical scientific terms which is found in the definitely 
organized sciences. This may be clearly realized by exam- 
ining any set of terms used in a closely organized science 
to express the closely discriminated distinctions that 
belong to its subject-matter.* 

The first stage of ratiocination is conceiving. 

In its beginning, in an}^ given case, conceiving is a con- 
tinuation of the highest stage of classifying in under- 
standing. The organizing attribute of the object, which 



=•• FUNGI. 










Series I. 










Class 1. Phycomycetes— The alga-like fungi. 








Sub-class I. 


Oomycetes. 




- 




Order 1. 


Chytridineae. On algae, etc. 








Order 2. 


Saprolegniineae. Water moulds. Those growing 








on seedlings. Those growing on insects. 








Order 3. 


Feronosporineae. White rusts. 








Sub-class n. 


Zygomycetes. 








Order 1. 


Mucorineae. The bread mould, etc. 








Order 2. 


Entomophthorineae. Insect, parasitic fungi, 


etc. 



38 The Problem of Method 

in classification is regarded as merely common to all 
aspects of the object, is, in conception, discovered to be 
genetic, productive. 

In the second stage of conceiving the mind attends to 
the particulars or distinctions produced by the creative 
activity. 

The third stage of conceiving is one in which the self 
becomes aware indistinctly that each particular is genetic. 
The energy of the object is now observed to be creative of 
all the distinctions in the object. The universal and the 
particular are, in this stage of conception, identified. 

The second stage of ratiocination, namely judging^ is 
the mind's process of apprehending indistinctly the par- 
ticular, i. e., the object; of isolating and knowing clearly 
the universal, i. e., the isolated attribute^ of ceasing to 
regard the attribute as isolated and noting distinctly its 
unity with the other aspects of the object. 

Reasoning^ the third stage, renders explicit the devel- 
opment of the identity expressed by the copula. 

One reason that students have difficulty in comprehend- 
ing the process of judging and of reasoning is that their 
first approach to each of these processes is usually logical 
rather than psychological. In regard to the judgment it 
is often said that consciousness, being possessed of two 
ideas, one universal and the other particular, identifies 
them or discriminates them, thus producing the judgment 
or proposition. This is a mechanical explanation and 
removes judgment from the realm of actual psychological 
processes of discovering truth in actual objects. Judging 
begins in the construction of the idea of a single object 
whether general or particular. In the examination of this 
object the self abstracts or isolates an attribute (or the 
absence of the attribute) and then identifies it with the 
object. In the first case the sentence would express iden- 



The Problem of Method 39 

tity. In the second the direct expression is that of non- 
identity, although in reality the judgment always ex- 
presses a kind of identity even when it is mainly aware- 
ness of difference. The judgment thus expressed is called 
a proposition. 

Keasoning has often received the same mechanical ex- 
planation as that referred to concerning the judgment. 
Eeasoning is said to be a connection of propositions. One 
who reasons is supposed to have in consciousness two 
propositions, and to deduce from these a third proposition. 
This explanation is based upon the notions of formal logic 
and not upon the nature of the psychological process of 
reasoning. The logical process is a generalization based 
upon the psychological process. In the psychological pro- 
cess of reasoning the mind is concerned with a single 
object and is making a real examination of it in order to 
discover some fact concerning it — a fact not immediately 
accessible. The first process is that of judging. That is, 
the mind constructs the idea of the object as a whole ; then, 
as a result of continued contemplation of the object, it 
abstracts or isolates an attribute, and then identifies this 
attribute with the object and its class, or with the object 
through its class. The self does not, however, have in 
consciousness a judgment concerning the object and a 
judgment relating to the class and then deduce a third 
judgment termed the conclusion. The truth it discovers as 
to the class belongs to the process of reacting similar past 
experience common to all processes of knowing. There is 
no attention to a class until the necessity for its consider- 
ation arises in the direct examination of the object. It is 
a great aid in obtaining a knowledge of reasoning to note 
that the mind always spontaneously regards each object, 
old or new, as one of a class. The reason for this is that 
each object of its entire past experience has been found to 



40 The Problem of Method 

belong to a class. Occasionally in reasoning there occurs 
a judgment, and then the process of discovering the 
ground for the identity. 

There are three stages in this process. The first is 
termed identljication. In identification the mind appre- 
hends indistinctly the relation to the class, which is the 
ground for asserting identity. This indistinctness is the 
basis of the inaccuracy so frequent in this stage. Reason- 
ing always involves the particular, the general or class, 
and the universal. The mind in identifying unifies the 
particular with the class because it has discovered in the 
particular an attribute (the universal) which it is aware 
belongs to the class. This attribute may, however, belong 
to another class, and may thus give rise to an incorrect 
conclusion, somcAvhat as follows: In examining a word, 
as red.) the characteristic expi^essing an attHhute may be 
isolated and then identified with the word. This com- 
pletes the judgment. Based upon past experience, the 
characteristic — expressing an attribute — may be identified 
with the class, attributive verbs. The word, red^ may then 
be identified with the class attributive verbs. The defect 
in the process is lack of distinction or differentiation in 
knowing fully the isolated attribute. The characteristic 
which has been abstracted has three elements, but one only 
is noticed in the given case. The act involves, (1) express- 
ing an attribute, (2) of an object, (3) without asserting it. 

The psychological process is— ■ 

Becoming conscious of the word, red^ as a whole. 

Isolating the characteristic expressing an attri- 
bute of an. object without asserting it,' but observing only 
the element, expressing an attribute. (This lack in not 
observing the two other characteristics is the source of the 
error in judgment.) 



The Problem of Method 41 

Unifying the isolated attribute with the object 
(the NYord red.) 

Identifying the isolated attribute with the class, 
attributive verbs. 

Identifying the word, red^ and the class attm'bu- 
tive verbs on the ground of their unity in expressing an 
attribute. 

The syllogism in the logical process is — 

The word, red^ expresses an attribute. 
AttributiA^e verbs express attributes. 
The word, red. is an attributive verb. 

It is to be noticed that the middle term is the universal, 
and that it is expressed in the predicate of the major and 
of the minor premise. 

This stage of reasoning is that of fused unity. It resem- 
bles the potential stage in the mind's activity. The con- 
clusion may be correct, but there is ahvays an opportunity 
for error, because two factors are undifferentiated. 

The second stage in reasoning is known as induction. It 
is the separative aspect of reasoning. It is the stage of 
distinction, although the final result is synthesis. The 
characteristic element in induction is the isolating or dis- 
covering of the distinguishing attribute of the class. 
Therefore, the result is both synthetic and analytic. The 
objects of the class are unified on the basis of the central 
attribute and the class is separated from the other classes 
on the same basis. 

In induction there is always a particular object, or a 
group of objects, to be investigated. Let it be assumed 
that the object is the word, red., as found in the sentence, 
"The leaf is red," and that it is the first lesson in thinking 
the nature of the adjective. 

It is also to be assumed that the puj^il does not know 
the name of the class or that there is a class. While it 



42 The Problem of Method 

may not be a new word, it is practically new so far as its 
definite meaning is concerned. Many objects exist thus 
to the pupil, and even to the mature scholar. 

The psychological process in induction with the word 
red as its object is : The pupil's mind attends to the word 
as a whole, an act which should occur many times with 
many such words, in order to stimulate the process of 
abstracting; abstracts the characteristic expressing an 
attribute of an object without asserting it; judges or 
rather assumes the object to belong to a class; gives con- 
sideration to (abstracts) the creative activity which pro- 
duced the words of the class; judges it to be uniform in 
its process; infers that all the words of the class possess 
this characteristic — expressing an attribute of an object 
without asserting it. This is essentially the mind's process 
in inductive reasoning, and as a mere process it is as 
clearly revealed with one object as it would be with many. 
In order, however, to insure validity to the result, there 
must be an iuA^estigation of many objects. 

The syllogism of the logical process is — 

The creative activity of a class is uniform in its 
process. 

The creative activity produced this object (the 
word recl)^ with the characteristic — expressing an attri- 
bute of an object without asserting it. 

All objects of the class possess that characteristic. 

This equips the mind of the pupil with a general prin- 
ciple, called in logic the major premise. 

It is to be noted that the attribute abstracted is actually 
found to be present. It is also to be observed that the 
subjects in the first and second propositions are the same, 
while in the identification the predicates were the same. 
Induction begins by discovering an attribute in a single 



The Problem of Method 43 

object and ends by asserting that attribute of the whole 
class. 

The third stage in reasoning is deduction. It resembles 
the third stage in the general process of consciousness. It 
is synthetic in that it unifies an attribute with a single 
object, but the result is to distinguish the object. That is, 
it terminates in analysis or separation. 

The psychological process in deduction is as follows : 

The learner attends to some object as a whole, as, 
to the word, i^ed^ in the sentence, "The red sandstone is 
expensive." 

He inquires whether the word, red^ limits the 
application of the word, sandstone^ or whether it merely 
emphasizes an attribute belonging to the object named by 
that word. This is the act of abstracting the attribute 
liTniting and inquiring whether the word, red^ possesses it 
in this special case. The second step in deduction is 
always, substantially, of this form. 

He then classes the word, red^ on the basis of an 
attribute which is different from the one inquired for. 
This second attribute is one that is observed to he f resent. 
In this case the characteristic on the basis of which the 
word is classed is exfressing a quality (color) which is 
variously manifested hy the object denoted hy the sub- 
stantive. That is, sandstone is a substance which appears 
in various colors. Sometimes it is brown, sometimes red, 
and sometimes gray, etc. Hence the word "red" is identi- 
fied with a class of words which express a quality that 
appears in the object referred to in various forms. 

He then analyzes the class. In this analysis the 
class is found to consist of w^ords which express an attri- 
bute of an object; the attribute is found to be one w^hich 
appears in various forms in the object; the word is seen 



44 The Problem of Method 

to express one form of the attribute only, and hence 
to limit. Therefore the attribute or characteristic of lim- 
iting is found to belong to every word of the class. 

He then knows distinctly that the words of the 
class limit, because his analysis has shown limiting to be 
one of the characteristics of the class. 

He infers that the word, red^ limits the applica- 
tion of the Avord, sandstone^ because it was found to belong 
to the class expressing a quality (color) which is variously 
manifested. 

The syllogism of the logical process is — 

All adjectives expressing attributes belonging to 
only a part of the objects of a class are limiting. 

The word red is an adjective, expressing an at- 
tribute belonging to only a part of the objects of the class 
expressed by the word, sandstone. 

The word, red^ possesses the attribute of limiting 
the application of the word, sandstone^ in the sentence, 
'•The red sandstone is expensive." 

It is to be noted that the attribute isolated is not directly 
known to he present^ as is always the case in induction. 
In deduction the attribute isolated, i. e., thought of, is not 
directly accessible. That is, the fact that' the word "red" 
possessed the characteristic of limiting could not be dis- 
covered directly, as could the fact that it consists of three 
letters. To become aware that the word is a lim- 
iting word, it is necessary to reflect upon its use in rela- 
tion to the use of the word "sandstone." The second stage 
in the process of deduction is to give attention to the attri- 
bute and to inquire whefher it is possessed by the object. 

Sometimes the person in the process of deduction centers 
attention upon the fact that the object has a cause, a use, 
an effect, a relation of likeness or difference, and inquires, 



The Problem or Method 46 

not whether it has the function, etc., but what the function 
or relation is. 

It is to be further noticed that the subject of the major 
premise is the predicate of the minor premise. 

The truth discovered in induction is based on uni- 
formity in the creative process and is given a general 
application; that is, the mind becomes conscious that the 
attribute which it has discovered to be present in a few 
objects, belongs to ever}^ object of a class. The truth dis- 
covered in deduction, however, is based on the uniformity 
of the essential class attributes produced by the creative 
activity, and is given a particular application. By this 
it is meant that the general truth which the mind has dis- 
covered to belong to a class, is judged to belong to this 
particular object because it is thought of as a member of 
a class. 

This indicates that there is no "inductive method." In- 
duction is only one stage of a process. Deduction is the 
other. Induction, beginning with a single object, discov- 
ers a general truth. Deduction, beginning with a particu- 
lar object, discovers that a general truth belongs to this 
particular object. The growth of knowledge is not "from 
the particular to the general," but from the particular, 
through the general to a particular, which is enriched to 
the mind by the discovery that it (the particular) possess- 
es the general. 

Dijferentiation in mental acts. To students who are 
new to the work in Psychology, all mental states seem to 
be a simple unit. The fact that a mental act is not en- 
tirely simple, is not discovered until some skill in intro- 
spection is attained. This is the same, however, in the 
physical world. A drop of water, the air, oxygen, etc., 
appear entirely simple until science, by its analytic pro- 
cess, shows the complexity of each. The student should 



46 The Problem or Method 

approach the investigation of the various processes of 
knowing with this thought in mind. 

To emphasize the fact that mental states are complex, 
in that they are constituted by elements or stages and to 
stimulate the student to close introspection to discover 
them, attention is called to the two following cases of 
complexity in the external object. (See Appendix I.) 

The special stages in the process of subjectifying or 
knowing are here to be reconsidered briefly, in order to 
discover a similar differentiation in each, as a basis for 
guiding the process of the child in learning, and also as a 
basis for the interpretation of lessons taught in the vari- 
ous grades. 



The Problem of Method 47 



Chapter III. 



PEESENTATION. 

The only forms of presentation are sensing, and 
sense-perception. The characteristic of presentation is as 
follows: The self, in an act of presentation creates an 
image of the object, and interprets it to signify a particu- 
lar object present in space, and entirely different from the 
knower. This fact that the mind in presentation makes 
an error by regarding the object as being entirely differ- 
ent from itself is expressed in Dewey's Psychology^ page 
159. A careful study of this page will be a great aid to 
the student. 

1. Sensing. 

a. General Sensing. 

A stage preparator}^ to a definite act of sense-per- 
ception is sensing. It is a general process in which the 
person senses at a given instant all elements of his environ- 
ment. He senses, or is dimly conscious, for example, in 
the case of sense-perceiving the two-cent stamp, of the 
blackboards, of the wall paper above, of the light entering 
from the west, of the open door at the east, of the chande- 
liers, of the benches, of the students in the class, of the 
desk, of the dictionar}^ upon it, of the postage stamp 
lying upon the dictionary, of the breeze, of his own posi- 
tion, of the sounds of the hammer, of the murmur of dis- 
tant voices, etc. (See p. 52). 



48 The Problem of Method 

The mind in a subconscious way constructs a sensation 
for each of these objects, practically simultaneously, and 
by adjusting its past experience to each sensation, indis- 
tinctly interprets it. This is the initial stage for many 
acts of perception, but it is too fused and general to 
be termed perception. General sensing is a condition in 
which many acts of perception are merely potential. For 
example, in the given case of sensing, if a person is sensing 
the desk, the dictionar}^, the open door, the chandeliers, 
etc., he is not really sense perceiving any one of these 
objects, but the sense-perception of any one of them is 
potential, that is, he has the power, the capacity, to pass 
immediately out of any one of these acts of sensing the 
object into the act of definitely sense-perceiving it. The 
attitude of the person to his environment, while sensing 
it, is that of indistinctness or undifferentiation. 

b. Special Sensing. 

There may be, also, an act of special sensing, as, for 
example, when a person senses or becomes aware of the 
roughness of a board which he is touching. It would be 
helpful to the student to trace the full circuit of this act 
of special sensing, including the ner^^ous factors, the psy- 
chical movement, and the activities of the voluntary mus- 
cles, in dealing with the object touched. (See Appendix 

II.) 

A characteristic of a stimulus in sensing is that it must 
be moderate in order to contribute most to intelligence. 
One may know a quality better, if the stimulus is neither 
intense nor slight. This is of considerable pedagogical 
importance to the teacher. It applies not only to the intel- 
lectual process of sensing, but to the problems of life in 
general. This is indicated in "The Song of the Nautch 
Girl," as given in the sixth book of "The Light of Asia :" 



The Problem of Method 49 

"Fair goes the dancing when the sitar's tuned; 
Tune us the sitar neither low nor high, 
And we will dance away the hearts of men. 

The string o'er stretched breaks, and the music flies; 
The string o 'er slack is dumb, and music dies ; 
Tune us the sitar neither low nor high. ' ' 

2. Se7ise-perception. 

In the act of sense-perception, there are two factors, 
the objective and the mental. The student beginning the 
subject must discriminate the two factors closely. They 
are: 

(1.) Some present object or stimulus, as, the odor of 
an invisible orange; the sound expresssed by the letters 
"la," as occurring, for example, to the right, in the hall, 
in the tone of a child's voice; a two-cent postage stamp, 
etc. 

(2.) The mind's act of becoming aware of this object 
as present. 

This act of sense-perceiving involves — 

(a.) The creation by the self of a particular men- 
tal state or image appropriate to the object. This image 
is complex, having within it not however as separate ele- 
ments, characteristics appropriate to the various parts and 
attributes of the object. For example, if the object being 
sense-perceived is the two-cent postage stamp, there is 
one element in the image capable of signifying the shape 
of the stamp ; another that may denote the width of the 
stamp; another that may mean the color of the stamp; 
another that may denote the smoothness of the stamp, etc. 

(b.) The reacting of similar past experiences or 
ideas, as, for example, the idea of various fonns, as, the 
triangle, the circle, the square, etc. The idea of the various 



50 The Problem of Method 

shades of red ; the idea of smooth and rough ; the idea of 
notch ; the idea of various kinds of leaves, as, oak leaves, 
laurel leaves, etc. 

(c.) The act of relating the present image, and 
these ideas of past experience. The consciousness of the 
relation involves the act of discovering the likeness of these 
ideas of past experience to the present image and the act 
of discovering the difference of these ideas of the past 
from the present image. Or stated objectively, the third 
step is becoming aware of the likeness and difference of the 
present object as compared with the various objects known 
in the past. 

(d.) The judgment or inference that the present 
image signifies a tAvo-cent postage stamp, present now, 
and other than the self. Or, objectivel}^ stated, the infer- 
ence is that the object being known is a two-cent postage 
stamp present now, and different from the knower. 

The entire mental process is practically sub-conscious. 
The only thing the mind seems to be conscious of is the 
object itself. The self ignores the fact that it has created 
the image of the object and has obtained the meaning of 
the image by adjusting its past experience to the image. 
It is engrossed with the meaning, i. e., with the object. 
Moreover, as indicated above, it does not discover its own 
nature or process in the object, although it is just its own 
process which constitutes the essence of the object. The 
postage stamp is the objectification of the process of the 
self. It did not always exist ; and when it came into being 
it did so through the fact that the self became aware of 
some defect, experienced a feeling of dissatisfaction, and 
an impulse to change from the defective condition ; ideal- 
ized a new condition, and experienced a feeling of satisfac- 
tion, and an impulse to change to the new condition ; de- 
sired the new condition ; chose the new condition. During 



The Problem oe Method 51 

all this process, all the various impulses were inhibited. 
After the choice, the mind put forth the act of thinking 
the appropriate means. This gave rise to appropriate 
feelings and impulses. These impulses were inhibited. 
The means, however, having been chosen, the mind re- 
leased, or gave freedom to its impulses. The action of the 
impulses gave rise to the outward act which produced the 
object. 

What, in the case given, was the new condition? 

All this process underlies the creation of any human 
product, and a similar process in the mind of God, or the 
Infinite, is at the basis of the productions of the objects of 
nature. Many persons, while admitting that the process 
of self is revealed in objects which human beings have 
produced, are inclined to doubt that natural objects, such 
as animals, plants, clouds, streams of water, etc. — objects 
which have been brought into being by Infinite intelli- 
gence — exhibit the process of the human self. Each one 
is prompted to say, "It is true that a natural object, as, a 
plant, exhibits intelligence, but it does not exhibit my in- 
telligence, because I did not produce the object. For this 
reason, it does not seem that the process of my ego is mani- 
fested in the plant." In reply to this, it may be said that 
God is an Intelligence, a Being who purposes, a Being who 
exhibits reflection. He is a Person. Therefore, the char- 
acteristics of personality, of a reflective, purposive being, 
are manifested in the plant. Since each human being is 
characterized by these traits, his own nature is manifested 
in the plant. If the object manifests the intelligence of 
the Infinite, or of any human being, any other human 
being, who is contemplating the object, is justified in say- 
ing, "I am discovering my intelligence, my process, in this 
object." 



52 The Problem of Method 

The self is, in this sense, the essence of each object 
The characteristic of sense-perception however, is that 
this unity of the object with mind, as mind, and hence 
with the mind of the one who is perceiving it, is not 
known. The object is regarded as a particuhir existence 
present in space, but the fact that it has an essential unity 
with the mind of the one who is knowing it is not even 
considered. 

a. Fused Perceiving or Immediate Synthesis. 

The transition may be made, hoAvever, from sensing to 
perception, at any instant. For example, the sensation or 
image which the mind has created in response to the post- 
age stamp as a stimulus wlien, in the act of general sens- 
ing, it was being indistinctl}^ aware of the postage stamp, 
of the desk, of the dictionary, of the light entering the 
window, etc., may develop into the perception of the 
stamp. This perception would begin in the concentration 
of attention upon that object. This would be an act 
of sense-perceiving a postage stamp, practically as undif- 
ferentiated. That is, while the mind would be conscious 
that it was a two-cent postage stamp, conscious of color, 
form, size, etc., the great majority of its attributes would 
be unknown or fused with the whole. 

Such an act of perceiving is, however, a separative 
process. 

(1). It isolates the postage stamp from the world 
of objects; i. e., from the dictionary, from the settees, from 
the air, from the light, from the various books in the 
room, etc. 

(2). It distinguishes the perceiving mind from 
the undifferentiated condition of the mind in its act of 
general sensing. That is, the mind in the particular act 
of perceiving the postage stamp is quite different from 



The Problem of Method 63 

itself in the act of sensing, in an indefinite waj^, the dic- 
tionary, the desk, the postage stamp, the entering light, 
the windows, etc. 

(8). The mind, in the special act of perceiving 
the postage stamp, is distinguished from itself in any other 
particular act of perceiving any other one of the objects 
previously sensed. The result at the conclusion of this act 
of fused perceiving is an indistinct idea of the object as a 
whole. The object is distinguished from the other objects, 
but the mind is not conscious of the attributes and rela- 
tions within the object itself. 

b. Analytic Perceiving. 

This laiowledge of the object as a whole is, however, 
a mere beginning of the perception of the object. The 
process continues by isolations. Such a process is analytic 
perceiving. For example, the face of Washington is dis- 
tinctly isolated or known. In this case, the coloring which 
represents Washington's face and the surrounding frame, 
is the object which is out in the world. It stimulates the 
nervous reaction in the nerves of the eye. 

In response to this nervous stimulus, the mind creates 
in itself a particular mental state or image of the object. 
This is the first mental movement in perceiving the face 
of Washington and its surrounding frame. 

The second movement is that of reacting similar past 
experiences. For example, the mind reacts its idea of 
the face of John Adams, of Thomas Jefferson, of James 
Madison, of Grant, of Benjamin Harrison, of McKinley, 
and of others as shown upon stamps. 

The third mental process is that of relating, i. e., com- 
paring and contrasting these ideas of past experience, 
with the present particular image. 



54 The Problem of Method •■ 

The fourth mental movement is that of inferring 
that the present image signifies the face of Washington 
with certain peculiarities, as an attribute of the two-cent 
postage stamp. 

If the four stars, with their exact location, are taken as 
an object, or the figure 2, with its surrounding wreath, the 
process of knowing such object would involve a similar 
nervous change and corresponding mental movements. 
In fact, the presence of any attribute in the stamp will 
arouse a corresponding nervous change which will in 
turn stimulate the mind to create in itself a distinct image 
appropriate to the attribute. The presence of this image 
stimulates the mind to react appropriate past expe- 
rience, and to adjust this past experience to the present 
mental change. On the basis of tliis adjustment, the mind 
infers the meaning of the present image. Thus, step by 
step, in analytic perceiving, the internal nature of the 
object is learned. An act of perception is, therefore, a 
series of acts of knowing. One by one, in analytic perceiv- 
ing, the parts and attributes are known. In knoAving any 
single attribute, however, the full process of knowledge 
is present, although the process is practically unnoticed by 
the mind. (See Appendix III.) 

c. Systematic Perceiving or Mediated Synthesis. 

The mind's act of mediated synthesis manifests itself in 
two forms: 

The first of these is unconscious, and occurs as the act 
of analytic perceiving is occurring. 

For example, in analytic perceiving, the mind abstracts 
the different shades of red in the postage stamp and 
becomes clearly conscious of these shades. So far this is 
analytic, but the mind immediately identifies this ab- 
stracted characteristic with the whole object. This is 



The Problem of Method 55 

mediated synthesis. One by one, as each attribute is 
abstracted, the mind re-identifies it with the Avhole object. 
This is a process of unconscious synthesis, which accompa- 
nies analytic perceiving and is the concluding aspect in 
each case of anal^^tic perceiving. 

The second form of mediated sj^nthesis is distinctly 
conscious and purposive. For example, the mind may, 
in the first place, become again conscious of several 
attributes of the object; as, the attribute of having several 
shades of red, of having mucilage on the back, of having 
notched edges, etc. To be aware thus again of several 
attributes, as separative, is the first step in purposive per- 
ceiving. 

The second step is to become conscious of the function 
of the two-cent postage stamp ; i. e., to carry written mat- 
ter having the weight of an ounce, or a fraction thereof. 

The third step is to relate each of the abstracted at- 
tributes to the purpose of the object, thereby discovering 
their harmony with the purpose. 

The concluding step is to become conscious that these 
attributes, although separate, are identical, through the 
fact that they contribute to the purpose. 
The Perception of Space Relations. 

In sense-perceiving objects, the mind always be- 
comes aware of space relations. This includes distance, 
size, direction, etc. The process in becoming aware of a 
relation in space includes the four mental movements 
involved in sense-perceiving any object. 

Assume, for example, that a pile of brick is about four 
hundred feet distant and about twenty-four degrees to 
the left. What is the process in sense-perceiving the 
distance ? 

a. The mind constructs a particular mental state 
or image appropriate to the pile of brick, the intervening 



56 The Problem of Method 

distance, and the environment in general. This image or 
particidar mental state must be interpreted to signify a 
certain distance. 

This distance will first be known in terms of muscular 
movement, fatigue, etc. Then it will be known as exact 
in temis of artificial measurement. That is, it will be 
known as four hundred feet. 

b. The mind re-acts similar past experiences; that 
is, it re-acts the ideas of objects that have been known 
in the past as situated at certain distances. It also reacts 
ideas of the amount of muscular exertion necessary to take 
the person from the place where he was standing to the 
place where the object Avas being observed. He, likewise, 
reacts the idea of the exact distance appropriate to that 
amount of muscular exertion and to the appearance of 
the object. 

c. It compares and contrasts the appearance of 
the present object, that is, its degree of dimness, etc., 
with the same as belonging to the object of past expe- 
riences. 

d. It infers that the present image which sig- 
nifies the object Avith a certain degree of dimness, also sig- 
nifies the same amount of muscular exertion, and the same 
exact distance that belonged to the object known in past 
experience. A similar process would be required in 
knowing the direction of the object, the size of the distant 
object, and the relatiA^e distance of two or more objects. 
In regard to direction, the muscular exertion Avould be 
that of turning the body, the head and the eyes. In 
regard to the size of the object or the relati^^e distance of 
two or more objects, the muscular exertion Avould be that 
involved in Avalking. Sometimes the muscular exertion 
is that involved in the moA^ement of the hand or finger. 

Distance, direction and location, in so far as the sur- 



The Problem of Method • 57 

face of the body is concerned, seem to involve a special 
element in the mental state. 

Lotze considers that each sensation of touch has, as one 
of its psychical elements, that element which denotes the 
portion of the body touched. For example, the person 
or subject ma}^ be blindfolded and touched simultaneously 
upon his forehead and upon the back of the hand. The 
experimenter may use as the object with which to touch 
the body two lead pencils of the same kind, using the flat 
end of the pencil. The pressure is assumed to be equal 
both in intensity and duration. In each case there is a 
nervous response, beginning with the reaction of the 
peripheral nerve ending resulting in the production of a 
nervous impulse. This nervous impulse is transmitted 
along the nerve fiber to the cortex in the tactual region. 
This stimulates the neurone, which reacts appropriately 
to the stimulus. This concludes the nervous stimulus. 

The mind, in response, constructs the sensation in itself 
appropriate to the pressure. Within this sensation or 
image is a mental characteristic which is the basis for 
determining the part of the body touched. The sensation, 
as a whole, by being related to past experience, signifies 
the pressure and, to some extent, the nature of the object; 
and also the portion of the body being touched. The 
psychical characteristic of the sensation which denotes the 
portion of the body touched, is called the local sign. It is 
not the external object or attribute, and it is not the 
nervous change. It is a characteristic peculiar to the men- 
tal change itself. (See Dewey's Psychology, page 54, and 
Angell's Psychology, page 147.) 

The Perception of Time Relations. 

The sense-perception of an object always involves 
an idea of time. The time is always felt to be now. The 



58 The Problem of Method 

perception of time, however, does not relate to the objec- 
tive as fully as does the perception of space. The idea of 
time arises more from activity of consciousness. The 
succession of mental stages in sense-perceiving different 
objects leads the mind to sense, as it were, or to feel the 
passage of time. 

The idea of duration in time is said to be based upon 
the fact that any mental state that is existing in conscious- 
ness does not cease instantly. Nor does the succeeding 
state begin instantly. The existing mental state grad- 
ually becomes indistinct; and as it becomes indistinct, the 
succeeding mental state grows distinct. This fact con- 
cerning conscious activities gives rise to the sense of dura- 
tion. Gradually the feeling of duration is identified with 
a certain amount of time marked artificiall}^ as by 
watch, clock or sun-dial. By practice, great skill can be 
acquired in judging intervals of time. 

Persons usually think that an act of sense-percep- 
tion is immediate — that is, that it has no relation to past 
experience. The notion is that the external object, as, for 
example, a wagon, is present and that the observer knows 
it at once without any process. The idea that past expe- 
riences bear a very important relation to the present act of 
sense-perceiving is not held by people generally. The de- 
pendence of sense-perception upon past experience is, how- 
ever, ]Derhaps its cardinal characteristic, aside from the 
fact that the image is interpreted to mean a particular 
object as present. 

Illusion and Hallucination. 

The close relation of acquired neural and mental 
habits to the present act of sense-perception is made evi- 
dent by the nature of illusion and hallucination. 



The Problem of Method 59 

Illusion is a peculiar form of sense-perception. Assume 
that the word though is present in a paragraph through 
mistake, when the previous part of the paragraph is of 
such a nature as to require the word through. Assume, 
also, that the observer's business has been one in which he 
is frequently required to read and to write the word 
through and that, in consequence, he has become much 
more habituated in the act of sense-perceiving that word 
than the word though. 

The process in the given act of illusion or sense-per- 
ception will be as follows : 

a. The mind in response to the stimulus given 
by the word though^ creates the appropriate image of the 
word. In this case, the nervous response and the mental 
image are appropriately adapted to the word which is 
present. 

b. It then re-acts similar past experiences. Since, 
however, there have been in the past many more activities 
concerning the word through^ the mind re-acts ideas of 
the word through. 

c. As usual in sense-perception, the mind com- 
pares and contrasts the present mental state with the 
reacted experience. The assumption is that this is care- 
lessly done. 

d. The mind infers that the present mental 
state denotes the word through as present now. This 
form of sense-perception is termed illusion. It is evident 
that the error does not begin in the first stage. It char- 
acterizes, however, all the other stages of the act of per- 
ception. 

There may be illusions concerning sounds, odors, objects 
touched, etc. At times the illusion is influenced by the 
environment, as may be observed in the following figures : 



60 



The Problem of Method 




Fig. 1. 



Fig. 2. 



In illusion a particular object is present to the sense, 
although it is not the one that the mind considers to be 
present. In hallucination^ however, an act of conscious- 
ness occurs in which an object is felt to be present in space 
when no object of any kind, save the ordinary environ- 
ment, is present. In case the person who is in the act of 
hallucination has no feeling that the object merely appears 
to be present, the act is termed true hallucination. In case 
there is present a feeling that the objective existence 
which appears to be present is not really present, the act 
is called /?5ewc?6>-hallucination. It is sometimes held that 
an act of hallucination is merety an extreme case of illu- 
sion, in which the external object is exceedingly slight, as, 
a faint sound, a very indistinct motion, a floating moat, 
etc. In this case the process would take the form of an 
ordinary act of sense-perception : 



The Problem of Method 61 

The mind would construct the image of the indefinite 
object. 

On account of the pre-disposition of the mind to 
consider a given person or event, or, on account of the 
pathological condition of the nervous organism, the mind 
would react ideas of objects or events quite different from 
the slight present object. These objects would also be 
objects which could not possibly be present. 

The act of relating would occur in an indefinite, in- 
accurate mode. 

The self would then infer that the present mental 
state or image signifies a certain definite object — not 
the slight object which is really present — but an object 
not present, and the presence of which is impossible at the 
time. 

A peculiarity of hallucination, if it is other than sense- 
perception, is that it is fully as vivid as an act of sense- 
perception, and its objectivity is equally strong. In 
hallucination the mind feels that the present activity has 
been stimulated by a present object as strongly as it does 
in an actual case of sense-perception. If hallucination is 
not stimulated by some slight present object, it is a mode 
of activity belonging under re-presentation.* 

d. Apperceiving. 
The first form of mediated synthesis is one that is car- 

"• This question is carefully discussed in " Phantasms of the Living," by E. Gurney, 
Vol. 1, page 464. Many cases of hallucination are given in this volume, beginning on 
page 521. Among these is a case concerning a Mr. Robert Collins. One night in his 
boyhood he awoke and found the moon brightly illuminating the side of the room 
facing the bed. 

He says, " While gazing, I distinctly saw rising in the moonlit space between the 
curtains at the foot of the bed what appeared to be vapour or cloud, and as this grew 
higher it gradually assumed the shape of a draped female, holding towards me in 
one hand a lamp and in the other a basin, from which steam seemed to rise. The 
form vanished slowly, and I afterwards fell asleep without experiencing either fear 
or horror." Does this case of hallucination seem to have been stimulated periphally 
or centrally? 



62 The Problem of Method 

ried on at all times, by all persons, whether educated or 
uneducated. 

The second is especially the process of those who are 
educated. 

The processes of fused, analytic and mediated perceiv- 
ing complete the act of adequate perceiving. 

At the end of such an act, the mind is in possession of 
the idea of the particular object as present now and dif- 
ferent from the self; but perceiving is a separative act 
taken as a whole, and there is now needed the act of apper- 
ceiving in order to organize this slight fragment of 
knowledge with the already acquired knoAvledge of the 
self. 

The particular idea of the particular object which was 
created in the act of perception is not left isolated. 
Through the mind's tendency towards unification it is 
classed with its kindred ideas, just as a geologist, upon 
obtaining a new specimen, places it in a class of its own 
kind. In the example given, the mind would apper- 
ceive, by ordering the idea of the two-cent stamp, with its 
idea of the class expressed by the words, "postal facilities." 
This class includes all such objects as the postoffice, mail 
car, letter carrier, special delivery stamp, ten-cent stamp, 
etc. The act of ordering includes the process of discover- 
ing the likeness of the two-cent stamp to each of these 
objects and its difference from each. In the act of order- 
ing the mind also becomes aware of the grading in the 
unity, that is, it becomes conscious that the two-cent post- 
age stamp is more closely unified with the ten-cent stamp 
than it is with the special deliver}^ stamp, and that it is 
more in unity with the special delivery stamp than it is 
with the mail car, etc. It thus appears that apperceiving 
is an act of modifying or ordering the ideas of the objects 
belonging to a class which is already understood, by re- 



The Problem of Method 63 

lating to each of these a new kindred idea. This new idea 
modifies the organized knowledge of the self, and in turn 
the organized knowledge of the self which is termed by 
Herbart "The apperceiving mass," modifies the new idea. 
The act of apperceiving fully concludes the act of 
sense-perception. As indicated, the apperceiving con- 
sists in classing or ordering the newl}^ constructed per- 
ceptive idea with the idea concerning an already well- 
known class. In the act of sense-perception every one 
classes the new idea with his already organized knowl- 
edge, at least indefinitel3% but the teacher in the process 
of education should make the learner distinctly conscious 
of the relations of unity and difference which the new 
perceptive idea has to the ideas of the objects belonging to 
the various classes which are well known to the child. 
Objectively stated, apperceiving is unifying or ordering 
the object which has been perceived with other objects that 
are already known. Apperception is mentioned first with 
sense-perceiving, because it first occurs as a stage of that 
process. In all forms of knowing, however, the process 
of apperception is essentially present. It is seen that 
apperception is regarded: 

As based on the mind's tendency to unify. 

As a process in which the mind orders the new 
idea constructed in perception with the ideas concerning 
objects of well known classes. 

As a process in which the new idea is modified by 
the already organized knowledge, and the organized 
knowledge, in turn, by the new idea. 

As a process in which the new idea is more closely 
related to some of the ideas possessed by the mind than to 
others, that is, the new idea is ordered or systematized. 



64 The Problem of Method 

As a process which occurs spontaneously, but one 
which ma}^ be made much more effective by being con- 
sciously directed. 

It is to be observed that apperception as here explained 
occurs at the conclusion of perception. Dr. Dewey, how- 
ever, seems to explain apperception in a way to make it 
include both the act of perceiving and this latter act 
which is here termed apperceiving. Indeed, he seems to 
employ the term apperception as equivalent to the term 
knowing. This will be evidenced by the following quota- 
tion : 

* ^ The characteristic of our intelligent life, both as a whole, and 
in its parts, is that it is significant. Significant means ordered, con- 
nected; and connected in two ways, simultaneously and successively. 
Accordingly, in studying apperception, or the activity of mind wliich 
renders psychical life intelligent, we are studying the means by which 
the sensuous elements of our knowledge gain significance through the 
union of all elements occurring together, and by the mutual reference 
to each other of those occurring at different times. We now turn to 
a study of the definite ways in which this is accomplished. 

Apperception is that activity of mind in which the significance of 
mental events is brought out, through becoming explicitly conscious of 
the relations involved in them. It is the appropriation of the intellec- 
tual, or qualitative, value of an experience merely momentarily felt. 
In our study of it we shall recognize three stages: 

1. Association. 

2. Dissociation. 

3. Attention. ' ' 

(Dewey 's Psyeliology pp. 88 and 89.) 

Dr. Karl Lange is in harmony with Dr. Dewey to a 
certain extent because he recognizes a primary appercep- 
tion as occurring throughout the process of percej^tion, 
and a cognitive phase of apperception as occurring at 
the close of an act of perception. The detailed explana- 
tion of the process of apperception by Dr. Lange is found 



The Problem of Method 65 

on pp. 170 to 174 of ''Herbart and the Herbartians", by 
Dr. De Garmo. (See Appendix IV.) 

The neural stimulus to sense-perception. 

The nervous process which acts as a stimulus to sense- 
perception is, in part, practically the same as the nervous 
process which has been given as that occurring as a basis 
of the mental act of sensing. For example, when the 
smoothness in a two-cent postage stamp is perceived in 
the act of analytic perceiving, the same in-going nervous 
process occurs as would be involved in a case of mere 
sensing. The reaction, in that portion of the cortex be- 
longing to touch is, however, different from its original 
response. Also, in the act of perceiving the different 
shades of red in the postage stamp, the peripheral excita- 
tion, and the in-going nervous response are essentially the 
same as in the case of mere sensing. The response how- 
ever, in the occipital regions of the cortex is different 
from the original response of this region. This is because 
CA^ery nervous current which has heretofore passed 
through these regions of the cortex, has left a definite 
impression or tendency in them. This acquired tendency 
will modif}^ the nature of the neural excitations passing 
inward in response to an external stimulus. This reveals 
the fact that the neural stimulus to sense-perception 
manifests the law of habit, since sense-perception is, itself, 
to a certain extent, as previously indicated, a reproduction. 
It is evident, therefore, that the cortical activity in sense- 
perception possesses a double nature. In the first place, 
it is characterized by the particular kind of neural stimu- 
lus passing inward to the neurones in the cortex. 

In the second place, the cortical response is determined 
by the influence which previous neural changes have im- 
pressed upon the structure of the cortex. 



66 The Problem of Method 

The mental act of sense-perception is, therefore, stimu- 
hited by an in-going sensory stimuhis which modifies the 
required reaction of the cortex and is itself modified 
thereby. 

Educational principles. 

Among the many educational principles implicit in the 
process of sense-perception the following may be men- 
tioned: 

(a). A moderate external stimulus and a corres- 
ponding moderate neural response are best adapted to an 
intellectual process. For example, if a given light, which 
is being sense-perceived is quite intense, it cannot be ac- 
curately known; also if the light which is being examined 
is very dim or indistinct the neural response will be cor- 
respondingly weak and the knowledge of the object will 
be ver}^ indefinite. 

(b). The ideas, feelings, and choices that are 
present in consciousness when one is about to enter upon 
the act of sense-perceiving some particular object should 
either be harmonious with the object, or consciousness 
should be freed from them before entering upon the act of 
sense-perception. This is for the reason that the learner is 
prone to perceive the object as corresponding to his ex- 
isting mental state, whether or not it does so correspond. 
For example, if a hunter is out in the fields, with the in- 
tention of shooting birds of a certain kind, any kind of 
moving object may be mistaken for that kind of bird. 
If a person is searching in the grass for a lost gold piece, 
any kind of yellow ribbon, leaf, or paper will be consid- 
ered the sought-for gold piece. 

It thus appears that the characteristics in an object 
which is being sense- perceived are determined to a certain 
extent by the condition of the mind. For example, in ex- 



The Problem of Method 



67 



amining Figure 3 first contemplate it just after the mind 
has been engaged in studying pyramids and frustrums of 
pyramids, and then examine it just at the conclusion of a 
study of tunnels and the entrances to tunnels. 




Fig. 3. 

(c). An object which is to be known through 
sense-perception should first be presented as a whole to the 
learner's mind. In the beginning no attention should be 
given to the various parts and attributes of the objects. 
For example, if one is beginning to sense-perceive a par- 
ticular pocket knife, he should not be led by the teacher to 
give special attention to the length, to the number of 
blades, to the material of the handle, etc. All beginning 
questions should refer to characteristics that belong to the 
object as a Avhole, as, its size, its form, its use, its weight, 
etc. It is evident that this principle is applicable to ob- 
jects being known through processes that include more 
than sense-perception. For example, it is applicable in 
the process of studying "Snow Bound", "Evangeline", 
"To a Waterfowl," etc. In the study of all such objects, 
the assignment and the questions at the beginning should 
relate to characteristics pertaining to the selections as a 
whole. A good assignment upon any one of these selec- 
tions would not direct the pupil to the examination of a 
small division or paragraph of it. 

(d). AYlien the sense-perception of the object as 
a whole has been practically completed the perception 
should become strictly analytic. That is, in a systematic 



68 



The Problem of Method 



way, the pupil should be led to give attention, successively, 
to the various attributes within the object. 

This is because the first sense-perception of the object 
as a whole merely distinguished it from the other objects 
of the world, and made it stand out in consciousness as a 
single object separate from other objects. The distinctions 
within it should now be discovered. The analysis by 




Fig. 4 

which this is done should be both accurate and full, be- 
cause the ideas created in such analysis are to be the basis 
of interpretation in future acts. 

(e). Both fused and analytic perception having 
occurred, the act of sense-perception is to be made more 
complete by synthetic perceiving which is systematic and 
purposive. This, as previously indicated, is called medi- 
ated synthesis because analytic perceiving has much to 
do with the nature of the meaning now to be discovered. 



The Problem of Method 69 

In another connection, it has been explained that synthetic 
perceiving is of two kinds — 

(1). The sub-conscious synthesis that occurs, cor- 
responding at every step with analytic preceiving. That is, 
whenever any attribute has been abstracted, and made 
known by examination, it is instantly and sub-consciously 
re-unified with the object as a whole. 

(2). The second mode of synthetic perceiving is 
far more thoughtful and is the one in which the skill of 
the teacher is especially revealed. In this process, as 
shown on page 55 several distinct attributes in the ob- 
ject are carefully re-examined. Then the purpose of the 
object is again distinctly thought of. 

In the third j)lace each of the abstracted attributes is 
carefully compared and contrasted with the purpose in 
order to discover the extent to which the purpose is fur- 
thered by the given attribute. 

In the fourth place, all of these seemingly distinct at- 
tributes are known to be identical to a degree because they 
alike contribute to the fulfillment of the purpose. 

This completes the act of perception itself. The mind 
is noAv supposed to be in possession of a distinct idea of a 
particular object. The full process of sense-perception, 
however, requires an additional act — appercewing. 

(f). The process of apperception has been 
previously explained. It is referred to here on account of 
its bearing on the process of education. The teacher is to 
be unwilling to conclude the process of sense-perception 
with merely a distinct idea of the particular object. This 
idea has certain relations to the organized knowledge of 
the pupil. Its relation to some ideas already known by the 
pupil is very close, to others the relation is less close, and 
to still others the relation is remote. Subconsciously, the 
pupil will relate his new idea to ideas he already possesses. 



70 The Problem or Method 

This subconscious process is not sufficient, however. The 
teacher should lead him to relate the new idea, systemati- 
cally and consciously, to his already acquired knowledge. 
For example, as previously suggested, the idea of the 
two-cent stamp should be ordered, that is, identified 
with and differentiated from the ideas of letter box, mail 
carrier, special delivery stamp, ten-cent postage stamp, 
etc. In other words, the idea should be given its place in 
the larger idea of fostal service. Objectively stated, the 
stamp itself, should be classed with postal objects. 



The Problem of Method 71 



Chapter IV, 



REPRESENTATION. * 

The term representation denotes the mind's act of repro- 
ducing some former experience of a particular object, 
consciously. It does not, as here employed, indicate that 
subconscious re-acting of former experiences which is a 
second stage in all forms of knowing. The second stage 
in any act of knowing is the process of re-acting similar 
past experiences. Ordinarily this is done sub-consciously. 
The word representation is not used here to refer to this 
second stage which is common to all acts of knowing. 
There is reproduction in all acts of sense-perception, but 
this process is not termed representation. For example, in 
the act of sense-perceiving a certain window, the mind in 
the first place creates a distinct image of the entire object. 
It then sub-consciousl}^ re-acts similar past experiences, as, 
for example, its ideas of glass, of putty, of frames, and of 
various Avindows known in the past. The second stage in 
an act of memory is also reproductive but this stage of 
reproduction is not what is expressed by the word re- 
presentation. 

An act of representation strictly considered involves 

The re-creation of a former mental image. 

The reproduction or re-acting of similar ideas, created 
in the past. 

The comparing and contrasting of the re-created 
image Avith these ideas of past experience Avhich haA^e 
been reproduced. 



72 The Problem of Method 

The interpretation of the present re-created image 
to signify a particular object, not noAv present, other than 
the self. 

The second process in the act of representation is 
clearly re-productive, but the word, representation^ 
does not refer to that one stage in the full act of 
representation, because that stage is usually sub-con- 
scious. In representation the object is clearly known to be 
an object of which the self has been conscious in the past, 
either in its present form or in a modified form. That is, 
the case may be one in which the self is aware that the 
object being represented has been present before, or it may 
be a case in which the mind knows, that the object in its 
modified or imagined condition, has never been present. 
Thus, it is evident that the act of representation involves 
the unconscious reproduction of past experience in order 
to interpret its present image, as does sense-perception, 
but, in representation the mind is conscious that its state 
is, as a whole, a representated state. 

It seems evident, therefore, that the characteristics of 
representation are as follows: It is an act in which the 
mind recreates in itself a particular image, and by re- 
lating this to already acquired experience, interprets it to 
signify a particular object other than the self, once present 
but not now present {memory); or not present now, and 
not at any time present, in its imagined form {imagina- 
tion) . 

The object, as in sense-perception, is regarded as differ- 
ent from the self, or rather it is tacitly assumed to be 
different from the mind knowing it. The separation of 
the object from the self is less complete, however, in rep- 
resentation, than it was in sense-perception. That is, in 
representation, the mind does not feel so strongly that it, 
itself, is one existence and the object it is knowing is an- 
other. On the contrary, in representation the self is dis- 



The Probkem of Method 73 

tinctly aware of the image, and that it is the image of an 
absent object. This gives rise to a certain feeling of iden- 
tity. An image which constitutes an element of the self, 
and is also the actual image of the object must, therefore 
be kindred to the object. Thus in representation, the 
mind is at least aware of a superficial identity between it 
and the object. It does not, yet, however, discover that 
its own process is the essential nature of the object. 

The mind in representation manifests itself in three 
forms — memory^ the more simple and the more strictly 
reproductive; imagination^ the more complex and the 
more creative; and the language act^ which involves the 
previous processes and is also a transition to thought. 

1. Memory. 

The act of memory exhibits three stages — spontaneous, 
voluntary and systematic. 

a. Spontaneous Memory. 

The characteristic of spontaneous memory is the lack 
of intention, and of clear consciousness in the process. 
All of the four movements are put forth by the mind auto- 
matically, and throughout the first three movements, i. e., 
throughout the re-creation of the image, the re-acting of 
similar past experience, and the process of comparing and 
contrasting the present image wuth the ideas of the past, 
there is, practically^ the absence of distinct consciousness. 

In the fourth movement however, namely, in the in- 
ference, consciousness is present. 

The process in an act of memory includes, as just indi- 
cated, (1) the re-creation of an image, which becomes 
thus, the memory image, (2) the reproduction of similar 
past experiences, (3) the relating of the memory-image 
to these past experiences, and (4) the inference that the 



74 The Pkoblem of Method 

memory-image denotes a particular object, as the leather 
back of a book, observed in the past at a given time and 
place with certain environments. The past experiences re- 
acted in a case of memory differ somewhat from the past 
experience in sense-perception, because the former relate 
to total objects or events and not to single attributes. The 
object is assumed to be different from the observer, but 
this feeling of difference is not so strong, as is the case 
in sense-perception. A superficial identity of the knower 
and the object being remembered is indistinctly felt, since 
the image — an element of the self — is the image of the 
object. The object is absent. Indeed it may have perished 
long since. If the self under these circumstances re-cre- 
ates the idea of the object it necessarily feels that its 
process has, in a certain sense, re-produced the object. 

The Process in Spontaneous Memory. 

The first step in the process is that of creating the 
memory image. This begins in the production of what 
may be called the initial element of the memory image. 
This initial element must be an element of a present men- 
tal act, and it must have been an element in the former ex- 
perience. Therefore when this element is produced by the 
self, the mind has really entered upon the former act. It 
is actually again in the former act, partly. The idea of 
the initial element is based upon the doctrine that each 
total image Avhich the mind creates of any object is ac- 
tually complex, i. e., is constituted by various mental ele- 
ments corresponding to the various parts and attributes 
of the object. This was referred to on page 25. In a 
former act of sense-perceiving the cover of a given book, 
for example, there may have been in the image an element 
appropriate to the curve of the leather on the back of the 
book. Let it be assumed that many months afterwards, in 



The Problem or Method 75 

a given forest, the same person who had previously 
sense- perceived the cover of the book is engaged in a pres- 
ent act of sense-perceiving a dry, crooked, tapering branch 
of a tree. In the present image of the branch of the tree, 
which the mind constructed in beginning to sense-per- 
ceive the object, there is an element denoting the attribute 
curved as found in the branch of the tree. This mental 
element which corresponds to the attribute curved in the 
branch of the tree, and also to the attribute curved in the 
leather on the back of the book is the initial element of the 
memory-image in the act of remembering the leather on 
the back of the book, an act of remembering, which the 
mind under the circumstances, is about to begin. The 
presence of this initial mental element which denotes an 
attribute of the leather and also an attribute of the branch 
of the tree is due to the stimulus of the attribute curved 
in the branch of the tree and to the self activity of the 
mind, i. e., to its tendency to be itself in the presence of a 
stimulus. Having, in the present act of sense-perception, 
produced this element in itself, which denotes the at- 
tribute curved in the present object, and in the leather, 
the mind is to a degree existing in the former act. The 
memory-image is not yet complete. In order to have the 
memory image complete, the mind must react all the other 
elements belonging to the image of the previous act of 
sense-perceiving the leather upon the back of the book. 
The initial element, plus all these other elements, consti- 
tutes the full memory-image. The nature of the stimulus 
which gives rise to the mental state termed "the initial 
element" is the basis for three kinds of identifving:. The 
first is identification or association through contiguity; 
the second, through likeness; the third, through differ- 
ence. If the attribute stimulating the act of producing 
the initial element has been contiguous in time or place, 



76 The Problem of Method 

with attributes in the object to be remembered the asso- 
ciation is that of contiguity. If the attribute stimulating 
the mind to create the initial element has never been con- 
tiguous in time or place with attributes in the object to be 
remembered, the association is that based upon similarity. 
If the attribute which stimulates the mind to produce the 
initial element has never been in contiguity with the ob- 
ject to be remembered, but is in contrast with the cor- 
responding attribute to be remembered the association is 
one based upon contrast existing in the former act. 

What are the other elements of the former image ? They 
may be assumed to be the element denoting the material — 
leather, the element denoting the length of the leather, 
that denoting the width of the leather, that denoting the 
place of the object, that denoting the time of the observa- 
tion, that denoting other persons present, etc. 

What stimulates the mind to react these elements, 
which, with the initial element, constitute the complete 
memory-image? The stimulus is not an extra-organic 
stimulus, but rather an internal one, viz., the tendency of 
the mind to complete any activity it has re-entered. But 
the question may arise, "Why did the mind re-enter just 
this former act, when, no doubt, the initial element was 
the beginning of many former acts?" This is answered 
by reference to subordinate laws of association as de- 
termined by recentness, repetition, novelty, and relative 
interest. Other things being equal, the mind will re-act 
that past experience which is most recent or that past ex- 
perience which has been repeated most often, or that past 
experience which, on account of its novelty, was attended 
to with greatest vigor, or that past exjDerience which, on 
account of its intimate relation to favorite projects of the 
mind, was attended to with deepest interest. 



The Problem of Method 77 

When the mind has thus fully reconstructed the mem- 
ory-image it has not, as is often supposed, completed the 
act of memory. To complete the act of remembering re- 
quires three additional movements or mental conditions. 
The first of these, which is the second step in an act of 
memory, is the process of reproducing former experiences, 
as for example, experiences at various times and places 
in the past in which the mind has become aAvare of leather 
as belonging to the binding of books. The re-acted past 
experience in memory corresponds to the elements in the 
memory image. These ideas of past experience are in the 
main ideas of complete events. Assume, for example, that 
the initial element in the memory image is the element sig- 
nifying "curved", that a second element means leather as 
to material, that a third stands for the length of the leath- 
er, six inches, that a fourth symbolizes the width of the 
leather, an inch and one-half, that a fifth represents the 
place of the object, on a library table, that a sixth is ap- 
propriate to the time of the observation, Saturday fore- 
noon, that a seventh denotes the other persons present, as, 
two boys. Each past experience which is re-acted will 
have a certain identity to one or more of these re-acted 
elements of the memory-image. For example, one of the 
past experiences may be an idea of a curved portion of a 
railroad track observed at the east side of a meadow, on 
a Wednesday afternoon three months before ; another may 
be the idea of a leather pocket book seen on the counter 
in a dry goods store, one Saturday forenoon a year ago; 
a third may be the idea of a white string six inches in 
length used to measure the distance between two tacks 
holding a calendar to the wall a year and a half previous- 
ly, etc. One of the past experiences re-acted, is the idea of 
the actual object which is signified by the memory-image 
being re-acted. When this past experience is compared 



78 The Problem of Method 

and contrasted with the memory-image, its identity with 
the memory-image is found to be greater than the iden- 
tity of the image with any other past experience. This 
leads the mind to infer that the memory image denotes 
this object of past experience. 

The third stage in an act of remembering consists of 
the double process of relating. In the act of relating the 
mind carefully compares and contrasts the present mem- 
ory-image with the reproduced experiences, one by one. 
Then occurs the fourth stage in memory. This stage is an 
act of identifying, it is an inference or judgment. On 
the basis of the process of relating and the feeling of simi- 
larity, the mind interprets the memory-image to signify a 
particular piece of leather observed by the self, at a cer- 
tain time, under definite circumstances, but not present 
now. 

The object remembered is always assumed, tacitly, to be 
other than the self. That is, the self does not, in memory, 
discover the object to be really merely an objectification of 
its own process, although it is aware of a superficial iden- 
tity between itself and the object because it knows that the 
present image is the image of an object, which is now 
absent. 

This fonn of memory — spontaneous — corresponds with 
the first stage of the law of consciousness, since it is so 
fully marked by unconsciousness, by lack of differentia- 
tion. 

b. Voluntary Memorj^ 

This second fonn of memory — voluntary memory — 
is separative. It reveals a conflict in the self, manifesting 
thus the second stage in the law of the mind. It is based 
upon the negative aspect of memory — forgetting — and is 
intended to negative that negation. 



The Problem of Method 79 

Voluntary memory arises because some act of spon- 
taneous memory is incomplete. 

The Process in Voluntary Memory. 

The first stage is to become aware of the lacking ele- 
ment, or to become conscious of the attribute or part 
which has been forgotten.- For example, the element in 
the memory-image signifying the color of the leather on 
the back of the book may not have been re-acted. 

The second stage is to construct in consciousness the 
jmrpose to re-act the lacking element, or, using objective 
terms, to become aware clearly of the color of the leather. 
It is the existence of this purpose which constitutes the 
voluntary aspect of the act of remembering. This form 
of memory is often termed recollection. 

The third stage is the act of judging or deciding upon 
the set of ohjects which are adapted to stimulate mental 
images which may initiate the spontaneous re-acting of 
the sought-for mental state. For example, the mind may 
judge that its attention should be concentrated on leather, 
as to its natural color ; on leather, as possessing other col- 
ors as revealed by past experiences, especially on colors of 
leather as used in the manufacture of book covers. 

The above third stage, in which the mind merely de- 
cides upon the objects which ought to be reconsidered, al- 
most imperceptibly merges into the fourth stage. 

The fourth stage is the meiital re-construction of these 
various objects with their various colors. That is, the 
mind reconstructs ideas appropriate to each of these ob- 
jects, especially as to the color. Among these ideas which 
have been re-acted may be one signifying the very color 
which had not been remembered, or the idea may be so 
similar to the idea of the sought-for color that under the 
stimulus of it the mind spontaneously reproduces the par- 



80 The Problem or Method 

ticular mental element denoting the exact color wanted. 

The act of voluntary memory is, however, incomplete 
until the mental state re-acted in the fourth stage is recog- 
nized as the desired one, or in objective terms, until the 
color, now reproduced in consciousness, is recognized as 
the one which was upon the leather. 

This mental act of recognition is due, probably, to the 
feeling of familiarity as arising from the similarity of 
both the idea and its neural basis to these two forms of re- 
action in the former experience. The act of recollecting 
a name would involve a process consisting of practically 
the same stages. In Appendix V. several explanations 
are given which may be helpful in making clear the nature 
of voluntary memory. 

c. Systematic Memory. 

The third form of memory may be termed systematic 
memory. It implies two stages. The first is not an act of 
memory itself but it is a preparation for the same. The 
second is the act of remembering the object for which dis- 
tinct and systematic preparation has been made. This 
involves a distinct preparation at the time of learning 
the object. The person who is becoming acquainted with 
an object or event has, it is to be assumed, special reasons 
for desiring to be able to reproduce, with facility, the idea 
of the object or event at any future time when it is needed. 
He, therefore, plans to learn it in the way that will give 
him most power in reproducing the idea of it. The most 
economical mode of doing this is to relate the object being 
learned to objects whose corresponding mental states are 
habits in the life of the learner. For example, if the 
learner is a minister, the objects for which he has habitual 
corresponding psychical activities are his parsonage, his 



The Problem of Method 81 

church building, the hymnal of his church, the Lord's 
Prayer, Paul's journey to Damascus, etc. 

The central fact in the preparation is that the object 
being learned is to be related with objects whose mental 
representatives have become hahitual in the life of the 
learner. It is evident, therefore, that the act of relating 
in the case of any person would reveal features peculiar 
to him, and also features common to him and others. 

The Process in Systematic Memory. 

In the stage of preparation each person relates or asso- 
ciates the object being learned to objects somewhat pe- 
culiar to him and under relations somewhat peculiar to 
him. 

The individual should relate the new object to fa- 
miliar objects under one or more of the relations given in 
the following descending grade: To familiar objects as 
to their purpose; cause and effect; likeness and difference; 
time and place. 

The new object should be related to familiar objects 
logicall}^, that is, if the purpose of the new object is trans- 
portation, it should be thought of in relation to some fa- 
miliar object that has the same purpose. If it was caused 
by dissatisfaction, in the minds of travelers, it should be 
related to familiar objects having the same cause, etc. 
This act of relating at the time the object is being learned 
occurs veiy largely spontaneously. Systematic memory 
is, however, characterized by a process of relating which is 
planned. Occasionally, especially when the more external 
relations of likeness and difference, time and place, are 
being considered, the process of relating may be stimu- 
lated by an artificial system. 

The first step in systematic memory is to create the idea 
of a series of objects. 



82 The Problem of Method 

The second is to relate or identify this series of objects 
with the object which is now being learned but which is 
later to be remembered. 

In the growth of the mind these two activities occur 
in three stages showing growth in thoughtfulness. 

The mind constructs the idea of a series of objects and 
relates the object now being studied to the series of objects, 
spontaneously. 

The mind constructs an artificial series which is of 
course external to the nature of the mind and identifies 
the object being learned with this artificial series. 

The mind constructs a series of objects in obedience to 
its predominant characteristic and relates the object being 
learned to this series. 

That is, if a man is inclined to the thought that free 
will is a ruling force in the world, and if he guide.s his 
action by this doctrine, he will, when studying a new ob- 
ject, create a series in harmony with this central doctrine 
of his life. • He will then relate the object being learned 
to this series. 

If he is a man engaged in transportation, who has for 
many years been concerned with steamship lines, steam 
railroads, and traction lines, his mind will construct a 
series of objects in harmony with this habitual mode of 
thought and he will relate the object to this series. 

This artificial system is referred to as a mnemonic sys- 
tem by Angell on page 201, and by James under ingenious 
methods^ on page 298 of his "Briefer Course." The latter 
gives as a common figure alphabet the following: 



1 


2 


3 


4 


5 


6 


7 


8 


9 





t 


n 


m 


r 


1 


sh 


g 


f 


b 


s 


d 










J 
eh 

g 


k 
c 
qu 


V 


P 


c 
z 



i 



The Problem of Method 83 

In this alphabet the vowels are not considered. It is 
first to be learned perfectly. The habit of thinking of the 
corresponding letters as soon as the figures are thought 
of and vice versa is to be made habitual. The knowledge 
of it is to be made as familiar as the ordinary alphabet: 
then it can have a limited use. For example, if one 
wished to remember 1718 as a date in history or as a 
street number he could relate it to some such expression 
as "To go to fee," that is, to go to give a person a fee for 
services rendered. This expression is easy to learn be- 
cause it has thought or meaning in it. The mind is able to 
relate the expression to a concrete act occurring in space. 
It is similar to the familiar expressions used to enable one 
to decide the number of days in a month or to enable him 
to know the key in a piece of music. It may help the 
student to understand the relations referred to above, to 
decide upon the relations one should seek to establish in 
order to gain permanent knowledge of "1718 Talbot Ave- 
nue," as a street address, or of the thoughts of the "Com- 
pact on the Mayflower," in their order. In preparing to 
know this street and number so as to be able to remember 
them without difficulty at some future time, each one 
would construct a series peculiar to himself. That is, he 
would emphasize relations determined by his special mode 
of thought, at least, to some extent. For example, one 
person in learning this address, might consider and em- 
phasize the following relations — "17" is one less than 
"18" and comes before it in the regular order; the first 
part of the word "Talbot" is the first part of the name 
of a friend living to the east and the last part is the last 
part of the name of an acquaintance living to the west; 
the word "avenue" belongs in the second degree of fash- 
ionableness as to streets, that is, that denoting the slightest 
degree of f ashionableness is "road" or "street" ; that indi- 



84 The Problem of Method 

eating a higher degree is "avenue", and that indicating 
the highest degree is "boulevard. This example will il- 
lustrate the fact that each person relates the object to a 
series vv^hich is somewhat peculiar to his own mode of 
thinking. 

In order to give the student an opportunity to study 
his own process in constructing a series of objects the 
following extracts are given: For example, "What series 
of objects," a student may ask, "would my mind construct, 
that is, what relations would I emphasize in fixing clearly 
in mind the first sentence in "The Compact of the May- 
flower" ? "Or," he may ask, "What series of objects would 
my mind construct, or what relations would I emphasize 
in preparing to remember the second sentence in "The 
Comj^act of the Mayflower" ending with "the faith, &c" ? 
When studying Lincoln's address at Gettysburg, he may 
inquire "AVhat series would my mind construct, or what 
relations w^ould it emphasize in making itself master of 
the first sentence in this address"? In all such cases it is 
assumed that the meaning is worked out and then the 
exact language fixed. The process in the act of prepara- 
tion is double. 

(1). Constructing the series of objects, either spon- 
taneously, artificially (externall}^) or rationally, in har- 
mony with the habitual modes of thought. 

(2). Relating the new object to the familiar mental 
state, or to the familiar objects. 

All this is merely preparation for an act of systematic 
memory. 

The act of systematic remembering in so far as the 
actual remembering is concerned does not differ greatly 
from voluntary memory. The distinctive difference is in 
the stage of preparation. This equips the mind with an 
ordered series of objects, Avhich is to be the basis for re- 



The Problem of Method 85 

meiiibering. This makes it unnecessaiy for the mind to 
reflect in order to decide upon the objects fitted to stimu- 
late the re-acting of the idea sought for. The stages are 
as follows: 

The mind in some way becomes aware that it desires to 
re-know a given object. This object is the one that the 
mind previous^ prepared to remember. 

It purposes definitely to remember the object. 

On account of previous preparation, this purpose is 
practically the purpose to re-act the mental state appro- 
priate to a selected series of objects. 

The mind therefore voluntary re-acts the psychological 
state appropriate to the series of objects. 

Since that psychological object had been identified with 
that idea of the object to be remembered, the mind spon- 
taneously re-acts that idea. 

It at once recognizes the idea and thus completes the act 
of systematic remembering. 

Suppose, for example, the mind in a previous act of 
preparation, has planned to remember the author of "Dr. 
Sevier," George W. Cable. In planning to remember the 
name of the author it constructed a series of objects as 
follows : The name of the first president ; the name of the 
third president ; the purchase of Louisiana ; New Orleans ; 
Ocean Steamers ; the large rope used to fasten the steamer 
to the wharf — cable. 

It is assumed that this series was prepared on account 
of the knowledge of the fact that the author's early home 
was in New Orleans. 

(An explanation of the basis of systematic memory is 
given in Appendix VI.) 

Selections for Illustrations. 

LINCOLN'S GETTYSBURG ADDRESS, (NOV. 19, 1863.) 

'' Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this 
continent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the 



86 The Problem of Method 

proposition that all meu are created equal. Now we are engaged in a 
great civil war, testing whether that natior., or any nation so con- 
ceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great 
battlefield of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that 
field as a final resting-place for those who here gave their lives that 
that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we 
should do this. But, in a larger sense, we can not dedicate— we can 
not consecrate— we can not hallow— this ground. The brave men, 
living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above 
our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor long 
remember, what we say here, but it can never forget what they did 
here. It is for us, the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the 
unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly 
advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task 
remaining before us— that from these honored dead we take increased 
devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of 
devotion— that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have 
died in vain— that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of 
freedom— and that Government of the people, by the people, for the 
people, shall not perish from the earth. ' ' 

THE COMPACT OF THE MAYFLOWER, (NOV. 11-21, 1620) 

''In the name of God, Amen. We whose names are underwritten, 
the loyall subjects of our dread soveraigne Lord, King James, by the 
grace of God, of Great Britaine, France, and Ireland king, defender of 
the faith, &c., haveing undertaken, for the glorie of God, and ad- 
vancemente of the Christian faith, and honour of our king and 
countrie, a voyage to plant the first colonie in the Northerne parts of 
Virginia, doe by these presents solemnly & mutualy in the presence 
of God, and one of another, covenant and combine ourselves togeather 
into a civill body politick, for our better ordering & preservation & 
furtherance of the ends aforesaid; and by vertue hereof to enact, 
constitute, and frame such just & equall lawes, ordinances, acts, con- 
stitutions, & offices, from time to time, as shall be thought most meete 
& convenient for the generall good of the Colonie, unto which we pro- 
mise all due submission and obedience. In witness whereof we have 
hereunder subscribed our names at Cap-Codd the 11 of November, in 
the year of the raigne of our soveraigne lord, King James, of Eng- 
land, France & Ireland, the eighteenth, and of Scotland the fiftie 
fourth, Anno: Dom. ' 1620.'* 



The Problem of Method 87 

Memory more fundam^ental than sense-perception. 

In what respects is memory more fundamental than 
sense-perception? Range of consciousness of relations is 
the factor which determines whether one mode of mental 
action is more fundamental than another. Mind is held to 
be "the universal substrate," and whatever form of men- 
tal activity exhibits most of the self-activity of the mind 
is most fundamental. 

With this as a criterion, memory appears to be more 
fundamental than perception in these respects: 

It involves a more extended range of consciousness. In 
sense-perception the mind has constructed an image, but 
the self is unconscious of the image, the attention being 
centered upon the external object only. In memory, how- 
ever, the mind is distinctly conscious of the image and of 
its process in knowing the absent object. 

It involves a more complete idea of the self. Sense- 
perception is limited to a consciousness of the immediate 
present. It involves but a brief portion of the observer's 
life. In memory the individual is conscious not only of 
his present, but of a definite past, and in a certain sense of 
his life during the intervening period. 

Memory is also more fundamental than sense-perception 
in that in an act of memory the mind ignores, to a certain 
extent, the various details of the object of which it was 
distinctly conscious in the act of sense-perceiving. This 
act of ignoring the details in the object is a more advan- 
tageous basis for thought, since it concentrates attention 
upon the essential nature of the object more fully than is 
done in sense-perception. 

The neural basis of memory. 

There are two things to be noticed in regard to this : 
The initial element, the beginning element in the mem- 



88 The Problem of Method 

cry image, has a neural basis similar to that belonging to 
sense-perception. At least, this is the case in all acts of 
memory beginning in an act of sense-perception. In this 
case, some attribute in the present object stimulates the 
peripheral nerve ending giving rise to a nervous impulse. 
This nervous impulse is transmitted along the nerve fibre 
to the appropriate region in the cortex, arousing the 
action of the appropriate neurone. To the action of the 
neurone, the mind responds in a definite mental stage, the 
initial element. 

The neural basis for the other elements in the image 
involves, however, no excitation of the peripheral nerve 
ending and the transmission of a nervous impulse inward. 
The nervous process begins in the appropriate cortical 
center, and the series of cortical re-actions occurs in the 
same form as that which was the basis of the original 
mental act. The process then passes to the motor region 
and finally out into the voluntary and involuntary 
muscles, giving the response which is habitual in the com- 
plete sensory circuit. If an act of memory takes its rise 
in another act of memory, imagination, or thinking, the 
first part of this neural basis would be lacking, or, at 
least, it w^ould be so far back in the series of nervous ac- 
tivities as to be difficult to trace. 

Educational frinciples. 

Among the pedagogical principles that are implicit in 
the act of memory, the following may be noted: 

The principles in training the memory are mechan- 
ical, logical and practical. 

The mechanical principle is shown in the stimulation of 
the nervous organism so as to bring about permanency in 
the cortical actions, and to increase the number of the in- 
ter-related re-actions in the cortical actions. It also in- 



The Problem of Method 89 

eludes the training given to the memory through the arti- 
ficial system known as mnemo^iics. In regard to the ner- 
vous response the aim is to make this vivid. This is done 
either through a stimulation strong in itself through fre- 
quent repetition, or through special interest in the object 
to be examined which will result in concentration of at- 
tention in examining the object. The stimulation may be 
merely repeated or it may be brought about by the excita- 
tion of the various senses. A thoughtful form of repeti- 
tion is that which involves differentiation. This adds 
novelty to the fact being studied and hence gives greater 
vividness. For example, if one is studying the constitu- 
tional form of government of England and Germany, in 
review, he should consider constitutional government in 
new relations, as in Norway, France, etc. 

The second mode of giving training to the memory is 
that of working out the logical relations when originally 
studying the object. By this it is meant that the learner 
should reflect upon the nature of the object. He should 
raise questions concerning the purpose, and relate it to 
other objects having the same purpose, and he should also 
distinguish it from objects having quite an opposite pur- 
pose. He should consider the cause of the object and 
both identify it with and distinguish it from other objects 
known, as to this relation. The same should be done in re- 
gard to its effects, its time, its place, etc. These things 
organize closely the idea of the object being studied with a 
large range of ideas belonging to the organized knowledge 
of the learner. This process is economical because it iden- 
tifies this idea with organized knowledge, and hence re- 
sults as it were in making it and these others a single ob- 
ject. It also renders it easy to remember the object be- 
cause the idea of it is related to so many ideas already 
possessed by the mind. 



90 The Problem of Method 

The learner should be systematic in relating the objects. 
For example, beginning with purpose he should employ a 
descending scale consisting of purpose, cause, effect, like- 
ness, difference, time, place. Or this order could be re- 
versed. 

If the act of memory is one of voluntary memory the 
child should be led to make clear to himself the element 
which is lacking. 

In voluntary memory the object is already largely 
known. Some aspect of it, however, is lacking in con- 
sciousness. In enabling the child to re-know this aspect 
of the object he should be led to define to himself exactly 
the attribute in the object which he does not know. If he 
merely states this to himself clearly, it will aid him in 
remembering. 

The third mode of training the memory is that which 
has been termed practical. The meaning of this is that 
the pupil should put into immediate use that which he 
has learned and which he wishes to remember. If, for 
example, he has learned the difference between the ad- 
jective and the adverb for the first time he should be 
given some w^ork in grammar or composition which would 
require him to use the two kinds of words. 

2. Imagination. 

The second and higher form of representation, i. e., 
imagination, manifests three stages, mechanical imagina- 
tion; productive imagination, also called constructive or 
separative; and creative or idealizing imagination, 
a. Mechanical Imagination. 

The first kind of mechanical imagination is that in 
which the mind produces a modification of an image sig- 
nifying a present object. 



The Problem of Method 91 

For example, the mind creates the sense-perception 
image of a paper pencil with certain letters on the out- 
side, and a blue crayon point. 

The mind then ceases its act of existing in the element 
signifying blue in the crayon point, and produces in its 
stead the element signifying red as the color of the crayon 
point. The principles determining the modification of 
the image are the mind's tendency to act in a mode similar 
to its present act, and its tendency to seek freedom from 
its environment, or to make it different. It continues to 
act along with this, all the other elements of the sense- 
perception image, and interprets the new image, which 
is now the imagination image, to signify the pencil with 
the attributes indicated, as not present now and never 
present. 

The second kind of mechanical imagination is that in 
which the mind produces a modification of an image sig- 
nifying an absent object. 

In the second kind the mind constructs, for example, 
the memory-image or an imagination image of a particu- 
lar gold-handled pen. In creating the memory-image the 
mind reconstructs all of the elements of this image just 
as they were. The mind then ceases to act the element 
signifying gold-handled, and produces in its stead the ele- 
ment signifying pearl-handled, continuing to act all the 
other elements of the memory-image and interpreting the 
modified image to signify a pearl-handled pen not present 
and never present. 

In each kind there are four movements : 

The mind constructs the imagination image. 
It re-acts similar past experiences. 

It compares and contrasts the imagination image with 
ideas of past experience. 



92 The Pkoblem of Method 

It interprets the imagination image to denote a particu- 
lar object not present at the time and never present. 

Point out the process of imagination in the following : 

''Sometimes her narrow kitchen walls 
Stretched away into stately halls; 
The weary wheel to a spinnet turned, 
The tallow candle an astral burned, 
And for him who sat by the chimney lug, 
Dozing and grumbling o 'er pipe and mug, 
A manly form at her side she saw, 
And joy was duty and love was law." 

b. Productive or Separative Imagination. 

This form of imagination is called separative because 
but slight attention is given to the image constructed in 
response to the immediate stimulus. No doubt, this image 
is interpreted to denote the present object, but this pro- 
cess is practically ignored. The characteristic mark is 
that the mind instantly constructs an image of that which 
is symbolized by the present object and then interprets the 
image to mean an object not now present and never pres- 
ent. For example, assume that the present stimulus is a 
small patch of blue upon a map. The first process of the 
mind is to sense-perceive this blue patch. This would in- 
volve the full process in an act of sense-perception, but the 
whole process is practically ignored by the mind and it 
proceeds at once to construct a definite image of a body 
of w^ater having peculiar shores, shape, color of water, etc. 

The mind then re-acts its ideas of lakes and ponds 
known in the past. 

It relates the present image to these ideas of past ex- 
perience and interprets the image to mean a lake, having 
many strange features, not present now and not at any 
time present. 



The Problem of Method 93 

Productive or separative imagination is concerned with 
several kinds of objects; as, for example, with the follow- 
ing: 

Words — oral, and written or printed. 

Signs upon a map. 

Pictures, photographs, or drawings. 

The externalities of works of art. 

This last refers especially to the external characteristics 
of an example of architecture, sculpture, painting, etc. 
The features spoken of are called externalities for the 
reason that they are neither the meaning of the work of 
art, nor are these external features interpreted by the 
mind at this time to signify the meaning. An externality 
of a work of art is rather interpreted to signify some ex- 
ternality of the object represented. For example, in the 
marble statue of Minerva a certain arrangement of the 
marble is intended to denote her spear, another arrange- 
ment her helmet, another, her hair, another, her forehead, 
etc. In the process of productive imagination the portion 
of marble intended to signif}^ the spear may be imaged. 
The mind pays but slight attention however to the direct 
meaning of the image, which is a certain arrangement of 
marble present now but constructs the image of the spear 
itself, and interprets the image to mean a spear, construct- 
ed of a certain material, not present now and never pres- 
ent. 

Another wa}^ of stating the process is the folloAving: 
The mind constructs the image of a certain arrangement 
of marble, then by the ordinary process interprets the 
image to signify the marble, and then interprets the mar- 
ble to symbolize the actual spear. 

The following is an example in which words are the 
immediate stimulus. Suppose that a reader comes upon 
these words in a paragraph : 



94 The Problem of Method 

"Through the black smoke of the city rose the lofty 
tower of the court house." As the mind sense-perceives 
the form of these words it interprets the visual image 
appropriate to the words, to signify the object — a tower 
looming up through the smoke, rather than the words, 
"Through the black smoke." etc. One element of the 
mental activity is the consciousness that this object has 
never been experienced. The following also may be re- 
garded as stimuli to the activity of productive imagina- 
tion. 

"He could pursue wild game even across the growing crop of a 
farmer, regardless of the ruin thus wrought while all this game, 
however noxious, was sacred from the peasant. In other places on 
certain nights in the year the peasants were obliged to beat the 
water in the castle ditch to keep the frogs quiet. ' ' 

* * * 

''The stag at eve had drunk his fill 
Where danced the moon on Monan 's rill. 
And deep his midnight lair had made 
In lone Glenartney's hazel shade; 
But when the sun his beacon red 
Had kindled on Benvoirlieh 's head, 
The deep mouth 'd bloodhound's heavy bay 
Resounded up the rocky way. 
And faint, from farther distance borne 
Were heard the clanging hoof and horn. ' ' 

* * » 

"The curfew tolls the knell of parting day. 
The lowing herd winds slowly o 'er the lea, 
The plowman homeward plods his weary way. 
And leaves the world to darkness and to me. ' ' 

* « * 

"Seek'st thou the plashy brink 

Of weedy lake, or marge of river wide. 
Or where the rocking billows rise and sink 
On the chafed ocean side?" 



The Problem or Method 



95 



"How often have I paused on every clxitrm,— 
The sheltered cot, the cultivated farm, 
The never failing brook, the busy mill, 
The decent church that topt the neighboring hill, 
The hawthorne bush with seats beneath the shade. 
For talking age and whispering lovers made. 
* * * 
Washington was defeated at Brandywine. ' ' 





''Over many a cold and desolate pass, crawling painfully across 
the wind-swept shoulders of the hills; down many a black mountain 
gorge, where the river roared and raced before him like a savage 
guide; across many a smiling vale, with terraces of yellow limestone 
full of vines and fruit trees; through the oak groves of Carine and 
the dark gates of Zagros, walled in by precipices ; into the ancient city 
of Chala, where the people of Samaria had been kept in captivity 



96 The Problem of Method 

long ago; across the swirling floods of Tigris and the main channels 
of the Euphrates, flowing yellow through cornfields, Artaban pressed 
forward until he arrived at nightfall of the tenth day, beneath the 
shattered w^all of populous Babylon. ' ' 

Let a further example be that in which a photograph 
is the immediate stimuhis. In this case, the mind does not 
immediately perceive a person. The thing sense-perceived 
consists of light and dark shades, white back ground, etc. 
In the act of sense-perception the mind creates an image 
of these and by the ordinary process interprets the image 
to signify the light lines, the shades, the white back 
ground, etc., as present. The mind however at once passes 
into an act of imagination by creating the image of the 
actual object denoted by the photograph and interpreting 
this image in the usual process of imagination. It inter- 
prets the image to signify the actual body of the person, 
the actual material of the dress, etc., as objects never ex- 
perienced. 

c. Idealizing Imagination. 

The two great classes of the idealizing imagination are 
the creative and the interpretative. 

In the creative imagination the mind produces an ideal 
object, as, for example, the statue of Minerva, the poem 
"To a Waterfowl," etc. 

The interjDretative imagination is that act of idealizing 
in which the self thinks the ideal meaning of some object 
which has been produced by the creative imagination, or 
some object of nature which expresses an ideal. 

The first kind of creative imagination is that in which 
the self creates the idea of the picture of an object. For 
example, the mind having a clear idea of a robin and its 
nest may create the image of the picture of a robin and its 
nest. The picture itself has not been produced. The mind 
has merely created a distinct image of the robin and its 



The Problem of Method 97 

nest. By re-acting past experience, comparing and con- 
trasting, tlie mind is able to infer that tliis image means 
the picture of a robin, a picture not now present and 
never present. 

The second kind of creative imagination is that in 
which the mind creates the idea of an object which it re- 
gards as a s3^mbol of some activit}^ of the self. This sym- 
bol is, in a certain sense,* an object of nature but it sym- 
bolizes a spiritual object. 

The objects produced under this form of imagination 
are of three kinds. 

Those that satisfv^ the aesthetic interest. 

Those that satisfy the intellectual interest. 

Those that satisfy the volitional interest. 

For example, if the mind creates the idea of a statue 
symbolizing liberty the ideal object appeals to the aesthet- 
ic interest. If it creates the idea of a book which sym- 
bolizes the truth concerning chemical action, the book 
satisfies the intellectual interest. If it creates the idea of 
a constitution for a state which symbolizes a mode of gov- 
ernmental action, this ideal constitution appeals to the 
volitional interest. 

The process in creating the idea of an aesthetic object 
is manifested, for example, in the act of imagining a 
maiden blindfolded, holding in her hands the scales, as a 
symbol of the spiritual object — justice. Such an ideal 
always consists of a particular object and of a general 
spiritual activity which it symbolizes. The process of 
creative imagination may begin in the contemplation of 
the general object, or it may begin in the contemplation 
of the particular object. 

In the process beginning with the contemplation of the 
general object 



98 The Problem of Method 

The mind creates the idea of a general object, as, 
protection. 

It differentiates this idea of protection, for ex- 
ample, into two subordinate ideas — 

The idea of the physical protection afforded by a for- 
tress. 

The idea of the protection Avhich belongs to a human 
soul when its mode of activity is kindred to the activity 
of God. 

It then becomes conscious of the identity of these two 
objects, regarding the fortress and its protection as a 
symbol of that human activity which resembles God's 
activity. 

This completes the activity of the imagination in this 
case, strictly considered. If, however, the creation of the 
idea of this symbol is considered the first stage in the 
language act, the metaphor "God is my fortress," could 
be produced by a continuation of the language act through 
the second and third stages. The second stage would re- 
sult in the idea of the sentence just given, and the third 
in the idea of the identity of the symbol or sentence and 
the ideal object, the idealized object being the fortress as 
symbolizing the protecting human activity. 

A second example is the following: In the first stage, 
the mind may be considering the general object, purity. 

In the second stage it differentiates its idea of this 
general into two aspects, one of which signifies the physi- 
cal object, as a lily, snowy white, growing in a quiet val- 
ley; and the other signifies the spiritual object, a soul un- 
stained by sin. 

In the third stage the mind identifies the physical ob- 
ject, the lily of the valley, with the spiritual object, the 
unstained soul, as its symbol. Strictly considered, this 
concludes the act of creative imagination, but the imag- 



The Problem of Method 99 

inative process naturally merges into the language act, 
and the mind, by means of the second and third stages of 
the language act, expresses the idealized unity by some 
such expression as "The soul is the lily of the valley." 

In the process beginning with the contemplation of the 
particular object this object may be either physical or 
spiritual, but it is usually physical. An example is as fol- 
lows: 

The mind creates the idea of a piece of granite. 

It continues to consider this object and creates as a 
somewhat different object, the idea of a mind lacking 
sympathy. 

It then becomes conscious of the identity of the granite 
and the unfeeling human spirit. 

A second example may be noted: 

The mind may be conscious of a lute upon which the 
various breezes are playing. The mind continues to be 
conscious of this object, and creates in contrast with it the 
image of a spiritual object, i. e., the soul, stirred, some- 
times, by the passing whims of fashion into discord, and 
soothed, at times by deeds of philanthropy. In the third 
stage, the mind identifies the physical object — the lute — 
with the spiritual object, the soul, regarding the physical 
as its symbol. By the language act the mind may express 
the idealized unity somewhat as follows : "The soul is the 
lute upon which every passing breeze may play." 

In the second form of creative imagination — that which 
satisfies the intellectual interest — the process is similar 
to that in the form which satisfies aesthetic interest. 

There is first the creation of the idea of some general 
object, as, that of plant acti^dty. 

In the second place the mind produces the idea of the 
expression, as, a discourse on plants. 



100 The Problem of Method 

In the third place the mind identifies the discourse, 
and the thought relating to plant-life under the relation 
of symbol and thing signified. 

In the third form of creative imagination — that which 
satisfies an ethical interest — the process is similar to those 
in the forms which satisfy the intellectual and the aesthetic 
interest. The mind constructs the idea of some general 
truth or principle, as, for example, that expressed by "all 
just government derives its authority from the consent of 
the governed." In the second movement, the mind creates 
some embodiment of this, as, the Constitution of the 
United States or the charter of a city. In the third stage 
it judges that this constitution or this charter manifests 
this principle. 

Interpretative imagination^ in a way, reverses the pro- 
cess in creative imagination. For example, let it be as- 
sumed that a picture of a lonely wolf amid the frigid 
snow gazing at a well-lighted human habitation in the 
valley below, is being studied. What is the process of the 
mind in interpreting it? 

The object is carefully sense-perceived, that is, all of 
the various details of the picture are carefully examined 
in order to determine the significance of each. 

Under the stimulus of this examination the mind con- 
structs the idea of solitude. 

It then infers that this outside object — the picture — has 
as its inner meaning the notion of solitude. It thus esti- 
mates the picture, re-examining its various details in order 
to judge whether, as a symbol, the picture adequately ex- 
presses the meaning. 

(See Dewey's Psychology, pp 195-200.) 

The following are examples adapted to the activity of 
the interpretative imagination. They are taken from lit- 
eratui-e. 



The Problem of Method 101 

Architecture, sculpture, painting, and music furnish 
similar examples. 

Duke. And what's her history? 

Viola. A blank, my lord. She never told her love, 
But let concealment, like a worm i' the bud. 
Feed on her damask cheek: she pined in thought: 
And with a green and yellow melancholy 
She sat like patience on a monument. 
Smiling at grief. Was not this love indeed? 

Twelfth Night, Act II, Scene IV. 

Wisdom crieth without; she uttereth her voice in the street.— Proi;- 
verhs I, 20. 

Therefore shall they eat of the fruit of their own way.— Proverbs 
I, 21. 

He is a buckler to them that walk uprightly.— Proi;er6s II, 7. 

He keepeth the paths of judgment.— Pro-yerfes II, 8. 

To walk in the ways of darkness.— Prover&s II, 13. 

Length of days is in her right hand; and in her left hand riches 
and honor.— Pro-yer&s III, 16. 

The way of the wicked is as of darkness: they know not at what 
they stumble.— Proi;er6s IV, 19. 

Doth not wisdom cry? and understanding put forth her voice?— 
Proverbs VIII, 1. 

Kighteousness exalteth a nation; but sin is a reproach to any 
people.— Pro^erfes XIV, 24. 

A soft answer turneth away wrath. — Proverbs XV, 1. 

He brought me to the banqueting house, and his banner over me 
was love.— Cant. II, 4. 

Blessed is the man that walketh not in the counsel of the un- 
godly.— Psaim I, 1. 

The fear of the Lord is clean and enduring forever.- PsaZm XIX, 9. 

The Lord is my shepherd; I shall not want.— PsaZw XXIII, 1. 

The Lord is my light.— PsaZm XXVIII, 1. 

Blessed is he whose transgression is forgiven, whose sin is covered. 
—Psalm XXXII, 1. 

Thou hast brought a vine out of Egypt; Thou has cast out the 
heathen and planted it.— Psahn LXXXI, 8. 

Mercy and truth are met together; righteousness and peace have 
kissed each other.— PsaZin LXXXV, 10. 



102 The Problem of Method 

Out of the depths have I cried unto Thee, O Lord.— PsaZm CXXX, 1 

* * * 

He breaks the power of canceled sin, 
He sets the prisoner free. 

* * * 

O God, the Kock of Ages, who evermore hast been 

What time the tempest rages, our dwelling place serene. 

Come, thou fount of every blessing. 

This day, God was my Sun and Shield. 

* * * 
God is our refuge and defense. 

* * * 

The Lord, Our God, is clothed with might. 

* * * 

For the love of God is broader 
Than the measure of man's mind. 

* * * 
Whither, midst falling dew. 

While glow the heavens with the last steps of day, 
Far, through their rosy depths, doest thou pursue 

Thy solitary way? 

Vainly the fowler's eye 
Might mark thy distant flight to do thee wrong 
As, darkly seen against the crimson sky. 

Thy figure floats along. 

Seekst thou the plashy brink 
Of weedy lake, or marge of river wide. 
Or where the rocking billows rise and sink 

On the chafed ocean-side? 

There is a Power whose care 
Teaches thy way along that pathless coast— 
The desert and illimitable air — 

Lone, wandering, but not lost. 

All day thy wings have fanned. 
At that far height, the cold, thin atmosphere. 



The Problem of Method 103 

Yet stoop not, weary, to the welcome land, 

Though the dark night is near. 

And soon that toil shall end; 
Soon shalt thou find a summer home, and rest. 
And scream among thy fellows; reeds shall bend 

Soon, o'er thy sheltered nest. 

Thou'rt gone, the abyss of heaven 

Hath swallowed up thy form; yet, on my heart 
Deeply has sunk the lesson thou hast given, 

And shall not soon depart. 

He who, from zone to zone. 
Guides through the boundless sky thy certain flight, 
In the long way that I must tread alone, 

"Will lead my steps aright. 



I have touched the highest point of my greatness: 
And from that full meridian of my glory, 
I haste now to my setting: I shall fall 
Like a bright exhalation in the evening. 
And no man see me more. 



This is the state of man: today he puts forth 
The tender leaves of hope; to-morrow blossoms. 
And bears his blushing honours thick upon him; 
The third day comes a frost, a killing frost. 
And, when he thinks, good easy man, full surely 
His greatness is a-ripening, nips his root, 
And then he falls, as I do. 

In all the symbols heretofore mentioned the symbol itself 
partook largely of nature and that which was symbolized 
contained a large element of nature. The mind, however, 
is not content to symbolize merely objects of the external 
world. Its ultimate purpose is to symbolize itself. It not 
only desires to symbolize itself but it wishes the symbol 
to be its own product as nearly as possible. If it imagines 
the lion to symbolize strength, this symbol is a product 
of nature. If, however, the mind creates the word "lion" 



104 The Problem of Method 

to s3^mbolize its idea of the characteristics belonging to 
the class "lion" both the symbol and the thing symbolized 
are, in a certain sense, the mind itself, since they are di- 
rect products of its activity. Each object of the world 
manifests, in fact, peculiar characteristics and general 
characteristics. No object of the world is solely particu- 
lar, or solely general. Each object is both' at once. The 
mind, however, may concentrate its attention upon the 
general aspect of the object and practically ignore its 
particular aspect. In this case, the word imagined by the 
mind is a cormnon noun^ as, city ; but the mind may con- 
centrate its attention upon the particular characteristics 
of the object and practically ignore its general aspect. In 
this case the word imagined by the mind is a proper iioun^ 
as, Brooklyn. 

This form of creative imagination, merges into the 
mental activity explained hereafter as the language ac- 
tivity. 

The process in the form of imagination under consid- 
eration is as follows: 

The mind constructs the conception of an object. For 
example, it becomes conscious of the set of characteristics 
common to the class of objects named by the word, city. 
The object to be s3^mbolized is, therefore, a conceived ob- 
ject, a general. 

The mind being conscious that there is no single object 
to symbolize its concept imagines a symbol, as, the oral 
word "cit}^," and the printed Avord "city." 

The mind then holds in consciousness the symbol itself 
and the conceived object and judges the symbol to be 
appropriate to the object and thereby adopts it. 

This is essentially the process in creating a sentence, a 
paragraph, a long discourse. 



The Problem of Method 105 

The first stage is not imagining, but conceiving (arising 
out of an act of sense-perception, memory or imagina- 
tion), and analysis. 

The second stage is a form of creative imagination. 

The third stage is judging, not imagining. 

The whole process is practically identical with the first 
form of the activity to be mentioned later as the language 
activity. 

Imagination more fundamental than memory. 

It seems evident from the foregoing discussion that the 
process of imagination is more fundamental than the 
process of memory. Some of the main ways in which 
there seems to be greater development may be mentioned. 

The imagination reveals more freedom from external 
restraint. In the act of remembering the pencil, the mind 
created the image of the particular pencil, and this image 
corresponded exactly to the external object. In the act 
of imagination the mind created the image of an object — 
a pencil — which had never been experienced, thus mani- 
festing the mind's initiative. 

It has more of consciousness in it because in any given 
case the mind ceases to act an element or elements then 
being produced and constructs other elements signifying 
other characteristics of the object. 

There is also a fuller range of consciousness, since, in 
imagination, the person is slightly aware of the general. 
For example, in the case of the pencil, the mind ceased to 
act the element signifying blue in the crayon point, and 
constructed in its stead the element signifying red. Since 
the object with the new characteristic, red crayon, is still 
regarded as a pencil, it is evident that the mind is slightly 
conscious of the general which the word, "pencil," 
names. 



106 The Problem of Method 

It is more developed than memory because its activity 
is related more distinctly to the purposes of the self. 
Every time the self images an object, either in an im- 
proved form or merely in an new form, the first step to- 
ward purposing to have the object in that form has been 
taken. In harmony with this idea it has been said that 
"brain paths lead to action." 

The imagination is more fundamental than memory 
in that it is more closely related to the feelings, particu- 
larly to the aesthetic feelings. Any creation arouses the 
feeling of satisfaction in the form of admiration or dis- 
satisfaction — negative aesthetic feeling. 

Aesthetic feeling may be admiration of an object of 
nature or of a created object when it reveals beauty, or 
there may be the opposite of admiration, that is, aesthetic 
feeling in the form of negation, as when an object of 
nature or a created object in the field of art reveals a lack 
of beauty. 

Aesthetic feelings are appropriate to the beautiful and 
also appropriate to its opposite. 

The feeling awakened when considering Raphael's 
painting "The Sistine Madonna" is positive aesthetic feel- 
ing, while the feeling aroused by contemplation of Dante's 
creation of Charon is partially negative aesthetic feeling 
and partially positive. 

Since imagination appeals to this wide range of feeling 
it is said to be more fundamental than memorj^ 

The neural hasis of imagination. 

Introspection shows that the mental process in an act of 
sense-perception is usually more vivid than it is in an act 
of imagination and is also characterized by the feeling 
of objectivity. That is, the mental state in perception has 
as an element a feeling indicating the actual presence of 



I 



The Problem of Method 107 

the object. On this account it has been thought that the 
neural basis in imagination is different from that in sense- 
perception. This is true to a degree only. Sense-percep- 
tion involves currents entering from the periphery. This 
neural process is largely absent in an act of imagination. 
The neural process underlying an act of imagination is 
concerned with neurones in the cortex not aroused by an 
external object which acts upon the peripheral endings, 
but which are aroused ideationally. These neurones in 
the cortex are connected by the association fibers referred 
to by Flechsig. 

Except in cases of fever or hallucination these inter- 
cortical currents exhibit less energy than those stimulated 
from the periphery, and hence, the action in the neurones 
is less strong. This accounts for the fact that the image 
in imagination is less intense than in a case of sense-per- 
ception. The nervous process underlying imagination 
stimulates mental elements which denote the objective less 
strongly than would be the case with mental elements 
stimulated by currents entering from the periphery. If 
the sense of objectivity were as strong in imagination as 
in sense-perception one could not distinguish an object 
of reality from one of phantasy, and the result would be 
that his psycho-physical organism would not be ad- 
justed to the world about him. 

Educational principles. 

Some of the main pedagogical principles which origi- 
nate in imagination are as follows: 

The child should be trained to select words that are 
graphic, picturesque. For instance, he may be led to lis- 
ten to the sound of the wind until he will be inclined to 
describe the wind as howling. 



108 The Problem of Method 

This is a case of the figure termed onomatopoeia. In 
this figure of speech the sound of the word is imitative of 
the sound of the object which the word represents. The 
dictionary gives as examples, "the buzz of the bees" ; "the 
crackle of the fire." 

The child should be led to image according to true re- 
lations. For example, if he is writing a description of 
the object suggested by this sentence, "Aunt Polly sat 
in her little back parlor paring a pan full of red apples be- 
fore the fire,"'*' he may, by a few suggestions, be made con- 
scious that Aunt Polly's parlor would not be furnished 
with a piano or with a Brussels carpet. 

The child's imagination must be so trained that he will 
tend to seek the inner meanings of works of art. For in- 
stance, in the picture of St. Michael and the Dragon the 
child should first sense-perceive the picture as a whole. 
Then he should be led to distinguish the picture into its 
constituents or parts — an angel with large wings, bright 
face, and great arms, holding a mighty sword in one hand 
over a dark scowling figure with small Avings, and with 
the other hand forcing this ugly figure down into a dark 
pit between two mountains. B}^ explanation, questioning, 
and suggestion the child may be led to interpret the great 
arms and large wings to signify strength, and the bright, 
fair face, goodness; the small wings, weakness; the 
scowling face, evil. . 

He is then to be so directed that he will unify the 
various parts with their meanings in a way to catch, 
creatively, their general truth, "Good conquers evil." 

3. The Language Activity. 

This mode of mental activity is concerned with sym- 
bols, which are strictly signs, i. e., letters, words, sentences, 

* "First steps in English Composition," by H. C. Peterson, A. Flanagan & Co., 
Chicago. 



The Problem of Method 109 

etc. In one aspect the language act is partly an ob- 
jectifying activity. It is a complex activity involving : 

The creation of content or meaning. 

The imagining of a symbol, i. e., an oral or visible word. 

The act of judging as to the appropriateness of the 
symbol to the meaning. 

The act of creating a content or meaning seems to occur 
in several forms, although doubtless the fundamental pro- 
cess is one of thinking^ that is, of conceiving, judging, or 
reasoning. The activities that appear to be involved are 
sense-perceiving, remembering, imagining, conceiving, 
judging, and reasoning. 

The following is an example of the first, and from this 
example, as a suggestion, the student may easily think out 
examples of the other forms of activity involved in cre- 
ating the content or meaning. 

Assume that a new object is present to a person, as, for 
example, a window shutter. The observer, however, does 
not know its name because it may not have a name. That 
would be the case if this object were the first of its kind 
in the world. If the observer has produced the object 
he is acquainted with its various characteristics. As it 
exists before him, his mind — 

Creates a distinct image of it. 
Re-acts similar past experiences. 
Relates the present image, by comparing and 
contrasting it and the similar past experiences. 

Infers that this present image denotes a particular 
object present at the time. 

It will be observed that the mind appears to have an 
idea of a particular object which is present. Careful in- 
trospection in such a case, however, would reveal a con- 
ceptive element, that is, the person is aware to a degree 
of the set of characteristics corrmion to such objects. Al- 



110 The Problem of Method 

though, according to the supposition, but one such object 
exists, the mind would, nevertheless, construct at the 
time a notion of a class. Hence, whatever word or ex- 
pression is imagined as a symbol of the object, would 
denote the conceptive element and the set of characteris- 
tics conceived, rather than the act of sense-perceiving and 
the particular object sense-perceived. 

If at this stage, the student were to work out a par- 
ticular example of a case in which the content or meaning 
is produced by an act of remembering, of imagining, of 
conceiving, of judging, or of reasoning, it would go far 
toward rendering clear his idea of the language activity. 

The object of the language activity seems to casual ob- 
servation, to be the whole language — expression and 
meaning. 

Strictly considered, the object of the language activity 
is the identity of the expression and the content, or, it is 
the appropriateness of the expression to the meaning. 

The general nature of the language activity is explained 
in Psychology^ by Dewey, pp. 211-212. 

The language act, as previously noted, is the process of 
the self in either producing or interpreting language. 

a. The Act of Producing Language. 

In this act, as shown by the examples given above, the 
mind first becomes conscious of an object. The term, 
object^ is here used in the sense set forth on page 24. It 
denotes the object known in sense-perception, memory, 
imagination or introspection, and the relation or meaning 
of which one becomes conscious in an act of understand- 
ing, conception, judgment, reasoning, or intuition. For 
example, through the presence of an object, or of a pic- 
ture of it, or through language, a person may become con- 
scious of an animal, as, the squirrel ; or through introspec- 



The Problem of IVIethod 111 

tion the mind may become conscious of its distinct mental 
states and be impressed with each as a unit; or through 
abstraction the mind ma}^ become conscious of an attri- 
bute or characteristic of an object, as is illustrated in the 
botanical experiments of Mr. Luther Burbank. In exam- 
ining closely a new fruit he noted particularly, i. e., ab- 
stracted, certain characteristics of both the potato and 
the tomato, as, the green top of the potato, the growth of 
the fruit on the top, like the tomato, the size and shape of 
a small tomato, white colored flesh, like the potato. This 
was an example of abstraction. The abstracted attribute 
was the object which was afterwards to be expressed in 
language. 

Abstraction is the second stage in the productive 
language act. Adam, according to Scriptural account, 
emphasized a certain characteristic of his companion. 
This was the second stage in his process of naming 
his companion. The first was the mental act of know- 
ing the object or companion indistinctly. By reflection or 
abstraction he became conscious of the general character- 
istic expressed by — "mother of all the living." This char- 
acteristic is the object which is to be expressed in lan- 
guage. These two steps may be viewed as the one process 
of knowing the object or content. The first stage is that 
act in which the meaning or content is produced. Tbe 
cases previously given are those in which the object or 
content is actual. It will be of advantage to present an 
example in which the object is ideal. Let the object be a 
well of water^ symbolizing by its relation to plants and to 
persons the effect of a human activity harmonious with 
Christ's life upon the human being putting forth the 
Christ-like act, and also upon others. The process in 
treating the ideal object is somewhat as follows: 



112 The Problem of Method 

The person may be contemplating the general, — 
giving neio life. 

He may differentiate the idea of this general object 
into two subordinate ideas — 

The idea of a well of water, giving refreshment to 
human beings and animals, and added life to plants. 

The idea of a higher spiritual life resulting in a person 
on account of a spiritual activit}^ in him which is in har- 
mony with Christ's spirit. 

The third step is to identify the two objects under the 
relation of symbol and thing symbolized. The process 
of creating the ideal object might begin in the conscious- 
ness of a particular object instead of a general. 

[In the second stage of the act of producing lan- 
guage the person becomes conscious that there is no suit- 
able term to preserve the idea of the object of which he 
became conscious in the first stage. He, therefore, pur- 
poses to produce such a symbol. In the first of the cases 
referred to above, having noticed particularly the tail of 
the animal, and especially its bushy character which en- 
ables it to cast a shadow, he imagined the term, squirrel 
(shade-tail.) 

In the second case, having emphasized the distinct- 
ness of each mental state, and the sameness of the mental 
states in this respect, he imagined the term psychome. (A 
mental state characterized by unity.) 

In the third case, having been impressed with the 
characteristics of the new fruit which he had obtained by 
crossing the potato and the tomato Mr. Burbank imag- 
ined the teiTn, pomato. 

In the other case mentioned, the special attention 
to the characteristic expressed by "mother of all the liv- 
ing," stimulated the act of imagining the name, Eve^ 
which signifies that characteristic] 



The Problem of Method 113 

The second stage in dealing with the ideal object re- 
ferred to is that of imagining the expression, "I am a 
well of water springing up into eternal life." 

The third stage consists of deliberating upon the 
appropriateness of the term — ■"! am a well of water 
springing up into eternal life" to the ideal object, and 
judging it to be adequate. The third stage in the act of 
producing language is, practically, contemporaneous Avith 
the second, and implied in it. It is the judgment or 
decision that the imaged term is appropriate to the mean- 
ing. This is its selection. 

This act of judgment or selection may be very brief, 
or it may require considerable deliberation. The process 
which has been indicated for words, is also present in the 
construction of phrases, sentences, paragraphs, chapters, 
and entire volumes. 

b. The Act of Interpreting Language. 

This process is essentially the reverse of the former 
process. The assumption is that the language has been 
produced, and that the learner is examining it in order to 
become conscious of its structure and meaning. 

The first stage is the process of becoming conscious 
of the term as a visible or audible object. For example, 
the pupil may become conscious of the word, ''squirrel," 
or "psychome," or ''Eve," or "psychiatrist," as a visible or 
audible expression. Since this term is always a particular, 
material object, the process of becoming aware of it is 
always sense-perception, memory or imagination. 

The second stage in the interpretative language act 
is the process of remembering, or constructing for the first 
time the idea of the object or meaning expressed by the 
term. For example, the child may be led by questioning, 
explanation, and the use of reference books to interpret 



114 The Problem of Method 

the word, "squirrel," to mean an animal Avith a bushy tail; 
the name, "Eve," to mean "mother of all the living;" the 
term "psychiatrist," to mean one who ministers to a mind 
diseased. 

The third stage is the act of the mind in judging 
or asserting distinctly that the term which was considered 
in the first stage is an appropriate symbol for the object of 
which the idea has been either re-created or created. This 
act of judgment, while distinctly a separate movement in 
consciousness, does not succeed the second stage in time, 
but is rather co-existent with it. Since the mind became 
conscious of the word or term itself in the first act, and of 
the meaning in the second act, it is assumed to be contem- 
plating the word for the purpose of deciding whether it 
is appropriate to the meaning. Therefore, its act of judg- 
ing as to the appropriateness of the term progresses as the 
act of clearly knowing the term is occurring. 

The language act more fundamental than imagination. 

The language act is a more fully developed form of 
consciousness than imagination. Some of the manifesta- 
tions of this greater development are as follows : 

In the language act, the mind is more distinctly 
conscious of the relation, (symbol and thing signified) ; 
and a relation, whether of unity or of diversity, is both 
general and objective. The knoAv ledge of the relation of 
the symbol and the thing symbolized is a form of think- 
ing. This form of thinking appeared in an implicit form 
in creative imagination. 

It is more distinctly conscious of the general, (the 
object expressed in the language.) The Avord "squirrel" 
expressed only incidentally the particular object. In a 
more fundamental way it denotes a set of characteristics 
common to the class. In the language activity this gen- 



The Problem of Method 116 

eral object — the set of common attributes — is more dis- 
tinctly known than is the case in imagination. 

The object or symbol which is created in the second 
stage of the productive language act is a word, phrase, or 
sentence, and hence is more fully in identity with the self 
than the object which is created in imagination. For 
example, a picture, a statue, a work of architecture has in 
it more or less of the material, while a word, as, "faith," is 
very largely a product of the self, manifesting, to a cer- 
tain extent, its fundamental process. The word exists as 
a total object to the child when first knowing it. It be- 
comes analyzed when he spells it or knows its letters. It 
is then at once a more clearly known and a more useful 
unity. There is, with the creation of the word, a more 
distinct consciousness of social relations, because the object 
created, i. e., the word, phrase, etc., is for the sake of com- 
munication. For example, the rattling of a window pro- 
duces a sound, but the sound is intended to have no social 
significance. The sound, "Good-morning," does, however, 
denote social relations because it is uttered by one person, 
to reveal that which is in his consciousness, and is heard 
by another, and its meaning becomes a part of the con- 
sciousness of the person hearing. The mind creates as 
similar expressions architecture, sculpture, painting, 
music, and literature. Gradually the expression becomes 
less material. In literature, the expression is almost 
wholly the product of the self. 

The neural basis of the language act. 

The language act is a complex mental state having 
elements corresponding to imagination, in creating the 
word; to sense-perception, memory, imagination and con- 
ception in interpreting the word, that is, in discovering 
the meaning ; to an act of judgment, in deciding upon the 



116 The Problem of Method 

appropriateness of the word. Its neural basis is, success- 
ively, that involved in these various activities. 

Educational principles. 

Among the principles of teaching implicit in the 
language act are these : 

The child should be led to distinguish clearly the three 
kinds of language, i. e., objective, subjective, and symbolic. 
This is the fundamental division of language. If a word 
is used to express a space-occupying object it may be 
temied objective language. An example is the word gate 
in the following : "The gate is made of oak." Subjective 
language is that used to express the condition of the mind. 
The words /, am, pleased, and know in the following sen- 
tence are examples : "I am pleased to know that the gate 
is made of oak wood." An example of symbolic language 
is the word gate in the following : "Strait is the gate, and 
narrow is the way, which leadeth unto life, and few there 
be that find it." 

He should be led to value, and to secure a rich fund 
of terms, as, earnest, pledge ; education, instruction ; train- 
ing, breeding; egotism, egoism; vanity, self-conceit; 
fealty, submission; reverence, honor, etc. 

He should be taught to discriminate closely, and to 
be satisfied with exact expressions only. For example, he 
should distinguish closely between the words fidelity and 
honesty. He should study whether the word allude can 
be employed in language of censure. 

He should be given a close acquaintance with the 
literal meanings of words. For example, he should notice 
that the word petrel resembles, in the first part, the word 
Peter, and in the last part the term ello, which means 
small. This will interest him in the richer meaning be- 
cause he will become aware that the little bird that flits 



The Problem of Method 117 

close to the wave and frequently walks upon the water is 
compared to the apostle. 

He may also become conscious that the word trivial 
denotes the kind of talk and actions that occur at a very 
small village in which there is merely one road entering 
at right angles to another road, thus giving three ways. 

It should be the aim to give him the habit of em- 
phasizing content or meaning over expression or form. 
This could be done by training him to note the meaning 
of words before they are spelled, by giving a greater 
amount of time to the meaning of a paragraph or chapter 
or poem than to the expression. It should be shown that 
the expression exists for the sake of the meaning, and that 
if the meaning changes the expression also changes so as 
to correspond. 



118 The Problem of Method 



Chapter V. 



THOUGHT. 

KNOWING THE GENERAL. 

People usually employ the word knowing to express 
more certain knowledge than the word thinking. For 
example, one may say "You think you are right, and I 
know that you are." "You believe you are right, and I 
know that you are." 

The word knowing is a more general term than the 
word thinking. In every case of knowing the mind con- 
structs a particular mental state or image and by relating 
it to past experience becomes aware of the meaning of the 
image. If the image is interpreted to mean a particular 
object which is present, or a particular object of any kind, 
present or absent, the mental process is not thinking. It 
is either presentation, representation, or the language 
activity. 

If, however, the image is interpreted to mean some 
general object, as difference, sameness, justice, the essential 
characteristic of the oak tree, etc., the process is thinking. 
In thinking, the mind constructs a particular state or 
image and by relating it to past experience, interprets it 
to denote some general object, some relation. 

There are five forms of thinking — Understanding, 
conceiving, judging, reasoning, insight or intuition. 

1. The Understanding. 

The language act is the transition from imagination 
to thought, because in becoming aware of the meaning in 



The Problem of Method 119 

language the thought processes are necessarily involved. 
The content of language is implicitl}^ or explicitly the 
object which has been conceived, the object of which we 
become aware in an act of judging, i. e., a relation; or a 
relation, together with the two^ main truths bearing upon 
it known in some process of reasoning. 

The general nature of thought was shown on pages 
32-33. Its main stages are understanding, ratiocination, 
and intuition or reason. 

The mental activity termed understanding is the 
lowest, most indistinct, and most mechanical form of 
thinking, although in its highest stages it becomes a very 
important process, involving considerable reiflection. That 
is, when the act of understanding is very accurate and 
complete a person becomes aware of the dominant char- 
acteristic of the object. He does not discover, however, 
that this dominant characteristic is really the genetic 
force which produces the. object. 

In its lowest stage it takes the form termed appre- 
hension. This is the mode of activity referred to in 
Angell's Psychology^ pages 203-206, as '"consciousness of 
meaning." On these pages it is shown that perception, 
memory and imagination, while signifying primarily par- 
ticular objects, denote, also, in an indistinct Avay, thf> 
meaning exhibited in these objects. The author says: 

''Perception could never lead to the establishment of habitual co- 
ordinations were we not able to apprehend the meaning of that which 
we see and hear and touch. Memory would be an abortive resuscita- 
tion of the past could we not recognize the meaning of that which we 
recall. Imagination in all its forms would be a mere mental logo- 
machy were it not for our ability to understand the meaning of the 
images which occupy our minds. From beginning to end, therefore, 
of our mental activities the presence of meaning is absolutely in- 
dispensable. ' ' 



120 The Problem of Method 

The essential nature of understanding is indicated 
by stating that its predominant category or relation is 
identity. In the act of understanding, there is consider- 
able discrimination. The second stage is largely one of 
distinction. Even in the third stage the cause is discrim- 
inated from the object and the effect is also. All of the 
distinctions, however, are a means to the discovery of the 
identity of the object with its cause, with its effect, and 
finally with its central meaning. 

In its act of understanding the mind becomes aware 
of the different parts and attributes of the object, but these 
parts and attributes are regarded as brought about in the 
object by forces that are external to it. The mind, in the 
stage of development known as the understanding, does 
not become conscious of an essential inner force in the 
object held to give rise to all of the parts and distinctions 
>f the object. 

The predominant stages of the understanding have 
been given as a f prehension.^ distinction and classification. 

Apprehension. 

In apprehension the mind constructs the image or 
special mental state appropriate to the object, reacts sim- 
ilar past experiences and interprets the image to signify 
a given meaning. This meaning is reached without the 
conscious process of reasoning, and there is a tinge of 
doubt as to whether the true meaning has been discovered. 
This doubt is reflected in the term "apprehension." For 
example, the mind constructs the particular mental state 
appropriate to the object denoted by the term — "The 
Mexican War." This idea has been constructed in the 
process of reading and study. The mind by reacting sim- 
ilar past experience and by comparing its present state of 
consciousness with its past experience judges that the 



The Problem of Method 121 

inner meaning of the series of events known as The Mex- 
ican War, is, perhaps, the adjustment of a boundary dis- 
pute. As usual in the case of apprehension this meaning 
involves some inaccuracy. This lack is felt, and the mind 
therefore attempts to test the result reached by means of 
the second process, which is distinction. 

Distinction. 

The process of distinction is that in which one by 
one, the mind abstracts and examines the different parts 
and attributes of the object in order to discover the special 
meaning of each. In this case, the parts or attributes 
abstracted may be supposed to be the following : 

The time, i. e., the period just succeeding the cam- 
paign which emphasized so strongly the controversy with 
England concerning the boundary on the north and that 
immediately following an exciting campaign in which the 
American people had been educated particularly by two 
campaign cries. One of these was "All of Oregon or 
none," the other, "54°, 40' or fight." It was also a time 
in which the political parties in the Senate were evenly 
balanced, and in which the northern region had ample 
territory for the formation of new states, while the south- 
ern region had not. 

The place. The place would be known to be near 
the southern states and convenient for the extension of 
slavery in case the Americans w^ere successful in the war. 
It would be evident that the place had not more reference 
to a controversy about a boundary line than did the 
Oregon region. 

The slight opportunity given Mexico for trying to set- 
tle the' controversy by diplomacy. This would hint some 
purpose other than the settlement of the boundary dispute. 



122 The Problem or Method 

The invariable success of the Americans in the various 
battles. This would indicates the inequality of the con- 
test, an inequality doubtless known by both nations. 

Thus, one by one, the various characteristics of the 
war would be abstracted and contemplated. 

The mind then holds the particular meaning of the 
attribute or part in consciousness along with the meaning 
which has just been apprehended, being aware that they 
are different, although known in the one mental act. This 
is to discriminate them. 

The two separate meanings are then compared. It 
is thus evident that the total process in distinction consists 
of abstraction, discrimination and comparison. The mind 
examines, thus, in its process of distinction, the various 
parts and attributes of the object until it feels justified in 
classifying it. 

Classification. 

The first process in classification is that of classify- 
ing the object as a whole, on the basis of the meaning dis- 
covered in the examination of the various parts and attri- 
butes. 

Prior to the process of distinction in the case of The 
Mexican War, the war might have been classed as one con- 
cerned with a controversy over a boundary line. 

After a careful comparison of the meaning of each ab- 
stracted attribute with the apprehended meaning it would 
appear inadvisable to so class it. 

The process of distinction would, perhaps, justify 
the student in classing it as a war intended to strengthen 
the administration by the gain of additional territory in 
which to advance American ideas and government, by 
extending the limits of the slave power, and by quieting 
the discontent of the people on account of the failure of 



The Problem of Method 123 

the administration to compel England to accept the 
boundary line as 54° 40'. 

In a certain sense this would class the war as a war 
of aggression against a weak government in order to sat- 
isfy the people's inclination for a conflict which had been 
promised, if the boundary line between the United States 
and Great Britain were not fixed at 54° 40' and to extend 
the territory for the institution of slavery which the ad- 
ministration favored. 

The second process in classification is the act of 
identifying the object with its causes and effects. By re- 
flection upon the object — The Mexican War — its cause can 
be abstracted or isolated. It would be found to be, not 
merely some material thing such as a disputed boundary 
line, but rather the mental condition of the two peoples. 

On the part of the administration of the American 
government, it may have been a purpose to re-establish 
the dominant party in the full confidence of the people 
and to secure a long lease of the government, by a war 
which would gain territor}^ for the extension of slavery 
and which would satisfy the people that the administra- 
tion was courageous. 

In regard to the Mexican people it was an unwill- 
ingness to be passive under acts that would depriv^e the 
Mexican government of valuable territory. 

Reflection would also make evident the effects of 
the war. These were partly material and partly spiritual. 
In a material way, it brought about a loss of territory to 
Mexico and a corresponding gain to the United States. It 
also resulted in the payment of several millions of dollars 
to Mexico. 

Its mental effects were not less important. To a certain 
extent, it led the people of America to dwell lightly on the 
fact that the administration had not entered upon a war 



124 The Problem of Method 

with England. It increased the determination to limit 
the extension of slavery. It gratified the people of the 
United States on account of the valor of the army and on 
account of the opportunity to develop Anglo-Saxon in- 
stitutions. 

It aroused in the Mexicans the sense of having been 
wronged and a feeling of humiliation on account of the 
loss of a large amount of territory. Its tendency was to 
prevent any genuine friendship in the future. 

This process is classification because its result is to 
class the Mexican war with all objects having similar 
causes and similar effects. 

The final process in classification is to identify the 
object with its central meaning. In this stage the mind 
becomes aware of the generic force which underlies the 
object as its dominant characteristic, but is not conscious 
of it as creative ; that is, does not recognize it as a generic 
force. It merely becomes aware of this central truth as in 
the object. Through the whole process of understanding 
the object or objects the mind regards all parts, attributes, 
divisions, etc., as externally imposed. In the case of The 
Mexican War the most dominant characteristic would be, 
most probably, the giving of an opportunity for the exten- 
sion of slavery in the United States. This would class the 
object — The Mexican War — with all other objects having 
that as their central characteristic. 

In the act of understanding The Mexican War, this 
characteristic would be known as passive. That is, it 
would be discovered merely as a characteristic of the war. 
When it is said that this attribute is viewed as externally 
imposed the meaning is that it is not regarded as the inner 
force, which produced the object. 

If this characteristic were viewed as the generic force 
which gave rise to the Mexican War and all of its distinc- 



The Problem of Method 125 

tions, the act would be quite different from understanding. 
It is one thing to discover the presence of a characteristic, 
but it is quite another to become aware that this charac- 
teristic is a generic force which is creative of the object. 




The following examples will reveal in more simple 
form the general nature of the process in understanding, 
since they may be known in the process of sense-percep- 
tion: 

Let the object be a glass pen in which the tubular 
holder tapers at one end to form the point. 

In the first stage — that of apprehension — the mind 
creates an image appropriate to the object. The 
image stimulates the mind to react similar past expe- 
riences, and to compare and contrast them with the present 



126 The Problem of Method 

image. Upon this l)asis the mind dimly interprets the 
image to mean the function or meaning a glass pen. This 
completes the stage of apprehension. 

The presence of this meaning stimulates the process 
of distinction. In this process the mind first abstracts one 
particular element of the image or of the object to which 
it directs its attention. In this case it abstracts the ele- 
ment signifying the tapering point. The mind then dis- 
criminates, or sets the idea of the tapering point over 
against the apprehended meaning of the object. This 
stimulates the comparison of the idea of that particular 
characteristic Avith the apprehended meaning to discover 
whether or not it is in harmony with it. The mind may 
put forth this full process of distinction with attribute 
after attribute of the object until it is certain as to whether 
or not the meaning apprehended is the correct one. In 
this case the element signifying the function of a tapering 
point harmonizes with the meaning, belonging to a glass 
pen, and the apprehended meaning is held to be correct. 
This completes the stage of distinction. 

The process of distinction develops into the stage of 
classification. 

First, on account of the external attributes of the 
object, the mind classifies it, as a whole, as a glass pen. 

The object is then classified as to its cause and 
effect. To do this the mind reflects concerning the process 
in the consciousness of the producer. What ideas caused 
him to produce the object ? This reflection may result in 
the idea that the producer Avished to make a pen in which 
the pen and holder Avould be in one piece. He may have 
thought that a glass pen w^ould prove more attractive to 
the child than an ordinary pen, and that in consequence 
the sales might be greater. He may have known that a 
glass pen Avould be easily broken, and that this would also 



The Problem of Method 127 

tend to increase the sales. The person who is studying the 
object may, by his reflection, have discovered many other 
causes of the glass pen, but these are sufficient to make the 
example clear. 

The mind of the investigator next discovers the 
effects of the production of the object. He finds that the 
pen is always ready for use, since it is made in one piece ; 
that it attracts the attention of the child, and that every 
child will have one if j)ossible ; that it is easily broken, and 
that a paper written with a glass pen does not present as 
neat an appearance as one written with a steel pen, etc. 

The last stage in the process of classification is the 
discovery of the central idea in the object. In this case it 
discovers the idea, urnting loith a one-piece object^ to be 
the dominant notion. This central characteristic of the 
object is, however, considered as passive, as merely there. 




Let a second example be the process of understand- 
ing some strange plant, as the loater-mouM . 

The act begins, for example, with the apprehension 
of the mould as it lies on a piece of mounting glass. In 



128 The Problem of Method 

this process of apprehension, as shown in the previous 
example, there are four distinct movements. The mind — 

Sense-perceives the mould on the mounting-glass; 

Re-acts similar past experience, compares and con- 
trasts the idea of the present object with similar past 
experience and is thus led to infer that the object present 
now is a mould having the peculiarity of living in water. 

Apprehension is really the first aspect of the law of 
self as manifested in the act of understanding. 

The presence of the apprehended meaning stim- 
ulates the mind to pass into the stage of distinction. This 
stage either proves or disproves the inference made in the 
stage of apprehending. It also is a complex process: 
First, the mind abstracts an attribute, as, colorless. It 
then discriminates the meaning of this attribute and the 
meaning of the mould which it had apprehended. It 
compares the meaning of the abstracted attribute — col- 
orless — and the meaning of the mould, asking the ques- 
tion, "Does the meaning of mould harmonize with the 
meaning of the abstracted attribute?" One distinction 
may furnish sufficient basis for the classification of the 
object, but the mind usually abstracts, one at a time, many 
attributes, and one by one, first discriminates the meaning 
of the abstracted attribute from the apprehended meaning 
and then compares the two meanings. For example, in 
this case the student may, by means of the microscope, 
isolate the characteristics — thread-like parts, spore-pro- 
ducing, particularly shaped spores, etc., and in each case 
discriminate and compare, asking, meanwhile, the question 
given above. 

When the process of distinction has disclosed con- 
siderable significant data, there is a development into the 
higher process of classification. 



The Problem of Method 



129 



In this process, on the basis of the meaning of the 
attributes discovered, i. e., living in water, receiving nour- 
ishment from seeds, fish eggs, fish and dead insects, color- 
less, thread-like, spore-producing, having sjDores of a char- 
acteristic kind — the mind makes the general classification 
of the whole object as water-mould. This meaning is more 
fully mediated, that is, based more fully upon past expe- 
rience, than that of apprehension. This act of general 
classification is succeeded by the act of classing the object 
with its causes and effects. It is discovered, for example, 
that the causes of the water-mould are the presence of 
wat^r in large quantities, of dead insects in the water, its 
own nature, that is, the nature of its own producing activ- 
ity, etc. 




The self continues its process of classification by 
becoming conscious that the effects are as follows: the 
disintegration of the lifeless insects, and the restoration of 
the elements in them to the air and soil, the destruction of 
dormant fish, the prevention of the hatching of fish eggs, 
the destruction of the germ in the seed, etc. 

The conclusion of the process of classification is the 
act of identifying the water-mould with its predominant 
characteristic, i. e., putting forth its peculiar mode of 



130 The Problem of Method 

activity, fruiting by living in water ^ as its name Saproleg- 
nia, signifies. 

Understanding more fundamental than the language act. 

The understanding is more fundamental than the 
language act in that the most active element of conscious- 
ness — attention — is concentrated more largely upon mean- 
ing, as such, than is the case in the language act. 

As previously indicated, the element of relation or 
meaning is indistinctly and indirectly noticed even in 
sense-perception and memory. This apprehension of 
meaning becomes slightly more explicit in imagination 
and still more so in the language act. It remains true, 
however, that in each of these forms of activity the focus 
of attention is upon the particular object which, in the 
language act, is language or expression itself. 

In the act of understanding, the focus of attention 
has changed from the particular object to its meaning, 
i. e., the mind does not apprehend the particular object, 
but rather the meaning of it; it does not notice the ab- 
stracted attribute, but the meaning of the abstracted attri- 
bute ; it does not discriminate the object and the abstracted 
attribute, but the meaning of the object and the meaning 
of the abstracted attribute, etc. This is an important 
advance. It is the act of being concerned with relation, a 
general, permanent something, rather than with a partic- 
ular, transient existence. 

The neural ha&is of imderstanding . 

In so far as the act of understanding involves sense- 
perception, memory, imagination, etc., its basis is the reac- 
tion of those regions in the cerebral cortex, the changes of 
which are the stimuli of these included activities. The 
neural basis involves, no doubt, to some extent the action 
of the Flechsig association centers. 



The Problem of Method 131 

Educational principles. 

The pupil should be led to feel that sameness is the 
relation emphasized in the understanding and that dis- 
tinction is for the purpose of identity; that is, he should 
become aware that the main aim is to classify and to dis- 
cover a characteristic common to the different parts or 
aspects of the object, and that the processes in distinction 
are merely a means to the discovery of the identity. 

His process in knowing the meaning should be in 
harmony with the order of development in the process of 
understanding — apprehension, abstraction, discrimination, 
etc., but there should be no effort to make him acquainted 
with the process itself. For example, in beginning to 
study the Revolutionary War, the pupil should be led — 

To become conscious of it as a whole in order that he 
may have the opj^ortunity to feel in an indistinct way, 
its core or meaning ; that is, to apprehend its meaning. 

To enter upon the process of analysis. That is, he 
should distinguish it into its parts, characteristic fea- 
tures, etc. 

Having distinguished clearly he should pass into the 
other stages of understanding. 

He must be led to feel that the true totality of an 
object is found in its causes, its present condition and its 
effects, and that what is usually called an object is only 
abstract, i. e., partial. The pupil is inclined to think that 
the total Revolutionary War is included in the events held 
in by the beginning and the closing years. He does not at 
first consider that the cause of the war and its effects are 
really included in the complete object. The Revolution- 
ary War is an object which begins with its causes and ends 
with its effects. The outward events are only a part of 
the war. 



132 The Problem of Method 

Finally the pupil must be so directed in his work 
of discovering the meaning of objects that he will feel that 
each object possesses a central characteristic which gives 
most insight into its nature. After the pupil discovers 
that the particular war which he is studying has its dom- 
inant characteristic he should be led to notice that this is 
true of each object which he laiows. This would be an 
incentive to him to discover this characteristic in each 
object he is studying. He should feel that his work is 
incomplete without a knowledge of it. 

2. Ratiocination. 

The nature of this general process has been sufficiently 
considered on pages 34-37. Attention is to be given 
here to its first form. 

a. Conception. 

The beginning stage of ratiocination is the process 
of conception. The idea resulting from the process is 
termed the concept. Conception takes its origin as do all 
other mental processes, in an initial condition, the image. 
(See page 24.) The image is the preliminary adjustment 
of the mind to the object. It may be said to be any partic- 
ular mental state of the self prior to the discovery of the 
function or meaning of that state. The image is the germ- 
inal stage of the total mental act, the other stages of which 
develop from the image according to the general laAvs of 
the mind and the special culture of the individual. The 
process of conception may be defined in a preliminary 
manner, as the construction of an image which is an ad- 
justment to a particular object present or absent, and the 
interpretation of this image as symbolizing; not the par- 
ticular object, but rather the set of characteristics common 
to this object and to all others of its class, or to signify in 



The Problem of Method 133 

a deeper sense its creative activity. That is, the past expe- 
rience is so adjusted to the image as to invest it with a 
general meaning. In other words, the image in concep- 
tion signifies a relation of the object, and not merely the 
particular object, and this relation is the essential nature 
of the object. The most common and, perhaps, the funda- 
mental process, is that in which the mind interprets its 
image to denote, as indicated above, the set of common 
characteristics. Assume, for example, that a particular 
chair is present. The process of conception is then some- 
what as follows: 

The mind constructs a particular image appropriate to 
the particular object. 

It re-acts ideas of similar particular objects known 
in the past, or j^erhaps examines a larger number of sim- 
ilar objects which are present. 

It carefully analyzes each of the objects, thereby 
discovering a set of characteristics common to the differ- 
ent objects, as, having a seat, having the seat elevated by a 
leg or legs a suitable distance from the floor, and having 
a back. This last characteristic is not so essential as the 
two others. 

The mind becomes aware that this set of attributes 
is common to the different objects of the class. It 
interprets the image, which is a particular image of a par- 
ticular object, to signify not that single object, but some- 
thing common to it and to others of its class. That is, the 
mind has conceived, not perceived, remembered, or 
imagined. Conceiving is becoming conscious of the essen- 
tial nature of the objects of a class. In this case the per- 
son is aware that the particular object is merely one of a 
class. The image of a particular object is related to the 
observer's past in such a way as to symbolize the common 
attribute, or the group of common attributes as passive. 



134 The Problem of Method 

i. e., as merely there. This aspect of conception is closely 
allied to the understanding. This notion is shown on page 
208 of Angell's Psychology. 

''We may say following the common usage, that eoneoption is that 
mental operation by moans of which we bring together the common 
points of our various expeiiences and mentally consolidate them into 
ideas; ideas which we are then able to use as symbols, or representa- 
tives of those manifold ideas. ' ' 

This is probably the notion of the concept which is 
best adapted to educational work in the grades and to a 
large extent in the high school. 

It is held by some psychologists that one may have 
a concept of a particular object, as of Lake Michigan. 
This seems to be the position of Herbart and those who 
are in harmony with his psychological doctrine. The view 
is not limited to these, how^ever. In Angell's Psychology^ 
pages 213-214, the same opinion is expressed: 

' ' We define conception as a process of forming general ideas, and 
this seems to be the most striking feature in the process. But if all 
words are essentially concepts, we must have concepts of individual 
objects as well as of classes; or at all events, our method of think- 
ing individual objects must be the same as our method of thinking 
classes. This is, indeed, the fact. We really have a concept of Jupi- 
ter, as well as of gods, a concept of earth, as well as a concept of 
planets; a concept of this particular book, as well as of books in gen- 
eral. We have only to remember that conception is, after all, at 
bottom, simply a mental process of designating meanings, to see that 
wo can in this way indicate any meaning we wish; e. g., the meaning 
of a single object or a dozen; the meaning of a mathematical rela- 
tion, or of an historical relation; the meaning of a familiar object, or 
of an impossible one. In each and every case we shall have a concept, 
and in most cases a word, or a word-image, will be a very convenient 
' device by means of which to think it. 

We may easily connect the process by means of which we gain 
concepts of single objects with the process by means of which we 
obtain general ideas of classes of objects, if we observe that in both 



The Problem of Method 135 

cases we have simply set a boundary line about certain things; in the 
one case the boundary contains one object, in the other it contains an 
indefinite number. But in both cases our mental act has been the 
distinguishing of one kind of moaning from all other kinds of mean- 
ing. That form of the process in which our idea refers to some com- 
mon property, or j^roperties, of a number of experiences has commonly 
been regarded as the true type of conception, because we appear in 
such cases to have abstracted the common qualities of a number of 
events, then generalised upon these, and so obtained the concept, or 
general idea. But the process by which we reach a concept of a 
single object involves abstraction just as truly, if not so extensively, 
as the previous form of operation. To obtain a concept of London 
involves setting the idea of London off against all other ideas; in- 
volves abstracting it in a perfectly definite way. In a sense, too, 
our concept of London is just as complete, just as universal, as is the 
concept city. It applies to all of its object, as truly as does the 
concept city, and it is in a measure an accident, an irrelevant incident, 
that the total object referred to is singular and not plural." 

In objection to this doctrine two things . may be 
said: In the first place, close introspection would prob- 
ably show that a person while considering the seemingly 
particular objects, e. g., Jupiter, the earth, London, etc., 
is in a subconscious way, aw^are of each as one of a class. 

In the second place, the process of abstraction, 
which is said to be involved in the act of creating the con- 
cept of a particular object, really resolves the particular 
object, as London, into man}^ objects, and hence the mean- 
ing observed is a general meaning in that it is common to 
all the aspects of the particular object. For example, one 
may dwell in London for months, or j^ears, and gradually 
become acquainted with its streets, docks, tramways, 
banks, cab lines, bridges, tenement houses, etc. In each of 
these aspects of London he becomes aware of a common 
spirit or meaning. This common meaning is the concept 
or significance of the many objects or aspects of the one 
city. The process is as follows : 



136 The Problem of Method 

The mind becomes conscious of London as a whole; 
that is, it creates a particuhir mental state or image appro- 
priate to that total object. 

It analyzes the object into its general parts or char- 
acteristics, as, streets, churches, fire department, police 
department, water works, banks, etc. 

By reflecting carefully concerning these objects which 
constitute a class, namely, the parts or characteristics 
of London, it is able to discover a common charac- 
teristic of some kind in these parts. This may be the char- 
acteristic expressed by the word progressiveness, or by the 
word conservatism. It must be a kind peculiar to London. 

This characteristic is then regarded as common to 
the class. This completes the act of conception — an act 
which gives rise to a notion of the common characteristic 
of the parts of the city. It is not, however, directly, a 
concept of the single object — London — but rather a con- 
cept of the class — tke parts of London. The mind con- 
siders, however, that this characteristic which it has dis- 
covered in the parts, is a characteristic of the whole city. 
In that sense only has the mind formed a concept of the 
city itself. This is indirect. The concept is directly con- 
cerned with the small class which consists of the parts of 
the object. 

In the same way one can form a concept of the 
Parthenon only through the process of discovering the 
characteristics common to its various parts. That is, the 
mind must discover a certain characteristic hinted by its 
width, its height, its location, the material of which it is 
made, the figures upon the building, the statue of the god- 
dess within, etc. To become aware of the meaning of all 
these parts is to construct a concept of the class — the parts 
of the Parthenon, This meaning is then identified with 
the entire object. 



The Problem of Method 137 

In the closing years of the high school, and to a 
limited degree somewhat earlier, the pupil is able to know, 
or at least, to feel a more fundamental meaning. To this 
more generic aspect of the meaning created in conception 
attention will now be given. The process is similar to that 
previously given except in the last stage. If, as before, a 
particular chair is present, the process is as follows: 

The mind constructs in itself a particular mental 
state or image appropriate to the particular chair. 

It then becomes conscious of other chairs that are 
present or reacts ideas of similar objects known in the 
past. 

It then analyzes each of the objects, becoming aware 
of the characteristics, i. e., having a seat, having legs, 
having the seat elevated to the desired distance above 
the floor and having a back ; and it also becomes conscious 
that they are the common characteristics of the w^hole 
class. 

By reflection the mind becomes conscious that this 
set of attributes exists as effect. This implies a causal or 
creative activity. The image of the particular object is 
therefore interpreted to signify, not the particular object, 
not even definitely the set of common characteristics, but 
rather a certain mode of activity, namely the activity 
necessary to produce a chair. In this mode of conceiving, 
the concept refers to an activity which is creative. 

The essential idea in conception is that of creation 
or production. It is, as may be noted in the example, an 
act of constructing an image of a particular object, as of 
a chair or a column, and interpreting the image to sym- 
bolize the creative activity which gives rise to this object 
and to all other objects of the class. In Dewey's Psychol- 
ogy this doctrine is thus expressed on page 204-205 : 



138 The Problem of Method 

''A concept is an image having the function of symbolizing some 
law or principle in accordance with which a thing or a number of 
things may be constructed. ' ' 

In this statement Dr. Dewey seems to use the word law 
or principle as this book uses the expression "producing 
activity." In the case of the chair or of the column, the 
term law or principle denotes what may be termed chair- 
producing activity or column-producing activity. It re- 
fers to the mode of activity which reveals sameness or 
identity. Instead of saying "A concept is an image hav- 
ing the function of symbolizing," etc., the expression 
might be — An act of conception is a mental process in 
which the mind constructs an image and then, by relating 
the image to past experience, discovers that it denotes the 
uniform producing activity in accordance with which the 
thing imaged and others belonging to the same class have 
been constructed. 

In the Public School Journal, Vol. 11, pages 128-130, 
the same writer in explaning the act of conception says: 

' ' The concept arises from the percept through realizing the full 
meaning M)i-plied, but not ea;-plicit in the percept. For example, take 
the percept of the triangle. So far as this is a mere percept, it is 
regarded wholly as a particular thing. Knowledge of it from this 
point of view would be exhausted in getting its exact shape, size, 
length of side, degree of angles, stuff made of, color, etc. The 
mind would nowhere be led beyond the consideration of the bare thing 
present. If it were found that the sum of its three interior angles 
was equal to two right angles this would be a trait of the particular 
angle, a bare item of information of no more general value than that 
the length of one side was one and two-seventeenths inches. 

But suppose the mind advances beyond the particular triangle to 
the thought that there is a principle involved in the triangle; that 
the triangle, like everything else in the world, is made upon a certain 
principle which is embodied in it; that this principle furnishes the 
plans and specifications according to which anything must exist in 
order to be a triangle at all; a principle which, if exceeded or come 



The Problem of Method 139 

short of, there is no triangle at all. What shall we call this princi- 
ple? Is it not evident that, since it is this principle which consti- 
tutes the particular thing a triangle, rather than a pumpkin or a stove 
pipe, it is this principle we really mean by triangle and are attempt- 
ing to know? Well, it is this principle which forms the concept, 'tri- 
angle. ' The concept of ' triangle, ' in other words, is the tvay in which 
three lines are put together; it is a mode or form of construction." 

In regard to this doctrine Dr. W. T. Harris, ex- 
Commissioner of Education, oilers the following on page 
179 of the same volume of the Public School Journal : 

''I was very glad to see Professor John Dewey's article on the 
question, 'How does the concept arise from the percept?' I think 
that his answer to the question is substantially the right one, and I 
do not know of anything more important in psychology than this view 
of the question. The concept arises from the percept, not by omission 
of certain traits and features that are not common to the special per- 
cepts — it does not arise from abstraction — but it arises by a deeper 
insight into the constructive nature of the process which creates or 
generates the particulars which form the objects of perception. Sense- 
perception furnishes us objects which are dead results. The concep- 
tive faculty perceives the generative causes, the f ormulative processes 
and sees these, more or less adequately, when it uses general names. 
The conception thus, as Mr. Dewey tells us, perceives a deeper re- 
ality than sense-perception. Nominalism had inverted the true order. 
It supposed that the objects of sense-perception were the true reali- 
ties, and that concepts were mere classifications or empty names, 
without a corresponding reality. 

There are two grades of reality; the dead results offered to our 
senses, and the living process or force, which brings or causes these 
dead results or things. The process is the deeper reality, because the 
cause contains in it all the reality of the effect and also all of the 
reality which is necessary to annul the effect. However, few people 
have learned to think sutiiciently to see that change involves, first, the 
reality of the thing as it is; secondly, a deeper reality which annuls 
the thing as it is and causes another thing to exist in its place. ' ' 

The process in the act of conception may be illustrated 
by considering it in relation to the column as a feature 
in architecture. With the Greeks there were at first two 



140 The Problem of Method 

orders, the Doric and Ionic. From these there developed 
the Corinthian order, and in later times, under Roman 
influences, there arose the Tuscan and the Composite 
orders. Each column consists of base, shaft and capital. 
The base usually includes the plinth, torus and scotia. The 
shaft is a cylinder varying in height from four to nine 
and one-half diameters. It is fluted, and the flutings vary 
in number, from sixteen to twenty-four. It slightly in- 
creases in diameter for about one-third of its height, and 
then decreases gradually to the capital. The capital con- 
sists of one or more grooves running around the top of the 
shaft at right angles to the flutings, the echinus, and the 
abacus. There is great variety in regard to these different 
features, but amid all variety the column maintains its 
central function of supporting and manifests a gradual 
transition from the stylobat to the architrave. 

Let it be assumed that a Doric column is present 
to the observer. What is the process in his act of conceiv- 
ing the column ? Let the case first taken be that in Avhich 
mind becomes aware of the set of common attributes. The 
process is then as follows : 

The mind constructs a particular state or image 
appropriate to the present column. 

It examines other columns which are present or 
re-acts the ideas of other such objects known in the past. 

It analyzes each of these objects, and discovers various 
characteristics, as, having a shaft, having a base, having 
a capital, etc. 

It becomes aware that these characteristics are common 
to the objects of the class. This is becoming con- 
scious that the image denotes a set of common character- 
istics and not any single object. Such an idea is a con- 
cept of the column, because it is an idea of the connnon 
characteristics of the column. 



The Problem of Method 141 

The second case is that in which it is assumed that 
one constructs the concept of a single object. What is 
actually meant is that the person primarily constructs a 
concept of characteristics common to a certain small class 
consisting of the single parts of the object, and thereby, 
in a secondary way, becomes possessed of the idea of the 
central fact of the single object. The process with a 
particular column, for example, is somewhat as follows: 

The self constructs an image of the particular col- 
umn which is present. It must be a certain column with 
special peculiarities. This activity might be one of remem- 
bering or imagining. 

The object is analyzed; that is, the mind gives par- 
ticular attention, successively, to the exact kind of shaft, 
base, and capital. It notices anything peculiar in the 
plinth, torus, and scotia. It regards carefully the height 
of the shaft. If it is fluted the nature of the fluting, and 
the number of flutes are noticed. The analysis continues 
in the examination of the particular nature of the grooves 
at the top of the shaft, the achinus, and the abacus. 

It becomes aware that these parts constitute a class, 
i. e., the parts of this particular column. Since the parts 
are manifold there can be a common characteristic. All 
columns support^ but this column must, according to the 
supposition, manifest supporting in a peculiar way. If 
such is the case, the capital must manifest this particular 
mode of supporting, the shaft must do the same, and also 
the base. It must be revealed in the plinth, torus, scotia, 
achinus, etc. It is also to be manifested in the height, and 
in the fluting. A common peculiar purpose, or use, would 
be found alike in all of the parts of this special column. 

After the careful analysis and the study of each 
part, the mind becomes aware of the characteristics com- 
mon to the parts. This is discovering the meaning of the 



142 The Problem of Method 

class, which class is, as noted above, the farts of this par- 
ticvlar column. The idea of the peculiar something com- 
mon to the parts of this column is the concept of the class, 
i. e., of the parts of this special column. In this case the 
concept is the idea of that peculiar characteristic belong- 
ing to each of the parts of the column. It is, therefore, 
incidentally an idea of the peculiarity of this special col- 
umn. Such an idea is sometimes referred to as the con- 
cept of a single object. 

The third case is that in which the image is inter- 
preted to mean, not the characteristics of the class "col- 
umn," not the characteristic of the parts of any single 
column, but the law, principle, or producing activity that 
creates various columns. The process is the same as that 
in the first case, with the exception that the image is inter- 
preted to denote the producing activity. 

The mind adjusts itself to the particular column 
2:)resent as it would in an act of sense-perception. That is, 
it constructs a definite image of the object. 

The presence of this image stimulates the re-action of 
similar past experiences. The presence of the present 
image and of the re-acted experiences in consciousness, 
stimulates the relating activity of the self. 

The result is a careful comparison of the present image 
with the re-produced experience. 

The act of relating gradually becomes an inference. 
The mind infers its present image to. denote, not 
the present particular column, not the set of common 
attributes belonging to columns, not even the group of 
characteristics common to the parts of a particular col- 
umn, but something still more fundamental, i. e., the cre- 
ative activity which produced this and other columns. 
This uniform activity is that which is referred to by 
Dr. Dewey as law or principle. It is column-j^roducing 



The Problem of Method 143 

activity. There is a peculiar mode of activity in the 
world, producing, whenever it occurs, a column. As activ- 
ity, therefore, it possesses various aspects corresponding to 
the parts and characteristics to be produced in the object. 
For example, in column-producing activity, there must be 
a special mode which results in giving rise to the shaft. 
The process thus terminates in the idea of the principle 
or energy which produces columns. In perception the 
mind would have interpreted the image to signify merely 
the particular column as present and as different from 
the self. 

In the act of conception the image is interpreted to 
denote a much more complex object than that known in 
sense-perception. By examining the act of conceiving the 
column it may be observed that the image denotes : 

• The generic energy or column-producing activity as 
undifferentiated. 

When it is said that this activity- is undifferentiated^ 
the meaning is not that it is entirely undifferentiated, but 
rather that it lacks the differentiation which will be men- 
tioned next below. 

The mind does, even in this first stage, discover dif- 
ferentiation in the activity, because it is aware that the 
activity has differences in it enabling it to produce base, 
shaft, capital, echinus, scotia, fluting, etc. Particularly, 
its differentiation as producing base, shaft, and capital, 
is noted. 

The differentiation of this universal energy into its 
principal modes of activity, as, for example, the activity 
revealing itself in the Doric order, that revealing itself in 
the Ionic order, etc., and the differentiation of each of 
these predominant modes of activity into still more par- 
ticular modes is not noticed. 



144 The Problem of Method 

The manifestation in each of these particuhirs of the 
universal mode of producing columns, as well as the more 
special mode, as, for example, the Doric principle, is also 
unobserved. 

This shows that a clear conception involves far more 
than the notion of the undiiferentiated mode of activity, 
or than the notion of the set of common attributes. The 
concept must be developed until the mind becomes aware 
of the subordinate modes of activity, etc. When the case 
is one in which the concept is the idea of a set of com- 
mon attributes, the development of the concept must 
extend beyond this so that the mind will become aware 
of the more specialized set of attributes. For example, 
the set of attributes common to all columns is found in 
the set of attributes common to Doric columns; but more 
than that is found, in that the attributes peculiar to the 
sub-classes of the Doric order are also known. This is 
true also with regard to the producing activity. In the 
activity which produces the Doric column there is found 
the activity which produces all columns, but also a more 
special form able to produce additional characteristics. If 
one has a full concept it includes consciousness of the set 
of common attributes, consciousness of the more special- 
ized groups of attributes, and a consciousness of the 
identity of the particular object being examined with the 
general set of common attributes and with at least some 
one special set of common attributes. That is, a person in 
examining a column, if he has the concept clearly in mind, 
is able to know that the object is a column and that it is, 
for example, a Doric column. The full act of constructing 
a concept, therefore, involves, in any given case, a con- 
sciousness of the set of common attributes or of the funda- 
mental, producing activity; of all the special sets of com- 
mon attributes belonging to all subordinate classes or of 



The Problem of Method 145 

the special modes of producing activity ; and of the iden- 
tity of the particular object with the main set of common 
attributes and with some one special set, or with the main 
producing actiA-ity and some one subordinate mode of pro- 
ducing activity. 

In discovering the identity of the particular object with 
the column-producing activity or with the set of attri- 
butes common to columns, there is formed an implicit 
judgment. In this judgment, however, if it is made ex- 
plicit, nothing is said concerning "column producing 
activity" or "the set of attributes common to columns." 
The following merely is the judgment : "This is a column." 

In becoming aware of the identit}^ of the particular 
object with Doric column-producing activity, or with the 
set of attributes common to the Doric column nothing is 
said concerning the activity or concerning the set of attri- 
butes. The judgment is merely — "It is a Doric column." 
A concept contains implicitly the three factors of the 
judgment — the universal, the particular, and their rela- 
tion. In the concept, however, the universal only is 
emphasized. 

It thus appears that the mind in its act of conception 
reads into its particular state or image a rich and impor- 
tant meaning. The image denotes a set of common attri- 
butes or a generic force, a universal; the differentiation 
of this universal into special sets of common attributes 
ai^propriate to smaller classes or the subordinate modes 
of activity producing the smaller classes ; and the further 
differentiation of the special sets of attributes into just the 
attributes belonging to a particular object, or of the sub- 
ordinate modes into the activity which produces the par- 
ticulars: and the manifestation by each particular of both 
the general set of common attributes and a subordinate 
set or the universal energy or mode of activity and some 



146 The Problem of Method 

one subordinate mode of activity. The great significance 
of the act of conception is that it residts in an implicit 
recognition of the unity of the generic and the particular. 
That is, the concept is an idea of that which is creative. 
It is important to have even merel}^ a feeling that the 
particular is generic. One does not usually consider that 
in making any assertion he is expressing his idea of the 
identity of the particular and the generic. If, however, 
one says, "This is a column," his notion is that the activity 
which is always concerned in producing a column has 
been at work in giving rise to this object. If a person 
says, "This apple is sweet," the expression "this apple" 
denotes the particular, and the word "sweet" denotes the 
universal or generic. The meaning is — this object which 
exhibits apple-producing activity, a universal or generic, 
also exhibits the activity required to produce SAveetness, a 
universal or generic. 

Conception more fundamental than understanding. 

Conception is more fundamental than the act of under- 
standing in the following respects: It involves a con- 
sciousness of the central characteristic as a creative force. 
It is the change from the comprehension of an object as 
passive to the notion of it as active, as having within it a 
mode of activity which creates its parts and attributes. 

The neural basis of conception. 

The physiological basis of the concept is the same mode 
of nervous activity as that which constituted the neural 
basis of an act of perception, of imagination, or of sensa- 
tion. Sometimes it is the neural basis underlying the men- 
tal activity appropriate to some word, oral or visible. It is 
not, however, the nervous activity underlying the mental 
activity appropriate to only one object of the class. It 



The Problem of Method 147 

includes in addition to this, the slightly active processes 
of many associated groups of cells, each group of which 
would, if directly stimulated, be the basis for the mental 
activity appropriate to each object included in the class. 
For example, the concept of the triangle would have as 
its neural basis the nervous action belonging to the men- 
tal state appropriate to a particular triangle. But the 
neural basis would include also the slight activity of the 
cells underlying the images of many particular triangles. 

Educational principles. 

The teacher should be aware of the three forms of the 
concept. 

The first is the concept which denotes the set of com- 
mon attributes. 

The second is the concept which denotes the attribute 
or attributes common to the parts or characteristics of a 
single object, and hence which denotes indirectly the cen- 
tral meaning of the object itself. 

The third is the concept which denotes the producing 
activity that gave rise to each object in the class. This 
producing activity is often spoken of as the law or prin- 
ciple, which is causative of the diiferent objects of the 
class. 

Examples of the full process of the first form of con- 
ceiving and of the teaching process based thereon: 

The three stages in a full act of conceiving furnish 
the basis for the act of teaching the nature of a class, as 
the noun, or the atoll. 

For example, the first stage in conceiving the noun is 
the act of becoming aware of the set of attributes common 
to all nouns, as, having an oral and a visible form ; having 
as meaning an object composed of attributes ; having the 
oral and visible forms as symbols of the meaning ; having 



148 The Problem or Method 

these oral and visible forms as symbols purposely con- 
structed to communicate the meaning; having oral and 
\dsible forms which are names. 

This suggests certain features of the teaching process. 

Nouns of all kinds should be placed in some way before 
the pupils. 

By examination of each word and reference to past 
experience the pupil must be led to know that each has 
an oral and a visible form. 

By the same kind of examination the pupil is to 
learn : 

That the meaning is an object composed of attributes. 

That each of the forms is a sign or symbol of this 
meaning. 

By the examination of the Avords and of such objects as 
doors, desks, windows, etc., the pupil is to be made aware 
of the fact that each form, the oral and the visible, has 
been purposely constructed to coimnunicate the meaning 
to other minds. 

By examining the selected words and comparing them 
with such words as he^ it^ they^ etc., the pupil should learn 
that the oral and visible forms name the object. 

The second stage in conceiving the noun consists in 
becoming conscious of the special sets of attributes con- 
stituting the essentials of the various special classes of 
nouns. These special classes are primarily objective 
nouns, as gate; subjective, as mind, joy, fear, etc.; sym- 
bolic ; as vine, branch, in the sentence, "I am the vine ; ye 
are the branches." Each of these classes consists of 
subordinate classes ; as, common nouns and proper nouns. 
Each of these is still further subdivided. 

Since the second stage in conceiving the noun is to 
become aware of the special sets of attributes common to 



The Problem of Method 149 

the special classes, the nature of the teaching process is 
indicated : 

Many kinds of noims would be presented to the pupils 
mostly in sentences. 

By noticing such nouns as gate, tree, cloud, etc., the 
pupil would notice a new characteristic of the meaning in 
addition to those common to all nouns. This new attri- 
bute is that of occupying space. 

By a similar examination of such nouns as joy, pride, 
satisfaction, mind, etc., the pupil Avould discover charac- 
teristics beyond those belonging to all nouns, i. e., the 
characteristic, naming an object which is mental, non- 
spa ce-occupy ing. 

By a closer, more difficult study of the nouns, vine, 
branch, way, day, etc., in such sentences as "I am the 
vine ; ye are the branches," "I am the way," "Jocund day 
stands tip toe on the misty mountain tops," etc.,. the pupil 
can become aware of a new attribute not common to all 
nouns but only to the class symbolic nouns. This attri- 
bute is that of naming an idealized object; i. e., a mental 
state expressed in terms of a physical object. In a similar 
process the new attribute characterizing a proper noun 
and a common noun in addition to the set belonging to 
objective nouns, subjective nouns and symbolic nouns may 
be discovered. The proper noun as, Brooklyn, emphasizes 
the particular aspect of an object which is also general.^ 
while the common noun, as, city, emphasizes the general 
aspect of objects which are also particular. 

The process of examining nouns may be thus continued 
until the attribute additional to those belonging to proper 
nouns and to common nouns marking names of persons, 
etc., and those marking collective, class and mass nouns, 
etc., may be found. 



150 The Problem of Method 

The third stage in conceiving the noun is that of know- 
ing the identity between the particular object, i. e., the 
noun and the set of attributes common to all nouns; and 
between the particular noun and at least one special set of 
attributes, as those belonging to symbolic nouns. 

This stage of conceiving suggests the teaching 
process : 

Many nouns in sentences and out of sentences, many 
pronouns, adjectives, verbs, adverbs, prepositions, etc., 
should be placed before the class for examination. 

The pupil should be asked to select a noun. This being 
done he should be asked to give reasons for so classing it. 
This would require him to show in it the set of attributes 
common to all nouns, for example, some five charac- 
teristics. 

He should then be asked to tell the class of noun, as, for 
example, objective. As before, he should be asked to give 
reasons. This would lead him to show in the noun the 
characteristics belonging to such nouns. If, for exam- 
ple, the noun were the word Brooklyn, two special sets of 
characteristics would need to be shown in addition to the 
set belonging to all nouns. 

In advanced work the stages in the act of conceiving 
and in the corresponding teaching process could be con- 
cerned, not with the set of common attributes, but with, 
the producing activity. For example, in the first stage 
the student might, while examining one or more nouns, 
interpret his image or mental state to denote, not the set 
of attributes common to nouns, but instead the noun-pro- 
ducing activity. That is, he would become aw^are of the 
stages in the activity which brought into existence each 
object in the class called noun. 

A similar process would be employed in leading the 
pupil to conceive the atoll. 



The Problem of Method 151 

In the full act of conceiving the atoll, one becomes 
aware in the first stage of a set of attributes common to 
atolls, i. e., being of lime formation; being found in clear 
moving salt water, whose temperature is not below sixty- 
eight degrees; being ring-shaped; enclosing a lagoon. 

In teaching the atoll to children the teacher should have 
them become aware of atolls by means of re-productive 
imagination, or in other words by means of imagined 
objects expressed by words, pictures, drawings, and maps. 
He should lead them, after careful study and close obser- 
vation, to see that one characteristic common to all atolls 
is being of lime or coral formation. He should then lead 
them to see from careful and extended study of the text 
that atolls are found only in warm water, temperature 
not below sixty-eight degrees, and in water which is clear 
and in motion. Pupils may easily learn from maps, pic- 
tures and drawings that another characteristic common to 
all atolls is being ring-shaped. In the same manner they 
may become aware of the common attribute, enclosing a 
lagoon. 

In the second stage of conceiving the atoll one inter- 
prets his image to mean the more special sets of attributes 
conunon to the special kinds of atoll. 

By the use of geograjDhies, pictures, maps, descriptions, 
drawings, etc., at hand, the pupils should learn about as 
many special atolls as possible. 

They should be led to examine one special kind of atoll 
at a time, and, to be sure that the first stage of conceiving 
is well developed, the teacher should have the pupils notice 
that the special kind would include a set of attributes 
common to atolls, as : formed of lime deposit — ^the result 
of coral formation; circular in shape; enclosing a circular 
body of water ; found in restless salt water of temperature 
not less than 68 degrees, etc. 



152 The Problem of Method 

Then teacher and pupils should continue the examina- 
tion of the example and observe that it manifests also 
a special set of attributes common to this special kind ; as, 
Certain age. 

Nearness to coast of mainland. 
Elevation. 
Presence of island in centre of the inland sea, etc. 

This examination should be continued until each special 
kind is thus seen to include the general set of attributes 
and one or more attributes peculiar to the special class. 

In the third stage in the act of conceiving the atoll, one 
becomes aware of the identity between the particular 
object, say an atoll in the picture before one, and the set 
of attributes common to atolls. He also becomes aware 
of the identity between the particular atoll in the picture 
and the special set of attributes common to that partic- 
ular kind. 

In obedience to all this psychological process, the teacher 
should, in teaching the pupil the atoll, place before him a 
number of pictures and models of atolls and perhaps of 
other islands both of coral and not of coral formation. 

By attention to these objects, the teacher should lead the 
pupil to know the set of attributes common to atolls, viz. : 
being a land form, being made of lime, being circular in 
form, being surrounded by water, and having a lagoon 
enclosed. 

Then he should lead the child to know the special sets of 
attributes common to the various kinds of atolls, as to 
those with circular land form entire, to those having land 
form submerged in one or two places, to those having land 
form submerged in many places, to those having only few 
parts above water, etc. 

The teacher should then point out the various pictures 
and models before the child and have him tell which rep- 



The Problem of Method 153 

resent atolls. In doing this he should have him keep 
before his mind, as a guide, the set of attributes common 
to atolls. 

Finally the teacher should lead him to tell what kind 
each atoll is, whether it is one with land form entire or 
submerged, with land form submerged in one or two 
places, with land form submerged in many places, or 
with land form above water in but few places, etc. 

If the child can readily point out the atolls as he sees 
them in pictures or on the moulding table, stating the 
attributes common to the whole class, and the kind of atoll 
each is and if he can name the special set of attributes 
common to the special class, he has a good conception of 
atolls. 

The teacher should be conscious that the creation 
of a complete concept includes a knoAvledge of the under- 
lying activity of the whole class, or of the set of activities 
common to the whole class; of the subordinate activities 
giving rise to the various subordinate classes, as in case of 
the triangle, the classes scalene triangle, isosceles triangle, 
and equilateral triangle, or to the set of characteristics 
common to each of these classes ; and of the identity of the 
particular object with the general mode of activity or with 
the general set of common attributes and also of the 
identity of the particular object with some special mode 
of producing activity or with some special set of common 
attributes. 

An example of this last is as follows : If the student is 
examining any particular triangle he should know, in the 
first place, that it is a triangle, and in the second place 
that it is a particular triangle as "scalene." In the first 
case he has identified the particular object with triangle- 
producing activity or with the set of attributes common 
to all triangles, and in the second case, he has identified 



154 The Problem of Method 

the particular object with scalene-triangle-producing 
activity, or with the set of attributes common to all scalene 
triangles. 

Among the pedagogical principles implicit in the 
process of conception the following also may be noticed: 

The teacher should lead the pupil to think of the 
idea in the object itself as determining the various parts 
and attributes of each particular object. For example, 
the central idea or function of the column — supjyorting — 
determines that there shall be a base, a shaft and a cap- 
ital; that the plinth shall be a transition from the scotia 
to the torus, etc. 

The pupil should be led to see the unity of func- 
tion of the parts and attributes of each single object. He 
should become aware, for example, that the level bottom 
of the water pitcher, the handle, and the lip, are identical 
in that they have a common purpose — aiding in producing 
an object to hold liquid, which is to be poured into an- 
other, and generally a smaller, vessel. 

He should be encouraged to select the characteristics 
of the objects of subordinatf classes, and of the total class. 
For example, he should be led to enumerate the character- 
istics of some particular triangle; of the class, scalene 
triangle; of the class triangle. He should discover that 
the attributes of the single object are greatest in number, 
those common to the subordinate class, next greatest in 
number, and those common to the total class least in 
number. 

He also should have awakened in him the desire 
to clarify his indistinct concepts. This sometimes widens 
the meaning, as when Jesus said to the Jews, "Ye shall 
know the truth and the truth shall make you free." It 
sometimes restricts the meaning, as when one thinks the 
word teaching to denote all instruction, and afterwards 



The Problem of Method 155 

conceives teaching as the distinctive art which puts the 
learner more into possession of himself. To clarify indis- 
tinct concepts was, perhaps, the distinctive work of Soc- 
rates in the world. He regarded each individual as pos- 
sessed of the true concept on account of his pre-existence 
in the Empyrean, but that on account of his incarnation 
it was encrusted or intertwined with opinion and caprice. 
Opinion he regarded as a conscious state which made one 
aware of the manifold, the particular, and the relative, 
and not of "that which is." This is the Platonic doctrine 
of reminiscence, in so far as it refers to the previous exist- 
ence in the Empyrean. It is poetically expressed by the 
following from Wordsworth's Platonic hymn : 

''Hence in a season of calm weather, 

Though inland far we be, 
Our souls have sight of that immortal sea 

Which brought us hither, 
Can, in a moment travel thither. 
And see the children sport upon the shore. 
And hear the mighty waters rolling evermore. ' ' 

Almost all of the concepts of practical life are indis- 
tinct, and in the interests of clear thinking require to be 
clarified ; for example, the concept of patriotism. If this 
concept is complete, the person is aAvare of the set of 
characteristics common to all cases of patriotism. 

He is also conscious of the special sets of characteristics 
common to the special kinds of patriotism. 

In the third place he is able to discover the identity of 
any case of patriotism with the set of characteristics com- 
mon to all such cases and also to discover the identity of 
the particular case of patriotism with the set of attributes 
peculiar to its own special kind. In other words he is 
able to decide that it is a case of patriotism and a certain 
kind of patriotism. Generally, however, a person has no 



156 The Problem of Method 

such complete concept of patriotism. Ordinarily all that 
he knows is that patriotism is a love of country by an 
inhabitant of that country. Even this first requires clar- 
ification because he must be led to know that the concept 
of patriotism is an idea of a love in an inhabitant of a 
country for that which is ideal in his country's life or 
procedure. 

The necessity for the clarification of concepts may be 
illustrated further by considering the animal named in 
common language by the word "bat" and scientifically by 
the term, "chiroptera." 

If one should be asked what characteristics are common 
to the individuals of the class "bat," he would reply some- 
what as follows : 

A bat is an animal having — 

A body somewhat similar to that of a mouse. 

Wings. 

Teeth. 

No covering such as hair or feathers. 

A tendency to seek darkness as does the owl. 

He would not probably have a knowledge of the sub- 
ordinate classes of bats and of the sets of characteristics 
common to these. 

In the third place, while he would probably be able to 
class any particular bat as a bat, he would not be able to 
identify it with its special class. 

In what respects would this conception, typical of that 
usually held in practical life, need clarification? 

The first aspect of the concept would need modification 
in order to have it denote more explicitly the set of char- 
acteristics common to the whole class as follows : 
Body covered with hair. 
Nourishing the young with milk. 



The Problem of Method * 157 

Having wings of membrane, stretching over the 
legs. 

Having teeth suitable for catching and eating 
insects. 

Having a tendency to be active, especially at night. 

The second aspect of the concept would be clarified in 
having the learner become aware that there are two sub- 
ordinate classes — 

Fruit eating. 

Insect eating. 

He should become conscious that the first subordinate 
class includes the five characteristics of the whole class 
and a special characteristic of its own — having longitudi- 
nal furrows in the molar teeth. 

He should also discover that the other subordinate 
class includes the five characteristics common to the whole 
class, and a special characteristic of its own — having the 
molar teeth covered with sharp points. 

Under the second aspect of the concept, he should also 
become aware that the subordinate class, insect-eating 
bats, consists of two more subordinate classes or families 
— the leafy-nosed bat and the pointed-ear bat. 

He should become conscious that the first of these 
includes the six characteristics common to the insect-eat- 
ing bats and a special characteristic of its own — having a 
leafy outgrowth on the nose. 

He should know that the second of these subordinate 
classes includes the six characteristics belonging to the 
insect-eating bats and a peculiar characteristic of its own 
— having pointed ears. 

The third aspect of the concept should be clarified by 
having it signify the identity of any particular bat, with 
the five characteristics common to the whole class; with 



158 The Problem of Method 

the six characteristics common to one or the other of the 
first two subordinate chisses ; and the identity of the par- 
ticular bat with the several characteristics common to one 
or the other of the two families of either class. 

It is indeed true that all education consists largely in 
the clarification of concepts. 

b. Judgment. 

In the development of mental activity there is no dis- 
tinct break. Conception is an outgrowth of the lower 
forms of mental activity, and judgment is a mere develop- 
ment of conception. Its likenesses to conception are great- 
er than its differences. Sense-perception, memory, and 
imagination make the mind conscious of the particulars of 
the world; the act of understanding and the act of con- 
ceiving are mental processes in which the mind becomes 
conscious of the general w^hich is exhibited in these par- 
ticulars. The object known in conception is complex, in- 
volving the common or general, and the particular which 
manifests the general. 

These factors, however, that is, the particular, the set 
of common attributes, and the identity are somewhat 
indistinct in the concept. The general, or the set of com- 
mon attributes, possesses in conception the highest degree 
of clearness. It remains true, however, that in conception 
the mind is conscious of an object which is complex in that 
it consists of two factors and their relation of identity. 
One of these factors is the individual object, the other is 
the universal and the third their identity. 

The function of the act of judging is to make the sej)- 
aration of the particular from the general very distinct 
and at the same time to make emphatic or explicit the 
relation. 



The Problem of Method 159 

In judgment the relation is brought into distinct con- 
sciousness, but it is not exflained. The explanation of the 
relation which the copula expresses, is reserved for the act 
of reasoning. 

In order to know the nature of the act of judging, the 
student must be conscious of the difference of an existence 
or object in itself, and this same existence or object as 
thought about. For example, a metal existing in the earth 
of which no one has ever been conscious, is a mere exist- 
ence, a mere object. If a person becomes conscious of it, 
the object has changed. It is then a thought-of object. 

If an attribute of the object is abstracted by the mind, 
this attribute is not a mere attribute. It is a thought-of 
attribute. 

If the identity between the object, which is being 
thought of, and the attribute which is being thought of, 
is known, it becomes a thought-of identity. The same is 
true if difference is discovered. 

The thought of the object merging into the thought of 
the attribute and then into the thought of the identity or 
difference, as a single mental act, is the judgment. 

Since the terms, thought and idea are used here inter- 
changeably, the judgment may also be spoken of as fol- 
lows: The idea of the undifferentiated object merging 
into the idea of the attribute in itself as isolated, and into 
the idea of the actual identity or difference, of the actual 
object and the actual attribute, is, as a united mental 
process, the judgment. 

The judgment is a mental state in which the mind 
adjusts itself to a real object, a real attribute, and their 
real relation. It is not concerned with the idea of the 
object, the idea of the attribute, and the idea of the rela- 
tion of likeness or difference. These ideas themselves, as 
a single mental state, are the process of judging. 



160 The Problem oe Method 

A jiidgiiient is not a menial state denoting an idea and 
another idea and the idea of their relation. That is, it is 
not a mental act which denotes a mental state and an 
aspect of that mental state, and their identity or differ- 
ence, unless the judgment occurs in the study of psycholog- 
ical phenomena. In the investigation of psychical activ- 
ities the judgment is, of course, a mental state, signifying 
a mental object, a characteristic of it, and the identity of 
the two. If, for example, a person is examining a par- 
ticular state of hoping in himself, its attribute of having 
the element of expectation, and the identity of the hoping 
as an imdifferentiated object, and the attribute which is 
itself mental, it could be said that the judgment which is 
mental, is concerned with an object, an attribute, and a 
relation, all of which are mental. In this case the judg- 
ment would be the thought of the identity of the mental 
state and the characteristic of that mental state. 

In cases concerned with objects other than psycholog- 
ical, that which is identified with or differentiated 
from the attribute, is the actual object being thought of 
and not the idea of the object; the attribute that is identi- 
fied with or differentiated from the total object, is the 
actual attribute of the material object, and not the idea of 
the attribute; the relation of likeness or difference is the 
actual relation of the whole object and its attribute, which 
relation would be there whether any mind were conscious 
of it or not, and not a mere idea of the relation. 

A relation is not mental unless the object and the 
abstracted attribute are mental. If, for example, the 
object is sugar^ and the abstracted attribute sweety 
the relation is as material as the object and the attribute, 
and the relation would be there whether any one were 
conscious of it or not. 



The Problem of Method 161 

In a judgment expressed by a sentence, there are — 

The undifferentiated object, the abstracted attri- 
bute, and the relation. 

The idea of the undifferentiated object, the idea of 
the abstracted attribute, and the idea of the relation. 

The subject of the sentence, the predicate of the 
sentence, and the copula. 

It is generally said that the sentence expresses a judg- 
ment. Psychologically viewed, and expressed in more 
cumbersome way, the sentence expresses an object, which 
is known as an undifferentiated object, an attribute which 
has been abstracted and clearly known, and the known 
relation between the undifferentiated object and the ab- 
stracted attribute. The subject of the sentence expresses 
the undifferentiated object as known, the predicate 
expresses the abstracted attribute as known, the copula 
expresses the actual relation as known. 

The object expressed by the subject of the sentence is 
always particular when considered in relation to the object 
expressed by the predicate. If, for example, one says, 
"This stone is hard," it is evident that the object expressed 
by the subject of the sentence is particular, Avhile the attri- 
bute expressed by the predicate is general. It is some- 
times said, hoAvever, in cases such as the folloAving, that 
the subject of the sentence does not express a particular 
object: "Honesty should be sought." The object ex- 
pressed by the subject of the sentence even in this case is 
particular as compared Avith that which is expressed by 
the predicate. 

The judgment is a mental act Avhich can be more easily 
understood by the student than any other mental process, 
because it manifests so definitely the law belonging to the 
mind, as explained on page 6. 



12 



162 The Problem of Method 

The first stage of the judgment, which exhibits the first 
stage of the law of the mind, is the act of knowing the 
object as undifferentiated; the second is the act of abstract- 
ing or isolating an attribute from the object. This is a 
separative process, and corresponds to the second stage of 
the law of knowing, or of the law of the self as a whole ; 
the third is the act of becoming conscious of the identity 
of the isolated attribute and the total object. This is a 
synthetic stage, a stage of reunification, and hence it cor- 
responds to the third stage in the law of knowing and in 
the law of the total self. 

Judgment is the most universal form of mental action. 
Even when the child utters a single word, as hall^ this one 
term expresses an indefinite act of judging. Every act of 
sensing, sense perceiving, remembering, imagining, under- 
standing and conceiving, is an act of judging. It is also 
true that every act of inductive and of deductive reasoning 
is an act of judging. It therefore appears that there are 
two stages in the growth of judgment as a whole: 

Acts of judging concerning objects and attributes 
which have not been generalized^ that is, in which the 
mind has not yet become conscious of the presence and 
nature of the general. 

Acts of judging concerning objects and attributes 
that have been conceived, i. e., in which the general has 
been discovered. 

These judgments, however, as indicated previously, are 
not acts of knoAving the relation of concepts but rather 
acts of knowing the relation of objects which have pre- 
viously been made clear as to their relation by the dis- 
covery that they manifest the general. 

The psychological activity of judging is, therefore, a 
development of conception. In conception the self is con- 
scious of a universal, a particular, and their unity. There 



The Problem of Method 163 

is a distinct consciousness of the universal as such, but the 
knowledge of the identity of the universal and the par- 
ticular is implicit. Judgment is a higher mode of know- 
ing than is conception in that, in judgment, the conscious- 
ness of the relation of the general to the particular be- 
comes explicit. The judgment involves discrimination as 
an element, because the general and the particular, as the 
basis of distinct identifying, are held apart in conscious- 
ness. Comparing and identifying are also elements. The 
explicit knowledge of the identity constitutes the develop- 
ment out of conception. 

The consciousness of the relation of the general and the 
particular is, in judgment, so distinct that it is called an 
assertion. The assertion is mental. It is the act of identi- 
fying, and may afterwards be expressed in the copula of 
the sentence. The word "assertion" denotes, primarily, 
the mental act of asserting. It is also used, however, with 
reference to the language itself. Since in the act of con- 
ception the mind is conscious of (1) the universal or the 
generic activity, (2) the subordinate modes of the generic 
activity, (3) the particular, and (4) of the further fact 
that the particular manifests the generic activity, the act 
•of judging is merely the explicit knowledge of the same 
factors. 

The characteristic fact of which the self becomes con- 
scious in its process of judging is that the particular is 
generic. This is implicit in every judgment and may be 
observed by noticing any expressed judgment, as, "This 
Doric column is fluted. The attribute expressed by the 
word "fluted," is produced by a generic activity. It is the 
general activity which produces fluting. When, there- 
fore, the attribute expressed by the word "fluted" is as- 
serted of the Doric column, it is the same as asserting that 
the Doric column manifests the activity that gives rise 



164 The Problem of Method 

to fluting. The activit}^ which produces the attribute ex- 
pressed in the predicate is al*ways included in the larger 
activity which produces the object expressed by the sub- 
ject of the sentence. 

No attribute can be asserted of a Doric column 
which may not be produced by the larger activity that 
creates the column itself. For example, one may not 
say, "The Doric column is moral." That is because the 
attribute expressed by the word "moral" is not one which 
can be produced by the activity that gives rise to the 
Doric column. The object which the subject of the sen- 
tence expresses is produced by a generic activity. The 
attribute which the predicate expresses is also produced 
by a generic activity. This second generic activity is, 
however, a mere element in the more comprehensive 
generic activity which creates the object that the subject 
of the sentence expresses. When, therefore, the sentence 
asserts an attribute of the object, it, in reality, asserts that 
the generic activity which produced that attribute is man- 
ifested by the object which the subject of the sentence 
denotes. It is evident that the subject of the sentence 
expresses a known object, the predicate a known attribute, 
and the copula a known identity. The fact that the par- 
ticular is spoken of as a column and as Doric, indicates 
that the mind is conscious that the particular manifests 
the generic, i. e., the universal activity which produces 
columns, and that it also manifests that subordinate form 
of column-producing activity known as Doric. 

The word "fluted" also denotes the presence of a 
generic activity, since the attribute expressed by the word 
is one of the potential products of column-producing 
activity. If this assertion is made, "This nail is rusting," 
the attribute expressed by the word "rusting" must be 
implied in the activity which creates the nail. This activ- 



The Problem of Method 165 

ity is able to produce an object which is capable of rusting 
or that attribute could not be asserted of the completed 
object. However far removed an attribute may be from 
the nature of the producing activity it is always one of 
potentialities either directly or remotely. 

It appears from this analysis that the process in an act 
of judgment is: Consciousness of a particular, of a uni- 
versal, and of their unity. Hence, the judgment seems to 
represent more closely than does any other form of know- 
ing, the characteristic process or law of the mind. The 
knowledge of the object as a whole, or as indistinct, corre- 
sponds to the first stage in the law of the self as has pre- 
viously been stated. The knowledge of the universal, that 
is, of the abstracted attribute, corresponds to the second 
stage in the law of the self. 

The knowledge of the relation of the particular and 
the isolated attribute corresponds to the third stage in the 
mind's law in that it is re-unification. 

The inference is that the subject of a sentence always 
expresses a particular, at least in comparison with that 
which the predicate denotes; that the predicate expresses 
a universal and the copula a unity of the two. If one says 
"This pencil is short" it is evident that the object ex- 
pressed by the subject of the sentence is a particular and 
that expressed by the predicate of the sentence is a gen- 
eral. The subject of the sentence expresses a particular 
and the predicate a general in the following: "Hope en- 
courages." The object expressed by the subject of the 
sentence is particular compared with that expressed by 
the predicate of the sentence. 

Let this inference be examined by a consideration of 
examples under the classes of sentences : 

On the basis of the characteristic process of the self, 
judgments are immediate, conditional, or definitive. This 



166 The Problem of Method 

is, perhaps, the fundamental division in judgments and in 
sentences, since it is based upon the characteristic process 
of consciousness. 

Examples of these forms are : 

This flower is blue. 

If the snow is melting it is warm. 

A circle is an enclosed space, every point in the 
circumference of which is equally distant from a point 
within called the center. 

On the basis of whether the attribute expressed by the 
predicate adds to the meaning of the object expressed by 
the subject of the sentence, judgments are analytic and 
synthetic, as: 

The robin is a bird. 

This flower is blue. 

The shortest distance between two points is a 
straight line. 

The first of these is regarded as analytic, because the 
object expressed by the word roMn is thought to include 
the characteristics denoted by the word hird. The second 
and third are considered to be synthetic on the ground 
that the attribute expressed by the predicate adds a new 
characteristic to the object expressed by the subject. It is 
probable that all judgments termed synthetic are, psycho- 
logically viewed, analytic. 

On the basis of the necessity of the unity of the partic- 
ular and the universal, judgments have been classed by 
Kant, Brougham, Sir William Hamilton and others as 
contingent and apodeictical. An example of the contin- 
gent form is "All existences are useful," while the apodeic- 
tical form is shown in "Only one straight line can be 
drawn between two points." 



The Problem or Method 167 

On the basis of purpose judgments are classed into four 
kinds exemplified by the following : 

Iron is a metal. 

Is the book heavy ? 

Open the letter. 

"How far that little candle throws its beams!" 
On the basis of the number of psychological assertions 
of the unity of the general and the particular, and the 
relation of these thoughts, judgments are classed as sim- 
ple, complex, compound and compound-complex, as : 

This flower is blue. 

This flower which is in the vase is wild. 
This flower is mine and the vase is mine. 
This flower which is in the vase is mine and the 
vase is mine. 

On the basis of whether the relation asserted is unity 
or difference, judgments are classed as positive, or neg- 
ative, as: 

Anger is an emotion. 
This fruit is not an apple. 

It will be of advantage to examine, one by one, each of 
these judgments given to illustrate the various classes, in 
order to decide whether the mind is conscious of a par- 
ticular in that which is expressed by the subject, and of a 
general or universal in that which is expressed by the 
predicate; and also to determine whether the relation 
expressed is always, fundamentally, one of unity, even in 
those cases in which the Avriter's intention is to denote 
difference. 

It is evident that the mind asserts a unity between the 
particular and the general in the judgment, "This flower 
is blue." In the sentence, "Iron is a metal," is this also 
the case ? A single fragment of the iron of the world, or 



168 The Problem of Method 

the whole of the iron existing may be regarded as a par- 
ticuhir object. That which the self is conscious of as 
denoted b}^ the predicate seems on the surface to be a 
space-occupying object, lleflection, however, indicates 
that the mind, is thinking of the cJuiraetenstics of metal 
or the attribute, being in the ddss^ metals. 

Each of these is a general, and hence wider than the 
object expressed b}^ the word "iron." 

The same may be shown in regard' to the mind's act of 
judging as expressed in the sentence, "Anger is an 
emotion," 

The nature of the mental process in judging, may be 
made more clear by examining the negative form in order 
to determine whether the clearly expressed relation of 
difference is really intended to signify the existing nature 
of the object. If this is the case, all acts of judging are, 
essentially, a consciousness of the unity of a particular 
and a general, although the expression in the sentence may 
manifest the mind's attention to difference, which mental 
state is also present. The example given above is, "This 
fruit is not an apple." 

The one who uses the sentence evidently intends to 
exj)ress the thought that the fruit under consideration is 
dijjereiit from the apple, i. e., that it does not manifest 
the characteristics of the class, apjyle. Does not the w^riter 
thereby express, secondarily, the unity of the particular, 
expressed by this fruity with the attribute, expressed by 
(liferent fromj the apple? 

The foregoing examples may be examined further for 
the purpose of considering whether the mental act of 
judging is consciousness of the unity of a particular object 
and the attribute of that object, or whether it is a con- 
sciousness of the relation of concepts. 



The Problem of Method 169 

In the judgment expressed by the sentence, "This flower 
is bhie," does the writer of it intend to express his thought 
that the idea of the object is in identity with the idea of 
the attribute, or is it his purpose to express his notion that 
there is a unity of the space-occupying object expressed 
by the words, "this flower," and its actual attribute de- 
noted by the word, "blue?" 

The judgment has been sjDoken of as "the assertion of a 
relation between two mental elements." This assumes 
that the judgment is a mental process of becoming aware 
of one concept, then of another, and then of their relation. 
This seems too mechanical, and it always implies three 
factors as underlying every sentence, e. g., "This wood is 
hard." These factors are : 

The actual wood, the actual attribute expressed by the 
word, "hard" and the actual relation of unity. 

The concept denoted by the word, "wood," and the con- 
cept denoted by the word, "hard," and the concept of 
their unity. 

The consciousness of the unity of the two concepts is 
supposed to be the actual judgment. Is it a mental asser- 
tion concerning two mental objects which denote two 
physical objects? It would seem that the psychical act 
of judging is more related to reality than that. Since the 
hearer is closely concerned with the relation of the w^ood 
itself to its own attributes, it does not occur to him that 
the speaker is expressing his thought concerning his own 
mental states. It seems probable that, considered psycho- 
logically, the given sentence expresses the known unity of 
the actual object and the actual attribute of which the 
person is conscious. In the judgment this attribute w^as 
abstracted from the complex object and identified with 
it at the same time, for the second and third stages in the 
act of judging are practically contemporaneous. 



170 The Problem of Method 

What, psychologically, is the relation of the extent of 
the object expressed by the subject of the sentence, and 
the extent of the attribute expressed by the predicate? 
The mere form of the sentence, sometimes indicates that 
the attribute may be of wider extent, as, "The pencil is 
hard." In other cases the form suggests equality of extent, 
as, "A man's a man," "Four equals four." Considered 
with reference to the psychological process, the attribute 
denoted by the predicate appears to be of greater extent 
in all cases than the object expressed by the subject. This 
seems evident in regard to the sentence, "The pencil is 
hard." Reflection will show that such is the case, also, in 
the other examples, "A man's a man," and "Four equals 
four." The word "man," in the subject means a partic- 
ular man, i. e., a man with his ignorance, poverty, ragged 
clothes, evil tendencies, etc., while the word, "man," in the 
predicate denotes manhood, or the potentiality of man- 
hood. A similar explanation may be given for "Four 
equals four." 

The fact that judgment is studied as a development of 
conception, does not imply that judging is not manifested 
at all in the earlier stages of consciousness. The mind is 
really judging implicitly in every case of sensation, sense- 
perception, memory, etc. As noted before, even the mental 
activity of the child which is expressed in the single word, 
"ball," is some implicit judgment, as, "This is a ball." 

Why, then, is there an explicit treatment of a special 
form of psychical action known as jitdgment? Judgment, 
as that form of mental action which is the stage succeed- 
ing conception, is a distinctive form. It is a mode of 
judging possible after the mind has become somewhat con- 
ceptive in its thinking and it involves, consciously, a con- 
ceived general in the predicate. It thus seems that the 



The Problem of Method 171 

psychological activity of judging is a constant form, ap- 
pearing at first implicitly, and afterwards, explicitly. 

While, however, the judgment may be viewed as a psy- 
chological activity developing from conception, it is in a 
crude form the mental state out of which the concept 
arises. This is well shown by the following from Angell's 
Psychology, page 228 : 

"All of which seems to indicate with no great uncertainty that 
the origin of such a concept as badness is to be found in mental pro- 
cesses which are in their nascent stages crude, vague, undeveloped 
judgments, involving a rudimentary recognition of relations between 
certain more or less distinct portions of our experience. We get at 
these elements of experience mentally by means of rudely disting- 
uished ideas— in the case of our illustration the idea of the act and the 
idea of its consequences. Such concepts as this, i. e., badness, owe 
their creation, then, to elaborations of already attained ideas in a 
primitive form of judgment." 

Judgment more fmidamental than conception. 

It is more fundamental than conception because, as 
noted above, it involves a more extended consciousness. 
In conception the knowledge of the unity of the partic- 
ular and the set of common attributes is implicit, while in 
judgment it has become explicit. This implies a more 
distinct discrimination of the general and the particular. 
The general and the particular also become more distinct 
or differentiated in themselves in judgment. 

The neural basis of judgment. 

In judgment the object may be known through sense- 
perception, memory, imagination, or conception. The 
neural basis in such cases is that which has been pre- 
viously noted under each of these activities. In the first 
case it would be primarily peripheral and then cortical. 
In the three other cases, it would be primarily cortical 
and, secondarily, peripheral. 



172 The Problem of Method 

The second process in judgment is abstraction. In 
abstraction the attention is withdrawn from all of the 
attributes except one and concentrated upon that. It is, 
therefore, a case of attention, and would involve those 
neural changes underlying an act of purposing with the 
accompanying muscular contraction. 

The third stage is the act of identifying the isolated 
attribute with the object as a whole. This would prob- 
ably involve to a certain extent, nervous changes in the 
form of cortical reaction accompanied by the action of the 
Flechsig association centers. 

Educational principles. 

The following pedagogical principles are among those 
which seem to be based on the nature of judging: 

To foster accurate habits of judging in the pupil he 
should be so directed in work that he will first concentrate 
his attention on the object. This will isolate it from the 
environment. 

He should then be directed so that he will analyze the 
object, thus abstracting the included attribute. As he 
becomes aware of this attribute he identifies it with the 
object. 

He should then be led to analyze the attribute, that is, 
the general. It is important to have the pupil become as 
clear as possible concerning the nature of this attribute 
which is in unity with the object, because it is by means 
of this clearly understood attribute that the nature of the 
object is to be learned. 

His educational work should also lead him to com- 
pare the extent of the attribute with that of the object. 
This means that the pupil is to become distinctly con- 
scious that the attribute, for example, that expressed by 
the word, "blue," belongs to many objects besides the one 



The Problem of Method 173 

under consideration, and that this object is thereby identi- 
fied to a degree with all the other objects in which this 
attribute is found. 

The pupil should also observe that this attribute is 
narrower in a certain sense than the total object, because 
it is only one of the many different aspects of the object. 

The power of judgment can be strengthened still further 
by a careful examination of sentences. For example, in 
studying the sentence, "The j^ellow pine hardens," ability 
in judging is increased by answering such questions as, 
"What change in the extent of the object expressed by 
the word, "pine," is made by considering the attributes 
expressed by the words, "yellow" and "the," as belonging 
to it? What attribute is expressed by the word, "hard- 
ens" ? "Does this word also denote the unity of the object 
and the attribute?" "How can the predicate be given so 
as to express, explicitly, both attribute and relation" ? 

The pupil's power of judgment may be increased in a 
very effective way by having him express a thought and 
then, after studying the expression, again express it more 
precisely. 

c. Reasoning, 

In judgment, the relation is not mediated. That is, the 
two definite relations which justify the assertion in judg- 
ment are not distinctly recognized. It is true, however, 
that the relation of the particular object to the universal 
is explicitly known in judgment. The word, "judgment," 
is often used in popular speech to signify the act of rea- 
soning, as in the sentence, "He is a person of excellent 
judgment;" but strictly considered, the relation of which 
one is aware in judging is not, as just noted, consciously 
mediated. What is the advance in consciousness which 
mediates the relation? When, in judging, the self discov- 



174 The Problem or Method 

ers the unity of the particular with the general, it has 
become conscious of a truth concerning the particular 
object. In order that this truth shall become mediated to 
the mind, the consciousness of its dependence on two other 
truths must arise. The relation or truth which is known 
in judgment is always an element of these larger truths, 
or these two truths are the invariable accompaniment or 
sign of the relation known in the act of judging. In the 
mere act of judgment, however, these other relations, 
which are the ground or sign of the relation asserted, are 
not noticed, at least not explicitly. If these other truths 
are observed and held to be the basis or sign of the rela- 
tion between the particular and the generic, of which the 
person is conscious in judging, the relation is mediated. 
This is the development in consciousness which reasoning 
manifests, considered as a stage of knowing which arises 
out of judgment. 

In judgment the idea that the particular is in unity with 
or different from the generic is in a certain sense imme- 
diate. The function of reasoning is to mediate this idea : 
that is, to become conscious of its relation to two other 
relations, that explain it. It becomes mediated when the 
person becomes conscious of the basis of the relation ; that 
is, when he knows why he deems the relation to be true. 
This thought is expressed on page 221 of Dewey's Psy- 
chology^ as follows : 

''Reasoning is that act of mind which recognizes those relations 
of any content of consciousness through which it has the meaning 
which it has, or is what it is. ' ' 

The relations, referred to, are two. What these rela- 
tions are might be discovered by noticing an inductive 
process and a deductive process. Assume the following to 
be an inductive process: 



The Problem of Method 175 

I become conscious of a long strip of newspaper. 

I abstract or notice the attribute heing yellow, 

I class the object in the class "old newspapers." 

I become conscious that the activity which brings into 
existence this class, "the old newspaper," is uniform in 
its process. 

I notice that the process of producing "the old news- 
paper" has, in the given case, produced it with the attri- 
bute "being yellow." 

I infer that all newspapers grow yellow with age. 
In this last judgment I have discovered the meaning 
which the particular object has. I become aware of two 
relations that enabled me to discover the meaning. In the 
first place, the relation of the object to the producing 
activity was noticed. 

In the second place, the relation of a particular attri- 
bute of the object to the producing activity is known. 
That is, the observer discovered exactly what attribute was 
given to the object by the producing activity. 

These two relatione, namely, the relation of the pro- 
ducing activity to the wkole class, in being uniform, and 
the relation of the particular object to the uniform activ- 
ity, as exhibited in the special attribute, are the peculiar 
relations of induction which justify the assertion. The 
syllogism is as follows : 

The activity or environment which changes a new 
newspaper to an old newspaper is uniform in its process. 

The process in making this particular piece of news- 
paper old caused it to appear faded or yellow. 

All old newspapers have a faded or 3^ellow appear- 
ance. 



176 The Problem of Method 

The following may be assumed as the deductive process : 

I become conscious of the long strip of paper upon 
the wall. 

I abstract or begin to think of the attribute being old 
and inquire whether that attribute belongs to the paper. 

I class the paper as a piece of faded, yellow news- 
paper. 

I analyze the class and recognize the fact that one 
characteristic of the objects of the class is that of "being 
old." 

I infer that this piece of newspaper is old. 
The two relations that enable me to become conscious of 
the meaning of the object are the following : 

Its relation of identity with the class "faded yellow 
newspapers." 

Its identity with the essential attributes, that are 
found to belong to each object of the class. 
The syllogism is as follows : 

All pieces of faded yellow newspaper are old. 

This piece of newspaper is faded or yellow. 

Therefore it is old. 
Three forms of reasoning may be mentioned, although 
the first is merely an inaccurate aspect of induction or 
deduction. Neither induction nor deduction is a distinct 
process in itself. The two constitute one concrete process. 
Every case of concrete reasoning involves both. 

Identification. 

This is the inaccurate reasoning of the untrained thinker 
who notices hut partially the two truths which are the 
basis of the relation asserted. The relations thought of in 
identification as the ground of the unity between the par- 
ticular and the generic are characteristic of other unities 
than the one asserted. They may or may not be its 



The Problem of Method 177 

basis in the given case. If one regards a certain ground 
material to be coffee, because it is brown in color, the act 
is identification. 

The initial stage in the process is the creation of an 
image of the object. Identification is, as noted above, 
merely a case of inaccurate induction or deduction. 

Induction. 

The particular object in the judgment of induction is 
the entire class. The universal is an attribute which is 
judged to belong to each object of the class, and not 
merely to those which have been examined. 

What are the relations or truths which are regarded as 
the ground of the identity of the particular and the gen- 
eral of which one is conscious in the judgment involved in 
the act of induction? This may be shown with another 
example. Assume that one becomes conscious in an act of 
induction that "All adverbs express an attribute of an at- 
tribute." The objects denoted by "All adverbs" constitute 
the particular object; the attribute denoted by "express 
an attribute of an attribute" is the general ; the relation is 
one of unity. 

What are the two other relations which are the ground 
or sign of this relation? They are (1) the unity of ad- 
verb-producing activity and the attribute of being uni- 
form, and (2) the fact that the activity has produced this 
one adverb with the characteristic expressed in the pred- 
icate. Thus the person believes that the process of pro- 
ducing the adverb is always substantially the same, and 
he observes that in this case, it has made the adverb pos- 
sess the characteristic of "expressing an attribute of an 
attribute." 

What are the special stages in the process of induction? 
These have been previously considered on pages 41 and 
42, hence will be but briefly noticed here: 

13 



178 The Problem of Method 

A particular object (an adverb) is known in the process 
which has been spoken of as the language act. This spe- 
cial process should occur with many such objects for the 
purpose of stimulating the act of isolating the general. 

The result is that the mind abstracts an attribute, as, 
expressing aii attribute of an attribute. 

The objects are then thought of as being members of a 
class, or the mind continues to think of them thus. It may 
be that the name is known and that they are understood 
to be adverbs. 

The person who is studying them becomes conscious that 
there is a uniformity in the process of creating adverbs. 

He knows that the process has given to all those objects 
which have been examined the characteristic of expressing 
an attribute of an attribute. 

The inference is then made that the relation expressed 
in the judgment is true because of the truths asserted 
concerning the general process of producing the adverb. 

This completes the process, and the relation expressed 
in the judgment of the induction has become mediated. 

The act begins in the creation of an image and the func- 
tion of this image is to denote, not especially the relation 
of the particular and the general, but rather the relation 
of the identity which is asserted to the two other relations, 
which are (1) the uniformity of the objectifying process 
and (2) the special result of the creating activity in this 
given case. 

Induction is sometimes spoken of as analytic. It is, 
however, both synthetic and analytic. It begins with an 
indefinite knowledge of an object as a Avhole, analyzes the 
object in abstracting one of its attributes, identifies the 
object with a class, identifies the class with an activity 
which is uniform in its process and by these means syn- 
thesizes the particular object, (which finally becomes the 



The Problem of Method 179 

whole class) and the isolated attribute. If the conscious- 
ness of these two relations which are the basis of the 
identity asserted in the judgment is implicit^ induction 
may be termed empirical or a posteriori reasoning. If the 
consciousness is explicit^ the induction may be termed a 
priori reasoning. 

Induction more fundamental than judgment. 

The process of induction is more fundamental than 
judgment in that it involves not onl}^ a consciousness of 
the direct relation between the particular, which is the 
whole class, and the general, but also a knowledge of two 
other relations, namely, the uniformity of the process and 
its specific results in this given case. Along with this 
there is also a knowledge of the fact that these two rela- 
tions are the ground of the direct relation. 

Educational principles. 

The pedagogical implications in the inductive process 
contain, among others, the following: 

The pupil should examine, as a whole, a sufficient num- 
ber of objects to emphasize the attribute which is to be 
abstracted. 

The attribute should then be clearly abstracted and 
considered. 

Attention should then be given to the process and to 
the fact that it is substantially uniform. For example, if 
the object is a grain of com and the attribute to be ab- 
stracted is that of possessing a pericarp^ the process is 
corn-producing activity and the pupil should be led to 
notice that it seems to be practically uniform. The gen- 
eral uniformity of processes in nature and in the activities 
of man in cultivating corn, should be illustrated in exam- 
ples that may be easily understood. 



180 The Problem of Method 

Emphasis should then be given to the special result in 
the given case of this process Avhich is held to be uniform, 
that is, the fact should be dAvelt upon that this process 
has manifested itself in this special case by producing a 
given particular attribute and that it is considered to be 
uniform in its mode of action. 

The fact that this abstracted attribute is a character- 
istic of the class should then be stated as a law in simple 
language. 

The pupil should finally be led to test the law by the 
examination of new cases. 

The general result should be that the pupil would tend 
to experience dissatisfaction if he were not given an 
opportunity to examine an adequate number of objects in 
order to discover the law and afterwards to study a suf- 
ficient number of new cases to test it. 

Deduction. 

This process, as previously noted, is merely one aspect 
of reasoning, induction being the other. The result of 
induction is that the self has become conscious of the gen- 
eral truth or law of the class. This has enriched the 
mind's past experience, which is always employed in 
knowing new objects or new truths about old objects. The 
employment of this idea of the general which the mind 
has discovered in its inductive process, to answer an 
inquir}^ about a particular object is deduction. The as- 
sumption is that the object is not accessible and hence can 
not be examined, or that for some reason it is not advis- 
able to examine it directly, to the extent necessary to ascer- 
tain whether it possesses the inquired-for attribute. The 
particular object in deduction is, therefore, some single 
existence and not a class. 



The Problem of Method 181 

The deductive process begins with the idea of this par- 
ticular object as a whole. 

This idea stimulates the mind to abstract or isolate some 
attribute and to inquire whether the object is character- 
ized by this gixen attribute. 

Since there is no direct way of determining whether the 
object possesses the attribute, the mind proceeds to iden- 
tify the object with a class suggested by other attributes 
which are obviousl}^ present. It is the assumption that 
the act of identifying it with that particular class will 
give special aid in knowing whether the inquired-for 
characteristic belongs to the particular object. It would 
not suffice to class the particular object with any class 
whatever. The person engaged in the deductive act knows 
his own purpose and he will naturally be impelled to 
identify the object with a class, the consideration of which 
will further the investigation. 

The act of classing the object is succeeded by an analy- 
sis of the class to which it has been referred in order to 
have clearly in consciousness the essential characteristics 
since this will give opportunity to notice whether the 
inquired-for attribute is among the characteristics of the 
class. 

The result of this analysis may be that the attribute 
which was inquired for is not found among the essential 
characteristics. In such a case, the mind considers that 
attribute to be lacking in the particular object. This last 
act is the conclusion, or the deductive judgment. 

What are the related truths, the consciousness of which 
has mediated the truth asserted in the deductive judg- 
ment? One is the fact that the inquired-for attribute is 
not an essential characteristic of the class. The other is 
the identity of this object with the class. 



The Problem of Method 



In order to illustrate the process, let the following activ- 
ities be assumed : 

The mind becomes conscious of a certain grain. This is 
knowing it as a whole. 

The mind, then, influenced by some external stimulus 
or idea, abstracts, i. e., centers its attention on a certain 
attribute, "as, having an endopleura^ and begins to think 
whether this grain possesses such a coat. 

.Alearone Grains 



Pericarp 




Outer Surface 



Testa 



• Starch cells 
Cross Section of Outer Edge of a Grain of Sugar Corn. 
A seed proper may have a variable number of coats, from one to three, depend- 
ing on the species. In most seeds there is a tough or hard outer coat called the testa. 
A grain differs from a seed in that the former has in addition to its regular coat 
or coats the pod fused with the coat of the seed proper. The portion which repre- 
sents the pod in a grain is called the pericarp. 

In the corn the pericarp consists of two layers, an outer epidermal layer and an 
inner layer, both having thick walled cells. Beneath the pericarp is the thin testa. 

In order to answer this question the grain must be iden- 
tified with some class which its obvious attributes suggest, 
provided such identity will aid in the answer, as will 
usually be the case if the object is thoughtfully classed. In 
the given case, the fact that the grain is wedge-shaped 
and that it has an indentation on one side at the scutellum 
are noticed and in consequence, the grain is classed as a 
grain of com. 



The Problem or Method 183 

The mind then remembers the general truth concerning 
the arrangement of coats in grains of corn which it has 
acquired in previous inductions, namely, that grains of 
corn possess two coats only, the pericarp and a slight 
testa. 

This leads to the judgment that the grain being consid- 
ered has no endopleura. This ends the deductive process. 
Its result concerns one object only. 

In deduction the mind is synthetic in first knowing the 
object as undifferentiated. 

It then becomes analytic in abstracting the inquired-for 
attribute. 

The process is then synthetic in the act of classing the 
object. 

It then becomes analytic in distinguishing the class into 
its essential characteristics. 

The process is finally synthetic in the concluding judg- 
ment, and in identifying the truth expressed in the judg- 
ment, with the two truths upon which it depends; in the 
given case, (1) with the fact that grains of corn possess no 
endopleura, and (2) with the fact that this is a grain of 
com. 

If the consciousness of the relation of the truth ex- 
pressed in the judgment to the other relations that are its 
basis is implicit^ deductive reasoning is empirical or a 
posteriori. If the consciousness of this relation is explicit^ 
the reasoning is a priori. 

The two aspects of the one process of reasoning are, 
considered as a unit, a procedure from a somewhat fused 
particular through a general to a more clearly known par- 
ticular. This is also the process in each aspect, although, 
if superficially noticed, induction seems to be merely a 
procedure from the particular to the general and deduc- 
tion a procedure from the general to the particular. 



184 The Problem of Method 

The fact that the identity asserted in both the deductive 
and the inductive judgment is grounded on two other rela- 
tions gives rise to the syllogism so much emphasized in 
logic. 

Dcdaction less fundamental than induction. 

Induction is, as a process, less vital and fundamental 
til an induction because it seems to be concerned with 
accomplished results rather than with producing activ- 
ities, and results are always less universal than the creative 
energy which gives rise to them. Deduction is more fun- 
da)nental than judgment in that it involves not merely a 
judgment, but also a consciousness of the relation of the 
identity asserted in the judgment to two other relations 
of identity; namely, the identity of the whole class with 
the essential characteristic and the identity of the partic- 
ular object with the class, as to the essential attributes. 

It will be of advantage to the student to make clear to 
himself by examining various cases of concrete reasoning 
the fact that all such cases involve both induction and 
deduction. For example, let the deductive process of dis- 
coA'cring that a particular grain of corn has no endopleura 
be reconsidered for the purpose of showing the presence 
of the inductive element in it. 

The first process is becoming conscious of the grain of 
corn, as a whole. This is, also, the first process in induc- 
tion. 

The second process is the abstracting of a given char- 
acteristic and inquiring whether it is present. Abstract- 
ing is the second process in induction also. 

The third process is that of classifying the grain as a 
grain of corn on attributes observed to be present. This 
process of classifying is the third process in all cases of 
induction. 



The Problem of Method 185 

The mind then reflects that grains of corn have two 
coats only, the pericarp and a slight testa. This general 
truth is the result of a previous act of induction. 

The deduction concludes with the judgment that this 
given grain of corn has no endopleura. This truth is the 
result of a previous induction. By the inductive process 
in previous cases, the mind had learned the general prin- 
ciple or law that the particular object does not manifest a 
given essential attribute provided that attribute does not 
belong to the whole class. 

The neural basis of reasoning. 

In so far as sense-perception, memory, imagination, 
conception and simple judgment are involved, the neural 
basis belonging to them is implied. The peculiar process 
of reasoning, i. e., recognizing the relation of the two rela- 
tions to the asserted relation implies cortical changes not 
clearly known. 

Educational principles. 

Among the pedagogical principles which may be traced 
to deduction the following should be noticed : 

The essential characteristics of any class of objects 
should be clearly distinguished from those that are merely 
common, and also from the peculiar characteristics. 

The learner should be led to notice carefully, what the 
inquiry concerning the object is. For example, in regard 
to the grain which was observed he should emphasize the 
fact that the inquiry concerned itself with the coats of the 
grain, and particularly, as to whether it possessed the coat 
called endopleura. 

He must then be made conscious that he must know two 
things in order to answer the question; namely, the class 
to which the object belongs, corn, and the characteristic 



186 The Problem of Method 

of the class in regard to coats, i. e., that it has two coats 
only, the pericarp and the testa. 

He should be given exercises that will improve his abil- 
ity to select promptly and accurately the special attri- 
bute or attributes that indicate the class of the object. For 
example, in regard to the grain of corn, he should observe 
that two attributes, especially, are helpful in classing it; 
namely, its wedge-like shape and the indentation upon the 
side. 

The inadequate conception of reasoning usually 
possessed by those who have made no study of the process 
in a professional school for the training of teachers, may 
be inferred by an examination of a series of statements 
given under Appendix VII. 

A summary of the stages of knowing may be made by 
indicating the function of the image. 

On pages 24-25 the nature of the image is briefly 
explained, and in the first paragraph of the treatment of 
conception, page 204, of Dewey's Psychology^ a distinction 
is made between the image or particular mental act and 
its function. The author indicates that perception does 
not differ from conception on account of the difference in 
the particular image^ considered as an existing mental 
state^ but rather on account of a difference in the function 
or meaning which the image has. 

It may be of advantage to show this distinction through- 
out the series of intellectual activities : 

Sense-perception — An act in which the mind constructs 
a particular image or state, and then interprets it to mean 
a present particular object. 

Memory — An act in which the mind re-creates a partic- 
ular mental state or image, and then interprets it to mean 
a particular object once present but not present now. 



The Problem of Method 187 

Imagination — An act in which the mind creates a par- 
ticular image, and then interprets it to mean a particular 
object not present now and at no time present. 

The Language Act — An act in which the mind con- 
structs a particular image appropriate to language and 
meaning or to meaning and language, and then interprets 
it to signify that the language symbolizes the meaning. 
Thus, the image denotes that identity of language and 
meaning which may be referred to as the relation of sign 
and thing signified. 

Understanding. 

Apprehending — The mind's act of creating a particular 
image and then interpreting it, indistinctly, to signify the 
meaning of the object. 

Distinguishing. 

Abstracting — The mind's act of creating a particu- 
lar mental state or image, and then interpreting it to mean 
an isolated element in the meaning of the object. 

Discriminating — The mind's act of creating a par- 
ticular mental state or image, and then interpreting the 
image to mean the difference of the two or more objects 
being contemplated, notwithstanding their unity in a 
single mental activity. 

Comparing — The mind's act of constructing a par- 
ticular mental state or image, and then interpreting the 
image to mean the unity of the two or more objects dis- 
criminated in regard to some selected common attribute. 

Classifying. 

Generalizing — The mind's act of creating a particu- 
lar image, and then interpreting it to mean the unity of the 
object with the class. 



188 The Problem of Method 

Analyzing the object into cause and effect — The 
mind's act of creating a particular state or image, and then 
interpreting it to mean the object as distinguished into 
cause and effect. 

Discovering the structural idea of an object — The 
mind's act of creating a particular mental state or image, 
and then interpreting this image to mean the activity or 
idea revealed in each aspect of the object, considered as 
passive. 

Ratiocination. 

Conceiving — The mind's act of creating a particular 
mental state or image, and then interpreting this image to 
signify the universal creative activity underlying the 
given object and all others of its class, the prominent sub- 
ordinate modes of the creative activity, and the fact that 
each object manifests both the general producing activity 
and one subordinate activity, i. e., that each particular is 
generic. In a more simple process the image may be inter- 
preted to mean the common attributes under the same 
stages. 

Judging — The mind's act of creating a particular state 
or image, and then interpreting the image to signify the 
relation existing between an isolated attribute and the 
remainder of the object from which the attribute has been 
isolated. 

Reasoning. 

Identifying — The mind's act of creating a particu- 
lar mental state or image, and then interpreting the image 
to mean that the object being known belongs to a class on 
the basis of an attribute pertaining not only to that class, 
but to other classes. This is the basis of possible error. 



The Problem of Method 189 

Inductive reasoning — The mind's act of creating a 
particular image, and then interpreting the image to sig- 
nify that the attribute isolated from an object, or a num- 
ber of objects, belongs to all the objects of the class, on 
account of its relation to the fact that the producing ac- 
tivity is uniform in its process and to the additional fact 
that it has produced the object or objects examined as 
possessing the isolated attribute. 

Deductive reasoning — The mind's act of creating a 
particular image, and then interpreting the image to sig- 
nify that a certain general characteristic known to belong 
to the class in which this object is found is in identity 
with the object. 

* * * 

To render the various processes of knoAving concrete, the 
student should examine them as manifested in the acts of 
the pupils during their recitations. For example, the les- 
sons presented to the children in the different subjects, and 
in the various grades, should be observed in order to note 
the psychical processes put forth by the children in be- 
coming acquainted with the subject-matter presented. 

The ohieet of each act of knowing, i. e., that luhich is 
being knoivn in each process should be clearly distin- 
guished in these attempts to interpret the lessons which 
are observed. 

A form for recording the results of the observation, 
which may be suggestive, is given in Appendix VIII. 



190 The Problem or Method 



Chapter VI, 



THE ESSENTIAL IDEA OF METHOD. 

Mr. Andrewes was a good scholar, and (quite another matter) a 
good teacher. 

Mrs. J. H. Ewing.— .4 Flat Iron for a Farthing. 

Method, in the most general sense, is an activity which 
is uniform. It is the law of the object acting. 

1. Method in the External. 

The corn plant, for example, always acts so as to give 
its grain two coats, pericarp and testa. Such action is 
method or law. The whole process of activity by which 
the grain of corn develops into a plant and the plant pro- 
duces seeds is the method or law of the plant. 

The activity which creates the coral island is an example 
of method or law. 

2. Method in the Psychical. 

The process of the self as feeling is to know some par- 
ticular, to become conscious of the ideal of the self as to 
that particular realm ; to discover the relation of the par- 
ticular to the ideal, and then to create in itself a feeling, 
which, by its tone denotes the value of the first act of 
knowing or of the object known in it. This is the method 
or law of feeling. The following is an example: One 
becomes conscious that he is ignorant of the Greek lan- 
guage. His ideal is to study authors treating of Greek 



The Problem of Method 191 

life. He knows that his mental condition (ignorance of 
the Greek language) hinders the accomplishment of his 
ideal. He then experiences a feeling, which, by its dis- 
agreeable tone denotes the lack of value in the ignorance. 
The process of the self as will is to know a present 
defect in the self; to create in ideal a new kindred condi- 
tion of the self; to exist simultaneously in a feeling of 
pain on account of the real condition and of pleasure on 
account of the idealized condition; to produce the desire 
to change to the idealized condition along with the desire 
to continue the real condition rather than to put forth the 
requisite effort ; to choose between the two desired objects ; 
that is, the two idealized conditions of mind; to think out 
sets of means adapted to make the chosen object real ; to 
choose one set of means ; to give freedom to the impulses 
which have been inhibited ; to bring into existence through 
the action of the impulses, the idealized object. This is 
the method or law of willing. An example is as follows : 
A person may become conscious that he is not orderly in 
his habits; he creates an ideal of himself as orderly; he 
experiences a distinct feeling on account of his knowledge 
of the actual condition; he also experiences a feeling on 
account of his consideration of the ideal condition; he 
produces a desire for the idealized condition over against 
the desire to continue in the actual condition rather than 
take the work necessary for a change; he chooses the ideal- 
ized condition which is desired; he then thinks out the 
means as, for example, the habit of always making any- 
thing orderly which has been left in disorderly condition, 
even if it involves considerable inconvenience; he chooses 
this means from among all of the means considered; he 
gives freedom to all of his impulses upon each occasion on 
which the means can be employed and thereupon brings 
about the employment of the means. In this way he 



192 The Problem of Method 

finally changes himself to a person who has orderly habits. 

The process of the self as intelligence is to become con- 
scious of the object as a whole. This consciousness is 
always somewhat fused and indistinct. It is followed by 
the activity of discovering distinctions in the object. That 
is, the mind analyses the object into various attributes and 
parts. It is thus enabled to concentrate its attention par- 
ticularly and intensely upon each attribute and part. 

The third stage is that of discovering the unity in the 
object. This unity which is discovered is more valuable 
than the first unity because it has been preceded by 
analysis. In this third stage the mind examines, for exam- 
ple, two or more parts, or two or more attributes, and by 
considering their relation to the whole object it becomes 
conscious of the relation of each one of these to the others. 

a. The Method in Education. 

The essential aspect of method or law in Education is 
the fundamental, universal process of consciousness. In 
referring to it as universal it is meant to imply that it is 
exhibited in each state of the mind whether simple or 
complex. Given in its most general form the method or 
law of the self is, as has been elsewhere stated, to exist as 
fused, or undifferentiated; to become separative by exist- 
ing in some special act; to become to some extent, an un- 
differentiated energy again because of the termination of 
that particular act. The act, however, leaves its influence, 
and hence there is differentiation in the form of a new 
tendency. 

This general law of consciousness appears in a special 
form in the act of knowing, as previously noted. 

The first stage in knowing anything is to become con- 
scious of it as a whole, indistinctly or indefinitely. This 



The Problem of Method 193 

is similar to the first stage of the self as a whole, in which 
it exists as undifferentiated. 

The second stage in knowing is to analyze the object 
into its different attributes and parts and become dis- 
tinctly conscious of each. This is a separative process and 
resembles the second stage of the law of the self as a 
whole, which is merely that of becoming separative by 
passing into a particular act. 

The third stage in knowing is to give organization to 
the object by discovering the unity in the various attri- 
butes and parts of the objects by becoming conscious of 
the fact that they all contribute to the function or mean- 
ing of the object. This is similar to the third stage in the 
law of the self as a whole, as will be evident when it is 
remembered that the third stage in the law of the self as 
a whole is to bring to an end the particular state of con- 
sciousness thus releasing the energy involved in it and 
permitting the self to become in a certain sense potential 
again with, however, as stated above, a tendency to react 
that particular act. 

In the treatise entitled Psychology, by James R. Angell, 
the author calls this mode of activity "the characteristic 
cycle of consciousness." (Page 75.) In showing how the 
child acquires a certain mode of voluntary muscular 
action he says : 

"Now and again the world of light and sound and contact breaks 
in upon the co-ordinations which our hereditary neural m'echanisms 
are executing, because the adaptive responses made by these are in- 
adequate to the organic necessities of the situation, and at such 
points we find consciousness appearing. Consciousness immediately 
enters upon its characteristic cycle. At first, of course, its activities 
are vague and crude. But presently it has selected from out the 
masses of motor responses created by the sensory stimulations to 
which the sense organs are sensitive, those particular ones which issue 
in effective muscular control over the environment, and straightway 



194 The Problem or Method 

we are confronted with habits. As soon as these habits are firmly 
established, consciousness betakes itself elsewhere to points where 
habitual accommodatory movements are as yet wanting and needed. ' ' 

This universal mode of psychological activity, referred 
to in this and the preceding example, is the key to all 
those external jDrocesses that are called method. 

Education recognizes that while this fundamental, 
universal process is present in the child's mental processes 
it is, at the beginning, capricious, inaccurate and incom- 
plete. 

To be made free from these defects it must contemplate 
itself in more orderly and universal forms. That is, the 
incomplete mind of the pupil must face the whole of truth 
little by little until it becomes as complete as truth, and 
then the process of education is as complete as is possible, 
since it is a growing process. 

But this truth is the child's larger self. The world as 
a whole reflects the Infinite consciousness. This is indi- 
cated in Scriptural terms as follows: "The Heavens de- 
clare the glory of God : the firmament showeth His handi- 
work." (Psalm XIX-1.) 

A plant reflects, in its special way, the process of Infin- 
ite consciousness, and hence the larger self of the child. 
It exists, at first, in an undifferentiated condition, namely, 
as a seed. This, under certain influences of soil, moisture, 
warmth, etc., differentiates somewhat, and then more fully 
and stiH more fully until at last it produces the seed. 

The window as an object reveals the child's larger self. 
It is produced in response to a need. It involves certain 
desires and choices, the selection and employment of 
means, etc. In this sense the window is an objectification 
of the self. 

All of the objective world manifests consciousness or 
intelligence and in a higher, more organic form than the 



The Problem of Method 195 

mind or intelligence of the learner. It thus comes about 
that the material in geography, mathematics, literature, 
and in all other branches of study, manifests the larger 
self of the learner. 

All such material then will have the law or method of 
the self in it. 

b. The Method of the Teacher. 

This gives the basis for method as usually understood, 
i. e., the mode of the teacher in developing the mind of 
the pupil by stimulating it to adjust itself to the Truth 
— to its larger self. 

(1). His mental attitude, 
(a). As to the pupils. 

He has faith in the ability of the pupils to master truth, 
and in their responsiveness to truth. 

He believes that they are capable of being interested in 
truth. 

He has confidence that their minds are adapted to truth 
since it is their other self. 

(b). As to the aim of education. 

He knows that education, as evolution, aims to awaken 
the pupil's mind. He comprehends that the end of edu- 
cation is not merely information ; that it is to inspire the 
child, to give him the power to know, to confer upon him 
the inclination and the ability to take the initiative ; that 
in general it is to arouse in him the inclination to choose 
and labor for free will in himself and in others equally. 
This kind of freedom means the untrammelled processes 
of feeling, will and knowing referred to above, 
(c). As to the branch of study. 

He know^s that the branch of study is the means or 
instrument which is to be employed to develop the mind 
of the pupil ; that it contains his larger self in that intelli- 



196 The Problem of Method 

gence in a more universal form is revealed in it. He 
knows that the child faces a larger truth in it than his 
mind at present manifests on account of the fact that the 
material of the branch of study has already been sys- 
tematized by minds wiser than his own. He knows that 
if the child comes into touch with this systematized mate- 
rial he will become educated in that field. 

In organizing the material of the branch of study the 
thinkers were obedient to a certain interest. This led to 
the abstraction or isolation of a given attribute of the 
material. This attribute thereupon became the organ- 
izing attribute of the branch of stud}^ For example, in 
Geography, earth, air, water, plants, animals, man, modes 
of communication, etc., are studied with reference to the 
characteristic of clistrihution in space. Hence, if Salt 
Lake is to be studied one should examine its actual loca- 
tion; the influences which gave it its location, and then 
the various distributions of other objects in space brought 
about by the location of the lake. 

In Language, words, sentences, paragraphs, etc., have 
been produced and studied. 

Gradually it became organized. How did the organiza- 
tion occur? Through the influence of a certain interest. 
Man was interested in communicating his ideas, feelings 
and choices. This gave the organizing relation of lan- 
guage — that of communication. 

If the teacher's method is rational, his knowledge should 
be as follows: 

(1). He must know in a full, accurate, organized 
way the facts of the branch of study ; the organizing attri- 
bute isolated through interest, and hoAv the thought of 
this selected attribute or relation gives rise to the organ- 
ization. The knowledge of the organization of the mate- 
rial of the branch of study, on the basis of the charac- 



The Problem of Method 197 

teristic attribute, would, through reflection, make the 
teacher conscious of the following: 

(a). The extent or scope of the subject matter. 
If the organizing attribute in geography is distribution 
is S'pace^ the subject would include the phenomena of the 
earth in so far as they are considered in connection with 
this attribute. For example, the corn crop, the system of 
education, the mode of family life w^ould be investigated, 
but onl}^ in so far as the relation of space is a determining 
factor. 

(b). The divisions and subdivisions of the mate- 
rial of the subject. With distribution in space as the cen- 
tral relation, the divisions and subdivisions would be as 
follows : 

The location of the earth as a whole. 

The location of land, water, air, minerals, vegetation, 
animals, man, and his institutions. 

The fact that distribution in space is the characteristic 
relation, leads to the discovery of divisions or stages in the 
process of location itself. For example, if New York City 
is to be studied geographicalh^ — 

The location of the city in itself is to be clearly 
learned. 

Then attention is to be given to the various forces or 
influences which led to the location of the city. 

Finally attention is to be given to the location of other 
things as brought about by the location of the city. 

Each of these three aspects of location is to be thor 
oughly investigated. 

(c). The relative importance of the divisions and 
subdivisions. 

Owing to the fact that distribution in space is the pre- 
dominant characteristic, the basis of the relative impor- 
tance of divisions and subdivisions is found in this rela- 



198 The Problem of Method 

tion. The general principle is that the division or sub- 
division which reveals or exemplifies most fully the char- 
acteristic relation is the division or subdivision of most 
importance. For example, if the land forms manifest 
more fully the various aspects of location than do the 
water forms, the former would be of more importance. If 
vegetation involves more fully the relation of distribution 
in space than do the institutions of education, the former 
would be more important geographically, etc. 

(2). If the branch of study is considered as merely 
a means by which the pupil's mind is to be developed, 
one aspect of method is to adjust the material of the 
branch of stud}^ to the stages of development in the con- 
sciousness of the child. Hence the teacher must know 
the course of study in the subject. That is, he must be able 
to distribute the material of the subject so as to adapt it to 
the develpoment of — 

(a). Presentation, or sense-perception. 

(b). Representation, in the form of memory and 
imagination. 

(c). Thinking, in the form of understanding, 
conception, judgment, inductive reasoning and deductive 
reasoning. 

(3). He must know the pupil's mental process. If 
the teacher knows, accordingly, the material of the branch 
of study and the nature of the development of the mind, 
he will be able to work out the process of the learner in 
knowing any fact of the subject. He will understand that 
this process must be in the general form of the character- 
istic activity of consciousness, namely, potentiality or 
fused knowing ; distinction or analysis, and mediated syn- 
thesis or re-unification. In this last stage of the process 
the learner becomes conscious of the organization of the 



The Problem of Method 199 

subject, or of the organization of the special aspect of the 
subject which he has been considering. 

If the teacher has a clear knowledge of these two fac- 
tors, (1) the material of the subject matter, and (2) the 
nature of the learner's mind, he will also know that this 
general process which has just been referred to, will, in 
the pupil's act of learning the subject, be specialized 
through the influence of the particular subject matter. 
For example, if the pupil is making a study in geography 
of Lake Michigan he will know as a whole indistinctly (1) 
the location of Lake Michigan itself, (2) the forces that 
led to this location, and (3) the various distributions in 
space that have been brought about by the location of the 
lake itself. In this first stage of knowing the lake these 
aspects will not be noticed. 

In the second stage of learning the lake each of these 
aspects will be distinctly examined and known as a thing 
in itself. 

In the third stage of the process of gaining a knowledge 
of the lake they will be considered in their inter-relations 
and Lake Michigan will be known as a totality which 
includes these three aspects — its own exact location, the 
influences that gave it this location and the various loca- 
tions of plants, anim-als, homes, industries, lines of com- 
munication, etc., which have been influenced by the loca- 
tion of the lake. 

This special process in geograph}^ is not identical with 
the special process of any other subject as, for example, 
language. The general process of consciousness is the 
same in the two, and, in fact, in all branches of study. 
The process in learning each subject contains certain spe- 
cial features owing to the material of the subject-matter 
which is being examined. Let it be assumed that the lan- 
guage process is concerned with a word as, the word 
"simple." 



200 TiTE Problem of Method 

In the first stage of the activity of knowing it, the word 
would be known as a whole and somewhat indistinctl)^ 
The fact that it exists as form and meaning, that the form 
consists of two parts sim and pie and that the meaning 
has two aspects — one expressed by the word loithout and 
the other by the word, fold^ is not known. 

In the second stage each of these distinctions is clearty 
known. 

In the third stage there is a process of synthesis, of uni- 
fication, and the word is then consequently known as a 
single object possessing, in their relations, these distinc- 
tions. 

(4). He must know the mental effects of the in- 
vestigation of the branch of study. The know^ledge of — 
The subject matter as unified by its characteristic 
relation ; 

The mental processes of the learner; and 
The aim of life — will qualify the teacher to know 
the mental effects of the branch of study. These effects 
will be intellectual, emotional and volitional. 

One prominent effect in each subject is the habit of 
putting forth that mode of activity which is character- 
istic of the subject. For example, the mode of activity 
characteristic of geography and t*he mode of activity 
characteristic of language, as noted above. 

(5). He must knoAv the devices. The foregoing 
elements of knowledge constitute the thought side of the 
teacher's outward procedure. This external mode is 
sometimes termed devices. It is more often, however, 
spoken of as method. When based directly on a clear 
knowledge of the facts and relations referred to in the 
preceding, it is somewhat deserving of the name and con- 
stitutes an artistic educational process. 



The Problem of Method 201 

When obtained through imitation or through unreflect- 
ing experience it becomes merely a series of devices, and 
it is this form of procedure which has given rise to the 
slight estimation in which the subject of Method is held 
by many educators. 

It is evident from the foregoing that the subject of 
method is just as capable of assuming the form of a dis- 
tinct science as is any other one of the subjects dealing 
with truth, such as phj^sics, chemistr}^ geology, botany, 
gramnjar, history, etc., for the reason that the sources of 
its principles and its central principle are perfectly def- 
inite. The principles arise, on the one hand, from the 
nature of the subject to be taught, and on the other hand, 
from the nature of the mind to be educated. Method 
itself may be said to be the mental activity of the learner, 
specialized by activity upon the subject being studied. 

The doctrine of method has been compactly stated as 
follows : "The fact in the thing ; the law in the mind ; the 
method in both."* Close study w411 give a fuller and a 
more definite meaning to this expression. 

"The fact in the thing" will come to mean some fact of 
a subject unified by having one of its attributes empha- 
sized, and the other attributes subordinated to this empha- 
sized attribute by the interest of the mind. For example, 
"the fact in the thing," in geology, may be a mountain 
range, with its attribute of growth or hecoming empha- 
sized by the interest of the mind. All of the other attri- 
butes of the mountain, thereby become subordinated to 
this one attribute of growth, and are considered only to 
the degree in which they contribute in making it clear. 

"The law in the mind" will come to mean the great 
truth that the mind, in considering any fact, as for exam- 



*Wm. A. Jones, first President of the Indiana State Normal School— from 1870 to 
1879. 



202 The Problem of Method 

pie the mountain range, seizes it first indistinctly, that is, 
somewhat in the form of blind feeling; that second, as 
thought, it analyzes the object under consideration into 
its definite elements, rather isolating each element as if it 
were complete in itself; that third, as thought, concen- 
trating its attention upon the isolated attributes, it deter- 
mines which is the predominant one. This unifying pro- 
cess is continued by considering each other element as re- 
vealing or bearing upon this predominant attribute — thus 
re-unifying the isolated elements. Finally, through repeat- 
ed consideration of the object in these relations, this or- 
ganized, unified view of it becomes habit, and thereby 
sinks into feeling again, becoming thus truly the self. 

"The method in both" will come to mean the funda- 
mental process of mind specialized by having as its 
subject-matter or content some fact of a branch of study 
with one of its attributes emphasized by the mind's inter- 
est, and all the others subordinated through this interest 
to that attribute. The method in a subject, then, is a 
mental movement; it is not, however, a mental movement 
considered abstractly, that is, apart from any content. Its 
content is the particular object, attribute, or relation being 
investigated. This renders the mental act specific or par- 
ticular. 

If the foregoing presents the correct view, a method 
cannot be invented; it can only be discovered. It can 
never become a personal thing to be carried about with 
one and "applied" to a subject. 



The Problem of Method 203 



Chapter VIL 



THE DIFFICULTY OF THE PROBLEM. 

The notion that the subject of method presents a prob- 
lem is much at variance with the usual thought, which is 
that the subject of method is a very simple, superficial 
branch of study, having a problem eas}' of solution. The 
problem of method is, however, more difficult than that 
involved in merely gaining a knowledge of helpful de- 
vices. It is both difficult and important on the assumption 
that the one who is to gain a knowledge of method in the 
subject does not clearly possess the organizing idea or 
principle of that branch of study nor the close organiza- 
tion of the material of the branch of stud}^ upon the organ- 
izing principle. 

The reasons for considering the problem of method to 
be both difficult and important have been shown, to some 
extent, in the previous chapter. The argument of that 
chapter is re-presented here with varied illustration. As 
before noted, a true insight into the nature of method in 
any given subject, involves: 

In addition to the academic view of the subject gained 
in common school, high school, academy or college, a 
thorough knowledge of the organizing principle of the 
branch of study to be taught, and a close organization of 
the subject on that principle. 

In addition to the academic view of the subject of 
psychology a thorough knowledge of the central principle 
of mental life and of the organization of mental phe- 
nomena upon this principle. 



204 The Problem of Method 

A knowledge of the mental process necessary in learn- 
ing the subject. 

A knowledge of the following important truth: In 
themselves facts belong to no subject. They belong merely 
to the universe. Each fact has a large number of rela- 
tions, a large number of attributes. Considering the fact 
in itself, any one of these relations or attributes is just as 
important as any other. 

In order to discover the psychical method inherent in 
the investigation of a branch of study, the teacher needs 
to know clearly the material or subject-matter as organ- 
ized. To do this it is necessary to become conscious of — 

1. The general material of the branch of study, and of 
the characteristic attribute of its facts. What this attri- 
bute is, has been determined, to an extent, by the value the 
race has attached to the facts of the subject. 

In order to render any attribute the essential one of the 
facts, the mind must withdraw its attention temporarily 
from the other attributes and center it upon this one. 
Thereupon the mind's interest centers in this attribute, 
and the purpose arises to consider the facts with all of 
their other attributes in relation to this attribute. This 
causes the subject to assume definite shape. Prior to the 
emphasizing of this attribute, the facts of the subject 
were known to the mind only crudely, indefinitely. The 
one attribute, however, having been emphasized, as for 
example, the attribute of growth^ or hecomiiig^ in the 
mountain range, the subject has acquired in consequence, 
an organizing principle. It now for the first time pos- 
sesses a distinguishing mark. All facts viewed with ref- 
erence to this attribute now belong within this subject, 
even if they may be at other times facts of another sub- 
ject. They cannot, however, be facts of another subject, at 
the same time that they are facts of this subject and 



The Problem of Method 205 

possess the same relation and the same emphasis of rela- 
tions that they do in this. 

With this emphasized attribute in mind as the central 
truth of the subject, the student is able to determine defi- 
nitely : 

2. The scope of the subject. It is often thought that 
the various productions, such as cotton, wheat, etc. ; insti- 
tutions, such as church, school, government, etc., are in- 
cluded in the subject-matter of geography. This is true 
only in so far as distribution in space is the determining 
factor. Deciding to what extent the corn crop, the cotton 
crop, the educational institutions, etc., are included in 
geography in the light of its characteristic attribute is an 
example of what is meant by determining the scope or 
extent of the subject. 

3. By reflecting upon the material of the subject and 
upon the central characteristic, the teacher can decide the 
divisions and sub-di^^sions of the subject. These should 
not be decided externally. The teacher should develop the 
divisions and subdivisions from a clear knowledge of the 
subject-matter and of its predominant nature. 

4. It is only through the same scrutiny of the material 
of the branch of study and of the influence of the char- 
acteristic relation under which this material is to be exam- 
ined that the teacher can know the relative importance of 
the divisions, subdivisions and separate facts. Very few 
things are more important in making the teacher's work 
artistic than the ability to recognize whether the division 
being studied is more important or less important than 
the one previously studied or the one to be studied. How 
is the teacher to decide, in the subject of geography, 
whether to treat more fully the desert of Sahara, or an 
equal amount of territory in the fertile portion of Europe? 



206 The Problem of Method 

It is to be decided by the central relation which geography 
emphasizes. Distribution in space is more fully exempli- 
fied in the second region than in the first. 

5. By considering the material of the branch of study 
together with its characteristic principle, and also the 
stages of mental development characterized by the law of 
knowdng, the teacher is able to decide the successive move- 
ments or steps that would be taken by the mind of the 
learner in mastering any one of the facts of the subject in 
such a way as to bring into prominence the attribute 
around which the mind's interest centers. Method^ essen- 
tially^ is just this act of the pupiVs mind in rendering sub- 
jective a particular fact of a given subject. It influences 
all outside means which are usually termed "method." 
This mental process may be viewed in two ways: 

( 1 ) . The steps in any given case may be seen to be 
what has been termed above, the fundamental movement 
of mind, i.. e, grasping a thing indefinitely ; analyzing it 
into definite elements ; re-unifying these isolated elements 
into an organized, differentiated unity; repeating this 
thought of the organized unity in such a large variety of 
forms that through habit it is at last transmuted into 
enlightened feeling, thereby becoming a part of the indi- 
vidual himself. 

It is seen that the mastery of this view of the movement 
necessaril}^ belongs to the systematic study of psychology 
itself. This movement is, in truth, the organizing idea in 
educational psychology. Hence it indicates the true scope 
of the subject, its divisions, the relative importance of the 
divisions, etc. 

(2). The other view of the steps to be taken by the 
mind of the learner, is what may be termed a special view. 
The special steps are the characteristic process of mind 



The Problem of Method 207 

specialized by the particular subject-matter of the branch 
of study. For example, the special steps in studying the 
mountain range as a fact in geology, are : 

(a). The indistinct, indefinite comprehension of 
the mountain range as to its growth, as to its becoming. 
This may involve sense-perception, memory, imagina- 
tion, etc. 

(b). Definite analysis of the facts or elements 
involved in the mountain range viewed as to its process of 
becoming. This involves the isolation of the prominent 
attribute — the process of becoming — the isolation of all 
other attributes, as locality, length, direction, height, pres- 
ent condition of structure, etc., and the distinct consider- 
ation of each. This may involve memory, abstraction, 
comparison, imagination, etc. 

(c). Re-unifying, i. e., considering each of the 
isolated elements as to its bearing on the central attribute 
— the process of becoming. 

(d). Such varied and repeated thinking of this 
organized unity as will result in habit; that is, in trans- 
muting this thought of the organized unity into feeling 
— not, however, into blind feeling, since the feeling here 
indicated arises after definite analysis and definite re- 
unifying. 

The mental process here indicated under "5" is the core 
of the problem of method. Method in geology is this 
specialized mental activity required in order to understand 
clearly the mountain range in its process of becoming. As 
a preparation for knowing clearly what the method is, 
one must be able to have a knowledge of it first as the 
general movement. He is then to comprehend it as spe- 
cialized through the definite subject-matter. As soon as 
the general movement has become specialized, one is able 



208 The Problem of Method 

to know the different activities of mind involved in each 
of the four general steps. Thus he is able to judge whether 
geology involves observation, memory, induction, etc. 

6. When the teacher knows the organized material of the 
branch of study, the mental process of the learner neces- 
sary to know this material, and the aim of life, he is' 
able to comprehend the mental effect produced in the 
learner. While this effect may be prominently intellec- 
tual, emotional, or volitional, it is always all three, that 
is, the whole mental being is affected by the truth studied 
and by the process of studying it. One who understands 
the problem of method must be able to set clearly before 
himself the effect to be produced upon the mind of the 
learner by the investigation of any given subject. 

The most important effect is the mental hahit resulting 
from the distinctive process of hnoicing the facts of the 
subject^ as, the essential act in knowing a fact in gram- 
mar, the essential act in knowing a fact in geography, 
etc. The first would be the act peculiar to the subject of 
grammar, the second would be the act peculiar to the 
subject of geography. 

7. If the teacher understands the organized material of 
the subject, the special mental act to be employed in know- 
ing any fact of the subject, the resulting mental effects, 
and the aim of life he will be able to decide upon the 
means or devices. These means or outward activities con- 
stitute what is usually known as "method." The term 
"method" as used by the general public and by the ma- 
jority of educators is intended to denote the various ac- 
tivities which the teacher employs in order to stimulate 
the pupil to investigate the branch of study. Of these 
outward acts, there are two kinds, general and special. 
The general is the teacher's act of preparing a course of 



The Problem of Method 209 

study. In doing this, he adjusts the material of the branch 
of study to the successive stages of the child's mental 
development. The special includes laboratories, and all 
modes of procedure in laborator}?^ work, field work, ques- 
tions, illustrations, work with maps, written examina- 
tions, discussion of examination papers, lectures, etc. All 
these things constitute, however, only one feature of 
method, and its external feature. If this outward pro- 
cedure of the teacher is closely based upon the thought, 
discussed under 1-6, it may be termed "method." If it is 
not based upon such thought, but arises merely from imi- 
tation, and unreflecting experience in the school room, it 
should be termed "device." 

To justify the teacher in considering his outward pro- 
cedure to be "method," he must not only be aware of 
the external means themselves, appropriate to the sub- 
ject ; but he must also see the reasons underlying their use, 
and the order, of their use. In considering this outward 
procedure of the teacher, or external method, it should be 
noted that there are two ways of dealing with the subject 
in order to gain a knowledge of it. 

In the first mode the learner, having, even in the begin- 
ning, a somewhat crude view as to the facts that belong 
under the subject, enters at once upon an examination of 
the facts. Gradually he becomes aAvare of their various 
relations, and on the basis of these relations groups them 
into divisions and sub-divisions. He thereby gains .i 
knowledge of the relations within the subject, and of the 
general relations of this subject to other subjects. 

The second mode includes all of these indicated under 
the first, and in addition, the more scientific process of 
seeking first the organizing principle of the subject: de- 
riving from this a knowledge of the scope of the subject, of 
the divisions and sub-divisions, and of the relative empha- 

15 



210 The Problem of Method 

sis of the divisions, sub -divisions, and facts. This central 
truth arises from the interest or purpose of the race. The 
second, and higher knoAvledge of the subject thus indi- 
cated, implies that the teacher and the learner know : 

a. That the subject acquires its core, its central truth, 
from the mind's interest in a given attribute. 

b. What this given attribute is. 

c. The mental process in making any given attribute 
the predominant one of the subject. 

The study of the subject of psychology has the same two 
modes of examination. It is evident that the knowl- 
edge of the branch of study, and the knowledge of 
psychology, are not really elements in method, strictly 
considered. They are, however, aspects of pedagogical 
work. In "5" on page 206, the essential nature of method 
itself is found. It will also be evident that the mental 
steps in mastering any given fact in a subject, and the 
ejfect to be produced upon the mind of the learner, con- 
stitute the basis for the outward means, the devices. The 
question now arises as to what is requisite in order to 
make substantial progress in discovering the method in 
any given branch of study. One often speaks of a special- 
ist in a branch of study as having these requisites. 

He has very important qualifications, but does not, 
necessarily possess them in full. Sometimes one speaks 
of the specialist in psychology who has only a general 
understanding of the nature of the branch of study to 
be taught, as the one fitted to discover the method in that 
subject. He does possess a very important qualification, 
but as previously indicated, method cannot be "invented ;" 
it is already there. It is to be discovered and it cannot 
be discovered in isolation from a systematic knowledge 
of the subject. One cannot evolve the method in geology 
out of inner consciousness, and then in the usual terms, 



The Problem of Method 211 

"apply it" to geology. The method of a branch of study 
cannot be discovered apart from and in ignorance of 
the branch of stud}^ It is also true that it cannot be dis- 
covered in ignorance of the nature of the processes and 
the law of mind, of the stages of mental development, etc., 
even by one who is an expert in the branch of study. A 
branch of study, as physics or chemistry, does not consist 
merely of facts ; it consists of known facts organized on a 
special interest or purpose of the human mind. The attri- 
bute of these facts emphasized' by this special interest or 
purpose becomes, therefore, the distinguishing mark of the 
facts and along with the law of consciousness the key to its 
method. 

The one best fitted, then, to discover the method in 
physics, chemistry or any other branch of study, is the one 
who has become a specialist in both the branch of study 
itself and psychology. This would give the ideal condi- 
tions. On account of the comprehensiveness of such con- 
ditions, it is very difficult to possess them. The aim is to 
approximate these ideal conditions as fully as possible. 
The problem of method, can, however, be solved to a help- 
ful degree, even by those who know of the branch of study 
only enough to secure a good grade of license to teach; 
and who know of mind only that which would come from 
close observation of their own mental activities, from close 
observation of those of children as indicated by their 
words and outward actions, and from a brief course in the 
systematic study of psychology. It can be solved to a 
highly helpful degree by those students who have done all 
this, and who in addition have had the advantage of a 
systematic study of the branches of knowledge and of 
psychology from the pedagogical attitude. 

It is but natural that a certain indefiniteness should 
prevail as to the actual nature of method, in distinction 



212 The Pkohlem of Method 

from external means. The reason for this is that activity 
is the one thing to be found in the universe. Sometimes 
one speaks of a thing and of activity upon it. But what 
is the thing itself other than activity? A block of com- 
pact steel seems perfectly motionless, yet every atom in it 
has a space of its own, and exists in continual motion. 
Thus it is with every atom in the hardest granite. It 
seems, therefore, that only activity is. This activity rises 
from its most passive form as space, until it becomes an 
activity that can become aware of itself, as in conscious- 
ness. The branch of study called Method must deal with 
a psychological activity and with the realm of device, or 
external means, which is also activity. 

Every branch of study investigates activity as type or 
law; and law is method, and method is hiAv. The past 
makes us its debtor by handing over to us this thought in 
the very term method itself. The word "method" signifies 
according to a way. But what is it that is according to a 
way? And what is meant by a way? If the thought 
above presented, viz., that there is nothing in the universe 
other than activity, be true, then it must be actimty that 
is according to a way. And, moreover, the way itself is 
necessarily an activity. Then it becomes clear that the 
past transfers to us this thought which it had garnered 
from the fields of experience — a method is an activity 
according to, or in harmony with, activity. The first 
activity mentioned must be the real one, the one actually 
occurring, the one exhibiting itself in some product. The 
second activity referred to must be the ideal one, the typ- 
ical activity, the norm; it is both the end and the criterion 
of the real activity, of the one that is actually occurring. 
A method.) then^ is a real activity according to., atid h(> 
harmony with an ideal activity. 



The Problem of Method 213 

Every branch of study has for its subject-matter certain 
particulars, certain phenomena that are essentially its 
own. These phenomena may appear in other branches of 
study as well as in this one, but, as before noted, they do 
not appear in those other branches in the same aspect. 
The cotton plant appears as a fact in geography. It is 
also present as one of the phenomena considered in botany. 
As a geographical fact, however, it is not identical with 
itself as a botanical fact. If in this sense each branch of 
study has its own set of particulars, the activity that pro- 
duces any one of these particulars must be t^^pical. Why 
does one in looking at a piece of sandstone say. "This is 
not a good specimen?" It is because the activity that pro- 
duced it was not according to the type, to the ideal. The 
activity that produces the facts in history or in geology, 
must be activity according to the type. Hence, in this 
sense, activity is a method. The activit}^ that produces a 
grammatical fact, a geographical fact, a historical fact, 
is a method because it is an activity which has as its end 
and criterion an ideal. Identity with this ideal must be 
the end of the activity, and the ideal is its criterion. It 
is with such a thought in mind that one says, "This is 
not truly a geographical fact; that is not really a gram- 
matical fact ; that ought not to be termed a historical fact." 
There is, then a method in the subject^ and this method 
is the activity that produces the individuals composing 
the subject-matter- 

The problem in a given branch of study is to investigate 
the nature of the activity that produces its facts; to deter- 
mine the various phases thereof and their relations to one 
another. For example, the noun is a fact in grammar. 
The activity that produces it is different from the activity 
that produces the lily of the valley. Grammar must 
investigate the first activity, botany the second. Each 



214 The Problem of Method 

branch of study is, however, an investigation of the 
method that creates the individuals in its subject-matter. 
This activity may be termed the objective method. 

Every branch of study, therefore, has its objective 
method. B}^ this is meant the activity, force, or energy 
that produces the different individuals composing the sub- 
ject-matter. For example, the objective method in reading 
is the activity required to produce the various individuals 
in the subject-matter; such as "Thanatopsis," "Evange- 
line," "The Burial of Sir John Moore," "The Legend of 
Sleepy Hollow," etc. Grammar has its objective method. 
This is the activity that creates the various individuals in- 
cluded in the subject-matter of grammar; as, the noun, 
the adverb, the preposition, etc. History as a branch of 
study has its objective method. This is the activity that 
created the various individuals in the subject-matter as, 
the battle of Bunker Hill, the Hartford Convention, the 
Secession Ordinance, etc. 

In academic investigation the subject-matter is assumed 
to be a fact distinct from the examining mind; but there 
constantly arises a peculiar set of questions, such as, What 
is the relative value of this division compared with that ? 
Of this sub-division compared with that ? Of this partic- 
ular compared with that? Thus it becomes evident that 
there is a factor to be considered over against the branch 
of study. This factor is the mind which is to do the 
investigating. When one says, "What is the relative value 
of this fact as compared with that?" he evidently means 
the relatiA^e value to the investigator, arising from making 
subjective, from making an element of his consciousness, 
this fact, as compared with doing the same with that fact. 
In such inquiry what is hinted? A second activity. The 
activity that produces any fact in the subject of botany 
may be termed the objective method because it is man- 



The Probi^m or Method 215 

ifested in the branch of study. But the activity which 
renders this fact of botany subjective to the inquiring 
mind is subjective method. 

This activity is distinctive, that is, the act of consciou.s- 
ness which transmutes a fact of botany into self, has dis- 
tinguishing marks that set it off from the activity which 
renders a fact of geology an element of consciousness. 
The activity that produces a fact in the subject of physics, 
is the objective method in physics ; but the activity of the 
inquiring mind necessary to make this fact of physics an 
element of consciousness, is the subjective method in phys- 
ics and is distinctive. 

Every branch of study, therefore, has both its objective 
and its subjective method. The objective method is the 
activity that produces the various individuals that con- 
stitute its subject-matter. The subjective method is the 
activity of mind necessary to transmute into the self any 
one of these facts of the subject-matter. 

When in the subject of method, one has determined the 
essential nature of this conscious activity put forth by the 
inquiring mind in mastering a fact of the subject, two 
important inferences — inferences which have already been 
referred to — may be made. These in*ferences are of suf- 
ficient importance to merit a brief re-statement in a some- 
what different form. 

The first thing to be inferred from the nature of the 
mind's activity in mastering a fact of a given subject is 
the effect produced upon the mind by identifying itself 
with the fact. This effect is a certain habit of mind which 
the given subject alone is fitted to establish. For example, 
in language the definite mental process begins with know- 
ing the object in sense-perception, memory, imagination, 
but it ends by abstracting an attribute and thus general- 
izing it. The next movement is the forming of a purpose 



216 The Problem of Method 

to express the object to another. Thereupon, the mind 
imagines the expression and then contemplates the har- 
mony, or correspondence between the object to be ex- 
pressed and the expression. No subject other than lan- 
guage is fitted to establish just this habit, just this men- 
tal process. This may be termed the language act. 

There is also the historical act. In such an act the mind 
first conceives the disposition, the mental condition of the 
people. This is succeeded by the consideration of the 
event or object produced by this condition of the minds of 
the people. In the third place the mind becomes aware of 
the new^ disposition, belonging to the people as produced 
by the creation and the contemplation of this event. In 
the historical act, then, any event, as for example, the 
Civil War, appears as the result of a certain state of mind 
in the people ; and as a stimulus to a succeeding state in 
their minds. To conceive a certain state of the public 
mind, to apprehend this as taking shape in some event or 
statute, to seize the new state of the public mind as an 
effect of contemplating the event or statute, is the peculiar 
mental process in the subject of history. 

This central effect — the making of the essential process 
belonging to every Subject a habit — is one of the effects to 
be studied. 

Under effect is to be noted also the emotional response. 
In history there arises an interest in the state of the public 
mind, in the event to be produced thereby, and in the 
reflex influence of this event. Just the nature of this, the 
various opportunities that life affords for its play, and 
its value compared Avitli the knowledge of specific gravity, 
for example, and with other ideas and emotions, are to be 
known by the teacher. It would be a preparation in 
method to determine the main and the subordinate emo- 
tions to be awakened by the study of Dickens' "Hard 
Times," by the study of "Evangeline," by the perusal, in 



The Problem of Method 217 

Dante's "Divine Comedy," of the lines setting forth the 
condition of the angry and the sullen. The occasions in 
life affording oj^portunity for the exercise of these feelings 
and the relative value of such mental states compared with 
a knowledge of cube root, with a knowledge of the surface 
of the United States, etc., would be reflected upon by one 
who is discovering the method of the subject. 

A third thing to be noted under effect is the volitional 
development, the tendency to a prompt and decisiAe 
choice, and to persistence in that choice. It prepares one 
to determine the method to know just what tendencies 
toward choice and toward perseverance in a given course 
would be awakened and stimulated by a study of the con- 
dition of the inhabitants in the vestibule to the Inferno, 
by a study of Tito, in George Eliot's "Romola," as an 
example of fixation of character, by a study of Taylor's 
persistence in the Mexican War, and Grant's in the Civil 
War. It would aid the teacher in discovering the method 
in these subjects to know the various occasions in life that 
would call for prompt choosing and persistence, and the 
value of such mental traits along with those arising from 
the study of book-keeping, compound numbers, etc. 

In method, then, occurs the examination and valuation 
of the entire realm of effects produced upon the self in its 
mastery of the facts of any subject. In this is seen the 
value to the teacher arising from a study of such subjects 
as aesthetics, ethics, logic, psychology and philosophy. 

The knowledge of the main mental process in mastering 
a subject gives the key to its educational value as a subject 
compared with other subjects. 

The second thing to be inferred from the main mental 
process emplo3^ed in mastering a given subject, is the 
means^ devices^ or instrumentalities appropriate to the 
direction and stimulation of this mental process and to 
the awakening and fixing of the mental effects naturally 



218 The Problem of Method 

arising from a study of the subject. The study of means 
includes a consideration of the teacher himself, the range 
of his scholarship, his disposition, the trend of his sym- 
pathies, the harmony of his character, his industry, his 
quickness of insight, his ability as a questioner, his spirit 
as an enquirer, and of the relation of all these qualities 
to the stimulating and directing of the mental process m 
the learner. Under this topic is included not only the 
determining of the devices, but also the deciding of the 
order of their employment and the grounds therefor. 

It seems, therefore, as previously assumed, that to every 
branch of study belongs not only an objective method^ or 
the activity which creates the individuals of the subject- 
matter, but also a subjective method^ viz., the mental ac- 
tivity involved in mastering any fact of the subject-mat- 
ter. 

Usually, however, in pedagogical schools, the process of 
discovering the organizing principle of the branch of 
study and the internal organization of the subject from 
its organizing principle, thereby revealing as develop- 
ments from this principle the scope, the divisions and 
sub-divisions, and the relative importance of divisions, 
sub-divisions and facts, has to be made an element of 
pedagogical training, because the branch of study has 
been investigated only from the outside, its internal devel- 
opment having been ignored. It is not infrequent tha t the 
presence of any one organizing principle is denied. Some- 
times the value of knowing it is questioned, even if the 
subject be admitted to possess such a principle. How a 
branch of study can be a science except on the condition 
that a single organizing principle unifies all of its facts is 
not clear. Nor is it clear why the discovery of this prin- 
ciple and the genetic organization of the subject from it 
is not the predominant trend of work after the student 
has the elementary knowledge of the facts of the subject. 



The Problem of Method 219 



Chapter VIII 



SPECIAL METHOD. 

The clearest idea as to the nature of method arises prob- 
ably, from an examination of the process in a particular 
act of learning. The general aspect of special method is 
as has been frequently noted, the characteristic process of 
consciousness. This fundamental process is essentially 
threefold, but it may be viewed as consisting of foui- 
phases, inasmuch as iteration, resulting in instinctive 
habit may close the last stage. The process is not, ho.v - 
ever, four separate acts; it is a united activity consisting 
of three stages and a repetition of these. 

In order to render the knowledge of this essential 
process in learning more definite, attention will be given 
to the assumption that every object is a unity revealing 
itself in various attributes. Let the following sentence be 
regarded as an object or unity exhibiting various attri- 
butes and parts: 

'■ ' I hear the Aztec priests upon their teocallis 
Beat the wild war drums made of serpent's skin." 

This is the object which the mind is supposed to be con- 
sidering in an act of learning. The object is a unity in 
both form and content. In content it is a unity in that it 
expresses a single object, viz., the person expressed by the 
first word as exhibiting himself in a given act. The special 
act is indicated b}^ all the sentence following the word 
expressing the actor. In this portion of the sentence there 



220 The Problem of Method 

is expressed a central attribute — that of hearing. This 
action has as its object that denoted by all that portion of 
the sentence beginning with the word, "Aztec." 

This object of the action expressed by the word, "hear," 
has also its unit}^, namely, the mode of action character- 
istic of the object expressed by the word "priests;" that is, 
a person who is termed a priest is viewed as one habitually 
revealing himself in a certain mode of activity. This cen- 
tral characteristic exhibits itself in the given case through 
various distinctions. One of these is expressed by the 
word, "Aztec," another by the expression, "upon their 
teocallis," a third by the expression, "beat the wild war 
drums made of serpent's skin." Each one of the distinc- 
tions has further distinctions within it. All these distinc- 
tions, or at least many of them, are in sub-consciousness 
during the first stage in the act of learning. 

The mind's process in learning may be illustrated 
further with the scalene triangle as an object possessing 
various characteristics. 

Among its distinctions these are found — its three sides, 
its inequality of sides, its inequality of angles, its having 
two angles smaller than a right angle, its possessing the 
attribute of differing from an isosceles triangle, etc. All 
these distinctions and the others that are present are to 
the learner unknown. In rendering this object subjective, 
the first act of the mind's process is that in which it knows 
it indistinctly, as a whole. In this stage the differentia- 
tions of the triangle are but dimly felt, the learner having 
merely a presentiment of them. 

Through dwelling upon the object, however, the mind 
gradually becomes aware of all the various distinctions, 
and in obedience to its analytic tendency these distinctions 
are strictly isolated. Therefore division or negation be- 
comes too prominent. By continuing to examine the object 



The Problem of Method 221 

the mind is led to seek unity. Through the acts of discov- 
ering and isolating the predominant attribute — enclosing 
a space by three unequal lines — and relating the other 
characteristics to this central one, the mind organizes the 
object. Thus the object becomes truly a unity to the self. 
Continued attention to it in this aspect, results in habit. 
In becoming habit the activity is transformed into feeling, 
and since clear anal3^sis has preceded it, the feeling is 
enlightened. 

The following literary selection may be regarded in the 
same way: 

THE BUGLE SONG. 

1. The splendor falls on castle walls. 

And snowy summits old in story; 
The long light shakes across the lakes, 
And the wild cataract leaps in glory. 

Blow, bugle, blow! set the wild echoes flying! 
Blow, bugle! answer, echoes! dying, dying, dying. 

2. O hark! O hear, how thin and clear. 

And thinner, clearer, farther going! 
O sweet and far, from cliff and scar. 
The horns of Elf -land faintly blowing! 

Blow! let us hear the purple glens replying. 
Blow, .bugle! answer echoes! dying, dying, dying. 

3. O love, they die in yon rich sky, 

They faint on hill, or field, or river; 
Our echoes roll from soul to soul. 
And grow forever and forever. 

Blow^, bugle, blow! set the wild echoes flying! 
And answer, echoes, answer! dying, d}dng, dying. 

From "The Princess," Tennyson. 

This object may be assumed to exist as a unity mani- 
festing itself in a great variety of distinctions. At first, 



222 The Problem of Method 

however, these distinctions are concealed from the learner. 
The poem is apprehended as a whole ; its central unity and 
all the distinctions are grasped dimly; they are merely 
felt, that is, the mind possesses a presentiment of their 
existence. 

Before noticing the mind's characteristic process as re- 
vealed in the act of studying "The Bugle Song," a partial 
indication of the distinctions involved in it may be given : 

There is, first, the distinction into expression and 
content. 

The expression is distinguished into language and 
imaged object. 

The content may be separated into central thought and 
purpose. 

The language, as a form of literature, has in it many 
distinctions. Leaving them for later consideration, some 
of the distinctions under the imagined object may be 
noted : 

There is, first, the physical background. One fact of 
this is expressed by, "The splendor falls on castle walls"; 
others by "Snowy summits old in story," "The long light 
shakes across the lakes," "The wild cataract leaps in 
glory," "the purple glens," "on hill, or field, or river," 
"yon rich sky." All these constitute a physical back- 
ground for the physical echo. 

A second aspect is the physical echo. This is a [)art 
of the complex object, including the bugler, the bugle, the 
act of blowing, and the flying of "the wild echoes." 
Within these distinctions subordinate characteristics are 
found : The echoes become "thin and clear" ; they are 
"sweet and far," they resemble the "horns of Elf-land," 
etc. 

All these, however, constituting the physical echo, seem 
to be employed as a symbol of some spiritual activity; 
some human deed. This introduces the central thought. 



The Problem or Method 223 

The conception of the central thought involves the 
distinction between the good deed and the evil deed. The 
beauty of the external background, and of the physical 
echo are in harmony, not with the evil deed, but with the 
good deed ; hence this distinction of harmony is involved. 
There are reasons for holding that evil deeds cannot 
"grow forever and forever." HoAvever this may be, the 
author, as indicated by the beauty of the physical setting 
he has emploA^ed, seems to have in mind the good deeds 
only. In this spiritual activit}^ are involved three dis- 
tinctions : 

It affects person after person. 

It becomes more prominent, important, and substantial, 
as it passes from consciousness to consciousness. Herein 
is involved a further distinction, namely, the difference of 
the spiritual echo and the physical echo, as to growth and 
endurance. The purpose of the writer also appears as a 
distinction, the central one. 

It affects the producer. 

In the study of the poem the child reads it through and 
thus becomes aware of it indistinctly as a whole. His 
apprehension of its central meaning and purpose, and of 
all the other distinctions, is dim. They are present to the 
mind in presentiment only. This first phase is natural, 
hoAvever. 

Out of this presentiment the mind passes into that phase 
in which it becomes distinctly aware of all the attributes 
in the object. The attributes of distinction, howcA^er, are 
to be limited to the object as literature. That is, the 
material affords many opportunities in spelling, grammar, 
etc. These distinctions are not to be considered, because 
the object is being studied as a selection in art — as a lit- 
erary selection. 



224 The Problem of Method 

Rising out of this phase of dilferentiation, the mind 
passes into the stage of organized unifying. In this stage 
of synthesis the mind notices one characteristic of the 
poem, another characteristic, etc. It then holds in con- 
sciousness the purpose of the selection. With this as a 
criterion, it examines each characteristic of the poem both 
as to expression and content, in order to discover their 
harmony with the purpose. Under this mode of activity 
the selection becomes a true unity to the learner. 

Through repetition of the act of thinking the poem as 
an organized unity, the activity becomes a habit. This is 
a return to feeling. The poem has finally become the 
learners' own, and he is, in a certain respect, the poem. 
It is to be noted that this fourth j^hase is merely the third 
in a more permanent form. 

Having thus illustrated the method in knowing a 
particular object it is now of importance to notice : 

1. That there is a partial identity between the first 
phase in learning an object, namely, apprehending it indis- 
tinctl}^, and the act of being engrossed with the material 
and considering the material, i. e., space-occupying objects, 
to be the all in all. Peing engrossed Avith the material is 
not, however, fully identical with the first phase of the 
mind's process, because this first phase includes also 
failure to distinguish the various attributes in the object. 
This, however, is to be noticed: each object is material 
and spirit, or meaning. The human being is material and 
spirit; the transom above the door is material and spirit, 
or meaning. The driver wheel on an engine is material 
and spirit, or meaning. It therefore follows that to be 
engrossed with the material to the extent of considering it 
to be the all in all, is, to a degree, identical with knowing 
a thing dimly. 



The Problem of Method 225 

2. That the concentration of the attention on the spirit- 
ual element as the all in all. is to a certain extent, identical 
with the second stage in the mind's characteristic ac- 
tivity. To thus consider spirit is to isolate it. The true 
position is reached when neither the material nor the spir- 
itual is regarded as the total. The truth is found in the 
unity of both. To exalt the physical is to dwell in the first 
stage of thought. To isolate and exalt the spiritual is to 
dwell in the second process, in the act of isolation or nega- 
tion. The reason that this is termed isolation while the 
first is not, is that it requires distinction or analj^sis, to 
discover the spiritual. 

3. That the third stage is, to a degree, identical with the 
process of discovering the deeper unity Avhich is seen to be 
the source or origin of both the physical and the spiritual.' 

Both experience and history show that these three 
phases are true, as to the child and as to the race. 

In religion, for example, when a people is substantially 
in the first movement of thought, it finds its gods in exter- 
nal nature. When in the second stage it finds its gods in 
alienation from nature. Thus Avhile the hills smoked and 
trembled in the presence of the Jehovah of the Jews, he 
does not appear as in unity with the physical universe; 
while ruling over it he is foreign to it. It does not reveal 
him, according to their thought. 

The third stage in the growth of religious thought dis- 
covers as its God a fundamental conscious activity which 
is revealed both in everything spiritual and in ever^rthing 
physical. 

In philosophy, the same is found to be true. In the first 
phase of thought the first principle of the universe was 
found to be chaos, moisture, fire, air, and the like. In the 
second the spiritual was more prominent. Its won- 



16 



226 The Problem of Method 

derful properties Avere exalted and regarded as the cri- 
terion. Thus the sophists found the individual spirit of 
man to be the measure of all things. When, however, phil- 
osophy reached the third stage of thought, Socrates dis- 
covered that the characteristic which makes man the meas- 
ure of all things is not his particularity. It is the divine 
element in him, in all other human beings, and in the 
Absolute Spirit. In this third stage of philosoph}^ unity 
became prominent, because the first principle was regarded 
as the source of everything spiritual and physical, and as 
revealed in them. 

In history this same truth is shown. In the first phase 
of thought the events are regarded as the history. This is 
abstract or partial. In the second phase a deeper view is 
gained. The feelings^ purposes and thoughts of the people 
underljnng these outside acts are regarded as history. This 
view is also abstract or partial. The spiritual is no more 
truly the man than are his objectifications. The property 
that one has acquired is will objectified. Any work of art, 
is in a sense the artist. Any historical or scientific work 
given to the world is the producer. Therefore the con- 
crete, i. e., the complete view in history, is not reached until 
one enters upon the third stage of thought. In this stage 
those concrete productions known as the institutions, 
viewed as produced by man's spiritual growth toward 
freedom and as reacting upon man are the history. 

Thus it is with everything. For example, the physical 
constituents and form of the door key are not the ke3\ 
The view that they are is abstract, and hence incomplete. 
The mere concept of the door key is not the door key. 
This view is also abstract and incomplete. The thought of 
the door key revealed in a particular Avay, that is, its two 
aspects taken as a concrete unity, constitutes the door key. 
This same process which has manifested itself in the 



The Problem of Method 227 

growth of religion, philosophy, and history, reveals itself 
in the growth of the conception of method. It is natural 
that the method in any subject should be found in this 
characteristic process of mind, which is just the mind's 
method. This method or process of consciousness is not, 
however, in itself the s fecial method in any particular 
subject. The distinctive method in any branch of study i>5 
analogous to the product of the third stage of knowing. 
The reason for this is that special method is an object 
involving a relation of two factors. For example, method 
in geograph}^ is not this fundamental process of mind: 
neither is it any mere external mode of activity. It is, 
however, the characteristic process of consciousness Sfe- 
cialized as it would necessarily be, in the mind's act of 
knowing a geographical fact. 

In summarizing it may be said : 

1. That method is at first conceived as something ex- 
ternal, as a mode of physical action, as a series of actions, 
consisting of directions, questions, illustrations, explana- 
tions, etc., since such actions bear a certain relation to the 
method itself, and are more easily noticed than the under- 
lying principle. As above noted, the universal tendency in 
the infancy of thought, is to be engrossed with the ex- 
ternal aspect of a thing, and to consider this external 
aspect as the thing itself. This is, however, an abstract 
or incomplete vieAv. 

2. That it is conceived, in the second place, as a series of 
psj^chological activities. The tendenc}^ to note the ex- 
ternal aspect when in the lower stages of development, is 
no more a universal mark than is the tendency to note the 
internal or spiritual aspect in the second stage, and to con- 
sider it as an isolated thing, and as the whole. To center 
attention on the series of psychological activities, viewing 



228 The Problem of Method 

the series as if it were the method, is, as above noted, also 
abstract. This incomplete mode of regarding method is il- 
lustrated by such expression as, "The method in arithmetic 
is abstraction and generalization." "The method in study- 
ing a botanical object is inductive." 

3. That it is conceived in the third place as the charac- 
teristic process of consciousness made special by the in- 
fluence of the peculiar subject-matter. In its concrete ac- 
tivity the mind seeks a unity in the two incomplete aspects 
discovered in the first two stages of development, each in 
its turn being considered as complete, as the whole. 



The Problem of Method 229 



Chapter IX, 



VARIOUS USES OF THE TEEM. 

In beginning to treat more fully the different views of 
method, certain expressions indicating the prevailing ideas 
of the term, culled from various sources, popular, educa- 
tional and pedagogical, are to be presented. These will 
be examined in order to determine: 

1. Which indicate the first stage, namely, the conception 
that method is a series of external acts. 

2. Which indicate the second stage, namely, the con- 
ception that method is a certain psychological activity in 
general, as sense-jDerception or imagination or induction — 
a mere psychological activity unspecialized by a dis- 
tinctive subject-matter. 

3. Which, if any, hint or indicate definitely the third 
conception as to the nature of method. 

The following range of examples of the use of the term, 
method^ is given in order to add clearness to the idea of 
method b}^ determining the exact nature of the activity 
shown in each example. This may be done by testing the 
use of the term by the idea of method developed in the 
previous chapters. 

The student should, before closing his work on this 
chapter, assure himself of his ability to discover and to 
express the conception of method in each of the cases 
given. In each case, 

(1). The presence of activity is to be shown. 



280 The Problem of Method 

(2). This activity is to lie shown to he regular and 
orderly. 

(3). It is to be shown as controlled by an ideal. 
(4). It must be noticed that the activity is that of, 
(a). The teacher, 
(b). The pupil or learner. 

(c). Vocations outside of the field of school edu- 
cation. 

(5). It is to be observed that the activity of the 
teacher may be, 

(a). His external activity^ as, his directions, 
questions, explanations, drawings on the black-board, etc. 
(b). His sei'ies of fsychological processes in 
knowing or thinking the nature of the object which the 
pupil is to learn. This series ma}^ involve sense-percep- 
tion, memory, imagination, conception, judgment, etc., 
according to the nature of the object being studied. 

(c). His essential conscious process. This is 
the process which is characteristic of sense-perception, 
memory, imagination, reasoning, and, in fact, of every 
form of consciousness. 

(6). It is to be noticed that the activity of the 
pupil is manifested in the same three forms as that of 
the teacher. 

(7). It is to be observed that the activity of the 
vocations referred to is usually view^ed and spoken of as 
strictly external activity upon external material. The 
psychological activity present is not taken into account. 
A helpful process of analyzing cases in order to deter- 
mine the conception of method held by writers may be 
learned by attending to the following analyses: 
1. Case'"l," page 234. 
This indicates (1)''' that activity is referred to, (2) that 

*The numbers (1\ (2), etc., refer in all cases to the same numbers on 
pages 229-230. 



The Problem of Method 231 

it is regular and orderly, (3) that it is controlled by an 
ideal, as suggested by the Avord, "after." 

2. Case "2," page 234. 

This case has two illustrations of the use of the term, 
method. The first, "a inethod of teaching languages,*' 
indicates (1) that there is an actiYit3% (2) that it is reg- 
ular and orderly, (3) that it is controlled by an ideal, as, 
an ideal in the consciousness of the teacher who conceived 
the method is implied. The expression also implies that 
the action denoted by it is the external activity of the 
teacher. 

The second illustration, "a method of improving the 
mind," manifests the fact (1) that activity is denoted, (2) 
that it is regular and orderly, (3) that it is controlled by 
an ideal, (4) that either the external activity of the 
teacher may be referred to, or the series of activities of the 
learner may be denoted. That is, "a method of improving 
the mind," may express the series of questions, the read- 
ings, the preparation of notes, the statement of plans, etc., 
a person may employ to improve the mind of another, or 
to improve his own mind. The expression may also be in- 
terpreted to signify the mental processes which will pro- 
duce in one's own mind habits of alert attention, logical 
division, and increasing skill in the search for relations. 

3. Case "3," page 234. 

The illustration of this case is "Though this be mad- 
ness, yet there is method in it." Hamlet w^ho had been 
reported to be mad appears in a room of the castle read- 
ing. Polonius says 

What do you read, my lord? 

Ham. Words, words, words. 

Pol. What is the matter, my lord? 

Ham. Between whom? 

Pol. I mean the matter that you read, my lord. 



232 The Problem of Method 

Ham. Slanders, sir; for the satirical rogue says here that old men 
have grey beards, that their faces are wrinkled, their eyes purging 
thick amber and plum-tree gum, and that they have a plentiful lack 
of wit, together with most weak hams: All of which, sir, though I 
most powerfully and potently believe, yet I hold it not honesty to 
have it thus set down; for yourself, sir, shall grow old as I am, if 
like a crab you could go backward. 

Pol. (Aside.) Though this be madness, yet there is method in't. 

It is evident that this use of the word, w.ethod, implies 
(1) activity, (2) a reguhir and orderly activity, and (3) 
an activity controlled by an ideal. The activity does not 
relate to teacher or pupil, but rather to an act in another 
vocation. The word, method^ denotes either the systematic 
arrangement of an outside activity, i. e., the replies of 
Hamlet, their adaptation to a purpose, etc., or it signifies 
the purpose in the mind of Hamlet. It is as if Polonius 
said, "Though this be madness, yet the speaker has a dis- 
tinct purpose in such actions and they are well adapted to 
the accomplishment of the end." 

4. Case "1," under "Popular Uses," page 234. 

The word, inetliod^ evidently refers to certain outward 
acts of the bank officials, such as lending money on insuf- 
ficient security, paying too high a rate of interest, using 
the funds of the bank in speculative enterprises, etc. 

The term refers then to an activity, (1). This activity 
is regular and orderly, (2) ; but it is regular, orderly pro- 
cedure in being irregular and disorderly in so far as bank- 
ing principles are concerned. It is, moreover, a series of 
activities controlled by an idea, (3) ; that is, by the pur- 
pose to make financial gains. The method referred to does 
not belong to the teacher or j)upil, but to a vocation which 
does not aim at education, although it necessarily educates. 



The pROBLEiM OF Method 233 

5. Case '^4," page 235. 

The word vnckedness^ denotes a particular psychological 
act of a person antagonistic to the accomplishment of the 
aim of life, which aim may be said to be the attainment 
of freedom. Wickedness may be a series of such acts or 
a tendency toward the performance of them. The word, 
method^ as here used signifies the act of increase in this 
tendency. The tendency so increases in strength that 
slighter and still slighter stimuli are required to induce 
wicked action. The term, method^ indicates, therefore, an 
activity (1), an activity that is regular and orderly, (2) ; 
an activity controlled by the inherent nature of the law 
of the self, (3). This is an ideal, but it is not one of 
which the person is clearly conscious. He would, no doubt, 
be opposed to the results of the ideal were he conscious of 
them. The ideal in this case is more universal than the 
individual. It belongs to the inherent structure of human 
nature. 

The activity denoted may be that of teacher, pupil or 
of a person in other relations of life. The word, method^ 
in this use, indicates the fundamental psj^chological law of 
the self, although the author of the sentence quoted may 
not have conceived the activity under the specific stages 
employed in defining the characteristic process of con- 
sciousness. The essentials in the conception of inetliod in 
the negative ethical realm are (1) the existence of a tend- 
ency toward evil, a fused, potential condition, (2) the 
choice of the evil and its performance, a stage of separa- 
tion, of distinction, (3) the ceasing of the evil act and the 
return of the peculiar mode of energy involved in it, to the 
potential self with a strengthened tendency toward the 
performance of evil deeds. This conception of method as 
found in the ethical realm is essentially the notion of gen- 
eral method as explained in this book. 



234 The Problem of Method 

6. Case ^^11," page 236. 

This is one of the extreme forms of the external use of 
the term, method. The word refers, of course, to an activ- 
ity, (1). It also refers to a regular, ordered activity, (2). 
It is an activity controlled by an ideal, (3) ; that is, by the 
conception in the mind of the launden'r. He idealized 
and set to work the complex, orderly process, involving 
machines, persons, chemical action, etc., known as the 
laundering process. The activity referred to is found in 
one of the vocations of the general world of business. It 
is method only in the sense that it is activity regulated 
and ordered by an ideal. 

General Meanings. 

1. Literal meaning, meia, after; odos, a way. 

2. An orderly procedure or process; regular manner of doing any- 
thing; hence, manner, way, mode; as, a metJiod of teaching languages; 
a method of improving the mind. Addison. 

3. Orderly arrangement, elucidation, development, or classification; 
systematic arrangement peculiar to an individual. 

Though this be madness, yet there 's method in it. 

Shakespeare. 

4. A mode or system of classifying natural objects according to 
certain common characteristics; as, the method of Theophrastus; the 
method of Ray; the Linnaean method. 

a. Synonyms. Order, system, rule, regularity, way, manner, 
mode, course, process, means; method implies arrangement; m,ode, 
mere action or existence; method is a way of reaching a given end by 
a series of acts which tend to secure it; mode relates to a single 
action, or to the form w^hich a series of acts, viewed as a whole, 
exhibits; manner is literally the handling of a thing, and has a wider 
sense, embracing both method and mode. An instructor may adopt a 
good method of teaching to write; the scholar may acquire a bad 
mode of holding his pen; the manner in which he is corrected \d\\ 
greatly affect his success or failure. 

Popular Uses. 

1. When Comptroller Eckels wrote that the failure of the National 
Bank of Illinois w as * ' due to injudicious, reckless and imprudent 



The Problem of Method 235 

methods," he was either not fully informed as to tlie factvS, or he put 
the case much too mildly. The Indiaimpolis Journal, Dec. 26, 1896. 

2. The report of the Inter-State Commerce Committee, published 
last week, brings out sharply some of the methods by which the rail- 
roads are evading the Inter-State Commerce Law. It deals espe- 
cially with the traffic associations by which railroads now combine to 
keep rates above the competitive level. The agreement of these asso- 
ciations, says the Commission, quoting Judge Cooley, are drawn with 
* ' marvelous ' ' ingenuity to evade the law against pooling. In those 
recently entered into, the words ' ' so far as legally can be done ' ' 
follow provisions for maintaining rates and dividing traffic which 
would not otherwise be distinguished from the pooling arrangements 
declared illegal. The Outlook, Dec. 26, 1896, p. 1171. 

3. Before Moses, sacrifice was well nigh universal. Many persons 
have the impression that Moses not only commanded sacrifice, but 
that it originated with him. No! sacrifice Avas the universal method 
of worship throughout the Avorld. Its origin is pagan, not Jewish. It 
antedates Judaism. * * * Pagans offered their sacrifices every- 
where, on every high hill and under every green tree. But this Levit- 
ical code said Israel should not do so. That is based on the idea that 
sacrifice is necessary, that one cannot have favor with God unless he 
offers sacrifice, and that idea was by every method discouraged and 
denied. Gospel Doctrine of Sacrifice. Outlool-, Dec. 26, 1896. 

4. There is a method in man's wickedness. It grows up by degrees. 
A King and No King, Act V, Scene 4. Beaumont and Fletcher. 

5. Who could have conjectured in advance anything of that wide- 
spread system of Totemism which Frazer has presented with such 
detail, the importance of which we are only beginning to reccguize, 
and the significance of which we are scarcely beginning to compre- 
hend? Indeed, it is doubtful if many of these eariy methods of 
thought and action will ever be really understood, for the reason that 
these customs so soon become merely traditional, and those who prac- 
tice them may no longer attach a definite significance to them. In 
looking at methods of life that express feelings and notions so dif- 
ferent from our own, we feel, so far as any comprehension is involved, 
almost as helpless as we do in watching the economy of an ant-hill. 
In the ant-hill there is a civilization very like our own, and yet, so far 
as the inner relations which it expresses are concerned, it is utterly 
foreign to us and unimaginable by us. The Gospel of Paul, by 
Charles Carrol Everett, p. 9. 



236 The Problem of Method 

6. However these two methods may, at the first glance, seem to 
resemble each other, there is a really great difference between them. 
The animal is identified with the worshipper in the Jewish scapegoat, 
for instance, where the sins of the people were laid upon his head. 
Among the Egyptians, the victim was sometimes marked with a seal 
bearing the image of a man bound with a sword at his throat. This 
was to show that the victim represented the human sacrifice which 
milder manners had given up. The Gospel of Paul, by Charles Carroll 
Everett, p. 25. 

7. It is hardly to be questioned that the sacrifice and the use of 
blood as a means of purification came to be regarded, to some extent, 
in the same formal and traditional manner. At least there must have 
been a tendency to the simple perfunctory use of such methods of 
winning the divine favor. Those by whom the gods were conceived in 
too spiritual a fashion to admit of the earlier and grosser notions of 
sacrifice might still feel obliged to perform them according to the 
customary routine of worship. The Gospel of Paul, by Charles Carroll 
Everett, p. 35. 

8. As to the method by which the death of Christ took the place of 
the punishment which the sinner had deserved, Pfleiderer's statements 
lack the clearness which marks the greater part of his discussion. 
The Gospel of Paul, by Charles Carroll Everett, p. 127. 

9. I thus fail to find any method by which the resurrection of Christ 
may be made to appear to have any vital relation to his atoning work, 
as this is commonly understood. The Gospel of Paul, by Charles 
Carroll Everett, p. 209. 

10. He was with the Terre Haute Evening News in a responsible 
capacity and his brilliant and aggressive methods won for that news- 
paper a large circulation. Terre Haute Express, Jan. 1, 1897. 

11. Perfect methods make our work perfect. Advertisement of a 
laundry. 

12. ' ' In order to accomplish this result the melter and refiner must 
have the pure gold to begin with. He must take all the gold out of 
the brick, but in such a way as to leave no silver or other metal con- 
nected with it. His method is an odd one. He takes the gold brick 
and melts it with a lot of silver. He does this because the acid which 
is to take the silver out of the gold will not work well unless there is 
plenty of the silver in the mixture. He knows just how much silver 
is necessary for the right combination, and he adds this amount to the 



The Problem or Method 237 

gold brick. The combiued metals are next thrown into a vessel con- 
taining nitric acid. This acid has a peculiar affinity for silver and 
for the baser metals. It has no effect upon gold, but it sucks all of 
the other metals out of the mixture and combines with them, turning 
them into a liquid which looks not unlike water. The pure gold drops 
to the bottom of the vessel, while the silver and other metals are left 
in the solution. The liquor is now drawn off, and the melter and 
refiner has a lot of pure gold, out of Avhich he makes another brick 
or bar. ' ' 

13. Lieutenant Governor Nye ruled him out of order and decided 
an appeal to the Senate, saying the method provided for organization 
could not be departed from. Terre Haute Gazette, Jan. 8, 1897. 

14. But if we proceed in our inquiries as we lately did, by the 
method of mutual admissions, we shall combine in our own persons 
the functions of jury and advocate. BJc. 1, Sec. 348, Plato's Bepublic. 

15. When I assumed the position as chief of the Department of 
Geology and Natural Eesources, I started out Avith the expressed 
determination of making that department what its originators, in my 
opinion, intended it should be— a bureau of information, where any 
person can at any time procure a knowledge of the natural resources 
of our State. I did away with the unscientific method of county 
surveys, since the civil boundaries of a county have nothing to do with 
the boundaries or limits of a natural resource, and adopted the plan 
of taking up each of the great resources in detail, and preparing a 
monograph or special report thereon, accompanied by maps, cuts, 
engravings and tables of chemical and physical tests. Report of State 
Geologist to Indiana Legislature, Jan., 1897. 

16. The Board of Superintendents, acting as a central body for the 
whole school system of the city, has attended to all appointments and 
promotions; the superintendent states it to be the present method of 
administration. The Outlool', Jan. 16, 1897. The Teaching Pro- 
fession. 

17. The district method of electing county commissioners works 
very unjustly in this county. Under the present system Indianapolis, 
which with its suburbs, has nine-tenths of the population of the 
county and pays eight-tenths of the taxes, has only one of three com- 
missioners. The result is that it has little or no voice in the action 
of the board, being always voted down in matters of local interest by 
the country members. If the district method of electing commission- 



238 The Problem of Method 

ers is to continue in general, an exception should be made of counties 
containing cities of a certain population. Editorial in Indianapolis 
Journal, Jan. 20, 1897. 

18. The Associated Press report of the scene with Speaker Reed 
says that the committee of members pointed out the necessity of the 
buildings mentioned, and said that it was evident that the majority 
of the House desired their consideration. Speaker Eeed asked them 
if they were aware that the government was running behind in the 
matter of revenue at the rate of $58,000,000 a year. It was a ques- 
tion of the ability of the government to meet and pay its obligations. 
The committee replied that the bills did not appropriate a dollar, but 
only fixed the maximum of cost of the buildings, the appropriations 
being left in the hands of future Congresses. Mr. Reed said that he 
did not approve of this method of mortgaging the revenues of the 
government, to which the committee replied that they could not mort- 
gage what did not exist and thought that the subject of making 
appropriations could be safely left to future Congresses. The com- 
mittee came away feeling that it was not a cheerful outlook. Indian- 
apolis Journal, Jan. 21, 1897. 

19. An operator comes forward, and under his guidance we look 
into the methods of attending to a most important branch of the fire 
service— that of receiving and recording an alarm of fire from a 
street box, and transmitting the same to the engine companies nearest 
to the fire, in the shortest possible time. * * * After this when 
we see a fire company responding to the call of duty, we will better 
appreciate the methods that have been used to send them on their 
noble errand. St. Nicholas, Feb., 1897. 

20. Washington, Jan. 20. — Communications from the church bodies 
in various parts of the country are being received by members of the 
House committee on military affairs regarding the action of the sec- 
retary of war in granting permission for the erection of a Catholic 
cathedral building on the government grounds at West Point. The 
matter seems to have brewed a commotion nearly equal to that which 
has raged over school appropriations if the letters coming in are a 
sign. Several communications from bishops, ministers of organiza- 
tions, as w^ell as from laymen, have been received. Three other reli- 
gious bodies have applied for information as to whether they will also 
be allowed to place church buildings on the West Point grounds. It 
is possible that the matter may be brought before Congress by a res- 
olution of inquiry or some other method, Indianapolis Journal, Jan. 
31, 1897. 



The Problem of Method 239 

21. The Administrative Board of Libraries, Laboratories and Mu- 
seums at meetings held on November 28, 1896 and January 23, 1897, 
took the following action: 

In the place of Special Regulation No. 3 governing Departmental 
Libraries, the following was substituted: 

All officers of instruction may, with the approval of the appropriate 
departmental adviser, withdraw books from the library of their own 
department and retain them for a limited period to be agreed upon by 
the borrower and the departmental adviser. 

In the carrying out of this rule, the following methods shall be 
employed : 

1. The records of withdrawal of books are to be kept in each depart- 
mental library in an instructor's loan book provided for that purpose, 
and the drawer shall record his name, etc., title of the book, accession 
number, and the date of the withdrawal. 

2. The departmental adviser in connection with the head of the 
department shall determine the conditions under which books may be 
withdrawn from a department library, and inform the general library 
of these conditions. 

3. The departmental adviser may through the general library call 
in the book at any time. University Record, Chicago, Jan. 29, 1879. 

Educational Uses. 

1. The almost universal education of children under the Froebel 
methods seems to be close at hand ; it is the new movement of the age. 
But Froebel 's methods need evolution and expansion to meet the 
republican spirit of to-day in the Pan-American field. Among his 
methods, which merit a fuller expression in our child schools of ethical 
culture, we may note: 

a. Educational Walks. 

This plan belongs to the methods of both Pestalozzi and Froebel. 
These teachers took their pupils to places for the study of local his- 
tory, to the flowers for botany, to the rocks for geology, and to 
nature for all nature's lessons of life, etc. 

b. Froebel 's plan of associating children with little animals and 
birds, in order to teach them the brotherhood of all creatures, the 
oneness of life, and how to treat dumb animals, has found illustration 
in many kindergarten schools, but in some places has not been 



240 The Problem of Method 

regarded as a very essential feature of his method. But this is an 
essential method of heart education, etc. 

c. Patriotic Education. 

This is finding a place in most American kindergarten schools. As 
in Switzerland, the children march with the flag, and sing the songs 
of Justice and Liberty, etc. 

d. Teaching of self-control is an essential })art of the Froebel 
method, and in no country is this moral development more needed than 
in ours. ' ' To give firmness to the will, to quicken it, and to make it 
pure, strong, and enduring, in a life of pure humanity, ' ' says Froebel, 
' ' is the chief concern in instruction and in the school, ' ' etc. 

e. Stories of imagination. We must have a new literature for 
children to meet the needs of the educational revival, after the Swiss 
and German school methods, which follow the Hebrew parables. Tales 
of Indians, bear-hunts, and of boys who were men before their time, 
have had their day in our children 's reading. The time has come for 
a large place in the education of the creative imagination, for the 
imagination largely governs life, etc. 

f. Kindergartens for friendless children. The rich need kinder- 
gartens as well as the poor, for this form of education is the soul's 
school. But we believe that no other charity represents so much in 
life as the kindergarten, for it stands for the moral evolution of life 
from the beginning; it is the gospel of the Sermon on the Mount, of 
beatitudes put into the heart and habits of the child by the natural 
way of the playground, through the exercise of the creative faculties. 
Kindergarten Age, Beview of Beviews, Dec, 1896. 

2. Probably no person Avho has undertaken the subject of child- 
study has done so much to interest the average teacher as Earl Barnes. 
He has a method of study all his own, which he has used industriously, 
as may be seen when one reads his Studies in Education now being 
published. A sample of the Barnes method will illustrate: 

Once a mother gave a child for a birthday present — the child was 
just 6 years old — a beautiful box of paints. In the afternoon while 
the mother was busy in another room, the child painted all the parlor 
chairs so as to make them look nice, and then called out : " O mamma, 
come and see how pretty I have made the parlor. ' ' The paint could 
not be washed off and so the chairs were spoiled. What would you 
have said or done had you been the child 's mother ? 



The Problem of Method 241 

One day the teacher left the room and while she was gone, several 
children in the room began to make a noise. The teacher heard the 
noise as she came back, but did not know which children were out of 
order, and none of the class would tell her. So she kept the whole 
class in after school. Was the punishment just or unjust, and why? 

Thousands of children were given these and like stories for lan- 
guage exercises. The papers were sent to Prof. Barnes, who made a 
careful study of each set. The Bulletin, Vineennes, Ind., Jan., 1897. 

3. Although the foregoing experiments suffice to show that the 
periodic variations were of central rather than of peripheral origin, 
I sought a method of experimentation which would enable me to form 
a clearer idea of the relative influence exerted on the height of the 
contractions by the fatigue of the muscles and the change occurring 
in the central nervous system. At the suggestion of Professor Mosso 
the folloAving form of experiment was adopted. The flexor muscles 
of the second finger, weighted with one kilogramme, were stimulated 
every two seconds. Two different forms of stimuli were employed, 
electrical and voluntary stimuli, and they were applied alternately. 
During the electrical irritation, the nerves and muscles were stim- 
ulated by a tetanizing induction current, one of the electrodes being 
placed over the sternum, the other over the muscle. Pamphlet on 
Efect of Fatigue, p. 11. 

4. The usual way of computing interest is based on 360 days to the 
year. By the exact method the actual number of days is found and is 
regarded as so many 365ths of a year. This rule is the one adopted 
by banks and the United States Government, and it is growing in 
favor among business men. When the time in days is less than one 
year, the exact interest is found by first calculating the interest 
according to the methods already given, and deducting one-seventy- 
third from the result of the common years and one-sixty-first for the 
leap year. Complete Indiana Arithmetic, p. 220. 

5. When work has become a habit, and the pupil has learned to 
practice the right method from his own impulse rather than on 
account of external authority, his education in school has ended. 

But the subject must be adapted to the consciousness of the pupil, 
and here the order of procedure and the exposition depend upon the 
stage which he- has reached intellectually, for the special manner of 
instruction must be conditioned by this. If he is in the stage of sense- 
perception, we must use the illustrative method; if in the stage of 
image conception, that of combination; and if in the stage of think- 

17 



242 The Problem of Method 

ing, that of demonstration. The first exhibits the object directly, or 
some representation of it; the second considers it according to the 
different possibilities which exist in it, and turns it around on all sides 
(and examines its relations to other things) ; the third demonstrates 
the necessity of the relations in which it stands either with itself or 
with others. This is the natural order from the standpoint of the 
developing intelligence; first, the object is presented to the perception; 
then combination with other things shows its relations and presents 
its different phases; and, finally, the thinking activity circumscribes 
the recklessly moving reflection by the idea of necessity. Experiment 
in the method of combination is an excellent means of a discovery of 
relations, for a sharpening of the attention, for the arousing of a 
many-sided interest; but it is no true dialectic, though it be often 
denoted by that name. Bosenkranz's Philosophy of Education, 1889, 
p. xiv in Analysis of Contents; in body of book, p. 98. 

6. Hegel employs in this voyage of discovery a method that he 
names the ' ' dialectic. ' ' It has throughout the appearance of being 
a stricter method than that of Fichte's ''Science of Knowledge," and 
claims to be objective — an exhibition of the necessity of the process 
which is in the object before us, in contradistinction from mere sub- 
jective reflection upon it made from points of view external to the 
object. 

Hegel's method does not seek to find an external basis of attack 
or defense, but to get this basis from the object itself. 

Here we have the famous dialectic which is described as the self- 
movement of the notion {Begriff). Seize an imperfect idea and it will 
show up its imperfections by leading to and implying another idea as 
a more perfect or complete form of it. Its imperfection will show 
itself as dependence on another. This is the philosophic method seen 
so clearly by Plato and stated in his Republic (Book VII, chapter 3). 
Pure science according to him has a dialectic method and starts with 
hypotheses— or, as we should describe them, dependent ideas, ideas 
that imply other ideas to make them possible, just as the idea of inner 
and outer or positive and negative imply each other. But this dialectic 
method annuls these hypotheses on its way towards the highest prin- 
ciple. ****** The etymological ground is a dangerous 
one, however, and it is better not to build on it. Plato seems to mean 
that the dialectic method starts with premises given by sense-percep- 
tion and ordinary reflection, and seeking the presuppositions of these 
ascends to the first principle. An example of this is found in the 



The Problem of Method 243 

inference of independent being as the necessary condition for the 
existence of dependent being, and this may be said to be the substan- 
tial insight lying at the basis of all true philosophy. Plato contrasts 
this method of ascending from the imperfect to the perfect by discov- 
ering presuppositions with the geometric method that uses axioms or 
fixed hypotheses, not being able to deduce them or explain them. 
EegeVs Logic, 1890, pp. 57, 58, 174, 175. 

Pedagogical Uses. 

1. But it is no less true that these complaints are due in no small 
measure to false methods of linguistic training generally, or to some 
cherished prejudices in favor of certain languages on the part of the 
teachers; and it becomes, therefore, at the present day, a matter of 
great practical importance to inquire hovr far our traditional methods 
of teaching languages are in conformity with the method of Nature 
in her great art of thought-utterance, and how far they may justly 
be called on to submit themselves to a revision and a reconstitution. 

As language is a function which belongs as much to every normal 
human creature as seeing or hearing, there can be no difficulty in 
finding out the method of Nature in its acquisition. We have to 
answer only two questions: first, what are the factors of the process 
by which the human babe from being capable merely of inarticulate 
cries, like any of the lower animals, is developed into an easy and 
graceful manipulator of articulate speech? and again. How far, and 
in what respects, does this model require to be modified in order to 
enable the expert handlers of the mother tongue to use any second or 
third language with like expertness? 

Why does it seem such a difficult business to acquire a familiar 
knowledge of any foreign language, and why so much brain and so 
much time spent so frequently on their acquisition with such scanty 
results? The answer can be only one: because your teacher has 
ignored the method of Nature, and given you a bad substitute for it 
in his own devices; instead of speaking to you and making you 
respond, in direct connection of the old object with the new sound, 
and thus forming a living bond between the thinking soul, the per- 
ceptive sense, and the significant utterance, he sends you to a book, 
there to cram yourself with dead rules and lifeless formulas about the 
language, in the middle of which he ought to have planted you at the 
start. 



244 The Problem of Method 

These things being so, and the method of nature being so plain in 
the matter, we now ask what are the causes that have led so many of 
our teachers, even the most accomplished of their class, to neglect so 
infallible a guide, and to follow methods of linguistic inculcation 
equally unpleasant in the process and unprofitable in the result? 

Let books and not living converse be the final end of the study of 
languages; so they certainly are with the dead languages; but even 
with regard to them it is quite certain that the familiarity and fre- 
quent repetition which are the special virtues of the conversational 
method both render the mastery of books, as in the case of the mother 
tongue, more complete, and the hold of the printed signature at once 
more firm in the grasp and more easy in the approach. 

There is one other objection to the conversational method in the 
teaching of languages, viz: that it makes a man a parrot. Well, a 
parrot is an imitative animal and so is a man, and so far he must not 
be ashamed to own his kinship with the plumy prattler. 

In conclusion, I have a word or two to say with regard to the 
occasion and the plan of this little book. In the first place, whatever 
may be said of Hebrew or Latin, Greek is a living language, and must 
be treated as such even by those who persist in the notion that, while 
the method of living vocal appeal applies in its full extent to modern 
languages, it is certainly out of place in the treatment of the two 
ancient languages which justly claim the first place in the linguistic 
culture of our highest schools. 

But since that time, as a natural consequence of the great educa- 
tional movement of the age, some very distinct voices have come to my 
ear, to the effect that there is something radical]y wrong in our way 
of dealing with languages, and that the method of teaching by rules 
and grammar mainly can no longer be tolerated. 

When the young Hellenist has stamped its Greek designation di- 
rectly on every object that meets his eyes, and connected it with some 
single verb that belongs to its significance in familiar life, I would 
then suggest that the teacher, besides the daily repetition of certain 
forms of common conversation, should give a viva voce description of 
pictures hung on the wall two or three times a week, which the learner 
shall be called on to repeat without any written notes; the principle 
of the method being always to maintain the direct action of the mind 
on the object, through the instrumentality of the new sound, without 
the intervention of the mother tongue. 



The Problem of Method 245 

One other matter requires special notice — a matter not necessarily- 
connected with the colloquial metJiod, but which may be wisely used as 
a help. To each lesson I have appended a short list of English words, 
either by family affinity, or by direct borrowing through the Latin, 
radically^ identical with the Greek. Preface in BlacMe's Primer, pp. 
V. to XV. 

2. In this papei" I attempt to contrast the metJiods of the Kinder- 
garten with those of the Primary School as it exists and has existed 
in America, not with the intention of disparaging either of these 
institutions, but in order to point out a certain fitness of each method 
for its work in hand. I claim here, and I claimed long ago when I 
recommended the school .board of St. Louis in 1672 to establish a 
kindergarten, that the presence of a kindergarten in a system of public 
schools will, of itself, work some change in the methods of the primary 
school, that will be a great benefit to those methods. But I wish to 
show that the methods of the primary schools, substantially as they 
are, have a foundation in reason, and that it is not well for our friends 
of the kindergarten to look always in the direction of a revolution in 
the methods of the primary school, and the adoption of plays and 
games and gifts and occupations, or some manual training modifica- 
tion of these in the course of instruction for children from the age of 
seven to twelve years. On the other hand I hope to convince the 
friends of the primary schools that their methods are not good for 
children under seven years, but that the kindergarten methods are 
most happily devised for children of the tender age — between four 
and six years. As teachers we must not get the method which we 
practice in the special grade in which we are teaching so close to our 
eyes that it shuts out all other grades and all other methods. We 
must study education in view of the entire life of man, and never 
forget that work with the children is to fit them for manhood and 
womanhood. It is not our object to prolong childhood forever; but 
on the other hand we wish to prevent too rapid transitions from one 
stage of development to another. We do not wish to see a hot-house 
system of education, forcing the growth of our human plants for the 
world market. Harris' Kindergarten Methods, pp. 3, 4. 

3. According to the classification given by Professor Brooks in his 
excellent book entitled, ^ ' Normal Methods of Teaching, ' ' there are 
four correct methods of teaching the noble science of geography. (1) 
The Analytic Method, which begins with the world as a whole, and 
passes by successive divisions down to the State, county, town or city 



i>4:6 The Problem of Method 

in which we reside; (2) The Synthetic, which begins at the smaller 
division, as a schoolhouse, yard, town, county, etc., and passes by 
successive enlargements to the surface of the world; (3) The In- 
ductice which begins with the particular facts of science, and passes 
to their classification into systems; and (4) The Deductive, which 
seizes upon the laws or general characteristics of a group of facts, and 
passes to the particulars embraced under these laws. This last 
method is more than analytic. It not only goes from the whole to its 
parts, but from the general to the particular. It is not our purpose 
to discuss now the relative value, or the proper employment, of these 
methods. We seek the more practical. 

Whether the method of teaching the whole subject of geography be 
analytic, synthetic, or inductive, we recommend, in place of following 
the text-book. The Topical Method of Study, 

We do this with much confidence, after years of experience and 
diligent search for light on the subject, because it is the best method 
thus far found by which to create unbounded interest among pupils 
in this study, and because it enables the teacher to instruct with sat- 
isfaction and pleasure. King's Methods in Geography, 1889, pp. 44, 
45. 

4. In teaching the art of reading, he may teach them the sounds of 
whole words, and by comparison evolve the sounds of particular let- 
ters; or he may associate with the several letters their respective 
sounds, and require them to construct the sounds of Avords by combi- 
nation of the letter-sounds; the one course is analytic, the other 
synthetic. 

But methods are right and necessary in their own place; they are 
parts of one whole, related to each other as antecedent and conse- 
quent. The observation of particulars is an incomplete and fruitless 
process, unless it issue in the establishment and application of general 
principles; but the application of such principles must be feeble and 
unreal unless founded on previous observation and particulars. In 
giving lessons, therefore, the teacher must consider which of these 
two methods mainly or wholly, he should adopt. Currie's Common 
School Education, pp. 269, 270. 

5. In the preface to ''The Essentials of Method,"* the 
author calls attention to the importance of analogies, and 



* "The Essentials of Method" (1897) by Charles DeGarmo. D. C. Heath & Co. 



The Problem of Method 247 

to the fact that there are many analogical theories of 
mind. Of these, two are important: 

1. That which regards the soul as a germ containing by 
involution that which it is to become by evolution — a self- 
active power. 

2. That which regards the mind at any given stage of 
its dcA elopment as the resultant of the variations of its 
environment. 

These two theories are regarded as but two figurative 
expressions for the thought that there is a method in the 
child, and a method in the subject of study. The preface 
adds that the w^ork deals wath the adjustment of the sub- 
ject-matter and the mind. "It seeks to find the essential 
forms of methods of instruction, as determined by the gen- 
eral law of development in the mind of the child." 

When the author speaks of a method in the child and a 
method in the subject of study, it would appear that he 
uses the term method in the first case to signif}^ a mental 
activity, that is, the psychical change occurring in the 
child as he develops tow^ard the perfection of his being 
under the stimulus of the subject; and that he uses the 
term method in the second case, to signify the external 
although invisible activity by which each fact or indi- 
vidual of the subject of study is produced. For example, 
if the subject of study is plants, then it would be thought 
that if the author speaks of a method in the subject of 
study he Avould mean the mode of activity by which plant 
energy produces the individuals of the plant world. Such, 
how^ever, does not seem to be his meaning in the w^ork 
on pages 91-93. There, by method in the learner, he 
refers to the act of observation, abstraction, induction and 
deduction, etc. This is in accord with the second view of 
method. In referring to "methods wath regard to the 



248 The Problem of Method 

thing to be learned," (page 92), no reference seems to be 
made to the activit}' by which each fact or individual in 
the subject is produced. The thought seems to be that 
each subject or object is a whole consisting of parts. This 
being the case, the child's mind may be apprehending the 
whole, and proceed from this to a consideration of the 
parts, giving an analytic procedure ; or it may begin with 
the parts and move toward the whole, giving a synthetic 
procedure. Method in this case is also mental, and ac- 
cords with the second view. On page 93, when speaking 
of '''"method with regard to the teacher" reference is made 
to the "monological" and to the "dialogical." In the same 
paragraph the author speaks of the "catechetical, Socratic, 
development method!''' It seems evident from these ex- 
pressions that he is speaking of external activities, such 
as questions, illustrations, example, etc., as method. This 
is according to the first view. 

The use of the singular form of the word method in the 
title of the book, indicates that generally the author im- 
plies the term to signify a definite mode of mental activ.- 
ity, and not the various devices used to stimulate it. The 
work is not, hoAvever, free from the latter use. In certain 
passages the term is used in a way to imply that the author 
holds to the first view of method. In other passages the 
inference would be that he holds to the second view. In 
still others it would appear that he approaches in his 
conception the third view. The following are passages 
indicating the first view of method : 

1. *'It seeks to find the essential forms of methods of instruction, 
as determined by the law of development in the mind of the child. ' ' 
(Preface, page 5.) 

2. "Physiological Psychology studies mental acts by observing 
and measuring their mechanical occasion and results, according to the 
7netJwds of Physical Science." (Page 25.) 



The Probkem of Method 249 

3. "When we recognize the process of apperception, however, then 
the external standpoint gives place to the internal one, and the 
teacher regulates the amount and method of his instruction by the 
psychical needs of the child, Avhich are determined largely by his 
knowledge and his interests." (Page 27.) 

4. "It is not uncommon for us to strive to create interest in study 
by appealing to emulation, to ambition, to love of praise, approval 
of others, duty, etc., or by indulging in spectacular display in meth- 
ods. These, and similar diversions may enable us to develop a momen- 
tary interest, etc." (Page 31.) 

The following may be noted as indications of the sec- 
ond view of method : 

1. "But if the essentials of right methods are observed, there may 
be almost infinite variety of devices in teaching and reciting the 
lesson, without vitiating the results." (Page 86.) 

2. * ' Deduction corresponds most closely to the stage of application, 
or to the return from universals to new particulars." (Page 92.) 

3. ' ' The method which begins with the whole and proceeds to the 
parts is analytical." (Page 93.) 

The work presents, however, a view of method far more 
important and fundamental than that indicated in these 
quotations which are here given to signify the first and 
second views. While the prevailing view in the work is 
not strictly that explained in the present treatise as the 
third view of method, it maintains a close analogy to it, 
and is identical in the sense that a true method is a mental 
activity returning in new shape to the original stage. 

It will be observed that the method presented is both 
triple in form and a return to itself, in that it contains 
these stages : 

1. Knowing the particular. 

2. Deriving the general from particulars. 

3. Returning with the general to the consideration 
of new particulars. 



250 The Problem of Method 

This is a very important and fundamental view. This 
triple movement and return, however, are found even 
within the first stage in which the mind deals with the in- 
dividual notion. This renders the view of method pre- 
sented in the book still more valuable, because it reveals 
more fully its accord with consciousness. 

In noting the discussion on pages 45-60, in connection 
with the illustration on pages 94-98, it will be observed 
that the movement of mind in dealing with the individual 
object is : 

1. To consider the object practically as a whole. 

2. To consider it "in small logically connected sec- 
tions." (Page 55.) 

The second movement is called by the author the law of 
"Successive Clearness." It is evident that it is analytic. 
These two stages, therefore, resemble very closely the two 
that have heretofore been given, in the present work, 
under the third view of method. Are the third and the 
fourth stages indicated? The following seems to denote 
the third stage or the organization of the distinctions by 
relating them to the central unity. 

"On the other hand, to fail to associate the parts of the lesson 
and to bring them to consciousness as a logical unity, would be to re- 
veal the mind distracted by the apprehension of a confused mass of 
disconnected details. These two steps, the absorption of individual 
notions, and their apperception, Herbart compares to the process of 
breathing, calling them the inspiration and expiration of the soul. 
Our maxim, step by step, has to do with this process, but it is in- 
complete, for it suggests only the sub-division without hinting at its 
purpose— the clear perception of individuals and their proper syn- 
thesis in consciousness." (Page 56.) 

As a hint of the fourth stage, (referred to in this work 
on page 28), the following may be quoted: 



The Problem of Method 251 

''Next to the formation of the series in instruction comes the need 
of fixing it in the mind. This, as we have seen, needs time. It needs 
also a constant attention to the matter in hand. Kepetition gives the 
time, and skill on the part of the teacher will secure the attention. ' ' 
(Page 60.) 

In this work, therefore, is found a close approach to the 
third view of method. 

6. In the preface to "Systematic Methodology"* the 
author indicates: 

That the work is written for those interested in un- 
derstanding the philosoph}^ of teaching. 

That the work is to be a systematic treatment of the 
problems of teaching. 

That parts I and II are adapted to those wishing to 
master the philosophy of education, and parts II and III 
to those desiring to study merely the practical problems 
that arise in presenting the different branches of study. 
In the introduction there are presented : 

1. The idea that methods as usually given are varied, 
inconsistent, and even contradictory; that they lack unity 
and completeness. 

2. The author's view that the art of teaching is capable 
of order and of systematic treatment. 

3. The thought that there are two important lines of 
investigation necessary to make methods rational : 

a. The- study of the human mind. 

b. The study of the nature of truth. 

4. The thought that in order to make the discussion 
complete and systematic, three things must be done : 

a. Terms must be used with consistency. 

b. Eecommendations must not be given in one con- 
nection and violated in another. 



'Systematic Methodology," by Andrew Thomas Smith. Silver, Burdett & Co. 



252 The Problem of Method 

c. Methods in the given subjects must all obey certain 
well defined fundamental lines applicable to truth in gen- 
eral. 

5. The statement that one aim of the work is to make 
clear to the reader that all school studies which have to do 
with a body of truth to be comprehended are capable of 
being taught by the same comprehensive plan. 

6. The claim that another aim of the work is to make 
clear to the learner that there are many school subjects 
which do not consist of a body of truth to be compre- 
hended; that these are either subjects that may be called 
arts, or subjects expressing merely facts to be impressed 
upon the memory. 

7. An explanation of the terms ''practical method" and 
"device." 

8. The thought that method is, in large part, a derived 
science. 

Under the explanation of the first aim, the author pre- 
sents his view to the world : 

''In the world of things about which we study, only individuals 
exist, while generalizations are merely contrivances of man wrought 
out for his convenience in mastering the truths concerning this world 
of real, but individual things." 

This same view of the world is again presented under 
the discussion of principle on page 10 : 

' ' We know nothing of the essence of mind, as we know nothing of 
the essence of matter. Phenomena alone are open to our study. What 
mind or matter does we may know, but not what either is. ' ' 

Under the discussion of the first aim, the author also 
presents "the comprehensive plan" av^cording to which 
subjects expressing truth may be treated. The compre- 
hensive plan is : 



The Problem of Method 253 

' ' Generalizations of a given order are to be comprehended only 
in the light of the appropriate individuals embraced within them. ' ' 

This is termed ''the one comprehensive plan or principle 
of learning." 

In considering whether the work is based fundamentalh- 
upon the first, second, or third view of method, it will be 
necessary to examine certain expressions. 

On page 5 the author says : 

''Works on teaching abound in which are to be found many and 
varied recommendations in method, most of which do not rise above 
the dignity of reasonable devices. ' ' 

This seems to distinguish method from devices. 

On page 11 the following definition of method is given : 
'^A^nethod in pedagogy is a rational plan or series of steps 
for effecting results in teaching." 

The first portion of this statement seems to regard 
method as an idea in the mind of the teacher; that is, a 
rational plan held in consciousness. The second portion 
of the statement looks upon it as a series of steps. It 
seems that these steps are the outward acts of the teacher, 
because they are spoken of as intended to bring about 
results in teaching. 

In the same connection this is said: '''Method is pro- 
cedure according to principles." This would seem to indi- 
cate that method is the outward activities of the teacher 
governed by a certain thought or principle. 

It is also said upon the same page : "A method of teach- 
ing, then, is procedure in teaching according to the princi 
pies of teaching." This implies that the method consists 
of the outward activities of the teacher. 

On page 12 it is said : '''Method is a way of reaching a 
given end by a series of acts which tend to secure it, but 
device refers rather to a single action." This seems to 
identify device and method, in that it regards each as an 



254 The 1^K()Blp]m of Method 

act, and the assumption is that this act is the outward act 
of the teacher, since the author looks upon device as 
merely a single act, while method is a series of acts. 

The use of the terms, "analytic mefkodr "synthetic 
method^'' "inductive method'' and deductive laethod^^' on 
pages 111 and 113, implies, unless closely scrutinized, that 
method is the psychological movement of the child in 
studying. A more careful examination of these expres- 
sions, however, seems to indicate that the author means, 
under the analytic method, the explanations, questions, 
suggestions, etc., of the teacher adapted to lead the child 
to analyze an object into its parts or elements. The same 
inference may be drawn as to the other methods men- 
tioned. 

On page 125 the author says: "Learning should begin 
with individuals and should return to individuals." This 
outwardly indicates that the third view of method is held. 

On page 127 there is an indication that the child is (1) 
to comprehend an object as a whole, analyze it into its 
parts, comprehend the whole as made up of these parts; 
(2) to conceive from several such wholes a general belong- 
ing to these similar objects; (3) to discover this general in 
new objects. This also hints the third vicAv of method. 

On pages 286-291, in considering the subject of liter-, 
ature, there is also some indication of the third view of 
method. The first movement of consciousness is indicated 
on page 286, the second on page 288, and the third on 
page 291. 

On page 309 the following statement occurs : 

* ' We know a man, a horse, a house or a piano first as entire things ; 
we are able to recognize these things and give their names; later, 
through our desire to know them more fully, we are forced to the 
necessity of mentally analyzing them. Then, after we have studied 
the details of their parts, we know the things in their entirety more 
intimately. ' ' 



The Problem of Method 255 

This gives an indistinct indication of the third view of 
method. 

On page 318 the author says: 

' ' The method in this, as in all natural sciences, should be inductive 
—leading up from the individual instances presented to the appropri- 
ate generalizations, and then returning to apply these truths in newly 
discovered instances. ' ' 

This likewise suggests the third view of method. 

Under all these uses, however, there is no clear indica- 
tion that the author regards method as the characteristic 
process of consciousness in the child. There is rather the 
indication that he considers method to be the external acti- 
vities of the teacher controlled by the notion that the mind 
may deal with particular objects in two ways, and with 
generalizations in two ways. Fundamentall}^, then, the 
work is in harmony with the first view of method. The 
principle that prevents the work from being truly organic 
or systematic is the one mentioned on page 8. "In the 
world of things about which we stud}^, only individuals 
exist, while generalizations are merely contrivances of 
man wrought out for his convenience in mastering the 
truths concerning this Avorld of real but individual things." 
This idea would indicate that a greater degree of truth is 
reached in sense-perception than in memory, a greater de- 
gree in memory than in imagination, a greater degree in 
imagination than in conception, etc. This view of the 
world is essentially divisive. According to such a view, 
no work can possess a fundamental unity. The reason is 
that, according to such a view, the individual is the only 
truth. 

This view of the world is again reflected in the idea of 
the concept presented on page 98, Avhich indicates that the 
concept is the notion of an individual object or of the class. 
It is to be noted that the class is regarded as merely an 



256 The Problem of Method 

aggregation of individual objects, and is usually, there- 
fore, a space-occupying thing. The notion which applies 
to a class is regarded as concerned with the set of common 
attributes, and is not in harmony with the modern view of 
the concept, Avhich regards it as signifying the creative ac- 
tivity producing the various objects of the class. This view 
of the world again reveals itself in the division of method 
into four kinds, the analytic, the synthetic, the inductive 
and the deductive. If the world is a true unity instead 
of being made up, as the author suggests on page 8, of 
particulars, there is a single method according to which 
every branch of study should be taught. The separative 
tendency of the view of the world given by the author on 
page 8 also manifests itself in the classification of subjects 
given on page 131. It is further exhibited in that the 
author presents the different psychological facts much as 
they would be given in a work on psychology instead of 
limiting the psychological treatment strictly to those ele- 
ments that reflect the notion of method given in the book. 

The separative tendency of his view of the world also 
exhibits itself in the fact that the special methods given 
under the different branches of study do not definitely 
reveal the idea of method presented on pages 111 to 114. 
The view that, "In the world about which we study only 
individuals exist, while generalizations are merely con- 
trivances of man wrought out for his convenience in mas- 
tering the truths concerning this world of real but indi- 
vidual things," is the ground for the various ways in 
which the author uses the term methods. 

After having explained the four distinct methods as 
given on pages 111 to 114, Avould the author be entitled to 
use the term method, in any other sense than in one of the 
four given? Would there not be, indeed, a tendency on 
the part of every reader to seek some one fundamental 



The Problem of Method 257 

sense to which these four could be reduced? Let the fol- 
lowing uses ■ of the term be noticed in order to decide 
whether they are already included in one or more of the 
four mentioned. 

On page 8 the author speaks of "the varieties of so- 
called ''methods'^ of learning as simply 'variations of one 
comprehensive plan.' " This identifies the term "method" 
with the term "comprehensive plan." 

On page 10 the author speaks of a "principle" as the 
"basis of method." This distinguishes method from prin- 
ciple. 

On page 133 the following occurs: "Our method of 
teaching, then, should be one of imitation and practice." 
What is the relation of this method to the four mentioned 
on pages 111 to 114? Apply the same question to the use 
of the word "method" in the following quotations : 

Page 134, "It seems to receive attention only when the 
study is one that requires in its recitation some special 
method of delivery, as in declamation or singing." 

Page 141, "The only difference between childhood and 
manhood in regard to these methods is the difference in the 
predominant element. Both methods should be employed 
always." The author here refers to the concrete and the 
abstract methods. 

Page 146, "The product secured through such direct 
study should be compared with the products secured by 
the other pupils through a similar method, of study." 

Page 167, "This m^ethod of procedure robs the drawing 
class of its mechanical drudgery." 

Page 249, "It is not the ancient, stereot^/ped m^ethod of 
parsing." 

Page 257, "The child's method of study" ; "a method of 
testing" ; "the written method of recitation." 



18 



258 The Problem of Method 

Page 263, ''History is a methodical record of the impor- 
tant events which concern a community of men." 

Page 331, ''To this end we should adopt Avhat is called 
the scientific method of counting rather than the given 
met hod J' 

On account of the view that the world consist of real 
but individual things and that there are no generals in 
reality, the distinction is made into subjects expressing 
truth, those expressing facts and those that are merely 
form. This leads to a variety of method. In consequence, 
the book does not present one fundamental method. The 
tendency of the book is to lead the student to regard 
method as the outward activity of the teacher controlled 
by the principles belonging to the subject of study. 

7. In "Scientific Method in Education"" the "scientific 
method" is held to be an attitude of the mind. Thus on 
page 144 it is defined as follows : 

"Scientific metliod is the method, the attitude of mind that makes 
a search for the principle under which facts and observations may 
be experienced in their relations and made significant. ' ' 

This is seen to refer to the j^sychological activities of the 
learner. It does not, however, indicate a process of the 
mind as giA^en by Mr. Cramer in the "Method of Darwin," 
page 30. 

Mr. Cramer gives the "scientific method" as "observa- 
tion, induction, deduction and verification." In both cases, 
however, the view of method is that Avhich has been termed 
the second vieAv in that it relates to the psychological activ- 
ity of the learner. Often in the discussion the first view 
of method appears. The following are examples: 

* * Educational metliod to be of worth should be scientific 
method applied to the art of teaching." (Pagel47.) "The return 



■■' "Scientific Method in Education," by Ella Flagg Young, in Volume HI. of the 
Decennial Publication, published by the University of Chicago Press. 



1 



The Problem of Method 259 

to old methods of instruction and school management, the repudia- 
tion of the theories which have issued from investigation of biology 
and psychology have at once indicated that the theories have been 
found wanting because of the readiness with which they were con- 
structed from the few facts. " (Page 152.) " The application of the 
method of science to research is the social heritage of the child of 
today." (Page 154.) ''Many individual teachers in the schools of 
this country are in intelligent sympathy with the aims and ways of 
scientific method as applied to education." (Page 155.) 

The second view of method is, however, more prominent 
in the article. The definition of the scientific method given 
above indicates the second view. The following are also 
examples of that view : 

' ' The method of the teacher is simply an attitude of the mind 
like that of the scientist." (Page 147.) ''To teach children neces- 
sitates a knowledge of the mind, the law of mental activity." (Page 
148.) "The first element, the children, necessitates a readiness on the 
part of the teacher in interpreting the contents of mind, clear vision 
as to their method, and a sympathetic understanding of general con- 
ditions which are indicated not only by language expression but also 
by bodily expression." (Page 150.) "There should be an acquaint- 
ance with this which has been obtained by the psychologic method; 
that is, through investigation, through observation of sequences, and 
also by the logical method, that is, through making conscious stand- 
ards, or norms, of the ends toward which the psychological material 
points. ' ' 

' ' The two aspects of a subject gained by these two lines of ap- 
proach, may be called the method of the subject." 

(Page 151.) 

"A growing understanding of the method by which the mind 
works and develops shows it to be the inductive method of the scien- 
tist.'' (Page 154.) 

The third view appears but once in the discussion. It is 
then only incidental. It is indicated in the following: 

' ' As one does not become a botanist or a zoologist by begin- 
ning with the principle and data of pure science, so one cannot un- 



260 The Problem of Method 

derstand the life process of the soul if there be no original observa- 
tion of the activity of the mind preceding the study of psychology. 
As in the other sciences, the purely scientific study must be followed 
by a return to such material as formed the basis of observation and 
experience in the first stage, so in psychology the applied science must 
follow the pure science. In the study of psychology, the teacher must 
go through three stages; first, the observational and introspective; 
second, the purely scientific and experimental; third, the applied, 
which is generally termed educational psychology. He does not go 
through the third, he enters into it." (Page 149.) 



The Problem of Method 261 



Chapter X 



METHOD IN A BRANCH OF STUDY. 

It is necessary that one who enters upon an investiga- 
tion of method in a branch of study should be familiar 
with the facts of the subject. Upon the basis of this famil- 
iarity he can investigate the essential features that give 
organization to the subject. 

These essential features may be held to be: 

(1). The central idea of the subject. This is the 
characteristic attribute of the material. For example, in 
geography it is distribution in space. 

(2). The scope or extent of the facts, as determined 
by the central idea. The subject must be wide enough to 
include every fact possessing the distinguishing charac- 
teristic. From it must be excluded all facts not viewed 
with reference to that characteristic. For example, the 
walnut tree viewed as adapted to furniture would not be 
included in the scope of botan}^, since botany's distinguish- 
ing characteristic is plant life as to the process of growth. 

(3). The divisions and subdivisions as determined 
by the central idea. These are not determined entirely by 
the central idea in its abstractness. The nature of the 
material as characterized by the predominant attribute 
gives rise to the divisions and subdivisions. 

(4). The relative importance of the divisions and 
subdivisions as determined by the central idea. The cen- 
tral idea in and of itself does not determine the relative 



262 The Problem of Method 

importance of the divisions and subdivisions. This is 
determined by the inherent nature of the material as char- 
acterized by the predominant attribute. 

(5). The act of the pupil in learning a fact of the 
subject so characterized constitutes the fifth element. This 
mental process involves sense perception, one or more of 
the forms of memory, imagination in some form, reason- 
ing, etc. As a central process, however, involving these 
various stages of knoAving, it would consist of the essen- 
tial process of consciousness — contemplating the object as 
a whole, discoA^ering its distinctions, becoming conscious 
of it as an organized unity. This Avould result in special 
mental effects. 

(6). These mental effects constitute the sixth as- 
pect of the method in a branch of study. They are emo- 
tional, volitional, and intellectual. 

(7). There are certain rational means, to a large 
extent peculiar to each subject, for stimulating and guid- 
ing the pupil's process of learning the subject. They in- 
clude the assignment by the teacher, the teacher's ques- 
tioning, the use of the text book, etc. 

The method in a subject, therefore, includes : 

The organizing principle of the subject. 

The scope of material. 

The divisions. 

The relative importance of the divisions. 

The mental process in learning a fact of the subject. 

The mental effects. 

The means or devices. 

Of these the central or organizing principle is predom- 
inant. It determines the scope, the divisions and subdivi- 
sions and relative importance. It contributes in determin- 
ing the process in the child's mind, the effect produced in 



The Problem of Method 263 

the mind of the child, and the devices to be emplo^^ed. The 
first four, the organizing principle, the scope, the divisions 
and subdivisions and the relative importance relate to the 
branch of stud3^ The fifth and sixth relate to the mind of 
the learner. The seventh is a stimulus to the mind of the 
learner in mastering the subject-matter. It is identified 
on the one hand with the knoAvledge of the pupil, and on 
the other hand with the nature of the subject-matter. 
These characteristics of method in any branch of study 
may be illustrated by the subject of composition. 

Method in Composition. 

I. In composition the material consists of objects of 
thought in the process of being expressed in language for 
the purpose of communication. That which distinguishes 
composition from other forms of language is the fact that 
the thought of the object is in a process of development 
and the language is changing to adapt itself to the grow- 
ing thought. 

II. The sco'pe of composition is that range of material 
possessing the distinguishing mark of composition, a mark 
which differentiates composition from other language 
studies. This material is found to include also an attri- 
bute which unifies composition with all other language 
studies and an attribute which unifies it with all exist- 
ence. The first is the particular or organizing attribute; 
the second, the general ; and the third, the universal. The 
universal characteristic which connects composition with 
all existence is the fact that it involves ohjects thought of. 
That which unifies it with language as a whole is the fact 
that the objects thought of are expressed in language. 
The characteristic which distinguishes it from language 
as a whole is the fact that the ohjects being thought of 
are changing and the language itself is changing. 



264 The Problem of Method 

III. The divisions in composition must be genetic, that 
is, they must arise from the essential nature of the mate- 
rial as distinguished by the central attribute. The divi- 
sions are not to be imposed upon the material from with- 
out. The fundamental division is therefore into 

Changing language expressing objects of the external 
world; as that resulting in the description of a cotton 
plant. 

Changing language expressing objects of the mental 
world, as that resulting in the expression 

''Perception may be defined as knowledge of actnally present 
particular things or events. ' ' 

Changing language expressing idealized objects, as, 
that which developed into the following : 

' ' Jocund day stands tip toe upon the misty mountain tops, ' ' 

or, 

''Flower in the cra^nnied wall, 
I pluck you out of the crannies; — 
Hold you here, root and all, in my hand, 
Little flower— but if I could understand 
What you are, root and all, all in all, 
I should know what God and man is. ' ' 

The developing content then differentiates into devel- 
oping purposes which may be emotional, volitional, or 
intellectual, and developing thought. The form or ex- 
pression differentiates into changing audible expression 
and changing visible expression. Both form and content 
manifest many other subdivisions. 

IV. The relative im'portance of these divisions and sub- 
divisions is determined by the inherent nature of the 
material itself and the degree to which they manifest the 
organizing principle of the subject. 

Y. In composition, as is the case in all other branches of 
study, the fifth essential element is the psychological pro- 



The Problem of I^Iethod 265 

cess in the mind of the learner. In this process the learner 
becomes conscious of the object to be expressed as a whole. 
He constructs an indistinct notion of it ; he then abstracts 
a characteristic of the object, which characteristic is 
thereby generalized. The object is then viewed as distin- 
guished by this characteristic. This completes the process 
of considering the object, unless it is an idealized object. 
In the latter case, the process is more complex. ( See page 
98.) After this thought of the object has been completed, 
or while it is in progress, the mind imagines or constructs 
language which it deems appropriate. It then adjusts the 
language to the thought and concludes by judging it to be 
adequate. 

1. The process illustrated — 

The first step in the process is the objectification of 
a thought. The following short composition may be used 
in illustration \ 

EVENING IN THE VALLEY. 

The undifferentiated process. 

The shades of evening were falling fast, enveloping the little valley 
in a gray shroud and fusing the prospect into an indistinct vs^hole. 
Dark clouds, prophetic of a coming storm, scurried across the darken- 
ing heavens. The fast-rising wind blew in little gusts and puffs, of 
suf&cient force, however, to suck up the dead leaves as if in a 
miniature whirlwind. The low distant rumble of thunder came nearer, 
accompanied by sharp flashes of lightning which lit up the sur- 
rounding country. The lurid light illumined all with brilliancy but 
made the succeeding moments of darkness the more oppressive. Even 
these fleeting glimpses revealed something of the nature of the little 
valley. As a background for the scene lofty mountains raised their 
barren peaks and seemed to penetrate the clouds. A grove of giant 
oaks, deprived by autumn's chilly blasts of all last summer's foliage, 
stood as the lonely sentinel of this stormy evening. But what need of 
sentinels? Kepeated flashes of the lightning revealed no life. True, 
in a remote nook of the valley, among overhanging cliffs, the form 



266 The Problem of Method 

of a house was discernible. Constructed out of rough stones, from 
the neighboring hillsides durable enough material yet there were 
traces of decay. Here and there were crevices in the walls; some 
stone had slipped unheeded from its place. Straggling branches of 
dead vines formed an unsightly network over the stony walls. But 
this house might well have been merely a huge pile of stones for 
nowhere was life visible. No welcoming light shone out of this 
habitation into the wildness and darkness of the stormy world. 

The analytic fvocess: As soon as the writer had ex- 
pressed this somewhat undifferentiated thought, in lan- 
guage having the same characteristic, he concentrated 
attention upon the language which had been produced and 
began the process of isolation. For example, he observed 
or noticed the expression "lit up." He also considered 
the expression "constructed out of rough stones from the 
neighboring hillsides durable enough material." He made 
a study of the following expression, asking whether the 
objects referred to could be seen from his point of view. 
"But this house might well have been merely a huge pile 
of stones, for nowhere was life visible." 

Indicate other features that could be isolated and 
changed. 

The process of synthesis or reorganization. 

The writer considered the expression "lit up" with the 
expression "lighted up" as appropriate to the thought, and 
selected the latter. He compared the expression, "con- 
structed out of rough stone from the neighboring hill- 
sides, durable enough material" with the expression "con- 
structed, as it was, out of rough stones, a durable enough 
material," and selected the latter. He thought of the 
composition as including this expression : "But this house 
might well have been merely a huge pile of stone, for no- 
where was life visible," and as not including it. His 
choice was not to include it. The reorganized composition 
appeared, therefore, as follows : 



The Problem of Method 267 



EVENING IN THE VALLEY. 



The shades of evening were falling fast, enveloping the little 
valley in a gray shroud and fusing the prospect into an indistinct 
whole. Dark clouds, prophetic of a coming storm, scurried across the 
darkening heavens. The fast rising wind blew in little gusts and 
puffs, of sufficient force, however, to suck up the dead leaves as if 
in a miniature whirlwind. The low distant rumble of thunder came 
nearer, accompanied by sharp flashes of lightning which lighted up 
the surrounding country. The lurid light illumined all with bril- 
liancy but made the succeeding moments of darkness the more op- 
pressive. Even these fleeting glimpses revealed something of the 
nature of the little valley. As a background for the scene lofty 
mountains raised their barren peaks and seemed to penetrate the 
clouds. A grove of giant oaks, deprived by autumn's chilly blasts 
of all last summer's foliage, stood as the lonely sentinels of this 
stormy evening. But what need of sentinels? Eepeated flashes of 
the lightning revealed no life. True, in a remote nook of the valley 
among overhanging cliffs, the form of a house was discernible. Con- 
structed, as it was, out of rough stones, a durable enough material, 
yet there were traces of decay. Here and there were crevices in the 
walls; some stone had slipped unheeded from its place. Straggling 
branches of dead vines formed an unsightly network over the stony 
walls. No welcoming light shone out of this habitation into the wild- 
ness and darkness of the stormy world. 

VI. Among the mental effects to be produced by com- 
position, the following may be noted : 

1. As related to the whole. 

The establishment of both forms of the language 
activity as a habit {Psychology, Dewey, page 211). 

In the productive form. 

This involves — 

Consciousness of the object as a whole, as, for exam- 
ple, of the object expressed bv the words "Evening in the 
Valley." 



268 The Problem of Method 

The analysis of the object into isolated features and 
their arrangement into an order of succession, as, 
The effect of the shades of evening. 
The dark cloud. 
The action of the wind. 
The rumble of thunder. 
The lightning. 
The scene's background. 
The grove of oaks. 
The absence of life. 
The deserted house. 
This second stage is always one of abstraction. The 
abstracted characteristic is closely contemplated and gen- 
eralized and then re-unified with the object. It is this 
object in connection with which abstraction and general- 
ization have occurred. Language does not seem to express 
any particular object in connection with which there has 
been no generalization. On account of this, language is 
said to express the general. 

The creation of a distinct purpose, as, for example, 
thinking of the shades as shrouds, of the darkness as op- 
pressive, of the oaks as sentinels, etc. 

The imagining of the language in succeeding sentences 
and paragraphs. 

The judgment as to the fitness as the sentences and 
paragraphs are produced. 

These are the modes of activity in the first form of the 
language act which would be established as a habit. 

In the interpretative form. 
This involves — 

Observation of the constructed language. 

Consciousness of the meaning as hinted by the lan- 
guage. 



The Problem of Method 269 

Isolation of certain portions of the discourse, as, the 
expression, "lit up," etc. 

The imagining of other expressions. 

The comparison of these as to their fitness to express 
the meaning. 

The selection of the expression to be used. 

These are the activities under the interpretative form of 
the language act which are to be established as a habit. 

2. As related to the separate elements. 

Effects in relation to meaning or content: 

Distinct knowledge of the various purposes of 
discourse, as the arousing or changing of the emotions, the 
modification of the will, the changing of the intellect. 

Knowledge of the three kinds of objects (objec- 
tive, as, a building, a street; subjective, as, the process of 
remembering, and figurative, as, the object expressed by 
"He was a bulwark of liberty") ; knowledge of the four 
subordinate kinds — (individual object changing, as, 
"Sherman's march to the sea;" the individual object as 
fixed, as, the capital at Washington;" the general object 
as such, as "fidelity;" the general object as the content of 
an act* of reasoning. This includes the two truths which 
are the basis of an assertion, as, for example, "a republi- 
can form of government is more favorable to the develop- 
ment of the people than is a monarchial form.") 

Fuller knowledge of the various attributes and 
relations of objects. Since language does not express the 
object as undifferentiated, it necessarily leads to knowl- 
edge concerning the attributes and relations. Even in pro- 
ducing a word, the mind abstracts the essential attribute 
from the object which is to be named. It next pays strict 
attention to this attribute, thus generalizing it, and 



270 The Problem or Method 

reunifies it with the object. The word then expresses this 
object which has been differentiated and, in a sense, gen- 
eralized. 

Emphasis of the relations of fused unity, differ- 
ence, and unity after difference. The production of lan- 
guage or the interpretation of language necessarily makes 
very distinct the characteristic process of consciousness. 

A strong sense of order in the unfolding of an 
action or of an object. The object which is to be expressed 
is not only analyzed in order to make clear the topics 
which are to be discussed, but the order of these topics is 
carefully fixed. This occurs in all language work. It may 
be noticed in the short composition entitled "Evening in 
the Valley." 

A consciousness of the central law of discourse 
— unity (purpose) — and of subordinate laws — (selection, 
order, completion, coherence and proportion.) 

A tendency to have a conscious center in all dis- 
course. 

The notion, that each sentence, paragraph and 
entire selection has a center. 

Effects in relation to expression: 

A clearer idea of the three kinds of language and the 
four forms of discourse. It will become very evident to 
the child that there is a language to express the objective 
world, one suited to express the subjective world, and a 
third adapted to give expression to idealized objects. 
Work in language will also make it evident that there is 
a form of discussion suited to the changing particular 
object, one suited to the fixed jDarticular object, a third 
adapted to the exj^ression of a general object as such, and 
a fourth fitted to express the general, which is the basis in 
a process of reasoning. 



The Problem of Methoev 271 

The creation of a tendency to brevity. As one becomes 
skillful in language, he is more fully impressed with the 
force and capacity of different words, hence he is able to 
express much briefly. One not well educated in language 
employs many superfluous Avords. 

A refinement of taste in the use of words. 

The rendering of iteration purposive. A person who is 
not skilled in the use of language frequently repeats with- 
out any special aim. Education in language makes one 
acquainted with the different purposes and the adapta- 
tion of the expression to these purposes. This will enable 
him to use repetition or iteration only when it contributes 
to the purpose. 

Satisfaction on account of ability to employ the best 
medium for objectifying. Language is much more pliable 
than the materials of painting, sculpture, etc. 

A strong tendency to notice in all cases the correspond- 
ence of meaning (purpose and thought) and expression. 

The habit of self-examination as a test in the use of 
words. The comparing and contrasting of different 
expressions to be used, necessarily leads the person to self- 
examination. It is a process in which he inquires whether 
the first expression seems as suitable to him as does the 
second. The answer is found by introspection. 

Satisfaction in the knowledge of the thought of the race 
as expressed in words. It naturally gratifies the pupil or 
student to know that the word that he is using has been 
created by his own race in ages past and has been used 
through many years. It identifies him, to a certain extent, 
with the achievement of the past. 

VII. The devices in a branch of study are general and 



272 Xhe Problem of Method 

The general device or means is the organized course of 
study. This general device in composition may be given 
as follows: 

THE COURSE OF STUDY IN COMPOSITION. 

Stages in the Primary Grades. 

The First Stage. 
First and Second Grades. 

In the first stage of composition, conversation is prom- 
inent. The effort is to have the child acquire the correct 
use of language without giving attention to its structure or 
to the principles underlying the structure. The result is 
that the child is intent upon coromunicating only, and 
meaning and form are practically fused. During this 
stage there should be a strong effort to awaken the sense 
of the value of power in conversation, and the sense of the 
importance of the English language. The conversation is 
at times to be ordered, in that the teacher selects the 
objects, and decides upon the successive topics. 

This is for the purpose of making the child familiar 
with thoughtful, regulated conversation manifesting law. 
At other times the conversation is to be more fully under 
the choice of the child, in that he will select the object and 
determine the successive topics. This will be favorable to 
his spontaneity. In bringing about conversation upon any 
subject, the pupil will be led to objectify freely his thought 
in language. The teacher will then aid him in changing 
the meagre, or profuse, or otherwise inartistic forms into 
clear, concise and refined expression. Much conversation 
centers in the systematic construction of a series of sen- 
tences expressing the successive phases of an activity in 
nature, or in tiie life of man, viewed as returning to its 
beginning phase. (See Appendix VII). Conversation 



The Problem of Method 273 

also arises in the form of the free reproduction of stories 
read or told by the teacher. The conversational aspect of 
the work may be supplemented by its reproduction in 
script or print upon the board, by the expression in script 
or print of sentences slowly constructed concerning an 
inanimate object, plant or animal being studied, and by 
the combinations of these sentences, and their formation 
into paragraphs. Conversation, and also all the more 
definite forms of work mentioned as belonging to the first 
stage, may be both strengthened and refined by the con- 
sideration of songs, poems and artistic prose. 

Five lines of work are thus implied : 

Conversation on objects chosen by the child. 

Ordered conversation on objects selected by the 
teacher. 

In an ordered conversation the children are held, at 
a given time, to the consideration of a certain topic. For 
example, the teacher may lead them to speak at first about 
the object as a whole. AAHiile this aspect of the object is 
being considered statements in regard to the parts, or to 
attributes not belonging to the object as a whole, would 
not be permitted. If, at a giA^en time, the main divisions 
of the object are under discussion, the pupil would not be 
expected to make any statements concerning the more sub- 
ordinate divisions, etc. 

The learning of selections of a high literary value. 

Eeading to the children by the teacher for the refin- 
ing effect of the language and thought upon the pupils' 
power of conversation, and for the purpose of having the 
selections read and reproduced substantially. 

The construction of a series of sentences expressing 
in ordered sequence the elements in acts of nature and in 



274 The Problem of Method 

the institutions of society. (Astronomy, geometry; an act 
in the home; an act in the school, etc. See Appendix 
VII). 

The ordered conservations may be upon natural objects, 
upon manufactured objects, upon productions in art, upon 
the various activities of institutional life, etc. 

Among the objects constituting a basis for these ordered 
conversations may be noted the following : 

Geographical. 

September, Equal days and nights, direction, the direc- 
tion of the sun at sunset. 

October, Frosts, dew, the formation of dew on cold 
surfaces. 

November, The winds, their direction, force and tem- 
perature (the thermometer). 

December, The short days and long nights, the length 
of the sun's shadow at noon. 

January, Snowflakes, the covering for plants. 

February, Freezing and thawing, the crumbling of 
clods, rocks, etc. 

March, Clouds and their forms and names, action of 
frost, rain, etc., on the soil. 

April, Rain and its measurements, illustrations of 
evaporation. 

May, Examination of a brook, its action in carrying and 
depositing soil. 

June, Length of days, position of the sun in early morn- 
ing, at noon and at sunset. 

Examination during the year of sand, pebbles, bould- 
ers, gravel, shale, limestone, sandstone, etc. 

Biological. 
Plants. 

September, Aster, golden rod, mustard, gentian, 
touch-me-not, velvet leaf, the various kinds of mallow, 
com flower, dodder, beech drop. 



The Problem of Method 275 

October, The flowering plants remaining are the spe- 
cimens of September. During October the conversations 
could be based upon the material of seed distribution. 
Among these may be noted the sandbur, cocklebur, bur- 
dock, milkweed pods, seeds of dandelion, seeds of maple, 
oak, beech, gum, etc. During November, December, Jan- 
uary, February and March, the conversation could be 
based upon non-flowering plants. Among these are the 
common puflPball, earth star, the various toadstools and 
mushrooms, lichens (reindeer and others), common bread 
mould, shelf fungus, mosses (pigeon wheat preferred), 
ferns, Indian compass, and some algae. 

April, Spring beauty, wind flower, hepatica, blood 
root. 

May, Buttercup, marsh marigold (see Songs of 
Seven), trillium, Jack-in-the-pulpit (see poem, Indiana 
Third Reader, page 191.) 

June, Dandelion, the various mustards, clovers, spid- 
erworts, iris, geranium, water leaf, etc. 

Animals. 

September, Grasshoppers, beetles. 
October, Clams, oysters. 

November, Butterflies, moths. (See book on Butter- 
flies, pub. by Doubleday, Page Co.) 
December, Crayfish, lobster. 
January, Fishes — yellow perch, Jack salmon. 
February, The frog. 

March, The woodpecker, crow, blackbird, jays. 
April, Redbird, sparrow, marsh robin. 
May, wren, thrushes. 
June, Hawks, owls. 



276 The Problem of Method 

Manufactured Objects. 

These are so numerous and so common that no selection 
need be indicated. 

Art. 

Architecture. 

The dome, the Greek column, the Roman arch, the 
Gothic window, the spire. 

Sculpture. 
A selection (probably in picture form), from Orien- 
tal, Greek, Roman, Mediaeval and Modern Sculpture. 

Painting. 

A selection from Oriental, Greek, Roman, Mediaeval 
and Modern Painting. 

Literature. Selections to be read to children: 

(Portions of these selections may be committed to mem- 
ory by the children after the thought has been carefully 
worked out.) 

1. "In Time's Swing," Fourth Eeader, McGuffey's, page 77. 

2. "The Lapse of Time," Bryant's Poems (household edition), 
page 75. 

3. "Freaks of the Frost," Fourth Eeader, Harper's, page 46. 

4. ' ' The Frost King, " in " Ehymes and Jingles, ' ' by Mary Mapes 
Dodge, page 199. 

5. ' ' Snow, " in " Ehymes and Jingles, ' ' by Mary Mapes Dodge, 
page 12. 

6. * ' Snow Song, ' ' Lucy Larcom 's Poems, page 123. 

7. "The First Snowfall," (Lowell), Literary Selections, page 320. 

8. "Evening Hymn," Second Eeader, McGuffey's, page 43. 

9. "Twilight," Third Eeader, Harper's, page 257. 

10. "The New Moon," Second Eeader, Harper's, page 161. 

11. "The Moon's Lullaby," Third Eeader, Harper's, page 39. 

12. "March," Second Eeader, McGuffey's, page 139. 

13. "March, "Lucy Larcom 's Poems, page 124. 



The Problem or Method 277 

14. ** April," in ''When the Birds Go North Again," by Ella 
Higginson, page 43. 

15. "The Eainbow, " (stanza at the close) Supplementary Second 
Keader, Golden Book of Choice Eeading. 

16. ''The Eai^bow," Fifth Eeader, McGuffey's, page 195. 

17. ''The Seasons" (the stanza on "Summer"), Fourth Eeader, 
McGuffey's, page 237. 

18. "A Summer Day, ' ' School Eeading by grades, page 35. 

19. "The Seasons," (stanza on "Winter"), Third Eeader, Mc- 
Guffey's, page 237. 

20. "Winter," Lucy Larcom's Poems, page 179. 

21. "The Seasons" (stanza on "Spring"), Fourth Eeader, Mc- 
Guffey's, page 237. 

22. "Spring," Third Eeader, McGuffey's, page 132. 

23. "The Seasons" (stanza on "Autumn"), Fourth Eeader, Mc- 
Guffey's, page 237. 

24. "The Autumn is Old," Fourth Eeader, Indiana revision, page 
234. 

Other selections expressing other aspects of life, both 
of nature and man, may be chosen. 

Pictures. 

Activities in institutional life. (See Appendix VII). 

Conversations upon objects similar to those indicated in 
the foregoing and graded according to the time of year 
and difficulty of use, constitute the work for the first and 
second years. The work contemplates a definite period for 
composition of not less than ten minutes from three to five 
days during the week. 

The Second Stage. 

Third Grade. 

This second stage, although one of conversation, is 
marked especially by the fact that it is a stage devoted to 
the discovery of distinctions. Throughout, the pupil is 
concerned with differences, and is therefore chiefly an- 



278 The Problem or Method 

alytic in his procedure. During the year the work is to be 
so organized as to lead the pupil to notice and to express 
himself as to the following distinctions in language : 

The distinction of language to express the external ; as, 
fence; the spiritual; as, / fear he is not here; the sym- 
bolic ; as, / am the vine, ye are the branches. These dis- 
tinctions are to be the more simple ones, and are to be 
sought in the readers and in general conversation. 

The distinction to be found in the separation of a stanza 
or paragraph into a series of disconnected sentences. The 
first stanza of Tennyson's Bugle Song so separated will 
read: 

^ ' The splendor falls on castle walls. 
The splendor falls on snowy summits old in story. 
The long light shakes across the lakes. 
The wild cataract leaps in glory." 

The idea of the sentence. The work on this must be 
very simple. For example, the children may be led to 
notice some object, as a match box, then to give attention 
to some attribute, as, its color, blue, and to observe that 
this attribute belongs to the object. It is this object 
thought of, as possessing that attribute which the sentence 
expresses, if the sentence is, "The match box is blue." 

The distinction of the sentence into its kinds. 

The distinction of each kind of sentence into its 
two uses — to express some fact, and also to express the 
mental attitude or state of the speaker. For example, the 
sentence, "The match box is blue," expresses not only the 
fact of the identity of the object and the attribute, but also 
the certainty of the speaker. In the sentence, "The match 
box is, perhaps, blue," the same fact is expressed and the 
doubt of the speaker is also denoted. 



The Problem or Method 279 

The distinction involved in working out different 
forms for some one sentence, as, 

The plowman homeward plods his weary way. 
The weary plowman plods his homeward way. 
His homeward way the weary plowman plods. 
His homeward way the plowman weary plods. 

The distinction of the sentence into its elements. 

The distinction of the sentence into its separate 
words, especially the chief ones, as nouns, adjectives, 
verbs. 

The distinction found among words, as — 
Common noun, proper noun. 

The distinctions under each, as names of places, of 
animals, etc. 

The distinction of such words as to, too, two; in, 
into ; is, was, were ; has, have, had. 

The distinction of words into main parts, prefix 
and suffix. 

The distinction between the current and the literal 
meaning of words.* 

The distinction in the meanings of words as shown 
by readings from such works as Oilman's Short Stories 
from the Dictionary. 

The distinction of words into those that are mere 
signs and those that onomatopoetic. The latter are 
words in which the sound imitates the sound of the object 
which the word represents; as, the hiizz of bees; the 
crackle of fire. 

The distinction of words into syllables. 

The distinction in meaning belonging to a word of 
one form, as race, e. g., "The human race^ not one man, 
produced this piece of literature." "He came to see the 
race which was to occur that afternoon.'' 



*See "The Problem of Elementary Composition," by Elizabeth Spalding p. 27. 



280 The Problem of Method 

The different sounds belonging to each letter. 

The difference as to the beginning of lines in prose 
and in poetry. 

The difference found in the ending of lines in 
poetry. 

The different images for a sentence separated from 
its context, as, "It was standing near the fence."* 

In this work the separate sentence should be placed be- 
fore the children upon the blackboard. Each child should 
then construct in his imagination an environment which, 
to be fully expressed, would require the given sentence 
along with other sentences. The pupil's thought of this 
environment should then be expressed in the form of a 
brief composition. These compositions should afterward 
be studied in order to render them both more full in cer- 
tain respects, and more compact and brief as a whole. At 
this stage the opportunity arises to consider the different 
images and the different meanings possessed by the word 
it in the different stories. 

The distinction found in the successive elements in 
a full activity, as, an act in society, an act in geology or 
geography, an act in physics. (See Appendix VII.) 

The different objects, actions, etc., mentioned in a 
brief selection. ( See "A Christmas Story," Indiana Third 
Eeader, page 58.) 

The distinction of the speaker and hearer in brief 
selections. In "A Christmas Story," referred to above, the 
principal speaker is the writer of the story, and the hearer 
is the reader. Within the story the child speaks to him- 
self, and is, hence, both speaker and hearer, etc. 

The distinction of letters that have been written, 
into their expression and content or meaning and the dis- 
tinction of the meaning or thought into its elements. 



* See "Language for the Grades," by John B. Wisely, p. 141. Published by 
Atkinson. Mentzer & Grover, Chicago. 



The Problem of Method 281 

The distinction in the process of writing and for- 
warding a letter. In this work the child should be taught 
the first act in writing a letter, the second act, the third 
act, etc.; the first act in forwarding a letter, the sec- 
ond, etc. 

The distinction of the elements of suspense, sur- 
prise and suggestion in stories. In every story there may 
be found features of the language and thought suited to 
keep the mind of the reader in suspense until a certain 
result is reached. There may be found, also, character- 
istics of language and thought suited to awaken surprise. 
There are suggestive elements, also. For example, at the 
beginning of a story, the writer may use an expression 
which suggests a result to occur much later. The children 
should be made skillful in discovering these character- 
istics. 

The distinction of the parts of a reading lesson 
illustrated by pictures, from the parts not so illustrated. 
(See the picture on page 34 of the Indiana Third Reader.) 
It will be observed that this picture illustrates next to the 
last paragraph. 

The distinction of the use of pictures in descrip- 
tion, from their use in illustrating an element of a story. 
The picture on page 76 of the Indiana Third Reader is 
of the first kind, and those on pages 28 and 29 of the same 
book are of the second kind. * 

The collection of examples of simile and of per- 
sonification in the pupils' ordinary language. 

The examination of brief literary selections in order 
to discover simple examples of simile and of personifi- 
cation. 

Selections from these and similar distinctions should be 
carefully adapted to the development of the pupil and of 
the subject. 



282 The Problem of Method 

Fourth Grade. 
The work in this stage is essentially constructive. Based 
upon the many clear distinctions discovered in the pre- 
vious stage the pupil now enters upon synthetic work. 
Of course the work in this stage is not solely synthetic. A 
stage of work in which differences are discovered always 
involves also the thought of unity. In like manner, a 
stage in which the idea of unity is the main thought is 
necessarily marked by a consciousness of many distinc- 
tions. The different kinds of work are substantially the 
following : 

1. The study of synonyms. 

2. Readings on the literal meanings and history of 
words from such works as, Palmer's Folk- Etymology^ 
Trench's The Study of Words, etc. 

3. The elaboration of a single sentence into a para- 
graph.* The process in this work is suggested by the 
following : 

The analytic study of paragraphs to discover the 
truth that a paragraph is merely an elaborated sentence 
having a common subject and diverse predicates. 

The reduction of paragraphs to this simplest form. 
Let this reduction be shown with tlie following para- 
graph : 

"It was a strtinge coronation. One of the bishops, who performed 
the ceremony, asked the Normans, in French, if they would have 
Duke William for their king. They answered, Yes. Another of the 
bishops put the same question to the Saxons in English. They too, 
answered Yes, with a loud shout." (Indiana Third Eeader, page 
207.) 

The selection of the sentence, as, "The stream was 
very clear." 

The enumeration of appropriate details. 

• "The Problem of Elementary Composition," by Elizabeth Spalding, pp 64-75. 



The Problem of Method 283 

The construction of a paragraph based on these 
details. 

By class and teacher working together. 
By the individual pupil. 
Suitable paragraphs for such reduction may be found 
in the works of Irving, Hawthorne, etc. 

The analysis of paragraphs to discover: 
Topic and attributes. Indicate the topic and the 
attributes in the paragraph quoted. 

The law of unity and its relation to diverse 
objects, and to opposites, as war and peace. 

In the paragraph given above, the Normans and 
the Saxons are diverse objects. How is the law of unity 
manifested ? The unity of a paragraph is preserved even 
if one object suggests the opposite. 

The study of successive paragraphs to determine: 
That the topic limits. Examine the paragraph 
that has just been quoted, the one preceding it, and the 
one following it in order to discover how the topic limits. 
The form of the beginning in each. The first 
paragraph begins with "Upon the ground," etc. ; the sec- 
ond with "It was a strange coronation;" the third with 
"The noise, being heard," etc. Shows the relation of each 
beginning to the preceding paragraph. 

The mode of indicating a quotation. 
The mode of uniting paragraphs. 
4. The construction into a brief organized discourse of 
some one of the series of separate sentences indicated 
under the work of the previous stage. (Appendix VII). 
In this work the pupils should be led to refine and to 
render more accurate the sentence and then to notice the 
order of the sentences belonging to the series, and to de- 
cide whether it is the order desired. The sentences should 
then be unified by the use of and^ for^ because^ etc The 



284 The Problem of Method 

different thoughts should then be elaborated, the result 
being fuller expression. This should be followed by the 
organization into paragraphs. 

5. Selection of a particular object, as a tree, and a study 
of this object. The pupils should be led to become con- 
scious of it as a whole. 

Their process would then become analytic. That is, 
they would discover one by one, in an orderly way, the 
various attributes and relations of the object. As each 
attribute and relation is discovered by the pupils, their 
minds should identify it with the object as a whole. The 
process of expressing in language this fixed object would 
result in a knowledge of the following laws of the form 
of composition called Description: 

Formation of mental picture. (Visualization.)* 
Point of view. (Referring to place and distance 
of writer or speaker from the object he is describing.) 
Manner of describing (mode of procedure). 
Whole by means of its attributes. 
Parts by means of their attributes. 
Reconsideration of the whole. 
Range of senses appealed to. 
Action in description. 
Ordering of attributes. 
Obvious to obscure. 
Physical to mental. 
Near to remote. 
Specific language. 
Purpose of Description. 

6. The examination of a brief, simple description of a 
high grade in order to discover in its structure indica- 
tions of one or more of the characteristics under "5." (See 



=:■ "First Steps in English Composition," by H. C. Peterson, pp. 19-20. A. Flan- 
agan Co., Chicago. 



The Problem of Method 286 

Robert Louis Stevenson's description of "the brown old 
seaman," on pages 3 and 4 of "Treasure Island.") 

7. The study of some simple object accessible to the 
children and possessing an interest for them, as, for exam- 
ple, a decorated china stamp box. This must be a partic- 
ular stamp box. 

This study of this particular, fixed stamp-box is 
to lead to the preparation of a brief description of the 
object. The description is then to be studied in order to 
learn what characteristics mentioned under "5" are illus- 
trated in the description. 

An additional purpose in studying the description 
is to form the basis for deciding whether the pupil se- 
lected just those attributes and parts needed to accom- 
plish his purpose; whether they were in the order neces- 
sary to accomplish the purpose, whether all the attributes 
and parts needed to accomplish the purpose were given 
and whether there was proportion of treatment. (The 
laws of selection, order, unity, completeness, proportion.) 

8. The construction of description of objects when the 
point of view is from a distance, a device in harmony with 
the first stage of consciousness, because the knowledge of 
the object under such conditions is a knowledge of an 
indistinct whole; and when the point of view is near, a 
device in harmony with the second stage of consciousness, 
because under such condition the knowledge is clear con- 
cerning the various details of the object. 

9. The examination of already constructed discourse to 
discover cases of onomatopoetic words, as, hum, pewit, 
whip-poor-will, cuckoo, hiss, crash, whirl. Examples of 
the figure of speech, onomatopmia^ may be found in "The 
Bells," by Edgar Allen Poe, and "The Brook," by Tenny- 



286 The Problem of Method 

son. The following from Hood's "How the AVater Comes 
Down at Lodore," is a good example — 

"The cataract strong, 

Then plunges along, 

Striking and raging 

As if a war waging 

Its caverns and rocks among. ' ' 

10. The construction of onomatopoetic paragraphs.* 

11. The selection of one or more brief narrations of 
high grade, from some standard writer, upon topics of 
interest and value to find the following main laws gov- 
erning this form of discourse. 

Essential characteristics, change and coherence. 

Theme, purpose and plot. 

Incidents leading up to main incident. 

Setting, time and place. 

Characters. 
Use the plot, as worked out in the selection, in writing 
a reproduction of it. After this, work out a plot of an 
original story with the whole class and have the pupils 
write the story. Later let each child write a plot of an 
original story and then write his own story. 

12. The selection of a brief nan^ation of a high grade, 
from some standard writer, upon a topic of interest and 
value, and the examination of it to discover the laws indi- 
cated under "11." 

13. The examination of songs in order to stimulate and 
to direct effort toward literary production. 

14. The selection and examination of letters written by 
children during the different periods of English and 
American History. The letters selected should be, in so 
far as possible, representative of different classes. They 



'The Problem of Elementary Composition," by Elizabeth Spalding, pp. 42-43. 



The Problem of Method 287 

should pertain largely to home life, and to the relation of 
child to parent, of brother to sister, etc. To some extent 
they should relate to society and to the church.* 

15. Letter Writing.** 

The letters in this stage should relate to affairs of home 
and school, and to the simple aspects of society for chil- 
dren. They should be written to schoolmates, friends in 
the neighborhood, friends in distant regions, parents, 
brothers and sisters. 

The established forms of letters should be made clear, 
and the work should enable the pupil to write a brief let- 
ter involving any of the relations above given, according 
to the accepted form, legible, correct in paragraphing, 
language, punctuation, etc., and obedient to the laws of 
discourse. 

Stages in the Intermediate Grades. 

The First Stage. 

The first stage is not one of work in the sense that the 
teacher attempts actively to lead the children into the 
comprehension and use of more developed forms of lan- 
guage. That which is referred to is the mental condition 
of the pupil as to the relations of language that have been 
considered either not at all or partially in the first, sec- 
ond, and third years. It is that comprehension and use 
of language resulting from the work of the fourth and of 
the other preceding years. The stage is not the active 
consideration of language forms and relations by the 
teacher and pupil, but rather the mental condition of the 



'■=See the "Diary of Anna Greene Winslow," a Puritan girl ten years of age 
The diary contains a series of letters written by her while residing in Boston, to her 
parents, then residing in Nova Scotia. 

** For additional examples of letters and for helpful suggestions on the process 
of beginning the work of letter writing, see pp. 4-5 "The Problem of Elementary 
Composition," by Elizabeth Spalding. 



288 The Problem of Method 

pupil as to facts of language which have been hinted but 
not explained. It is one of fused unity, although not so 
fully as is the first stage in the primary grades. Know- 
ledge is always partial. The realm of the unknown is 
far more extensive than that of knowledge. The clearly 
known in comparison with the unknown or the dimly 
known is always slight. At the conclusion of the work 
of the four years the pupil's comprehension and use of 
language involves many indistinct aspects. The stage is 
one of synthesis, because these aspects are fused into a 
unity, and because many distinctions are not noticed. 

The Second Stage. 

Fifth Grade. 
The second stage is a stage of work in language. It 
deals with the discovery of distinctions which are some- 
what more advanced and difficult than those considered in 
the third grade. These distinctions are a development of 
the differences studied in the third grade, and an unfold- 
ing of the distinctions not known, or at least but dimly 
known, at the conclusion of the work of the fourth year. 
Hence this language work is analytic. Among the dis- 
tinctions of the stage are the following : 

1. The distinction of words as to their current and their 
literal meaning,* as coitpe^ current meaning, a four- 
wheeled closed carriage for two persons inside, with an 
outside seat for the driver; literal meaning, to cut. 

2. The distinction of words into those that are mere 
signs, as hat^ on, sit, etc., and those that are onomatopoetic, 
as swish, whistle, etc. 

3. The difference in such expressions as he, his, him, 
who, whom, etc. 



'■'" The distinction into the current and the literal meanings may be aided by 
readings from such works as Waites' Forgotten Meanings. 



The Problem of Method 289 

4. The difference in the form of the pronoun after the 
verb to he and after such verbs as to have^ to strike. 

5. The difference in the forms of comparison, and their 
relative value, as, more dark^ darker. Which is preferred? 
Why? 

6. The difference in significance of one and two neg- 
atives, as (correct form), / know nothing of it; I do not 
know nothing of it (incorrect form). Show how one neg- 
ative cancels the other. 

7. The difference between an indefinite and a definite 
subject, and the forms the succeeding pronouns tend to 
take, as (correct form), "If Henry should carry this pack- 
age to the store, he would find, etc. If anyone should 
carry this package to the store, they would, etc. (incor- 
rect form). The pupils should be led to explain why the 
unreflecting speaker tends to use the plural pronoun. 
They should observe also that such use of the pronoun is 
a sign that there is lack of unity in the thinking. 

8. The difference between the single and the double 
direct object, and the tendency toward different forms for 
the objective, as (correct form), "He asked me to go; he 
asked Mary and / to go (incorrect form). Why does the 
use of and lead to the use of / instead of mef Both 
teacher and pupils should reflect upon this. 

9. In the third grade symbolic language was distin- 
guished from language used to express the external, and 
from language employed to signify mental states. In this 
stage further distinctions in symbolic language are to 
appear. These distinctions will be found under both form 
and content. 

Figures of Form. 

Under form are the figurative expressions belonging to 
single words, and those found in sentences. 



290 The Problem of Method 

The figurative expressions in words are brought about 
by omission. There may be omission from the first of the 
word, from within the word, or from the end of the word. 

In words. 
Aphseresis. 

In "The Vision of Sir Launfal" the word ^gan is 
used instead of began. This is called apha?resis. This is 
also shown in you'^ll for you will. 

Syncope. 
The second form is syncope. This appears in the 
word o^er. 

Apocope. 

The third is apocope. An example of this is the use 
of yon instead of yonder. This is used in the "Bugle 
Song." 

Hyphenized words. 

Another figurative form of words is that of combin- 
ing by the use of the hyphen, as. He answered with a I- 
feel-that-I-am-well-prepared-for-this air. What influence 
does this have upon the discourse? 

In sentences. 
Ellipsis. 

In sentences also figures are formed by omission, as 
in ellipsis. An example of this is, The virtue I admire^ 
instead of. The virtue which I admire. 

Asyndeton. 

Related to the ellipsis is the figure called asyndeton. 
This is the omission of connectives as, The hoy, his father^ 
his mother^ his sister, are present. 



The Problem of Method 291 

Pleonasm. 

Another form is obtained by inserting. The general 
term for this is pleonasm, as, "Thy rod and thy staff they 
comfort me." 

Epanalepsis. 
A subordinate form under this is epanalepsis. This 
is the repetition of an expression after intervening words 
or expressions, as The sun — that great hcminary of light 
and warmth — the sun began to appear in its glory, 

Epizeuxis. 
Another subordinate form is epizeuxis. This is the 
repetition of a word or expression immediately, as, The 
sun — the sun, the great contributor of light and warmth 
— began to appear. 

Polysyndeton. 
A third subordinate form is termed polysyndeton. 
This is the employment of many connectives, as T/ie boy, 
and his father, and his mother, and his sister, are present. 
The word or may be used in the same way. 

Enallage. 

Another figure under the form of sentences is ob- 
tained by substituting one part of speech for another. 
Among the examples often used are the following: She 
will queen it; He will out- Herod Herod. 

Figures of Content. 

Symbolic language deals not only with the form, but 
also with the content. Under the content the symbolism 
is shown by comparison, by association and by contrast. 

Comparison. 

Under comparison are the well known figures of 
simile, metaphor and allegory. 



292 The Problem of Method 

Simile. 

It has been held that the work on the simile should at 
first be oral and common to the class. In the beginning 
there should be the reading of simile after simile and 
free conversation concerning each one in order to awaken 
the thought that the function of the simile is merely to 
picture or illustrate the writer's thought, and that the 
thought is the prominent thing. In this discussion it 
should appear that similes are to reveal striking like- 
nesses amidst marked differences. It is thus seen that the 
enjoyment of similes rests upon surprise. 

The work should then change, and the children should 
enter upon the examination of literary productions in 
order to discover cases of the simile. 

By means of these exercises the pupils would be pre- 
pared to construct paragraphs and brief compositions 
involving similes. 

Metaphor. 

In connection with the metaphor are the forms known 
as personification and apostrophe. Examine the process 
in forming the metaphor under the creative imagination, 
page 98. What does this show as to the process in cre- 
ating a conception of the metaphor and in interpreting 
metaphors as found in literature? The pupil should be- 
come familiar with the likeness and the difference of per- 
sonification and apostrophe. 

The work on personification, as that on the simile, 
may be oral and common at first. This will be introduc- 
tory to the examination of literary productions for the 
purpose of discovering and studying examples of person- 
ification. The mode of work recommended in connection 
with the simile and with personification is mentioned in 
order to indicate the spirit of work with all figures of 



The Problem of Method 

thought. What process should be employed in making 
the pupil acquainted with the nature of the apostrophe? 

What should be the process in a lesson on the fol- 
lowing : 

"Milton, thou should 'st be living at this hour, 
England has need of thee. ' ' 

* ' Oh Liberty, what crimes have been committed in thy name ! * ' 

"Eoll on, thou deep and dark blue Ocean, roll! 
Ten thousand fleets sweep over thee in vain; 
Man marks the earth with ruin— his control 
Stops with the shore. 

Hyperbole. 
Example: "His muscles strong as iron bands." Let 
the relation of apostrophe and hyperbole be shown. 

Allegory. 
Example: "It rains and the wind is never weary." 
Show the relation of simile, metaphor, and allegory. 

Association 

Under association are found the two figures spoken 
of as synecdoche and metonymy. 

Synecdoche. 
Examples : "Give us this day our daily bread," "They 
cut the solid whiteness through," etc. 

Metonymy. 
Examples: "The pen is mightier than the sword," 
"Who steals my purse steals trash," etc. 

Oo7itrast. 

The forms of symbolic language under contrast are 
antithesis and climax. 



294 The Problem of Method 

Antithesis. 
Of this Webster's Dictionary says: "An opposition 
or contrast of words or sentiments occurring in the same 
sentence; as, The prodigal rohs his heir; the miser rohs 
hlniself. He had covertly shot at Cromwell; he now 
openly aimed at the queen. 

Climax. 

An example is the following : "Tribulation worketh 
patience, patience experience, and experience hope."* 

In these the contrast is clearly expressed. There are, 
in addition, the epigram, the interrogation and irony. In 
these the contrast is merely implied. 

Epigram. 
Examples : "The favorite has no friend," "The more 
haste, the less speed," "He asked for bread and received 
a stone." 

Interrogation. 
Examples: "Hath a dog money?" "Is it possible a 
cur can lend three thousand ducats?" "Who by searching 
can find out Grod?" 

Irony. 
Examples: "The atrocious crime of being a young 
man * * * j g^aH attempt neither to palliate nor to 
deny." "And woman, kind woman, wife, widow and 
maid, for the good of the hunted, is lending her aid." — 
Whittier, Hunters of Men. 

Wit and Humor. 
Let examples of these be examined to show that they 
involve contrast. 



* In connection with the study of the climax, the distinction between it and 
the ending may be shown in the examination of selections, involving the climax. 
("The Problem of Elementary Composition," p. 20.) 



The Problem of Method 295 

These various distinctions involve many strange terms, 
as aphieresis, syncope, polysyndeton, etc. Shall these 
pupils (in age about ten years) be made acquainted with 
such unusual tenns? The difficulty in the use of new, 
long, scientific words is not essentially in their pronuncia- 
tion, but in the clear knowledge of their content or exact 
significance. When the meaning is simple enough to be 
considered, the exact scientific terms should be taught. 
For example, the idea expressed by the word polysynde- 
ton is easy of comprehension. After the meaning has been 
worked out the exact scientific term should be taught and 
used. To the pupil there is a distinct pleasure in the mas- 
tery of such terms. These terms have been produced by 
the race in its process of development, and they have sup- 
plied a distinct need. To be able to comprehend and to 
use them is, therefore, an act on the part of the pupil 
which identifies him with the entire race. It has a ten- 
dency to make him universal, and although he does not 
distinctly know this, he feels it to a certain extent and 
experiences pleasure on that account. The use of the term, 
isosceles triangle, identifies the child and his knowledge 
with the whole progress of the subject of geometry ; and 
it gives him this sense of the unity with the universal, 
much more than does the expression, a space inclosed hy 
three lines ^ two of which are equal. 

10. The distinction of a selection, as, the "Bugle Song," 
into the aim of the author in writing it ; the thought used 
to accomplish the aim : the expression, — imaged object 
and language in the ordinary sense ; the adaptation of the 
imagery and the language to thought, and thought to 
purpose. 

11. The distinction of the sentence into the thought to 
be communicated; the aim of the writer or speaker; the 
adaptation of the language to accomplish the aim. This 



296 The Problem of Method 

last involves the whole realm of distinctions implied in 
careful substitutions. For example, the pupil may be 
considering the adaptation of the words in the sentence, 
The prisoner's innocence is to he assumed. He may be led 
to see by substitution the following: The innocence of 
the prisoner is to he supposed. The subject of substitu- 
tion is important enough to merit considerable work on 
account of the aid it gives in a knowledge of the meaning 
and structure of sentences. 

12. The distinction of the direct and the indirect quo- 
tation, as, Jesus said "I am the way, the truth and the 
life," and "Jesus said that He was the way, the truth and 
the life;" the difference in the expressions appropriate and 
the difference in their strength. 

13. The distinctions found in the successive elements 
of the full activity in some form of institutional life, as 
an act in the realm of business, of state, etc: ( See Appen- 
dix VII: Transactions on Short Credit.) 

14. The distinctions found in the successive elements of 
a full activity in nature, as an act in the development of a 
plant. (See Appendix VII: Hoav an Acorn Becomes an 
Acorn Again.) 

Selections from these and similar distinctions should be 
carefully adapted to the development of the pupil and of 
the subject. 

The Third Stage. 

Sixth Grade. 

The work in this stage is like that of the fourth grade — 
essentially constructive. The work of the fifth grade is 
a consideration of distinctions more difficult and more 
extensive than those examined in the third grade. The 
pupil is now prepared to enter upon this higher grade of 



The Problem of Method 297 

synthetic work on account of the preparation given by 
the work in the fifth year. 

As was suggested concerning the work of the fourth 
grade, the work in this stage is not, and can not be, solely 
synthetic. In constructive work necessarily certain dis- 
tinctions are brought into notice; but practically and 
mainly this stage is a synthetic one in which language is 
viewed in the process of construction. 

The different kinds of work are shown by the fol- 
lowing : 

1. A careful study of the primary law of discourse — 
unity (purpose). Let this law be clearly illustrated. 
After this has been done it will be well to have one or 
more selections from discourse examined in order to 
show how they exemplify this primary law\ 

2. A careful study of the secondary laws of discourse — 
selection, completeness, order. Think out the relation of 
the law of unity and of the secondary laws to the laws 
of coherence and proportion. 

Carefully illustrate each of these laws, and then exam- 
ine brief selections from discourse in order to discover in 
them the presence of these laws. 

3. A careful and systematic study of the nature of the 
paragraph and its laws.* In a paragraph one may find, 
(1) a unity or central thought, (2) a series of different 
subordinate thoughts, (3) a unity of these subordinate 
thoughts in that each reflects or aids in constituting the 
central thought, (4) a feature which unifies the thought 
of the paragraph with that of the preceding paragraph, 
and (5) a feature which unifies it with the thought of the 

* Study in connection with this work special works upon the paragraph, such 
for example, as "Paragraph Writing," by Scott and Denney, published by AUyn & 
Bacon, Boston, Mass., and "Writing in English," by Maxwell and Smith, i especially 
Chapter IX.) published by the American Book Co. 



298 The Problem of Method 

succeeding one. This makes it evident that the paragraph 
objectifies both the general process of the self and the 
process of the language activity. (Examine the para- 
graph, Montgomery's History, page 193.) 

' ' The new government had no money ; but a government can no 
more hope to live and pay its bills without money than you or I can. 
In order to obtain funds, Congress (1789) imposed a duty or tax 
on all foreign ships and on many foreign goods entering our ports. 
Thus, if a French vessel of six hundred tons loaded with wine came 
into New York, the owners would have to pay a duty of fifty cents a 
ton— or three hundred dollars on the vessel, and eighteen cents a 
gallon on the wine. Other articles, such as tea, silk and sugar, were 
charged different rates." 

Examine other paragraphs selected from discourse in 
order to discover the presence of these principles of the 
paragraph. (See Appendix VII.) Arrange for more ad- 
vanced work in the elaboration of single sentences into 
paragraphs as indicated under "3," of the fourth grade 
work. 

4. The construction into a brief, organized discourse of 
one or more of the series of separate sentences, indicated 
in "13" and "14," under the work of the fifth grade. (See 
Appendix VII.) Pupils should in this work be led to 
consider : 

The order of the sentences belonging to the series. 
The unity of the sentences. This would involve the 
use of and, for, because, etc. 

Elaboration of the different thoughts. 
Organization into paragraphs. 

5. Advanced work in harmony with the suggestions 
made under "5" in the work of the fourth grade. 

6. The examination of a description of a high class 
somewhat more difficult than that belonging to the fourth 



The Problem of Method 299 

grade to discover in its structure the characteristics men- 
tioned under "5" of the work of the fourth grade. 

7. The selection of a particular object viewed as chang- 
ing^ as, The Fonnation of The Magna Charta. 

The study of this activity as to its purpose, time, 
cause, effects and parts. 

The study of one of the parts as to purpose, time, 
cause and effect. 

The preparation of a brief narration by the pupil 
setting forth The Formation of The Magna Charta. 

An examination of this narration in order to test 
it by the laws of discourse. 

8. Advanced work in harmony with the suggestions 
made under "11" in the work of the fourth grade. 

9. Narrations based on given data. 

The following are examples from actual work. The 
assignment was — 

THE DATA. 

"Write a story based upon the following data— He was walking in 
the park at dusk. In his hand was a valise containing an infernal 
machine. It was his plan to blow up the Capitol. Either because 
of the arousal of his conscience or through fear he determined not 
to do it. The machine was set to explode in one hour. What became 
of the machine?" 

THE STORY. 
HIS WORST HOUR. 

Giovanni cautiously set his satchel down, and looking up at the 
clock on the beautiful marble State Capitol, discovered that in ex- 
actly one hour the infernal machine, so carefully nailed up in the 
wooden box in his satchel would explode, and the edifice would be in 
ruins. Suddenly a wave of remorse and self -anger swept over him, 
looking at the lovely park around the Capitol, and seeing in his 
mind's eye, the fair trees torn and blasted; the people wounded and 
slain. He covered his eyes as if "to ward off the sight. For a while, 



300 The Problem of Method 

he stood with bowed head, till the shrill whistle of a distant inter- 
urban gave him an idea. Glancing again at the clock, he found that 
he still had forty minutes in which to destroy the machine. Lifting 
the satchel, he hurried to the terminal station, just in time to board 
an out-going interurban. 

Twenty minutes later he was alone on a broad field outside the 
city, with the fatal satchel. He had determined that the explosion 
should harm only himself. He stood there, dumbly awaiting his death. 
Flight was an impossibility, it was beyond the power of his tortured 
brain. 

One! Two! Giovanni realized with every heart-beat, his seconds 
were one less. Three! Four! Five! He mechanically drew one 
cold damp hand across his throbbing forehead. Even though the 
minutes flew too rapidly by, each was an endless agony to the man. 
His parched lips murmured something, perhaps a prayer for pardon, 
as the great town clock boomed six, from afar. He knew he had 
sixty seconds to live. Suddenly he straightened up, ready to meet 
death like a man. He then began to count the seconds. When — ' Two 
hundred forty— forty-one' he found himself saying, and he realized 
that the hour was passed, and his doom had not come. Slowly, in- 
credulously, he grasped the faulty machine, and in a few hours it 
was resting safely in the bottom of the river. ' ' 

What modifications should be made in the story ? Point 
out elements showing suspense. 

10. The preparation of a story based on an outline. 

THE OUTLINE. 

I. The farmer's return from the city. 
A. His mood. 

1. Cause. 

2. Kesult. 

a. The refusal of his wife's wish. 

11. The visit to the barn. 
A. The discovery. 

1. The vain attempt to discover the child 's identity. 

2. Mrs. Holman's actions. 

3. The return of Santa Glaus. 

III. The awakening of Farmer Holman. 
A. Result. 



The Problem of Method 301 

THE STORY. 
WHAT CHRISTMAS BROUGHT TO THE HOLMANS. 

As Farmer Holman left the little village of Westby, where he had 
gone to transact some business, the sky suddenly grew dark and the 
snow began to fall in great flakes. Faster and faster it fell until, 
by the time he had reached home, it was several inches thick. The 
farmer, whose temperament was naturally stern, was by this time in 
a most disagreeable frame of mind. His trip had been very unsatis- 
factory and the storm had added the finishing touch. After un- 
hitching the horses he made his way to the house and entered the 
kitchen where his wife was preparing supper. She glanced up timidly 
as he entered, but, noticing the frown on his face, she remained si- 
lent. ''You don't catch me makin' any more trips to town on the 
day before Christmas— no, nor anyways near Christmas," the farmer 
blurted out. "All I heard today was, 'Merry Christmas' and, *What 
are you goin' to give this un and that unf I believe the whole 
creation 'ill lose its senses if Christmas ain't knocked off the calen- 
dar." 

Mrs. Holman stirred uneasily. "I was just thinking, Hiram, that 
we might kill one of the turkeys and have a little extra dinner to- 
morrow. It don't seem right to let Christmas go by without pay- 
ing any attention to it." 

The frown on the farmer's face grew deeper. "More nonsense," 
he growled. "Well, I'll tell you right now we'll do nothing of the 
sort. We'll have just what we have the rest of the week, and I 
don't want to hear any more about it." 

Nothing more was said until supper was announced. Meal time 
was always a quiet time in the Holman family, but tonight the si- 
lence seemed more oppressive than usual. Poor Mrs. Holman could 
scarcely restrain her tears as she thought of Christmas as it used to be 
when their little ones were living. At the close of the meal the 
farmer lit his lantern and started for the barn to see that the animals 
were safely housed for the night. As he opened the door he stopped 
suddenly and listened intently. "What kind of a noise was that!" 
he muttered. 

But as the sound was not repeated he started on his rounds of the 
different stalls. As he neared the last one, which was vacant, he 
again heard the strange sound. Raising his lantern, he peered around 
and there, under the manger, he beheld a small child, sobbing faintly. 
For an instant he stood as if rooted to the spot. Then he advanced 
a step nearer. 



302 The Problem or Method 

"Hello, there," he managed to blurt out, '' where 'd you come 
from?" 

' * Me 'ants muver, ' ' sobbed the child. 

The farmer hesitated a moment. ' ' Well, I guess you '11 have to go 
with me to the house," he said as he lifted the child awkwardly in 
his arms. 

The little fellow appeared to be about two years old. He was 
poorly dressed and was shivering with the cold. The farmer, hoping 
to find out something concerning the child, questioned him closely, 
but in vain. The little one only gazed at him with eyes full of 
wonder. 

* ' Well, Jane, ' ' the farmer said, as he entered the house, * ' it 
looks like I'd have to take a Christmas present whether I want it or 
not," and he set the child on the floor. 

With one bound Mrs. Holman had the little one in her arms and 
held it to her hungry heart as if she had found the one thing on 
earth, which she most desired. 

''Where in the world did you find the little darling, Hiram?" she 
exclaimed. 

The farmer related his experience and added, "Maybe you could 
find out something from it." 

But the child's knowledge of words seemed very limited and they 
were obliged to be satisfied with their own conjectures. 

"The little thing must be hungry. I'm going to get it something 
to eat, ' ' and Mrs. Holman proceeded to the kitchen where she fixed a 
bowl of warm milk and bread. Then taking the child on her lap she 
began feeding it. 

"Is it good, baby?" she asked. 

"Iss, " gurgled the child as it greedily gulped down the contents 
of the bowl. 

This operation being finished, the good woman washed the child 
and dressed it in such garments as could be hastily gotten together. 
Then she tucked it gently into bed. All this time the farmer ha'd 
been a silent spectator of the scene before him. He was picturing 
to himself the times when such scenes occurred nightly in his home 
and his eyes filled with tears. 

' ' Jane, ' ' he whispered, ' ' couldn 't we hang up the little un 's stock- 
ing and— and fill it like— like— you know, like we ust to?" 

The tears came to Mrs. Holman 's eyes at her husband's words. 
"Yes, Hiram, we'll pretend that he is our own for tonight. We'll 



The Problem of Method 303 

open the old trunk in the attic and fill his stocking with some of those 
toys. ' ' 

Together they climbed the stairs to the attic and, for the first time 
in many years, opened the old trunk, which held so many silent re- 
minders of their little ones. Selecting those which they thought would 
please the baby most they stole softly downstairs. As they filled the 
little stocking and hung it on the mantel, they experienced the first 
real feeling of happiness they had known since their children had 
been taken from them. After finishing their work, they went to the 
bedside of the sleeping child. Mrs. Holman's lip quivered as she 
turned to her husband. 

"I don't see how I can ever give him up if anyone should call for 
him, and they surely will. ' ' 

"It will be hard," said her husband, ''but I guess God sent him 
here to thaw out my frozen old heart and now that's done I reckon I 
oughtn't to kiek if he takes him away. Hereafter Christmas is 
agoin ' to be celebrated in this family if there ain 't another livin ' soul 
keepin' it, and as long as I live I'm agoin' to thank God for sendin' 
me this Christmas gift. ' ' 

What modifications, if any, should be made? 

11. The selection and examination of letters written by 
children and by men and women during the different 
periods of English and American History. These letters, 
as those belonging to the fourth grade, should be selected 
in so far as possible, to represent different classes of 
society. The letters in this grade, hoAvever, should relate 
largely to the more complex aspects of society, to busi- 
ness, to the state, and to the church. The pupils should 
make a collection of letters relating to society, business, 
state and church, from their parents, from men of busi- 
ness, from government officials and from church officials. 
Selections should also be made from magazines, works on 
history and on fiction, and from the daily press. 

Examine one or more of the selected letters, testing 
them by the thought of "5" and "11" of the fourth grade. 



304 The Problem of Method 

12. The writing of letters. The letters in this stage 
should relate chiefly to the more advanced aspects of 
society, to business, to the church and to the state. Among 
them, however, should be letters upon the more simple 
aspects of society for children ; friendly letters to school- 
mates and to friends in general, both in their own neigh- 
borhood and in distant regions; letters to parents, to 
brothers and to sisters. More careful work than that of 
the fourth grade should be given to the established forms 
of letters. The purpose is to enable the pupil to write a 
brief letter that is legible, correct in language, in punc- 
tuation, and in paragraphing, on any of the topics above 
given, and in any of the relations. 

Many special devices have been referred to in this dis- 
cussion. Several important ones will be mentioned here. 
The last of these — the construction of a series of sentences 
— will be given (in Appendix VII) a special explanation, 
which will bring into view many auxiliary devices. 

1. The use of the picture for the purpose of description. 
(See picture on page 76 of the Indiana Third Keader.) 

2. The use of the picture to illustrate some event in a 
story. (See pictures on pages 28 and 29 of the Indiana 
Third Reader.) 

3. The preparation of a brief outline for a story by the 
pupils with the aid of the teacher and the construction of 
a story as based upon this outline by the pupils. 

4. The preparation of an outline for a story by the 
pupils and the construction by them of a story based on 
this outline. 

5. The construction of a series of sentences expressing 
the different events in an activity viewed as returning to 
its beginning. 



The Problem of Method 305 

In Appendix VII examples of the different series of 
sentences referred to under the fifth kind of work are 
given. The action expressed in these sentences is to be 
found in the work of nature or in the activities of man. 

The various series representing the activities of man 
are to reveal his processes in the institutions, that is, in 
the family, in the church, in the state, etc. 

Series of sentences could be constructed which would 
reveal his processes in the arts, as in architecture, paint- 
ing, etc., and in the modes of activity by which he reveals 
himself in games and plays. 

In the series of sentences given in Appendix VII none 
relate to the field of art or to games or plays. The pupils 
under the guidance of the teacher, may be led to grade 
games and plays according to their adaptation to the age 
and development of the pupils, and to construct series of 
sentences expressing the activity in typical games and 
plays. The various series presented in Appendix VII and 
also others to be constructed should be graded upon cer- 
tain definite principles. Among these principles are famil- 
iarity^ simplicity^ and the rise from a high degree of 
passivity through the different stages of advancement to 
a high degree of activity. The different series given as 
examples are distributed and graded mainly according to 
the third principle. They are subject, however, to a new 
distribution and gradation in the light of the first and 
second principles suggested.* 

* The following: may be consulted to advantage in the different kinds of work 
indicated above: 

1. "How to Learn a Language in Six Months," by W. T. Stead. (Review of Re- 
views. Vol. V.July, 1892.) 

2. "The Art of Teaching and Studying Languages," by M. Francois Gk)uin. 

3. "How to Learn a Language," by J. S- Blackie. (Review of Reviews, Vol. VI, 
August, 1892.) 

4. "The Mother Tongue," Books I, II and HI. (Ginn & Co.) 

5. "How to Learn a Language in Six Months." A Report of Progress, by R. W. 
Waddy and others. (Review of Reviews, Vol. VI, Nov. 1892.) 

21 



306 The Problem of Method 

6. "A Royal Road to Learn Languages." The Result of Six Months Experiment. 
— W. T. Stead's Report Upon the Experiment in His Family. (Review of Reviews, 
Vol. VII. March. 1893.) 

7- "The Acquisition of Language by Children," by M. Taine. (Mind, Vol. II, 
April. 1877.) 

8. "An Infant's Progress in Language." by F. Pollock. (Mind. Vol. II. July, 1873.) 

9. "Thought and Language." by G. F. Stout. (Mind. Vol. XVI. Jan. 1891.) 

10. The Chapter on— Language Tone and Gesture; Articulation, Relation of Tone 
and Gesture to Words, Speech— in "Mental Evolution in Man." by George J. Ro- 
manes. 

11. "Language for The Grades," by J. B. Wisely. (Atkinson, Mentzer & Grover, 
Chicago. ) 

12. "The Threefold Purpose of Primary Language Work," by J. B. Wisely. (A 
brief article in the Inland Educator, Vol. Ill, Nov., 1890.) 

13. "Beginning Steps in Composition," by H. C. Peterson. (A. Flanagan, Chi- 
cago.) 

14. "The Problem of Elementary Composition," by Elizabeth Spaulding. (D. C. 
Heath & Co.) 

15. "The Teaching of English," by Percival Chubb. (The Macmillan Co.) 



The Problem of Method 307 



Chapter XL 



METHOD IN A LESSON. 

The material in a lesson is identical in nature with the 
material of an entire branch of stud}^ 

Method in a lesson is, therefore, characterized by the 
same essential elements as method in a branch of study. 

The Subject Matter. 

Each lesson has its dominant idea. This is the organ- 
izing frincifle. For example, assume that the following 
is the subject matter : 

The bright stars came out one by one. 
He had a cup of sour wine. 
It was the gloomy sunset hour. 
They followed her into the distant room. 
A /a^V, illusive vision that would vanish into air. 
I find the smiling features of an old sweetheart of 
mine. 

Rachel is the greatest of merely dranuitic artists. 

The subject matter in this case is constituted by the 
italicized words. They are adjectives and contribute to 
the expression of the unity which the sentence attempts 
to express. The organizing principle is found in the fact 
that they express attributes of objects, without assertion, 
for the purpose of communication. 



308 The Problem of Method 

The Scope. 

The subject matter in expressing the general nature of 
the material, and in indicating the attribute to be empha- 
sized, makes evident the scope. Not all of the character- 
istics in these sentences are to be considered. Not even all 
of the things belonging to the adjectives themselves are 
to be studied. No attention is to be given to the spelling, 
to the syllables, to their derivation, etc. Each is to be 
treated merely as expressing an attribute of an object, 
without assertion, for the purpose of communication. 

The Assignment. 

1. Think out what it is that each italicized word ex- 
presses. 

a. Separate this meaning into distinct factors, as, for 
example, with the word bright; an attribute, an attribute 
of the object expressed by the word stars^ not limiting the 
range of the class expressed by the word stars., not as- 
serted, contributing to the unity of meaning of the whole 
expression. 

2. What is the set of characteristics common to all 
the words ? 

3. How do the words hright and gloomy differ from 
the others ? 

4. On what basis — 

a. Could the words hright and gloomy be placed in 
one group of words and all the other italicized words in 
another group? 

b. Could the words hright and gloomy be placed in 
different groups? 

c. Could the words gloomy., illusive^ smiling., and dra- 
matic be separated from the words bright., distant^ fair., 
old^ greatest? 



The Problem of Method 309 

d. Could the word smiling be separated from the 
others ? 

5. Name the largest class of each italicized word; 
the smaller group to which it belongs, etc. 

6. Does it require more characteristics to belong to the 
smaller group than it does to the larger group ? 

a. Show with the word bright. 
It is evident that the assignment by its very nature 
indicates substantially the divisions^ subdivisions^ and 
their relative importance. 

The Purpose. 
As to Knowledge. 

Special. — To lead the pupil to know the general or 
common characteristics in adjectiA'es, and the special sets 
of characteristics common to the subordinate classes of 
adjectives; to lead him to know how the adjective con- 
tributes to the unity of the larger expression, the sen- 
tence. 

General. — To give the pupil a knowledge of attrib- 
utives as a class. 

As to Discipline or Training. 

To awaken the feeling of fitness or appropriateness; 
to satisfy the wish to express adequately; especially to 
satisfy the desire to limit or define. 

To arouse a tendency to seek that which is common in 
objects; to strengthen the tendency to distinguish ac- 
curately and then to identify on the basis of the dis- 
tinctions. 

The Mental Steps of the Learner. 

Under the steps in a lesson the outward procedure of 
the teacher, that is, the devices, are generally considered. 



310 The Problem of Method 

This, however, does not make clear the essential impor- 
tance of the steps. The steps constitute, in fact, the 
psychological process of the learner. They may be con- 
sidered under two headings. 

First, the essential or characteristic step of the whole 
lesson. 

Second, the particular or successive steps in the 
lesson. 

The essential or characteristic step in this lesson is that 
of conception. In the previous language work of the 
pupil he has examined and used many times various 
adjectives, but the supposition is that he is now for the 
first time working out definitely the notion of the 
adjective. 

1. In this process of conceiving the adjective, the 
preliminary step is the language act. In this act the pupil 
sense-perceives the visible language, w^orks out the general 
meaning of each sentence and, at the same time, becomes 
conscious that the sentence expresses this meaning. 

2. One by one, by concentrating attention upon it, each 
adjective is considered as isolated. (Abstraction.) 

3. The adjective is then analyzed, that is, the pupil 
becomes conscious that the adjective exists as form and 
meaning. He distinguishes the form into oral and 
visible. He discovers in the meaning the following char- 
acteristics: An attribute, an attribute of an object, ex- 
pressed for the purpose of communicating, not asserted. 
(Analysis.) 

4. The pupil then becomes conscious that this group 
of characteristics is common to this adjective and to all 
other adjectives. (Synthesis.) 

This concludes the first stage in conceiving the 
adjective. 



The Problem of Method 311 

5. The second stage in conceiving the adjective is to 
become conscious of the special sets of attributes belong- 
ing to the special classes. In this act the pupil Avould 
become aware that such adjectives as hright and gloomy 
possess all the attributes belonging to adjectives as a 
whole and that they also possess the attribute of merely 
emphasizing a characteristic of the object without indi- 
cating a limitation of the class; and that the other adjec- 
tives mentioned have in addition to the usual character- 
istics of adjectives that of indicating a limitation of the 
class. In this work of becoming conscious of the special 
sets of attributes belonging to the special classes the pupil 
would distinguish adjectives derived from nouns from 
those derived from verbs, etc. 

6. The third stage in conceiving the adjective is that in 
which the pupil discovers the identity between each par- 
ticular adjective and the characteristics belonging to the 
whole class and between each particular adjective and the 
characteristics belonging to the special class or the special 
classes. This concludes the process of conceiving the 
adjective in so far as opportunity is offered by the adjec- 
tives presented in the given lesson. 

7. The pupil is then led into an act of comparison in 
which he discovers that more characteristics belong to 
the smaller group than to the larger group. 

8. He would then by an act of deduction become aware 
that this truth is manifested in the word hright. He 
would discover that the word hright is an example of a 
smaller class than the whole class of adjectives, but that 
it has a larger number of characteristics. 

The Devices. 

The devices are the external activities of the teacher. 
The term, method^ is often applied to these acts, but it is 



312 The Problem of Method 

somewhat more accurate to reserve that word for the 
psychological process of the learner, since it is that which 
gives organization to the lesson. The devices are deter- 
mined by the nature of the subject matter and by the 
psychological steps of the learner. In the given case the 
selection of the sentences, the work of placing them before 
the pupils, the underlining of the adjectives, the order of 
the questioning, the explanations made, etc., constitute the 
devices. The arrangement of the work in order to have 
the characteristics belonging to the whole class considered 
first ; the special sets of attributes belonging to the special 
classes considered second; and the identity of each ad- 
jective with the main and subordinate sets of attributes 
considered third, constitutes one phase of the devices. In 
general whatever is done by the teacher to stimulate the 
mental process of the pupil may be spoken of as device. 
Since the psychological process of the pupil in learning 
the special subject is the organizing principle of the les- 
son it follows that devices in a lesson are always based 
upon the characteristic process of consciousness. This 
characteristic process of consciousness is the form which 
education must take in any special instance. 

Education is not merely knowledge; it is aspiration, 
insight, power. That branch of study which arouses most 
fully the activity of the student, is the one that is the 
most educative to him. This subject, to some students, is 
history; to others, it is mathematics; and to still others, 
physical science. Education has its principle, and the 
method in a lesson is identical with this principle. 

A principle is the essential mode of activity in an object 
or process. The principle in education is that psycholog- 
ical activity or process in the pupil which is manifested 
in every stage of his development. This activity is that in 
which the pupil becomes aware of the object as a whole. 



The Problem of Method 313 

analyzes it, and thus discovers its characteristics or dis- 
tinctions. These distinctions are then examined and the 
unity which they manifest is discovered. By this process 
the pupil gradually develops his potential capacities into 
actual capacities, and thus, in a certain sense determines 
his own nature. For this reason the central principle of 
education is often spoken of as self-determination. 

In order to make the general characteristics of the les- 
son more explicit and to give a more extended explanation 
of its elements a second example will be considered. 

A true lesson is an art product^ because it has a predom- 
inant activity (the universal) and objective elements 
which adequately exhibit, or stimulate and guide that 
activity (the particular). 

The Universal. 

The predominant activity or universal is the process 
in the pupiVs mind. It is the essential process of his mind 
in learning, that is, in rendering an object subjective or 
known. Suppose the pupil is to have a lesson upon the 
following when he is working on Washington's First 
Administration : 

* * The new government had no money.; ,but a government can no 
more hope to live and pay its bills without money than you or I can. 
In order to obtain funds, Congress (1789) imposed a duty or tax on 
all foreign ships and on many foreign goods entering our ports. Thus, 
if a French vessel of six hundred tons loaded with wine came into 
New York, the owners would have to pay a duty of fifty cents a ten- 
or three hundred dollars on the vessel, and eighteen cents a gallon on 
the wine. Other articles, such as tea, silk, and sugar, were charged 
different rates. 

*'By this duty, or revenue— tariff, as it was called, a very large 
amount of money was obtained. Hamilton, who was Secretary of the 
Treasury, got permission from Congress (1790) to use all of this 
money, not needed for the expenses of the government, to do three 
things. 1. To pay back to France and to other countries what we 



314 The Problem of Method 

had borrowed of them during the Revolution. 2. To pay the debts 
we owed at home to our soldiers, and to those who had lent money 
to the government during the war. 3. To pay the debts which the 
different states were owing their own citizens. Hamilton's wise and 
honest dealing put the credit of the United States on a sure founda- 
tion; it enabled us to pay debts amounting to nearly six millions of 
dollars, and to provide for the payment of many millions more. From 
that day to this, we have always been able to borrow all the money 
we wanted." (The Leading Facts of American History by D. H. 
Montgomery.) 

The mental process in the child is as follows: 

Vndijferentiation. 

1. He experiences a feeling of limit. That is, if he 
enters actively upon the study of this portion of history 
it is because he feels a need in himself for such study. It 
is true that the pupil in the schools often has this feeling 
but little, if at all. It is, however, the beginning stage in 
a process of investigation and should be stimulated by 
the teacher. 

2. He then apprehends indistinctly the historical event. 
By sense-perception he becomes conscious of the language 
expressing this, and then by an act of productive imagina- 
tion becomes conscious of the event itself. This involves 
an indistinct knowledge of the halls of Congress, the con- 
gressmen, the act of passing the bill, the arrangements to 
collect the duty, the ships in the harbor, the goods, etc. 

3. He now imagines himself as understanding clearly 
this object of which he has merely an indistinct knowl- 
edge. He is thus conscious of himself as two different 
selves. That is, he knows himself as being ignorant of 
the exact nature of this historical event in its various 
aspects. He is also conscious of himself in a more devel- 
oped condition — that of understanding all of the various 
distinctions concerning this first tariff act. It is not 



The Problem of Method 315 

meant, of course, that the pupil in the schools has dis- 
tinctly in mind this real self and this ideal self. It is true, 
however, that an indistinct consciousness of the two selvas 
is the basis for all effort. The teacher who understands 
the process of learning could stimulate a consciousness of 
this distinction to advantage. 

4. On account of this knowledge of the two diverse 
selves (the real and the potential), whether indistinct or 
clear, the pupil experiences feelings of dissatisfaction and 
also of satisfaction. The feeling of dissatisfaction relates 
to his actual self which is lacking in knowledge. The 
feeling of satisfaction has reference to the ideal self which 
he is contemplating. 

5. The pupil then creates in himself the desire to become 
the potential or ideal self by understanding clearly the 
nature of the historical event— the tariff act. Desire is 
a stronger state than dissatisfaction and satisfaction. It 
involves a conflict in the self. When one object is desired 
there is always found over against it another desired 
object. In the given case, if the object which is desired 
is the self which knows clearly the tariff act it is evident 
that this object implies work. Over against it the pupil 
may desire to some extent his other ideal self with the 
smaller amount of work involved, or a self out in the 
open air at play. 

6. This conflict of desires must be terminated by choice 
or purpose. And it is to be assumed that, under the direc- 
tion and aid of the teacher and the stimulus of the pres- 
ence of his classmates he has definitely purposed to make 
fully his own this first tariff act. 

Di-fferentiation. 

In order to accomplish his purpose he analyzes the 
object which has been indistinctly apprehended, into its 
elements or distinctions. 



316 The Problem of Method 

1. He distinguishes the historical event into the fol- 
lowing : 

a. The mental attitude of the jDeople as represented 
by Congress. This involves a consciousness that the new 
government has no money; that it needs money for cur- 
rent expenses and for the payment of bills. The mental 
attitude of the people also includes their desire and pur- 
pose to objectify themselves in some measure which will 
supply the government with money. 

b. The objectification itself. This is the bill provid- 
ing the duty on all foreign ships and many foreign goods. 
This objectification also includes the machinery for col- 
lecting the duty and the amount of money collected. 

c. A new mental attitude of the people. This is a 
consciousness that the tariff bill has worked well and that 
there is now a large amount of money in the possession 
of the government. This mental attitude, as before, in- 
volves the desire and purpose to objectify themselves in 
an external object or law that would provide for a suit- 
able distribution of these funds and others that would 
accumulate. 

d. A new objectification, that is, the provision by 
Congress that the Secretary of the Treasury should apply 
the funds to three purposes. 

(1). To pay back to France and other foreign 
countries money borrowed during the Revolution. 

(2). To pay money borrowed from citizens at home 
during the Revolution and to pay the soldiers. 

(3). To pay the debts which the different states 
owed to their own citizens. 

The objectification included this actual use of the 
money. 



The Problem of Method 317 

e. A new mental attitude of the people. This was a 
consciousness of the effect of this law of Congress, namely, 
that it had paid and satisfied the soldiers ; that altogether 
it had paid about $6,000,000 of debt, and that the original 
tariff bill had provided for the payment of many millions 
more and was constantly providing funds. It included a 
knowledge that the government had dealt fairly with the 
world at large and with its own citizens and that, under 
Hamilton's wise and honest recommendations, the govern- 
ment's financial system obtained a solid foundation. 

This concludes the main distinctions of the whole event. 
It shows the growth of the people^ s thought concerning 
the tarijf as a mode of securing revenue. The differentia- 
tion would be further continued by leading the pupil to 
notice the distinctions in the tariff act itself. This act is 
distinguished into purpose, namely, to obtain funds ; into 
the provisions of the law itself; and into effect, namely, 
the accumulation of a large sum of money. Under the law 
itself it would be observed that a tariff was laid on all 
foreign vessels entering our ports, but that it was laid on 
merely many foreign goods. It would be further noticed 
that an illustration was given in regard to both of these 
distinctions. The pupil would also give attention to the 
fact that this tariff is practically a tariff for revenue only, 
and that in this respect it differs from the tariff of 1816, 
1826, 1842, etc. He would in the comparison become aware 
that these later tariffs were for the protection of American 
industries and that while that feature belonged to the 
purpose of this tariff act as planned b}^ Congress, the act, 
in its application, provided only for the payment of debts 
and for the expenses of the government. 

He would also notice that the event relates to govern- 
mental and business aspects of institutional life. 



318 The Problem of Method 

Reunification. 

1. The pupil then becomes synthetic in his investiga- 
tion by reconsidering the various distinctions in order to 
discover the predominant characteristic. In the present 
case he would judge this characteristic to be the employ- 
ment of this measure to provide funds for revenue only. 

2. He would continue his synthetic process by estimat- 
ing each single distinction of the historical event with 
reference to this central characteristic. That is, he would 
examine each feature noticed in the analysis of the tariff 
act in order to see to what extent it harmonized with the 
intention to secure merely a revenue. 

This mental process indicated as exhibiting itself in a 
series of successive stages is the universal in a lesson be- 
cause it is the fonn of consciousness to be awakened in 
any case of learning. 

In school work it is seldom that the activities, 1 to 6, 
under Vndijferentiation^ require direct stimulation. The 
process in a lesson usually involves 2 slightly ; Differentia- 
tion distinctly and with considerable continuity; and 1 
and 2 under Reunification in the form of organization. 

The process of differentiation may require a series of 
lessons. In that case each distinction becomes a whole in 
itself and stimulates the universal process. For example, 
the relation of this first tariff to all of the succeeding 
tariffs, which is one of its important distinctions, might 
require a series of six or eight lessons. The discussion of 
this distinction would begin, as did the lesson upon the 
event as a whole, namely, with a feeling of limit on the 
part of the pupil. He would then become conscious of the 
relation of this tariff act to the others somewhat indis- 
tinctly as a whole, etc. The elements of the process in- 
volved in reunification are more brief but more difficult. 



The Problem of Method 319 

They are not infrequently neglected, and as a rule, even 
when stimulated they are inaccurate and incomplete. 

The Particular. A lesson, as a work of art, requires, 
however, not merely a universal, but also as previously 
noted a particular aspect which consists of, 

1. The subject-matter or the material acted upon. It is 
the exercise-ground for the learning mind. In this case 
it is the historical event, namely, the first tariff act as 
recorded in Montgomery's History, page 193. 

2. The acts of the teacher. These are to be considered 
in a comprehensive sense as including bearing, assign- 
ment, questions, explanations, encouragement, etc. 

3. The acts of the pupil. These are replies, explana- 
tions, questions, etc. They reveal to the teacher the con- 
dition of the universal process, that is, the condition of 
the pupil's mind as to the subject matter which is being 
studied. They also increase the pupil's knowledge of the 
object. 

4. Analogous environment. The environment referred 
to as a stimulus to the universal process is analogous to 
both the subject-matter and the universal process. If, for 
example, the subject matter is The First Tariff Act, pic- 
tures of ships in a harbor, a picture of New York harbor, 
a picture of a scene in a revenue office, etc., would consti- 
tute an analogous environment. 

The essential elements in a lesson are — 

The subject-matter. This constitutes the first of five 
essential elements in an organized lesson. In its definite 
form the subject-matter is a direct result of the principle 
or process of self-determination in the form of knowing. 
That is, the teacher in working out the subject matter, as, 
for example, the first tariff act, knows it as a whole indis- 



320 The Problem or Method 

tinctly. He then isolates or abstracts its central charac- 
teristic, namely, being an objectification of the people's 
thought concerning the tariff and indicating their growth 
in that respect. This attribute is then reunified with the 
object as a whole, and the historical event no longer exists 
as a mere tariff act, but as a revenue tariff signifying the 
growth of the people in institutional freedom. The sub- 
ject-matter must be expressed so as to indicate both the 
general and special aspects, that is, as follows: The first 
tariff act (general), as denoting the . spiritual growth of 
the people concerning the raising of revenue (special). 
The general indicates the material and the special ex- 
presses the particular attribute to be emphasized in the 
given lesson. 

The purpose. — The purpose in life may be said to be the 
establishment of the habit of freely choosing freedom 
itself for the self and others equally. To possess this 
habit is to have freedom both in form and in content. 
This means that the person is to be free in the act of 
choice which is the form, and that the thing or content 
which he chooses must be elevated, or true to social devel- 
opment. If the content or thing chosen indicates freedom 
it must relate to large social ends and to permanent per- 
sonal interests. It must relate to the whole psycho-phys- 
ical organism in the self and in others equally. The free- 
dom which is chosen must be, 

1. Knowing. It must be a mode of knowing which pro- 
motes the independence, the development of all selves. 

2. Satisfaction in a condition indicating a development 
of all. 

3. A tendency toward rational choice in every one. 

4. A skillful, disciplined body for every one. 



The Problem of Method 321 

The purpose in the teacher is the act of choosing a cer- 
tain condition of freedom in the pupil. When the first 
tariff act is the object which is being studied the condition 
of freedom in the pupil is to be brought about by his own 
activity in mastering the subject-matter of the lesson. 
This act of rendering subjective the subject-matter of the 
lesson is the second stage of self-determination; i. e., in 
order to understand the tariff act, the mind must pass into 
a special act of knowing, in fact, into quite a series of acts 
of knowing. But the process of knowing the tariff act, 
although it is the second stage in the law of self, never- 
theless reveals all aspects of that law. That is, the his- 
torical event is known at first indistinctly. This resembles 
the potential condition of the self. The act then becomes 
one of knowing all of the distinctions in the histoical 
event. This resembles the second stage in the law of the 
self. The central characteristic in the historical event is 
then known by examining all of the special distinctions. 
This stage resembles the third aspect in the law of the 
total self. The tendency or effect produced by the pupil's 
act of learning the nature of the first tariff measure is a 
manifestation of the third stage in the law of the self 
because it is an effect or a tendency which thereafter be- 
longs to the nature of the pupil's mind. 

The subject-matter of any single lesson is always a 
fragment of the immediate larger whole. That is, the first 
tariff act may be viewed as a fragment of the historical 
events constituting Washington's First Administration. 
In a more vital way, it may be regarded as a fragment of 
the tariff movement in the development of the United 
States. 

This is the basis for the distinction of the purpose, in so 
far as it relates to knowledge, into the special purpose and 
the general purpose. 



322 The Problem of Method 

The special purpose is to stimulate in the pupil the 
existence of the adequate idea of the subject-matter as a 
habit. He must be led to know the historical event — ^the 
first tariff act — so that it is a permanent possession in its 
essential features. In any given case this idea must be 
stated definitely by indicating both form and content. By 
this it is meant that the historical event must not be 
spoken of as merely the first tariff act, but must be rather 
referred to and thought of as the first tariff act manifest- 
ing the growth of the people of the United States in in- 
stitutional freedom. 

The general purpose is to awaken in the learner the 
adequate idea of the immediate larger whole. In this case 
the purpose would be to give an accurate knowledge of 
the transactions during Washington's First Administra- 
tion, or, preferably, to give a knowledge of the develop- 
ment of the tariff doctrine in the United States. This is 
partly accomplished in any one lesson. Its complete 
accomplishment requires the given lesson and one or more 
additional lessons. 

The statement of the special and general purpose must 
not merely echo that of the subject-matter, but the 
thought of the subject-matter should be rendered some- 
what more definite by that indicated in the statement of 
the purpose. This will be accomplished to some extent if 
the purpose as to feeling and as to will is indicated. It 
will also render the subject matter more definite when the 
general purpose is shown. If the general purpose is to 
give a knowledge of the development of the tariff system 
in this country, the relations to be emphasized in the sub- 
ject-matter would not be the same as if the larger whole 
were merely Washington's First Administration. 

This is because the special subject-matter of a lesson is 
a fragment of many larger immediate subjects. The stat^- 



The Problem of Method 323 

ment of the general purpose by the teacher to himself is 
therefore necessary to insure the emphasis of just those 
relations which unify the special subject-matter with the 
selected larger whole. 

PurjDoses larger than that belonging to the single lesson 
are considered because the purpose of the lesson is in- 
cluded in the larger purpose of the school, and the pur- 
pose of the school belongs to the purpose of life as a 
whole. In a very general way, as previously noted, it may 
be said that the purpose of life is the attainment of free- 
dom. 

The freedom which was said to be the aim of life is to 
be attained, 

1. "By elevating the individual to his species," accord- 
ing to Hegel. He is to reproduce in himself the achieve- 
ments of man. He is to make his own the great thought 
and emotions of his race. He is to reproduce in himself 
the moral achievements which mankind has exhibited. 

2. "By making habitual in the individual activities that 
reinforce rational institutions and which, in consequence, 
the rational institutions can afford to reinforce." That is, 
a« a member of the business world, he may not build up a 
habit in himself which the thought of the business world 
would not sanction. If, for example, he is a cashier in a 
bank, he must perform his duties in that accurate way 
which the welfare of society would require. 

These two statements are merely different forms of 
expressing the same meaning. 

In interpreting a .lesson as to the effect purposed the 
teacher or observer should, 

1. Indicate, in definite mental terms the special effect 
purposed. For example, in studying the first tariff act 
the pupil should be led to know that the government 



324 The Problem of Method 

planned to meet all reasonable obligations, even those 
which it was not legally required to meet. He should also 
become conscious that the people were, at first, somewhat 
doubtful as to the expediency of the tariff act. This was 
shown in the fact that the passage of it required a long de- 
bate. He should be led to know, however, that they be- 
came more fully convinced of its justice and efficiency. 
This would give rise to the thought that the actual history 
of a nation is constituted by the growth it makes in its 
thought concerning institutional life. 

2. Identify it with freedom, according to either of the 
above statements. That is, the teacher is to try to decide 
in what way anyone of these thoughts assists in identify- 
ing the pupil with his species, or in making him build up 
habits which would reinforce the institutions of society 
and which these institutions in turn could afford to re- 
inforce. 

3. Explain briefly the identity. For example, the 
thought that the government provided adequately for all 
obligations, even for those that were not actually required, 
would tend to identify the pupil with the moral attain- 
ments of his race, and establish in him habits of mo^al 
action which each institution could afford to reinforce, 
and which would reinforce each institution. In the light 
of these views, concerning the aim of the school and of 
life, the purpose of the lesson itself may be stated some- 
what as follows, using as an illustration the lesson on the 
tariff : 

(1). As to knowledge. 

(a). Special. To give a knowledge of the 
growth of the mind of the people of the United States as 
evinced in the first tariff act. 



The Problem of Method 325 

(b). General. To give a knowledge of Washing- 
ton's First Administration, but more fundamentally, to 
give a knowledge of tariff legislation in the United States. 

(2). As to feeling. 
To awaken a feeling of satisfaction on account of the 
high position taken by Congress and the Treasury De- 
partment, and to awaken the feeling that any piece of 
legislation should be subject to modification as the people 
increase in intelligence arising through reflection and 
experience. To lead them to appreciate the efficiency of 
the tariff for revenue. 

(3). As to will or volition. 
To awaken a tendency to be fully just in meeting pri- 
vate obligations, and to aid the public in meeting its obli- 
gations. To awaken a resolution to think carefully upon 
the relative merits of a tariff for revenue and a tariff for 
protection. 

The assignment. 
In the special example the assignment may be — 

1. Eead carefully the text explaining the first tariff act. 

2. Show by the text that the event may be separated 
into — 

a. The first mental attitude of the people. 

b. The external event, that is, the creation of the law, 
of the instruments for putting it into effect and the accu- 
mulation of money. 

c. A second mental attitude of the people, that is, 
their knowledge that they are now in possession of a large 
sum of money, and their intention to employ this justly. 

d. A second external event, namely, the arrangement 
which the Treasury Department and Congress made for 



326 The Problem of Method 

the distribution of the money, and the actual distribution, 
e. A final mental attitude of the people, namely, their 
satisfaction with the honest and equitable application of 
the funds obtained from the tariff and their favorable 
inclination toward the tariff. 

3. Explain the growth in the institutional life of the 
people indicated by these divisions. Show the growth in 
intelligence, feeling and will. 

4. In which of the following institutions of society does 
the event belong — government, business, family, church, 
polite society? 

5. Compare and contrast it with the tariff act of 1816. 

A comparison of the subject-matter and the assignment 
will show that the latter has as its function to awaken 
attention to more distinctions than were suggested by the 
statement of the subject-matter. 

In addition, the assignment is intended to indicate the 
order of the distinctions, and, to a degree, their co-ordina- 
tion and subordination. 

In general it may be said that an assignment must not 
be detailed enough to enable the pupil to recite from it 
alone, as such recitation tends to render the lesson spirit- 
less. There must be opportunity for the animation aris- 
ing from the teacher's active test, guidance and co-oper- 
ation. 

The assignment is most closely a stimulus to the first 
stage in the process of knowing — the indistinct apprehen- 
sion of the subject-matter. Still, it fosters a transition 
into the second stage, that of becoming conscious of dis- 
tinctions. 

Viewed with reference to the universal process in a 
lesson, it is a device to arouse the second stage, an indis- 
tinct consciousness of the object, the first tariff act, and to 



The Problem of Method 327 

promote a transition into a consciousness of the various 
distinctions in the object being studied, as in the given 
case, the distinctions in the growth of the people as shown 
in the first tariff act. 

Thus it appears that the purpose of the assignment is 
to awaken an indistinct consciousness of 

1. The main material of the lesson. 

2. The salient distinctions. 

3. The central attribute or characteristic with ref- 
erence to which the subject-matter is to be examined. 

4. The order of the distinctions. 

In addition to this, its aim is to stimulate and direct 
the discovery of further distinctions. 

Hence, the assignment, while related most immediately 
to the first stage in the process of knowing, namel}^, the 
apprehension of the subject-matter as a whole, is also a 
strong stimulus to the second, to the process of discover- 
ing distinctions. It even promotes the third process, to 
a degree, that is, the process of organizing into a unity all 
of the various distinctions discovered in the object. 

It would be helpful to examine the assignment given 
above in order to note its relation to the process of self- 
determination and to decide what changes, if any, can be 
made in order that it may conform more closely to the 
purpose of an assignment. 

In his pedagogical preparation, careful attention 
should be given bv the teacher to the relative advantages 
of, 

The written and the oral assignment. 

The assignment given at the beginning and that given 
at the close of the lesson. 



328 The Problem of Method 

The steps. — The fourth element in the structure of a 
lesson is spoken of, in a figurative sense, as the steps. Ac- 
cording to the Herbartian pedagogy, the step is the exter- 
nal activity of the teacher and manifests itself in five 
successive stages. The stages are called the five Formal 
Steps. It will be of advantage to the teacher to make a 
careful study of the five formal steps, because they repre- 
sent a valuable contribution to education. 

The term step as here employed, however, signifies the 
psychological activity of the learner. It denotes the sec- 
ond stage in self-determination — in the law of the self as 
a whole. This is separation or the special act of the learn- 
er's consciousness. This step, or act of knowing must, 
however, since it is the process of the self, involve more or 
less distinctly all three stages of the essential movement 
of consciousness. That is, in the given lesson, for exam- 
ple, there must be an indistinct consciousness of the tariff 
act as a whole, a clear knowledge of its distinctions, and 
a knowledge of its central thought or characteristic as 
indicated by these various distinctions. In general it is 
important to remember that each step in a lesson is not 
only a determination, but a S6?/- determination, because 
this brings into prominence the fact that some degree of 
independence or origination is present. The more fully 
the process is an example of the learner's initiative or 
independence the more clearly is it ^^//-determination. 
Whatever of truth the pupil really grasps, he must recre- 
ate or earn. It is for this reason that induction seems to 
be more independent, more clearly 5eZ/- determination than 
does deduction. Neither is, however, the complete process 
of self-determination. Each is merely one aspect of it. 
The scientific method involves, as essential elements, both 
induction and deduction, but the first is the more impor- 
tant because it manifests the creative or independent ten- 
dency more strongly. 



The Problem of Method 329 

The subordinate steps of a lesson. These are the 
learner's successive acts in the comprehension of the truth 
in the subject-matter. In the lesson on the first tariff act 
the subordinate steps are 

1. An act of productive imagination stimulated by 
language. In this act the mind of the pupil sense-per- 
ceives the language, reconstructs the general meaning of 
the different words and sentences, and imagines the con- 
crete object or event. By this act he becomes aware of 
the first tariff act as a particular event. He is conscious 
of it as a whole. 

2. Analysis. He distinguishes the event into the 
first mental attitude of the people ; the external event ; the 
act of the people in contemplating the law and its results ; 
the new mental attitude of the people in becoming aware 
of the result; the new external object, namely, the ar- 
rangement made by the Secretary of the Treasury and 
Congress for the payment of the money, and the actual 
payment itself; and, finall}^, the mental attitude of the 
people resulting from the contemplation of these pay- 
ments. 

3. Synthesis. The mind becomes conscious that all 
of these different aspects of the tariff act constitute one 
single phase in the growth of the people. In this third 
act the pupil becomes conscious that there is a continuous 
mental state of the people. . For example, they exist in a 
certain mental condition concerning the tariff and ob- 
jectify their mental condition in a tariff act. They then 
contemplate or study the outward act and hereby pass 
into a new mental condition. This new mental condition 
gives rise to an external object or law ; this w^ith its effect 
is contemplated and the result is a new mental condition. 



330 The Problem or Method 

4. Classification. The pupil is led to classify the 
tariff act as an aspect of government and of the business 
world. 

5. Comparison and contrast. In this act the pupil 
relates the present tariff act to the tariff act of 1816 dis- 
covering likenesses and differences. 

Disregarding the smaller mental changes, these may be 
considered as the series of acts which constitute the sub- 
ordinate steps of the lesson. 

The characteristic step of a lesson arises through sub- 
ordinate steps which constitute its stages. For example, 
in the given lesson on the first tariff act, the characteristic 
step may be said to be the mental act known technically 
as understanding. It consists of apprehension, distinc- 
tion, and classification. Under distinction are the mental 
acts of abstracting or analyzing, discriminating, and com- 
paring. Under classification are found the acts of class- 
ing the object or event as a whole, classing it as to its 
cause and effect, and classing it by discovering its central 
characteristic. The central characteristic is found to be 
that of producing a fund for revenue only. 

In the most comprehensive view the characteristic step 
of a lesson can differentiate into three subordinate steps 
only, 

1. The indistinct apprehension of the object as a whole. 

2. The discovery of all of the distinctions in the object 
appropriate to the pupil's stage of development, regard- 
ing each distinction as independent or isolated. 

3. The selection of the central distinction, and the or- 
ganization of the object by becoming aware of the re- 
lation of the other distinctions to the main distinction or 
attribute. 



The Problem of Method 331 

In a more analji^ic view the steps are the stages in the 
full process of a lesson indicated on page 310. 

In a still more special sense a step in a lesson is any one 
of the activities of the self in rendering subjective the ob- 
ject to be learned. These, in so far as the acts of knowing 
are concerned, are indicated on pages 314-319. Each step 
consists of process and meaning or of form and content. 
To render the characteristic step or any subordinate step 
definite both form and content should be given. 

Devices. — A device is not merely some object, as a map, 
or a box of geometrical forms. It is not merely a picture, 
a drawing or an outline. It is essentially an outward act 
of the teacher, as a question, a direction, an explanation, 
a commendation, the use of a map, the production and use 
of a drawing. A device may include a question or direc- 
tion of the teacher, a reply or work at blackboard by the 
pupil and the discussion of the reply or of the work. 

1. The central requirement of a device is that its effect 
shall be to concentrate the pupiVs attention on the ohject 
being studied and its relations^ rather than upon his own 
language, his manner, the degree of success he is attaining, 
the effect upon his mental development, or the impression 
he is making. The artistic device is one that leads the 
pupil to become objective, that is, to lose himself in the 
object and its relations. This may be otherwise expressed 
by saying that he is to become absorbed in the object. 

The teacher is assumed to know that knowledge is not 
the end, but that inspiration, insight, character, constitute 
the end. Still, this is not to be the attitude of the pupil in 
the recitation. The device should aid him in becoming en- 
grossed in the object being investigated. 

This characteristic of device is based on the idea that all 
true development in the pupil is due to the concentration 
of his interests in something which seems to be other than 



332 The Problem of Method 

himself. The doctrine implied in this function of devices 
is self -estrangement. {Ph'dosoj)hy of Education^ by Rosen- 
kranz, pp. 27-28.) Self -estrangement is another expres- 
sion for the law of the self. The aim of the process called 
self-estrangement, is to enrich the mind of the learner by 
having the strange object become familiar. Thus the cen- 
tral characteristic of all devices rests upon the total pro- 
cess of consciousness in that it assumes a potential or 
unspecialized condition in so far as the strange element in 
the object is concerned, stimulates directly a concentration 
upon the alien feature of the object and thus contributes 
to the enrichment of the self which returns from the 
estrangement. The teacher should reflect carefully upon 
the notion of self estrangement and up'on the thought that 
it is the central basis of devices in the lesson. 

The nature of this central basis of devices makes it evi- 
dent that they should harmonize with each of the follow- 
ing: 

a. The ideal in education is the total experience of 
humanity and not merely knowledge. It is not enough 
for the pupil to gain a knowledge of the main facts con- 
cerning the first tariff act. The aim must be to have him 
experience, to a degree, in his particular life, the total 
process of the race in objectifying itself in that event. 

That is, he must not merely hnow about the first tariff 
act ; he must possess, to some extent, the feelings of those 
who brought it into existence, the purposes or ideals 
they had, and their thought of the act. He is also to be 
prompted to appropriate action. 

b. The change or determination to be brought about 
in the child is to be self- determination. His attitude must 
not be that of passivity. His initiative and choice, his 
modes of expression and explanation, are to be given en- 



The Problem of Method 333 

couragement as fully as the development contemplated 
in the lesson will permit. The tendencies to inquire and 
to test are to be fostered. For example, he is to be given 
freedom from the text by a series of devices that will de- 
velop the power to wrest meaning from the text. Other- 
wise he will become passive. The ability to grapple with 
a difficult sentence or paragraph and to interpret it by 
an intelligent process of study is an important form of 
56^/- determination. In the lesson on the first tariff act, 
for example, the pupil might be asked whether "Hamil- 
ton's wise and honest dealing" referred to his use of the 
money after it had accumulated or to his influence 
throughout the whole transaction. 

c. The pupil's process or method in his development 
is at once negative and positive. It is the renunciation of 
inaccuracy and caprice in any given instance and the ac- 
tive reproduction of the positive experience of the race 
in regard to the same instance. For example, the pupil 
may have the habit indicated in the following: "If any 
one wishes to read some one of a number of books and they 
can find no time to read them they will become dis- 
couraged." To establish the pupil's education in regard 
to the appropriate language in this case requires both a 
negative and a positive process, and the latter is in har- 
mony with the culture of the race. This negative and posi- 
tive process is essential in all aspects of education. To be 
educated by a study of the Tories of the Kevolution, their 
negative and their positive traits must be understood. 
To be truly educated by a study of the first tariff act is 
to understand its negative and positive influences upon 
the prosperity and morals of the people and to be induced 
to perform appropriate action as a citizen. To obtain a 
true development from an investigation of a virtue, as 
truth-telling, of a church service, as a prayer-meeting, of 



334 The Problem or Method 

the history of a political party, the process must be one 
which brings into consciousness the negative and the 
positive. 

d. The teacher must identify himself as fully as possi- 
ble with the pupil in his struggle to know the object being 
investigated. The pupil has his dim vision, his partial in- 
sight, his separative attitude, his distrust of his own 
powers, his dependence upon words. 

The teacher must reproduce these mental conditions in 
his own consciousness as they are manifested from time to 
time in the lesson. Then he must project them and iden- 
tify them with the pupil, thus realizing strongly within 
himself that they are actual conditions of the pupil's mind. 
He must finally vividly think these conditions as possi- 
ble in himself under similar circumstances. Thus he has 
identified himself with the pupil, and is in sympathy with 
him. This enables the teacher to appreciate the pupil's 
failures and successes, and to appear as a co-seeher of 
truth. Teacher and pupil become, in a certain sense, 
comrades in a quest for the unknown. 

e. The central or organizing principle of the branch 
of study to which the subject-matter belongs, and the pro- 
cess of consciousness suggest the order and the concen- 
tration of devices. For example, in the study of the first 
tariff act there should be a concentration of devices to 
develop a knowledge of the outward event, of the mental 
attitude giving rise to it, and of the mental attitude suc- 
ceeding it. In the study of each of these three aspects 
there should be a concentration of devices to awaken an 
indistinct knowledge of the aspect as a whole; a clear 
knowledge of the distinctions within it, and of its sys- 
tematic unification upon its characteristic or dominant at- 
tribute, being devoted to raising revenue for the debts and 
current expenses of the government. 



The Problem of Method 335 



Chapter XIL 



PRINCIPLES OF TEACHING. 

From time to time reference has been made to various 
pedagogical principles, particularly in connection Avith 
the discussion of The Analysis of Knowing (pp. 47-189.) 

At this stage, however, it is deemed advisable to turn 
attention to various pedagogical principles, based, not 
merely upon the nature of phychological activities, but 
also upon the aim of life and the nature of the branches 
of study. 

It will, no doubt, be admitted that the most compre- 
hensive central principle of education is expressed in the 
statement that the mind is self-detey^mining. This means 
that the mind, in the beginning of its existence, is without 
definite habits and tendencies and that gradually, as it 
adjusts itself to the environment, it gives to itself certain 
characteristics of knowledge, certain modes of emotional 
response and certain forms of volition. 

To say that the mind determines itself is to assert that 
it gives to itself particular tendencies of action. At first 
the mind is potential, that is, capable of acting in any one 
of many forms ; but by responding in a particular way to 
a particular stimulus, it determines itself in that mode of 
action. That is, it gives to itself the characteristic of being 
more inclined to that kind of activity than to any other. 

Self-determination of the mind is, therefore, at first, 
potential, a general capacity for many kinds of action. 

In the second place, this general capacity becomes speci- 



336 The Problem of Method 

fie. By this it is meant that the mind constructs in itself 
certain particular forms of activity. These become, as it 
were, distinct, habitual processes. Among these deter- 
minations are the processes of sense preception, memory, 
imagination, conception, etc. To exist in any one of these 
kinds of activity is to be in the second aspect of self-deter- 
mination. 

Common observation, however, shows that if the mind 
produces in itself any special form of activity there re- 
sults a tendency toward that form. Thus, as life proceeds, 
the mind acquires definite tendencies toward action. These 
constitute the final aspect of determination. 

Determination in the mind is called s^?/- determination 
because the energy of the mind is, at least, a factor in 
bringing about its own new condition. Environment does 
not determine everything. It does not cause the different 
mental changes. Environment is merely a stimulus. Upon 
the existence of this stimulus, the mind may, by its own 
energy, create in itself a corresponding particular condi- 
tion. 

The general nature of the principle of self-determina- 
tion has been referred to on page 328. Growing out 
of this central principle of education there are various 
subordinate principles. The leading ones among these 
are the following : 

1. Attention. Without attention there can be no ade- 
quate education. What is the nature of attention ? It is a 
mode of psychical activity belonging to all conscious 
states. 

Every conscious state consists of elements, because the ob- 
jects of which a person is conscious are very complex. 
Even so small a thing as a child's ball is complex, for it 
possesses form, size, color, smoothness or roughness, hard- 



The Problem of Method 337 

ness or softness, distance, direction, etc. Any single mental 
state denoting this single object is complex in that it pos- 
sesses various elements denoting the various parts or at- 
tributes of the object. 

Is the whole act of consciousness attention ? By atten- 
tion is meant the most active element of a conscious state. 
In different terms, attention is the focus of consciousness. 
In every mental state the mind is attending with definite 
energy to some one aspect of the object or to some one 
object among many, while it is in a faint way noticing the 
existence of other attributes or other objects. 

This most active element in a consciousness, namely, at- 
tention^ is at first immediate or synthetic because it seems 
to denote the object as a whole. 

But it soon becomes analytic^ since the attention is cen- 
tered now upon the color, now upon the size, now upon 
the distance, etc. 

There is also a mediated synthetic attention, in that the 
mind having discriminated for example, two characteris- 
tics of the object, gives attention to their unity, that is, to 
the oneness of the function they have in the nature of the 
object. 

For example, a person in examining a water pitcher 
may attend to it as a whole. This is immediate synthetic 
attention. He may then attend at one time to its handle, 
at another time to its lip, at another time to the shape of 
the bottom which enables it to stand firmly upon a flat 
surface. During all this process the attention has been 
analytic. It now becomes mediated synthetic attention, 
however, because the mind notices closely the fact 
that all three of these characteristics are in harmony, 
when considered with reference to the use of the pitcher. 
Attention is essentially conative or volitional. On this 
basis it can be separated into ; 



338 The Problem or Method 

Spontaneous attention. 
Voluntary attention. 
Involuntary attention. 

Spontaneous attention is without conscious effort. It is 
often called non-voluntary attention. It is very valuable 
in education in that it reveals the nature of the child's in- 
terests and is thus a great revelation of his character. It 
is evident that the teacher can gain a great insight into 
the child's character by making from day to day a study 
of his spontaneous attention. 

Voluntary attention is a development from non- volun- 
tary attention and implies that the child has made that 
progress in education which enables him to create and 
consciously hold ideals or purposes. 

Involuntary attention is the attention which the mind 
seems to be compelled to give by extra-organic stimuli or 
by persistent ideas or by feeling. It belongs in the life of 
the child after the development of voluntary attention be- 
cause it implies an effort on his part to work toward pur- 
poses, and a neglect of these purposes against his will 
through the influence of outer or inner stimuli. 

Psychologists have noticed that attention can not be 
concentrated continuously upon any single fact whatever. 
The mind will shift its attention either spontaneously or 
under direction. Whenever the fact becomes old the at- 
tention will shift. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the 
teacher so to manage the work that the object under con- 
sideration will present logically, and succesively, new as- 
pects. 

The function of attention is to lead to the adjustment 
of the self to its environment. Therefore, attention is al- 
ways concentrated upon the exact point of adjustment or 
inter-relation. 



The Problem of Method 339 

When, therefore, any adjustment is completed it is the 
teacher's work to aid the child in directing his attention 
to the new field of adjustment. The ground of the shifting 
of attention is the mind's tendency to seek the new or dif- 
ferent. 

A great deal of discussion has been given to the ques- 
tion as to whether the mind can attend to more than one 
thing at once. The answer seems to be that the mind can 
attend to many factors at once but that these various 
factors are regarded by the mind at the time, as aspects of 
a single object. In that sense the mind can attend to only 
one thing at once, but this thing may be very complex. 

The question of the shifting of attention gives rise to 
the consideration of the following :* 

Inattention. 

Shifting attention. 

Dispersed attention. 

Inattention is not to be regarded as the negative of at- 
tention. There may be in this case very strong attention. 
It is, however, attention to some object other than the one 
which it is intended to study. 

Shifting attention is that rapidly changing attention 
during which many different things are regarded suc- 
cessively. 

Dispersed attention is practically lack of attention. In 
it the various aspects of the objects are given equal at- 
tention. This corresponds to lack of attention or to that 
fused recognition which belongs to the first stage of con- 
sciousness. 

It is to be seen that inattention as here used may be a 
sign to the teacher of the interest and character of the 
child. Shifting attention denotes a lack of the power to 
attend continuously or the fact that the teacher does not 

* Psychology, Angell, pp. 93-'.>8. 



340 The Problem of Method 

present sufficiently the new aspects of the object. Dis- 
persed attention in the child is a sign to the teacher that 
new aspects of the object should be presented. 

Since the education of the child rests upon attention 
and his education consists in the acquirement of the power 
of attention, the teacher should understand the central 
nature of attention, the synthetic and analytic aspects in 
the process and guide the work of the recitation in har- 
mony with it. 

2. ConMeration to he given -first to wholes. In the pro- 
cess of educating a child by means of any object or event, 
the whole of the object or event should, in so far as prac- 
ticable, be placed before him in the beginning. This har- 
monizes with the first stage of self-determination, with 
the first stage in the law of knowing, because it stimulates 
in the child an indistinct notion of the object as a whole. 
This is necessary in order to prepare him to understand 
the relation of the various parts and attributes that may 
be discovered afterwards, thus giving a framework or 
structure into w^hich all the various characteristics readily 
arrange themselves. In obedience to this principle, the 
child should examine all of a poem or all of any division 
of it which is practically a whole in itself; all of a para- 
graph ; all of a problem ; before turning special attention 
to any given part or characteristic, etc. 

3. Original feeling is potential knowledge. The original 
feeling which an object stimulates in the person who is 
investigating should be changed gradually into clear 
knowledge. When one begins to examine any object, as a 
poem, a painting, the voyage of the Mayflower, a part of 
speech, etc., he has an indistinct feeling of the meaning 
which it exhibits. The object should be analyzed and 
then specially studied as to the unity to be found in all of 
its various aspects so as to change this instinctive feeling 



The Peoble]m of Method 341 

into definite knowledge. All instincts, as, for example, 
instincts of behavior, impulses toward charitable action 
or impulses toward industry should be changed through 
work and study into definite ideas. 

If a parent, a teacher, or a person engaged in any other 
of the vocations of life, acts mainly upon instinct, even if 
the instinct be a true one, his action is unreliable. 

Only when feeling and instinct are grounded in a clear 
knowledge of the nature of the act Avhich manifests them 
is the result reliable.* 

The folloAving show, in poetic form, the transition from 
indistinct feeling or impulse to clear knowledge. 

' ' May that which works and lives, the ever-growing, 
In bonds of love enfold you, mercy-fraught, 
And Seeming 's changeful forms around you flowing. 
Do ye arrest in ever-during thought. ' ' 

Goethe 's Faust, The Prologue in Heaven. 

' ' Over his keys the musing organist 
Beginning doubtfully and far away, 
First lets his fingers wander as they list, 
And builds a bridge from Dreamland for his lay; 

Then, as the touch of his loved instrument 
Gives hope and fervor, nearer draws his theme. 
First guessed by faint auroral flushes sent 
Along the wavering vista of his dream. ' ' 

Lowell 's The Vision of Sir Launfal : Prelude I. 

4. Clearness of Distinctions. All educational wbrk 
should be regarded as unsatisfactory if the distinctions 
made by the pupil concerning the subject being studied 
lack clearness. Nothing aids more fully the true compre- 
hension of an object than the distinct idea of its various 
parts and attributes which can be made by abstracting 
each and making a careful study of it as it seems to exist 



■ See "A Study of Child Nature," by Elizabeth Harrison. 



342 The Problem of Method 

in itself. In obtaining this distinctive knowledge the at- 
tributes, or parts which are being studied should be closely 
compared and even more closely contrasted with the other 
attributes and parts. It should be a point of interest to 
both teacher and pupil to discover two or more things that 
are so closely related as to require special attention to dis- 
criminate them. Sometimes, for example, it is said that a 
certain law is "null and void." Just what is the dis- 
tinction between the objects expressed by these two words? 

5. Orderly process from widest to narrowest distinc- 
tion. In the discovery of distinctions the child should 
have an orderly process. It is meant by this that the ob- 
ject being presented should be distinguished, first, into its 
predominant divisions, and then these predominant divi- 
sions should be sub-divided. These smaller divisions 
should be then further sub-divided. For example, in study- 
ing the industries of the New England states it would be 
inartistic work to begin by discovering all of the char- 
acteristics concerning the people as engaging in the busi- 
ness of shipping. The distinctions should be made first 
rather in order to show that they were engaged in ship- 
ping, in manufacturing, in mining, in agricultural work, 
etc. After this wide distinction has been made, more de- 
tailed distinctions can be thought out under the business 
of shipping. This principle it is evident relates to the 
second stage in the process of self-determination. That 
is, the mental act of discovering the widest distinction and 
all narrower distinctions is a process of discovering differ- 
ences and is, therefore, separative. It is true that the pro- 
cess of unifying accompanies the process of distinction 
as is always the case, but the latter is prominent. 

6. Harmony of the mental acts involved in the discovery 
of distinctions^ with the pupiVs stage of development. 
The distinctions that are to be considered in connection 



The Problem of Method 343 

with any object or subject should, of course, be adapted 
to the pupil's stage of development. Many relations could 
be shown concerning the voyage of the MayfloAver in the 
eighth year grade that would not be considered in the fifth 
year grade, provided this event should be one of the sub- 
jects taught in the fifth year grade. In the later grades 
when studying United States History, attention would be 
given to the characteristics in the government which adapt 
it to a people desiring self-government. Probably this 
relation would not be considered in the earlier grades. The 
more simple relations should there receive attention in 
order to center the mind upon the less complex events in 
the life and government of the people. 

7. The impo7'tance of concluding a subject hy hecondng' 
conscious of its central characteristic. The concluding 
work in dealing with any subject, as, for example, the 
American Revoltion, is to lead the pupil to decide upon 
the central characteristic and then to think out the degree 
to which all the other characteristics manifest this central 
one. In studying the American Revolution he would 
become aware of many distinctions. Some one of these is 
the predominant characteristic of the whole event. This 
predominant characteristic, after being discovered, should 
be shown to be such by having it appear that each of the 
others is this predominant one in a special form. This 
process of thinking is a manifestation in the pupil of the 
third stage in self-determination. That is, it is a process 
of discovering unity. The various distinctions that have 
been known are shown to be unified in a predominant 
characteristic. It is of great importance in the pedogog- 
ical training of the teacher to have it recognized that this 
is an essential stage in the teaching process. 



344 The Problem of Method 

8. The motor factor in education. 

' * . . . . For if our virtues 
Did not go forth of us, 'twere all alike 
As if we had them not. Spirits are not finely touch 'd 
But to fine issues; nor Nature never lends 
The smallest scruple of her excellence, 
But, like a thrifty goddess, she determines 
Herself the glory of a creditor 
Both thanks and use. 

—Measure for Measure. 

When any object or event being studied has been 
learned or rendered subjective, in the form of idea, feel- 
ing or volitional tendency, it should then be made object- 
ive in order to accomplish two things. The first is that of 
making the process of knowledge complete. The process 
in know ledge is never entirely complete until the child has 
expressed in some w^ay the psychical condition which has 
been produced. The second is that of enabling the teacher 
to test the accuracy of the pupil's thought concerning the 
object which has been studied. 

Tbis principle is intended to emphasize the importance 
of the motor factor in education. It is therefore the basis 
of manual training, drawing, written examinations, oral 
recitations, etc. 

The total activity is as follows : The child goes through 
the process of gaining a knowledge of the object which has 
heretofore been alien or objective to him. That is, he be- 
comes aware of it, feels concerning it, and has volitional 
tendencies in regard to it. He must then study out some 
mode of exhibiting the thought, feeling, etc., to others. 
This psychical state may be manifested in drawings, water 
colors, oral expression, written examinations, etc. 

Complete education includes contemplation, or think- 
ing out the nature of a thing, and objectification or reveal- 



The Problem of Method 345 

ing in actions, words, writing, etc., the thought that has 
been gained in the study of the thing. Dante exhibits 
these two sides of education, the merely contemplative and 
the active or motor. He gives a fine example which in- 
cludes contemplation and manifestation by speaking of 
Leah and Rachel : 

"Know ye, whoever of my name would ask, 
That I am Leah: for my brow to weave 
A garland, these fair hands unwearied ply. 
To please me at the crystal mirror, here 
Here I deck me. But my sister Kachel, she 
Before her glass abides the livelong day, 
Her radiant eyes beholding, charm 'd no less 
Than I with this delightful task. Her joy 
In contemplation, as in labor mine. ' ' 

Dante 's Purgatory, Canto XXVIII, lines 101-109. 

If, after explaining a given thought in the class, the 
teacher should ask, "Do you understand?" and the pupil 
should reply by saying that he does, this principle re- 
quires the teacher to say further, "Show what you see," or, 
"You may explain." It is not at all unusual to have cer- 
tain defects in the thinking of the pupil revealed by this 
attempt to explain it. Even if this does not result, the 
thought will be made more prominent and more exact by 
the expression. 

The reply in a complete sentence is not merely for the 
purpose of securing practice in language. The complete 
sentence reveals the relation of the attribute to the object, 
and in consequence, one important function of the full 
statement is to indicate whether the pupil has the true 
view of the relation. For example, the teacher having ex- 
plained a certain thought in physiology may ask, "What 
does this imply?" and the pupil may answer, "It implies 
nervous action." "What nervous action ?" the teacher may 



34:6 The Problem of Method 

continue. The reply to this may be, "The action of the 
neurone." A further question may be, "The action of 
what neurone?" To this the pupil may answer, "The 
neurone in the spinal column." This will reveal an error 
in the thought of the pupil, because the true answer in the 
supposed case may be assumed to be, "It will denote the 
action of the neurone in the cerebral cortex." 

9. The freedom, of the mind to consider a new object. 
When the pupil is about to enter upon the consideration 
of some new subject, as, for example, the minerals of In- 
diana, or the birds of his own county, he should free his 
mind from existing feelings, purposes or ideas that are 
not of a nature to promote a clear knowledge of the new 
subject which is to be investigated. This is in order to 
render effective the specific act of knowing the new truth. 
It also promotes the appropriate feelings and the ten- 
dencies toward choice which belong to the new knowledge. 
All these educational principles should be considered in 
relation to the law of the total self. This law, as pre- 
viously noted, is what is spoken of as self-determination. 
It is expressed by saying that the mind exists at first as 
potential; that it then becomes analytic or separative by 
creating a particular mental state in itself, and that, fin- 
ally, its action is synthetic in that it ceases to perform this 
particular act thus permitting the energy to return to the 
potential condition, with a tendency, however, to repeat 
that particular act. This relates to the second aspect 
of self-determination, namely, that of establishing in the 
self a definite, effective psychological condition, in har- 
mony with the object being studied. 

10. Attention to relations at all stages. There should 
be a gradual increase in attention to the relations of ob- 
jects as the child progresses from grade to grade. The at- 
tention to the various relations is the analytic stage of 



The Problem of Method 347 

thinking. The teacher should not be content to have the 
child know objects merely as isolated. Simple relations 
at least should be noticed in the beginning. The aim should 
be to have a steady growth in the tendency to observe re- 
lations. This is especially true in regard to the relation 
denoted by the act of reasoning which is stimulated by 
word "why." It seems an incorrect educational doctrine 
to assume that the child should for many years consider 
objects as wholes only, disregarding their relations. In 
the beginning grades simple relations should be consid- 
ered ; in the immediately succeeding grades, relations that 
are somewhat more difficult ; in the still higher grades re- 
lations that are still more difficult. It was Agassiz who 
said that objects considered apart from their relations 
are stupid things. The tendency to consider objects 
as entirely separate things is already too strong when the 
pupil enters school. Little by little he should be led to see 
the relations within the object itself (analysis) and the 
relations of the object as a whole to other things (syn- 
thesis). The important thing is to grade the progress of 
discovering relations, but all stages in school work should 
deal with relations of some grade of difficulty. 

11. The rising grade in acts of knowing. Sense-percep- 
tion furnishes the minimum of truth. This is not usually 
held to be the case. Many people think that a direct ex- 
amination of objects through sense-perception gives the 
deepest and most prominent truth concerning the object. 
There should, of course, be no effort to minimize the great 
importance of this direct examination. It should be seen, 
however, in its true relation. It is to furnish materials 
merely for the discovery of deeper truths which are to be 
learned, not through sense-perception itself, but through 
higher forms of mental activity. Memory, even, gives a 
deeper truth than sense-perception, because it makes the 



348 The Problem of Method 

individual acquainted with his life as it bears upon both 
the present and the past. Sense-perception does not make 
the pupil acquainted with the essential realities. This 
principle concerning sense-perception hints to the teacher 
the graded series of activities in knowing. Memory does 
not reveal a truth as fundamental as that given by imagin- 
ation. Imagination does not make the person acquainted 
with a truth as fundamental as that given in conception, 
etc. This is the basis of the distribution of time and em- 
phasis in the process of teaching a lesson. 

12. The process which results in clear ideas. The pro- 
cess in the cultivation of sense-perception involves, in the 
first place, the examination of the object as a whole. This 
gives the basis for the analytic stage in knowing — for the 
discovery of the various distinctions in the object. 

One by one each of the attributes in the object is to be 
given distinct attention and thus clearly known as a thing 
in itself. 

Finally each of the attributes and parts distinguished 
is to be examined in its relation to the central meaning in 
the object. 

This makes it evident that the power of the child ade- 
quately to sense-perceive an object depends upon the clear- 
ness of the ideas he already has. The greatest aid in en- 
abling the child to perceive with rapidity and accuracy 
any object which he is to examine, is the possession of 
explicit and accurate ideas of objects previously learned. 

13. The range of knowledge in memory. As noted 
above, memory gives rise to a knowledge which is more 
substantial than that of sense-perception. This is because 
an act of memory requires more self-activity on the part 
of the mind in that it involves greater attention to the past 
and the present in their relations. Sense-perception in- 
volves attention to the past, but the attention is rather 



The Problem of Method 349 

sub-conscious. In memory the attention to the past in 
relation to the present is explicit and definite. This fact 
is the basis of higher estimation of memory and of the in- 
centive to make memoiy systematic. (See page 80.) 

14. Imagination' as a transition to thinking. The sense in 
which the imagination gives a greater truth than memory, 
as previously noted, is as follows : In memory the object 
is regarded as merely particular and there is no hint of 
the general. Imagination, however, is a somewhat dis- 
tinct movement toward the idea of the general. If the 
mind creates a mental state within itself denoting a change 
in the characteristics of the object and at the same time 
regards the object as belonging under the same class that 
it did before it was changed, the inevitable result is to 
lead the mind to contemplate two objects in somewhat 
different form which receive the same name. That neces- 
sarily suggests the general. 

Imagination also indicates more fully the self-activity 
of the mind, since it reveals greater freedom over the ex- 
ternal stimulus. In memory the mind is strictly obedient 
to the stimulus which was present in the former act. In 
imagination, however, the self feels free to produce in 
itself an image denoting a modification of the stimulus, in 
obedience to its own interests. This relation of memory to 
imagination should be carefully considered by the teacher 
and recognized in the emphasis given to the cultivation 
of the latter. 

15. The value of idealization. The tendency to idealize 
should be cultivated since it is an essential stage in the 
process of thought. Idealization is regarded by many per- 
sons as a mere b3q:>lay in life. It is held to belong to the 
dreamer, but not to the worker. The teacher should know 
that all clear thinking is rendered impossible if the ability 
to idealize clearly is lacking. Idealizing is the process of 



350 The Problem of Method 

imagining a present condition in a modified form. It is 
necessary, therefore, as a basis for discrimination. It is 
also necessary, as a basis for feelings of satisfaction 
and dissatisfaction which lead from desire to choice. The 
chosen desired condition, when analyzed by the intellect 
stimulates activities adapted to make the idealized con- 
dition real. The clear thinker is always a person whose 
power of idealization is strong. The teacher should there- 
fore feel entirely free to lead the child into modes of study 
that will cultivate well grounded processes of idealization. 
It would be helpful while considering this subject to ex- 
amine "Scientific Uses of Imagination," in "Fragments of 
Science," by John Tyndall. A valuable contribution upon 
the same subject is "The Imagination," in "Poetry, 
Comedy and Duty," by C. C. Everett. 

16. Tlie artistic phase of reading. The language ac- 
tivity, as explained on pages 108-117, is the process of 
producing and also of interpreting language. The second 
phase of the activity is termed interpretation. The inter- 
pretative aspect of the language act is the first process in 
a reading lesson. The language activity as producing, 
must of necessity have been at work, however, in order to 
bring into existence the selection which is to be inter- 
preted. The true reading of a selection, therefore, involves 
both the process of interpreting it, and, in a secondary 
way, the process of creating it. In fact, to produce in the 
mind the knowledge of any object is, in a certain sense, 
to re-create it. 

It is an advantage to the teacher to know that the full 
knowledge of a selection in reading involves (1) the pro- 
cess of becoming aw^are of the language, of the embodi- 
ment, of the thought and, of the purpose and (2) the pro- 
cess of beginning with the purpose, which is the initial 
stage in the author's mind, and noting how the purpose 



The Problem of Method 351 

leads to the selection of a definite thought, and then, in 
succession, how the thought selects and limits the embodi- 
ment and the language. 

It therefore follows that the final view of a selection 
which has been studied in the reading class is that of not- 
ing the adaptation of the language and the embodiment 
to the thought and purpose. This is the artistic aspect 
of reading work. It can be regarded but slightly in the 
lower grades, but as the child advances in his education, 
this aspect should become progressively more prominent. 

17. The effects of absence to he noted. In studying a 
word or any other form of language, or in considering an 
attribute of an object, the important thing is to compre- 
hend the reason for it. The most advantageous mode of 
discovering the reason for an existing thing or attribute 
is to make the pupil conscious of the effects of its ab- 
sence. Let it be assumed that the teacher wishes to lead 
the pupils to understand the reason for the presence of 
the adjective in the language. This can be approached by 
work which will make the child conscious of the limita- 
tion or difficulty that would arise if no adjectives what- 
ever were existing. He might, for example, be led to make 
the attempt to express his thought concerning even the 
most simple thing, under the regulation that no adjective 
was to be used. This would impress him with the im- 
portant place it occupies in the language, and would equip 
him for a careful study of the reasons for its existence. 
In like manner, the intelligence which underlies any part 
of an object or any attribute of an object can be best 
shown by awakening the idea of the results which would 
necessarily accompany the absence of it. 

18. Each object is given its characteristics by its own 
inner activity or idea. It was said, on page 124, that the 
mind, when in the stage of the understanding, considers 



352 The Problem of Method 

the various distinctions or traits of object to be externally 
imposed. In order, therefore, to cultivate self -direction 
in the pupil, the teacher should endeavor to assist him to 
rise out of the attitude peculiar to the understanding. 
This means that the child should gradually begin to think 
of the activity in any plant, animal, or person as largely 
determined by the nature of that plant, animal or person. 
Environment has, of course, a certain influence. It is 
to be regarded, however, as a stimulus. It is, moreover, 
true that the environment is determined by the spiritual 
attitude. The same natural environment is different for 
the artist and the stage driver. For example, then, the 
evils coming upon one must not be thought to be brought 
about by the circumstances which surround him. This no- 
tion is admirably expressed in Act I. Scene II, of King 
Lear^ by Edmund : 

This is the excellent foppery of the world, that when we are siek in 
fortune— often the surfeit of our own behavior— we make guilty of 
our disasters the sun, the moon and stars: as if we were villains by 
necessity, fools laj heavenly compulsion; knaves, thieves and treach- 
ers, by spherical predominance; drunkards, liars and adulterers, by 
an enforced obedience to planetary influence; and all that we are evil 
in, by a divine thrusting on." 

The same idea is promulgated in Act I., Scene IL, of 
Julius G(esar. Cassius, in speaking to Brutus, says : 

''Men at some time are masters of their fates: 
The fault, dear Brutus, is not in the stars. 
But in ourselves, that we are underlings. ' ' 

It will be an aid to the pupil to feel that excellent results 
of every kind, as well as evil effects, arise largely from the 
acts of the person affected; that each person, in a sense, 
works out his own salvation. This is the true moral stand- 
point. 



The Problem of Method 353 

19. The influence of a knotvledge of the structural char- 
actenstic. On page 120-124, it has been shown that the ac- 
tivity of understanding begins with the indistinct process 
known as apprehension. Rising through intervening 
stages of abstracting, discriminating, comparing, general- 
izing, and discovering the relation of cause and effect, the 
self finally becomes aware of the structural characteristic 
of the object. This is an important stage in the process of 
education. It adds greatly to the power of a person to be 
able to think of an object or event in relation to its struc- 
tural characteristic. The poem called "The Child Mu- 
sician," Harper's Fourth Reader, page 228, has as its 
structural idea the sense of monotony. 

*'He had played for his lordship's levee, 
He had played for her ladyship 's whim, 
Till the poor little head was heavy 
And the poor little brain would swim, ' ' etc. 

In the poem, "To a Waterfowl," the structural notion 
is that of faith. In "Evangeline" the structural charac- 
teristic or formative idea, is woman''s devotion. In the 
Constitution of the United States, the structural concep- 
tion is the idea of "A government of the people, by the 
people, for the people." The artistic teacher has an in- 
stinctive sense that each object, whether belonging to in- 
animate nature, animate nature, or to human beings and 
their products has a structural characteristic which gives 
to it its various aspects. This instinct made somewhat 
conscious would be a valuable guide in all the details of 
school work, whether relating to instruction or discipline. 

20. The producing activity. In all instruction leading 
to the formation of the concept, the teacher should re- 
member that while the process of conception is, in its 
more superficial sense, a consciousness of th^ set of com- 

24 



354 The Problem of Method 

mon attribrites belonging to a class of objects, it is, in its 
more fundamental sense, a consciousness of the froducing 
activity which gave rise to the objects and to all of their 
parts and distinctions. During the first six or seven years 
of school life, the work upon the idea of the general 
should usually terminate in the notion of the group of 
common attributes. As the higher grades are approached, 
however, the pupil should, little by little, be led to know, 
at least to a degree, that there is a creative activity which 
gives rise to the class. All this emphasizes in his mind the 
importance of a process. He begins to comprehend that 
the process is more important than its products. The 
object or product is merely a way-station in the process, 
because the process produces the object and then slowly 
removes it, producing another object in its stead. This 
notion of the process gives the key also, to the teacher's 
procedure in promoting intellectual and moral progress. 

The self-activity of the pupil brings about, largely, his 
present intellectual and moral condition. This condition 
may be regarded for the time being as static, as an es- 
tablished condition of the self, or as an habitual mode of 
being. The same self -activity, however, naturally annuls 
this condition and produces a higher one in its stead. This 
locates responsibility in the pupil mainly, and not mainly 
in his environment nor in his "stars" as indicated by such 
words as disaster. 

21. Content and extent increase together. The nature 
of the concept requires that the pupil should be led to see 
that the knowledge of each new object of a class tends to 
enrich the content or meaning of the class, and also to 
increase the extent of the concept. This is because the 
concept, in its deeper aspect, is the idea of the common 
creative activity. If a person's knowledge of triangles 
includes the equilateral and scalene triangles only, his 



The Problem of Method 355 

notion of triangle-producing activity would signify 
merely the activity capable of producing these two kinds. 
If he afterwards becomes acquainted with the nature of 
the isosceles triangle, two things occur: (1) he dis- 
covers that the activity which produces triangles has a 
capacity that he was not before aware of, (increase of 
content), and (2) he also knows that the extent of the 
class tHangle has been enlarged. It gives vitality to edu- 
cation to have the pupil feel, as he progresses from grade 
to grade, that the discovery of every new object and event 
makes him acquainted with new capacities in the creative 
activities and with an enlarged extent of the classes. 

In the old notion of the concept, namely, that it signi- 
fied merely the common attributes, the discovery of a new 
object under the class was said to increase the extent of the 
class but to decrease its content. If this were true, as 
one's education progressed his knowledge would become 
more and more empty. 

22. How the concept is made explicit. Education 
seeks to render explicit the concept which the child has 
constructed. This is done by developing the thought of 
the concept into a series of judgments. These differ- 
entiating judgments express the details of the thought 
denoted in the concept. On the assumption that the con- 
cept is that of the island, it can be rendered clear by lead- 
ing the child to express in various sentences all of the dif- 
ferent essential thoughts concerning the island, as, this 
island consists of rock ; this of coral growth ; this of sand, 
etc. — This island is surrounded by clear water; this one 
by cloudy water, etc. This is really the analysis of the 
concept. Its result is clearness. 

23. The order in teaching sentences. It has been shown 
on page 165 that the fundamental forms of the sentences 
are, those that express the immediate judgment, the con- 



356 The Problem of Method 

ditional judgment and the definite judgment. This indi- 
cates their order of difficulty and hence the order, in gen- 
eral, in teaching them. 

The immediate judgment is expressed in a sentence 
which explicit!}^ denotes only one relation, namely, the 
relation between the object and the attribute, as. The 
ground is wet. In taking up the work under sentences 
various examples of this class should be considered before 
those expressing the conditional judgment, as The ground 
is wet if it h^ts rained. In sentences of this second kind, 
the child is required to be acquainted not only with the 
relation between the object and the attribute, but also 
with the relation of this unity to a certain condition. 

The sentences which express definitive judgments 
should be the culminating work under the sentence, since 
they are sentences that express, in a complete way, the 
essential nature of the object which is denoted by the sub- 
ject of the sentence. This evidently requires a higher 
grade of thought than that necessary to deal with the 
other forms of the sentence, as may be realized by analyz- 
ing the process in creating the thought expressed by the 
following definitive sentence: A square is a parallelo- 
gram having four equal sides and four right-angles. The 
separate sentences involved in this one sentence are defi- 
nitive because each expresses an essential fact of the 
square. 

24. The predicate as expressing action. The teacher 
should gradually learn to look upon the predicate as 
expressing an action or the result of an action. For ex- 
ample, in the sentence, "This Doric column is fluted," 
the predicate expresses the attribute of "being fluted," but 
that attribute is the result of the activity concerned in 
producing Doric columns, i. e., ability to produce the at- 
tribute fluted is one of the capacities of the activity which 



The Problem or Method 357 

produces Doric columns. The attribute in the predicate 
always reflects the capacity of the activity which produced 
the object that is expressed in the subject. If the teacher 
is fully possessed of this thought, it will be an advantage 
in showing the child the close relation of the universal ex- 
pressed in the predicate to the particular denoted in the 
subject. The words, "Doric column," indicate the activity 
and the word "fluted" denotes one of the results of the 
activity. 

25. The copula of an immediate sentence expresses the 
relation as ungrounded. The copula should be regarded 
by the teacher as denoting an identity which is fused, 
undifferentiated. That is, the person reading the sentence, 
and often the one who produced it, is not conscious of the 
relations on Avhich the identity is based. It would be easy 
to say, for example, "The Doric column is fluted," and at 
the same time be unable to explain on what grounds it is 
judged to be fluted. The act of reasoning is required in 
order to become distinctly conscious of the basis of the 
identity between the object and the attribute. Then the 
copula no longer denotes a fused unity. The consciousness 
of this truth will tend to prevent satisfaction with mere 
statements by teacher or pupil. There will be an incli- 
nation to show the basis or ground for the assertion. This 
will of necessity render teaching more thoughtful. 

26. The psychological process in reasoning. The pupil 
in inductive and in deductive reasoning should be led to 
employ consciously, the differentiated psychical process 
rather than the fused logical process. In the logical pro- 
cess in deduction he makes three assertions, as, "All grains 
of corn have a pericarp. This is a grain of corn. There- 
fore it has a pericarp." 

The differentiated, psychical process in deductive rea- 
soning, involves five mental stages instead of three: 



358 The Problem or Method 

a. The child becomes aware of the object as a whole. 
He knows it as an object distinct from other objects, but 
he has not a clear knowledge of the distinctions in it itself. 

b. Prompted by some interest of the self, he abstracts 
or isolates the attribute "having a pericarp," and inquires 
vVhether this object has that attribute. 

c. On the basis of the shape of the object and other 
known attributes it is classed as a grain of corn. 

d. The mind then analyzes this class in order to dis- 
cover the various attributes, and among these finds the at- 
tribute, "having a pericarp." 

e. The assertion is then made that this object, since 
it belongs in the class, has a pericarp. 

27. Knowledge of the extent of the attribute. When 
the process of the pupil in reasoning is that of identifi- 
cation, his limitation is in not fully knowing the na- 
ture of the attribute which is expressed in the first 
judgment. Let it be assumed that the first judgment is, 
"This flower is red." The word "red," then, expresses the 
attribute denoted in the first judgment. The difficulty in 
the process of identification is that the child does not dif- 
ferentiate this attribute; he does not think clearly in 
regard to the different objects in which it is found. Since 
he does not notice this, he is willing to give as the second 
sentence, "The geranium is red." This leads him to the 
conclusion, "This flower is a geranium." When it is said 
that the pupil must fully differentiate the attribute of the 
first judgment, the thought is that he should reflect care- 
fully concerning the presence of red in flowers. If this 
were done, greater care would be exercised in making the 
first assertion. All processes of identification, that is, of 
inaccurate induction and deduction, are based upon the 
faihire of the pupil to carefully examine the extent of the 
attribute before expressing it in the predicate of the first 
j udgment. 



The Problem of Method 359 

28. Both synthesis and analysis present in any case of 
reat'oning. When the pupil has reached the stage of de- 
velopment in which he consciously considers to some ex- 
tent his own process, he should be led to note that in each 
act of induction and of deduction there is both separation 
and unity. For example, when, by a process of deduction 
the pupil has become aware that a certain grain has a per- 
icarp, he has identified the particular object with a gen- 
eral attribute, and by doing this he has separated the ob- 
ject from all objects that do not possess that attribute. 
Also, when having examined a number of grains of corn, 
the induction is made that all grains of corn possess a 
slight testa, there is analysis in isolating this attribute 
from the other attributes of the object, but there is also 
synthesis in that this object and all the other objects of 
the class are unified ; and further analysis, in that they are 
at the same time made separate from the objects of all 
other classes. Attention to these facts would tend to make 
the pupil thoughtful in his work. 

29. The value in examining many particulars. In order 
to give the pupil real ability in his work, he should be 
led to establish the habit of examining new and varied 
particulars as a basis for the discovery of the general prin- 
ciple known in the act of induction. It would not be 
sufficient to examine a few grains of corn in order to feel 
justified in asserting that grains of corn possess a testa. 
Many small grains should be examined, many larger 
grains, those that are red, those that are whitish, those 
that are yellow, etc. The same principle should control 
the child in dealing with historical facts, with events in 
literature, in language, etc. 

30. Examples for vemfication. The habit of seeking 
examples of the general truth which has been discovered 
should be firmly established in the pupil. For instance. 



360 The Problem of Method 

after examining a large number of grains of corn and 
finally becoming conscious of the general truth that grains 
of corn possess a testa, the pupil should be encouraged to 
verify this in the examination of many new particulars 
This same practice should prevail, also, in regard to his- 
torical events, geographical facts, facts concerning lan- 
guage, etc. 

31. The value in knowing the process in sympathy and 
kindred social feelings. The knowledge of sympathy is a 
suggestive guide for the teacher's work in the school. This 
may be shown by noting the process : 

a. Let is be assumed, for example, that a person is 
in the mental condition called resentment on account of a 
certain peculiar environment which he has. 

b. This mental condition is objectfied in his counte- 
nance, words, actions, etc. 

c. An observer, through sense-perception, becomes 
aware of these manifestations. 

d. The observer reproduces in himself the mental 
condition which he has usually been in when these external 
manifestations were put forth by him. 

e. This gives him an opportunity to examine closely 
the mental condition and to become aware of its nature. As 
he does this, he knows that the mental condition is not 
really his own now, but that it is the actual condition of 
the other person. 

f. As he reflects upon this, he becomes aware that 
such a mental condition, under the stimulus of such an 
environment, is possible to him. Instantly there arises a 
feeling of identity between him and the person exhibiting 
resentment. This feeling is called sympathy, (syn, with; 
pathos, feeling). Sympathy is, perhaps, the fundamental 
feeling of the self and bears the same important relation 
to the emotional nature that attention does to the intel- 



The Problem of Method 361 

lectual activities. If the teacher clearly understands the 
process in sympathy, it will enable him to stimulate sym- 
pathy in himself and in the child much more fully than 
could be the case if the process were not understood. 

It is evident that sympathy and also its opposite, anti- 
pathy^ are the social feelings which arise when the mind, 
in considering itself in relation to others, is emphasizing 
its attention to the others. If the emphasis of attention in 
this consciousness of self and others is upon the self, the 
feeling stimulated is pride or humility. 

The ideal, according to Aristotle, is the exercise of func- 
tion in the interest of the social whole and of the essentials 
of the individual. To live in harmony with this ideal is 
difficult. As the person becomes conscious that he has 
potentiality of this harmony, or that he is actually in har- 
mony with the idea, the condition for the feeling of pride 
is present ; if he is conscious of the opposite, he will experi- 
ence the feeling of humility. 

To be true elements in the development of the self, pride 
and humility must arise from the contemplation of the 
present condition of the self in relation to the adequate 
social ideal. 

They both become egoistic or negative if the objects con- 
templated are particular attainments of the self in relation 
to similar particular attainments in others. 

In Dewey's Psychology^ pages 334-335, certain complex 
social feelings are mentioned, as envy^ involving antipathy 
and the egoistic form of humility; jealousy^ involving 
sympathy and the egoistic form of humility ; malice^ hav- 
ing as its elements antipathy and the egoistic form of 
pride; covetousness, consisting of sympathy and the ego- 
istic form of pride. The idea of the nature of these com- 
plex feelings is a fruitful suggestion as to the mode of 
dealing with them in education. 



362 The Problem of Method 

The classical poetical portrayal of these feelings, par- 
ticularly of pride and envy is found in the Purgatory of 
Dante's Divine Comedy. The poet's artistic use of the 
ideal and its opposite in the education of the inhabitants 
of each terrace is especially noticeable. 

Sympathy and all its kindred social feelings are based 
upon the relation of self to others, but their deeper refer- 
ence is to an ideal which is the fundamental nature of both 
self and others. This is the social ideal as given by Aris- 
totle which involves the freedom as to intellect, feeling, 
will and bodily capacities. This freedom includes the 
disposition to bring about a like freedom in others. 

The educational procedure in cultivating sympathy 
and the other forms of social feelings that are positive, 
or in freeing the child from pride, envy and those other 
forms of social feeling that are negative consists, 

a. In making clear to the child, gradually, that ideal 
by which each individual life is to be measured. 

b. In bringing into clear consciousness the nature of 
the particular act. 

c. In measuring this act by the ideal. 

The essence of the principle is that each one of these 
feelings is to be cultivated or to be repressed by instruc- 
tion in harmony with the process of the intellect which 
produces the ideas that are the basis for the feeling. 

32. All education is hased upon faith. The mental con- 
dition known as faith implies that the individual is dis- 
tinguishing between a real condition of which he is dis- 
tinctly conscious, and an ideal condition which he has 
never realized, and has never known to be realized. To 
have the mental condition known as faith he must be con- 
scious that the present condition which seems very real 
does not have that stability and permanency, and that de- 
gree of reality which the ideal has. To feel that the ideal 



The Problem of Method 363 

is more real than the actual, is to be existing in the psy- 
chological state of faith. This is an important attitude, 
because it always prevents a person from excusing erron- 
eous action on account of the fact that it is in harmony 
with his nature. A person of faith comprehends that his 
present actual nature is to be transformed gradually into 
a higher condition which is his real or ultimate nature. A 
person must act in harmony with the first only to the 
extent that he desires to transform the first into the sec- 
ond. Jesus meant this condition in saying: "He that 
loseth his life for my sake, shall save it." Faith is of 
great importance to the teacher. He must have faith in 
the existence of truth ; in the pupil's fidelity to truth ; in 
the pupil's capacity to learn. 

33. Hofe is an essential in education. The process of 
education should stimulate and continue a condition of 
hope, A hopeful attitude is a substantial basis for educa- 
tion. To ensure this condition the teacher must be aware 
of the intellectual states that are the basis of hope. 

When does this psychological activity called hope arise ? 

a. The person must be aware of an idealized con- 
dition. 

b. This idealized condition must be one that he is 
interested in. That is, it must involve in a definite way 
that identity with the plans of the self which w411 stimu- 
late interest. 

c. The person must also discover in the present en- 
vironment certain indications that this idealized state 
will finally be made real. That is, hope is based on the 
notion of an idealization which is strongly allied to the 
self and the realization of which is hinted clearly by ex- 
isting conditions. If the teacher desires to awaken hope in 
the child she must make him distinctly conscious of this 
idealized condition and of its identity with his own inter- 



364 The Problem of Method 

ests. She must then lead him to notice all the indications 
of the present environment that sustain the notion that 
this idealized state will finally come to be real. The mind 
of the child, having been made aware of these things will 
necessarily create in itself the feeling of hope. 

34. Discouragement and education. Education in- 
volves, at every stage, some degree of discouragement and 
the necessity for its removal. What knowledge would 
enable the teacher to free the pupil from the condition of 
discouragement ? The knowledge of the intellecutal basis 
of discouragement will suffice for this. In order to be- 
come discouraged the pupil must be aware of a certain 
work to be done. He must also be conscious that he is 
putting forth well directed efforts for the accomplish- 
ment of this work. In addition to this, he must know that 
these well directed efforts are failing to solve the problem. 
Under these conditions, he becomes discouraged. 

How can the teacher make him free from this condi- 
tion? By emphasizing three things: 

a. He must first make clear to the pupil the exact 
nature of the problem which is to be solved and show him 
that the difficulties are not so great as he had supposed, 
or that his own ability is greater than he thinks it is. 

b. The pupil is to be made more fully acquainted 
with his own equipment for the work. 

c. He must be led to see that his well directed efforts 
have been already successful, to a degree. 

In every case of discouragement it would seem that 
these things can be accomplished by the teacher. It re- 
quires, of course, on the part of the teacher, careful re- 
flection concerning the conditions. 

35. Cheerfulness an incentive in education. Cheerful- 
ness, like hope, is a great incentive in education. How 
can this condition be cultivated in children? It may 



The Problem of Method 365 

be ciiltivated if the teacher understands the nature of the 
feeling itself and the psychological tendency it involves. 

Cheerfulness always relates to a change of conditions, 
or to new conditions. If a person is cheerful under these 
new conditions, it is because his tendency is to discover in 
the new conditions characteristics that are desired. For 
example, it may be a rainy day with surroundings that 
are usually termed dismal. The cheerful person, discov- 
ering the undesirable characteristics, will note the things 
in the present condition of weather that are favorable. 
This disposition will grow by being exercised upon differ- 
ent objects and conditions until it becomes a habit. The 
process in arousing the feeling is thus made clear. There 
should be an attempt in connection with any object or 
thought being studied to throw the emphasis of attention 
upon characteristics that are beneficial or that contribute 
to the interests of those attending to the object or con- 
dition. 

36. The relation of sullenness to education, A negative 
influence in the educational process is the feeling of sullen- 
ness. Can it be banished by any well thought out process. 

The mode of dealing with any feeling is based upon the 
knowledge of its intellectual ground. A child is sullen 
under certain conditions only. These are as follows: 

a. He believes that he has been wronged by some 
other person ; that is, by teacher or pupils. 

b. He knows that no acknowledgement of the sup- 
posed wrong has been made to him and that no other form 
of atonement has been made for it. 

c. He is aware by the actions of the teacher or the 
pupils that an effort is being made to treat him as if no 
wrong has been done. There seems to be a disposition on 
the part of those who have wronged him to ignore the 
wrong act and to assume the friendly relations that for- 
merly existed. 



366 The Problem of Method 

The existence of this complex state of the pupil's in- 
tellect, stimulates the feeling of sullenness. It is a defi- 
nite feeling based upon a definite intellectual condition. 

In order to make the child free from the feeling of 
sullenness, the teacher must deal with these three elements 
of knowledge that have been indicated. If no wrong has 
been done toward the pupil there must be careful work 
to show that this is the case. If wrong has been done 
this must be acknowledged and atoned for as fully as 
possible. 

37. Wo7ider as a stimulus to knowledge. Wonder is 
the form of love which relates to truth. It does not 
relate, however, to truth which has already been discov- 
ered, although it may be awakened b}^ the undiscovered 
characteristic of that which is exceedingly familiar. 
Wonder has been said to be the attitude which the emo- 
tional nature spontaneously assumes in the presence of a 
world offering many incentives toward the increase of 
knowledge. It is really based upon the assumption that 
the unknown object is in some way the self. 

The person who is in a state of wonder feels that the 
investigation of the truth in the unknown object will 
reveal him to himself more fully. It is a disinterested 
affection for truth, impelling investigation for the sake 
of the truth to be discovered and not for any selfish rea- 
son. If one seeks truth, not for the sake of the truth, 
but for the sake of gratifying his longing to discover 
truth, the feeling is curiosity instead of wonder. The 
educational significance of wonder is found in the fact 
that it is based upon unknown characteristics in the object 
and upon the assumption that the nature of the self would 
be more fully known if the object were more completely 
understood. This gives the key to the teacher for its cul- 
tivation. If wonder is absent from educational work 



The Problem of Method 367 

such work loses its vitalit}^ because this emotion is that 
which gives origin to and which continues the process of 
knowledge. The results of the educational process de-. 
prived of this element of wonder are forcibly shown in 
Hard Times b}^ Charles Dickens. 

38. Admiration as a factor iji education. Admiration 
is the form of love which is concerned with beauty, as re- 
vealed in both nature and art. 

It is the outgoing of the self toward beauty which is 
already existing and also the tendency toward the produc- 
tion of beauty. It is that form of interest which was 
spoken of by Socrates as love for the birth of beauty. 

Admiration is awakened by becoming conscious of the 
harmony or adaptation of a particular to the general truth 
which it exhibits. It can be given an important cultiva- 
tion in school work especially in the study of literature 
and the other forms of art, but it can be appealed to 
strongly also in the study of nature and in the investiga- 
tion of spiritual growth. 

39. Love as the fundamental emotion in education. In 
all ages love has been ranked with sympathy as a central 
emotional disposition. The intellectual basis of it should 
be clearly understood. The object or content of love is an 
ideal condition, i. e., an unrealized. state. It is said to be 
the emotional tendency of the self toward an object re- 
garded as other than the self. This implies that the self 
is disregarded. In this disregard lies the essence of self- 
sacrifice. In the interests of an ideal or unrealized state, 
there is a surrender of the present self as to its immediate 
aims and advantages. The true object of love is a de- 
veloped condition of the self or of another. That is, the 
object of love is not any real condition, but rather an 
ideal condition Avhich should be made real. One of the 
most important forms is the love of knowledge which has 



368 The Problem of Method 

always been a powerful interest in the lives of people. 
This is given admirable expression by Socrates in Plato's 
dialogue entitled, "The Symposium." An extreme example 
of its strength is shown in "The Grammarian's Funeral," 
by Robert Browning. In this latter case the object of love 
seems to be a self having a perfect knowledge of external 
forms of language. In every case, however, love seeks the 
realization of an ideal condition in the self, in others, or in 
the environment. This ideal condition should always be 
superior to the present existence of the person who is 
manifesting love. The teacher must base his work with 
the pupil upon the relation of a superior ideal to a present 
self — which, to a degree, must be sacrificed in the attain- 
ment of the ideal. In Luke IX-24 it is said, "For whoso- 
ever will save his life shall lose it ; but whosoever will lose 
his life for my sake, the same shall save it." The words, 
"for my sake," denote the idea. 

The word love is the central utterance of all sacred 
writings. Among the many beautiful expressions in Jew- 
ish and Christian Scriptures these may be noted : 

Canticles, VIII, 9 : " Love is strong as death. ' ' 

Canticles, II, 4: ''He brought me to the banqueting house, and his 
banner over me was love.*' 

St. John, XVII, 23 : " And that the world may know that thou hast 
sent me, and hast loved them, as thou hast loved me. ' ' 

St. John, XVII, 24: "For thou lovedst me before the foundation 
of the world." 

St. John XIV, 15: ''If you love me, keep my commandments." 

I John IV, 8 : " He that loveth not, knoweth not God, for God is 
love. ' ' 

I John IV, 11; "Beloved, if God so loved us, we ought also to love 
one another." 

I John IV, 19 : " We love him because he first loved us. ' ' 

Jeremiah XXXI, 3: "Yea, I have loved thee with an everlasting 
love. ' ' 



The Problem of Method 

Psalm CXXII, 6: "They shalt prosper that love thee." 

II Corinthians, XIII, 11: The God of love and peace shall be with 
you. ' ' 

Proverbs X, 12: ''Love covereth all sins." 

Proverbs XV, 17: ''Better is a dinner of herbs where love is, than 
a stalled ox and hatred therewith. ' ' 

In John IV., 8, it is said that "God is love." This indi- 
cates that God is conscious of himself as manifested in all 
objects and returns the manifestation with equal ardor as 
is shown in Dante's Purgatory, Canto XY., lines 64-67. 

"The highest good 
Unlimited, ineffable, doth so speed 
To love as beam to lucid body darts. 
Giving as much ardor as it finds." 

This universal relation of love is shown by Francis W. 
Bourdillon in the following: 

"The night has a thousand eyes; 
The day but one. 
So the light of the whole day dies 
At set of sun. 

The mind has a thousand eyes; 
The heart but one. 
So the light of the whole life dies 
When love is done. ' ' 

What is the result in a person's life "when love is done ?" 
There is no further outgoing of the self toward the beauty 
of a sunset, toward works of art, or toward a fine deed. 
The love of country is gone. There is no longer any 
affection for friends or relatives; no interest in the 
stranger and the alien. There is no love for one's vo- 
cation, for his ideals, for the development of himself or 
others; no desire for knowledge. 



370 The Problem of Method 

The extent of this emotion is shown in The Symposium 
of Plato. It was arranged that those seated at the banquet 
table at Agathon's home, should, in the order seated, each 
in his own way, utter an encomium on love. 

Phsedrus spoke first and Socrates closed the addresses. 
Phaedrus referred to the antiquity of love and to its bene- 
fits. He noted among the greatest of these, the sense of 
honor and dishonor. 

Pausanias was the second speaker. He distinguished be- 
tween love for spiritual things and love for the physical. 

The third speaker was Eryximachus. He also distin- 
guished the spiritual from the physical love but he ex- 
tended the empire of love through all things. It was, he 
thought, found at work not only in human beings and ani- 
mals, but also in plants and even in the inanimate world. 
It was the harmony of opposites. 

Aristophanes, who was the fourth speaker, regarded 
love as a desire for the whole. Anything which is incom- 
plete and is seeking to acquire its total nature was im- 
pelled, according to his thought, by love. 

Agathon's speech succeeded that of Aristophanes. He 
thought that all things which are done, are done in obedi- 
ence to love and that wherever there is love there is obedi- 
ence. He also traced obedience to justice and therefore re- 
garded love as underlying justice. 

In the speech of Socrates, however, there was made the 
really great contribution to the thought concerning lov^e. 
He began by discussing its nature and showing that it had 
for its object, not the actual, not anything which is really 
existing. It is, as he said, the outgoing of the self toward 
an ideal. Its object is beauty, but not existing beauty. 
Love centers in the birth of beauty, that is, in the produc- 
tion of that which is beautiful, whether physical or spirit- 
ual. He traced it in its grades, showing that at first love is 



The Problem of Method 371 

for one fair form; then for many; then for that which is 
common to them ; it then rises to a desire for the beauty of 
mind. From this, it ascends to an interest in the beauty of 
law and institutions. At last it centers in the beauty of 
that "everlasting nature which is the cause of all things." 
Thus the philosophical insight of Socrates conceived love 
in its highest forms as the emotional outgoing toward uni- 
versal beauty. Since the object of love is "the everlasting 
nature which is the cause of all," or absolute truth, it wiJl 
be seen that love is kindred to both wonder and admira- 
tion, in that it is the stimulus to all fields of investigation 
in the world of beauty and in the world of truth, as well 
as in the world of morals or duty. 

The educational value of understanding love is found in 
the emphasis it gives to the ideal ; in the distinction which 
it involves between the ideal and the real and the necessity 
for the surrender of much of the present for the -sake of 
the higher ideal. 

40. The function of interest in education. Much has 
been said concerning interest and its relation to attention. 
Interest is the active outgoing of the self toward an ob- 
ject which is regarded as the self, as in identity with the 
self. It is closely akin to love, but it involves more fully 
the sense that the object upon which the attention is cen- 
tered is the self. When one is in a foreign country and has 
been hearing for days and months the foreign language, 
the utterance of a single word of his own language im- 
mediately interests him because he is aware, although sub- 
consciously, that the object he is attending to is, in certain 
respects, the self. In order to interest a pupil in some 
object or branch of study, it is necessary merely for the 
teacher to make the child acquainted with the fact that 
the truths under consideration and the powers gained in 
the investigation of them are in identity with purposes of 



372 The Problem of Method 

his own. That is the essential procedure in stimulating 
interest in the pupil. Every pupil has purposes of his 
own ; there are objects or actions for which he cares. The 
teacher should study him enough to know what these ob- 
jects are, and to know the actions or the fields of know- 
ledge that the pupil does not care for. The identity be- 
tween these and his favorite pursuits should be sympa- 
thetically shown. The pupil's interest will then, neces- 
sarily, center in these activities or subjects, to a certain 
degree. 

41. The place of desire in education. The teacher can 
with great advantage further the education of the child 
if she knows the process in desire, because all true educa- 
tion must proceed in harmony with the desire of the child. 
This does not mean, however, that the child's capmce 
should be the guide. Desire is not merely a feeling. It is 
a complex mental condition involving the intellectual, 
emotional and volitional aspects of the self. It assumes 
that some impulse, as, for example, the impulse to travel, 
or the impulse to understand the work in algebra, has 
been gratified. As this impulse was gratified, the person 
was aware of the activity which gratified it, of the im- 
pulse itself, and of the pleasure resulting from the grati- 
fication of the impulse. If at any future time this impulse 
arises, it is termed a desire. This is because the mere im- 
pulse has been interpenetrated by knowledge. The person 
knows or remembers the former activity, the impulse that 
was satisfied by it and the resulting pleasure. He also 
knows the present condition, that is, he is conscious that 
the activity which satisfied the impulse is not now occur- 
ring and that the pleasure belonging to such activity is 
not present. Desire, therefore, involves a knowledge of a 
past condition and of an idealized condition similar to the 
past condition. The consciousness that at present the 



The Problem of Method 373 

condition is unrealized, necessarily gives rise to the affec- 
tive elements of pain and pleasure. Thus desire is a com- 
plex mental state. 

How may the teacher awaken in the pupil a desire for 
a worthy object or action? The process must be in har- 
mony with the nature of desire itself. In the first place, 
the teacher must lead the child to remember the former 
impulse, the activities which answered to it, and the pleas- 
ure resulting. He must then lead the pupil to realize that 
these conditions are not now present, but that they are 
possible. By stimulating these mental states in the 
child, the desire for the idealized condition will be created 
by the child. 

42. The relation of choice to education. The process of 
choice involves, as has been noted, a comparison of the 
desired condition with the aim of life. During the life 
of the race there have been many doctrines as to the aim 
of life, or the Good. The prominent one has been pleasure. 
It is probable, however, that the only aim that can satisfy 
the requirements of life, is freedom. This word denotes 
a release from limitations. What things can be limited? 
Limits may be found in the intellectual nature, the emo- 
tional nature, the volitional nature and the bodily activ- 
ities. A person grows in freedom as his thought becomes 
more rational, as his emotions become centered in higher 
and more refined conditions, as his choices come more and 
more to have as their content the habit of choosing free- 
dom, and as his body becomes harmonious in its action 
with the spirit it manifests. True freedom in an indi- 
vidual requires that he should seek these forms of develop- 
ment in himself and in others equall}^ This notion of 
freedom gives an important chart for educational develop- 
ment. The aim of life is not merely to know, to have 
fame, to have position, not even to be sympathetic. Sym- 



374 The Problem of Method 

pathy toward a person must be controlled by the notion of 
giving him freedom, i. e., one must be sympathetic toward 
a person to the extent that this sympathy will make him 
free from dependence upon others. 

In the development of the notion of freedom, the first 
ideal was that freedom consists in the enjoyment of the 
maximum pleasure. This was the doctrine of the Epi- 
cureans. 

The second ideal was that developed by the Stoics. 
Their thought was that all of the external world is colored 
by the spiritual condition of the person and that the en- 
vironment is immaterial, of no essential importance. 
Accordingly they regarded freedom as obedience to a uni- 
versal law. Obedience to universal law is the good. The 
individuality of the person was to be sacrificed in behalf 
of the universal. 

According to Plato, freedom consists in the subordina- 
tion of the inferior nature to the superior nature. In the 
subordination of the appetite to reason, the virtue of tem- 
perance arises. In the subordination of the "spirited" 
nature to reason, there appears the virtue of courage. In 
the subordination of the appetite and the "spirited" na- 
ture to reason as comprehending the highest ideal, there 
arises the virtue of wisdom. In the obedience of all the 
lower elements to the rational nature in the measure that 
there is harmonious activity of the whole self in the pur- 
suit of an individual vocation for the interest of society, 
there arises the virtue of righteousness or justice. 

This conception which Plato developed is practically 
the ideal of freedom as given above. Plato's ideal seems, 
however, to have been so distinctly separated from real 
life as to develop, in later schools, into asceticism. This 
weakness was implicit only in Plato's philosophy. 



The Problem of Method 376 

In Aristotle, the highest standpoint of freedom seems to 
have been gained. He did not regard freedom as con- 
sisting in subordination of the lower nature to the higher 
but rather in obedience to an ideal which implied the 
largest possible social range. According to him, freedom 
is the exercise of function in the way to advance the in- 
terests of society and hence the higher personal interests 
of the individual. He based this thought on the notion 
that the individual is a social being by nature. This latter 
is the first thought concerning ethical freedom in the sys- 
tem of Aristotle. His second is that there should be ample 
means consisting of wealth, friends, time, opportunity, 
etc., for the realization of this ideal. The third principle 
of his doctrine is that the means should be strictly adapted 
to the end, neither wanting nor in excess. This is his cele- 
brated doctrine of the mean. 

It will be observed that the notion of freedom given by 
Aristotle includes the idea of the full development of the 
intellectual, emotional, volitional and bodily nature of 
each individual, together with a disposition in the person 
to bring about a similar development in all others. 

There have been many attempts since Aristotle's time to 
express the thought of freedom. Among those which are 
of a high standard, is that given by Robert L. Stevenson : 

"To be honest, to be kind — to earn a little and spend a little less, 
to make upon the whole a family happier for his presence, to re- 
nounce when that shall be necessary and not be embittered, to keep a 
few friends, but these without capitulation— above all, on the same 
grim condition, to keep friends with himself— here is a task for all 
that a man has of fortitude and delicacy."* 



'•'From "A Christmas Sermon," by Robert L. Stevenson, Vol. XV, Thistle Edition, 



376 The Problem of Method 

John Boyle O'Reilly notes in poetical form the different 
ideals of life and his estimate of them, as follows : 

''What is the real good?" 
I asked in musing mood. 
''Order," said the law court; 
"Knowledge," said the school; 
"Truth," said the wise man; 
"Pleasure," said the fool; 
"Love," said the maiden; 
"Beauty," said the page; 
"Freedom," said the dreamer; 
"Home," said the sage, 
"Fame," said the soldier; 
' ' Equity, ' ' the seer. 

Spake my heart full sadly: 
"The answer is not here." 
Then within my bosom 
Softly this I heard: 
"Each heart holds the secret; 
Kindness is the word, ' ' 

It is evident that the poet regards kindness as the ideal 
of life, but this has its limitations. One should manifest 
toward a person kindness, as usually understood, only to 
the extent that it will further his freedom. The true ideal 
of life is the great conception which is to make vital all 
educational work and therefore it should receive the 
thoughtful consideration of the teacher.* It would 
be valuable to study the conception of Robert L. Steven- 
son and of John Boyle O'Reilly in relation to the ideal 
given by Aristotle. An investigation of this kind would 
bring out the limited view of the different ideals men- 
tioned in each of the two extracts quoted. 



'■"See "Spiritual Frontage," page 94 of "Afternoons in the College Chapel," by 
Francis G. Peabody. 



The Problem of Method 377 

43. The steps in choice. Education is incomplete, as 
shown above, if it ends in desire. Complete education 
involves choice and habitual modes of choice. How can 
the child be led to choose ? This process the teacher must 
understand. What is the first psychological process in 
choice? It is to hold in consciousness at the same time 
two or more desired conditions. This is the process of 
discrimination. 

In the second place, each of these desired conditions 
must be compared with the ideal of life as a whole and 
with the ideal in the person's special pursuit. The desired 
conditions must then be estimated as to their value in re-* 
lation to the modes of life and to the special pursuit. 

Finally, the pupil is to be led to assert mentally that 
the desired condition which is most in harmony with these 
aims shall be realized. This assertion is a volitional judg- 
ment and is called choice. The education of the ethical 
nature is in this process of choice. 

44. The relation of conscientiousness to education. All 
educational work is, in a sense, the development of the 
child's conscientiousness. Little by little, under true 
educational influences he will become more conscien- 
tious. It is important, however, to notice that conscience 
includes more than mere feeling. It is often spoken of as 
"the voice of God in the soul." This makes it an extra fac- 
tor in the conscious life of each person but such a view 
does not seem to be justified by psychological analysis. 
Conscience is not something conferred as a gift from the 
outside. It is native to human consciousness. 

Hamlet says, (Act III., Scene i), "Thus conscience does 
make cowards of us all." This is usually understood to 
refer to the emotional response in the form of remorse. 
The term may have been used in that sense in this drama, 
but conscience really includes the total range of psycho- 



378 The Problem of Method 

logical activities. It does not differ from other mental 
states, as, for example, from the activity of conceiving the 
nature of a triangle, except that its subject-matter is 
different. Conscience is concerned with conduct, with the 
relation of a particular act to an ideal. 

The cultivation of it must be based upon its own pro- 
cess. It is therefore, important to note carefully the pro- 
cess in the mental act called conscience. 

The first stage in the process of conscience is the appre- 
hension of a worthy ideal. 

This ideal is then held in consciousness over against the 
idea of a particular act of the individual. 

This is succeeded by the process of choosing to perform 
the particular act. 

If the particular act harmonizes with the ideal, the feel- 
ing of approbation arises. If it is out of harmony, the 
feeling of disapprobation is produced. It is this feeling 
which is spoken of as "the stings of conscience." 

It is seen therefore that the full process of conscience 
is intellectual, emotional, and volitional. 

In the endeavor, therefore, to make the child grow more 
and more conscientious the teacher must seek to make 
more clear to him worthy ideals ; to give him the habit of 
noting carefully his particular acts in relation to these 
ideals; to cultivate in him the habit of choosing the par- 
ticular act which is in harmony with the ideal so that he 
may experience the feeling of approbation which belongs 
to the sense of progress. 

To this end Polonius says (Hamlet, Act I., Scene iii.) : 

' ' This above all : to thine own self be true. 
And it must follow, as the night the day, 
Thou canst not then be false to any man. ' ' 



The Problem of Method 379 

45. The universal or central element in behavior. This 
cardinal element is obedience to an ideal or criterion. It 
is to be remembered, however, that all behavior is obedi- 
ence to some ideal or criterion. The first thing of import- 
ance in behavior is the possession of an adequate ideal. 
Is Epicurean pleasure an adequate ideal? Is the attain- 
ment of success in the way of the possession of wealth, of 
office, of reputation, an adequate ideal? Is the Stoical 
ideal of an ability to possess one's self under adverse cir- 
cumstances, an adequate ideal ? Can any ideal other than 
freedom be adequate? Must not freedom itself be con- 
ceived as the development of one's intellectual, emotional, 
volitional and physical nature and that of all others 
equally? Freedom is obedience to the law of one's 
social nature, for as Aristotle said, "Man is a social ani- 
mal." In all educational work the teacher must regard 
this ideal, and say to himself, "This work in arithmetic, 
this AYork in grammar, this work in history, is to 
increase the child's freedom in the four respects men- 
tioned, and among his tendencies is to be a desire to work 
for his own freedom and for that of others equally." 

The second thing in obedience is to act in harmony with 
the ideal until such action becomes a habit. 

46. Development in behavior. Growth in behavior is 
evidently a passage from obedience to some external ideal, 
through obedience to a mere subjective ideal, to obedience 
to a criterion which is not merely subjective. The obedi- 
ence which is not merely subjective must be an obedience 
to an ideal which is reflected in the thought of humanity 
and corresponds to its universal nature. This ideal is 
almost fully comprehended in Plato's conception of the 
subordination of the "appetitive" and "spirited" elements 
to the rational, but, probably, the only ideal which ade- 
quately represents the ethical nature, is Aristotle's con- 



380 The Problem of Method 

ception of "the exercise of function devoted to wide social 
ends and permanent personal interests." This has been 
previously accepted as the ideal of freedom. Such a truth 
can aid in the daily work of the school by stimulating the 
teacher to inquire whether his management of the school 
appeals to an external ideal, to some merely subjective 
state or to a freedom that belongs to the individual and 
to others equally. The test question is, "Am I training the 
child to hold before him the ideal of laboring for the 
intellectual, emotional, volitional and physical advance- 
ment of others and himself equally? Am I training the 
child so that he would be unwilling to increase his intel- 
lectual power if it decreased the opportunity of others for 
intellectual power?" 

47. Is ethical training separate from intellectual devel- 
opment? Total knowledge of an object or action is an in- 
centive to virtue. As indicated above, it is sometimes held 
that the individual is injured by increase of knowledge if 
his ethical strength is not also directly educated. Was not 
Socrates correct, however, in holding that "knowledge is 
virtue," if he meant that an adequate insight into objects 
and events enables the person to discover that evil is al- 
ways folly, and that virtue alone is permanently beneficial 
to all elements of the person's being ? If one's intelligence 
is slight, he may unduly estimate the pleasure that be- 
longs to evil acts considered in their isolation. If his in- 
telligence becomes more complete, he will be able to under- 
stand that this apparent- advantage in evil is very tran- 
sient and that the final result, which is the result consid- 
ered in relation to the whole social order, can be only neg- 
ative and disastrous. Sometimes a person speaks of an 
"educated rascal." The word, "educated," as thus used 
is very limited in its application. If the person were truly 
educated, it would be most plain to him that it is mere 



The Problem of Method 381 

folly to engage in conduct that may be called rascality. 
May it not be held that it is only the partially educated 
person who engages in evil works? 

48. The pupiVs nature the source of the rules of the 
school. The rules of a school are to be made by neither 
teacher nor pupil in the ultimate sense, since they are 
grounded on the nature of the organization itself. They 
belong to the organization, however, because they are 
found in the nature of the child who is to be educated. 
The regulation regarding promptness in attendance is 
really based in the needs of the child. Possessed of this 
thought, the teacher will lead the pupil to know that the 
rules of the school are not externally imposed, but that 
they are the outgrowth of his process of development. If 
this thought is shared by both teacher and pupil, the ex- 
ternal rules of the school could be formulated, to some 
extent, by the pupils themselves, and this formulation 
could become more prominent from year to year. This 
would arouse in the children the sense that they are self- 
directive. Progress in this direction should, however, re- 
ceive the careful oversight of the teacher so as to free it 
from the influences of caprice. The cause of self-govern- 
ment in school has sometimes been injured by having the 
process begin at too early an age. The idea that the child 
is finally to become self-governing, should, however, be a 
guiding principle to the teacher and should be practically 
recognized at all times when such recognition promises 
to further the true development of the child and the 
efficiency of the school. 

49. Regulations to he re-created hy the pupil. The reg- 
ulations of a school that are not originally made by the 
pupils should be, in a certain sense, re-created by them so 
as to make them their own. In other words, they should 
be led to Iniow the reasons underlying these regulations, 



382 The Problem of Method 

even in the early grades, to a slight extent. As they pro- 
gress from grade to grade it should be the endeavor to 
have them comprehend the reasons under the regulations 
more and more fully. When a pupil knows that a regula- 
tion is reasonable because it helps his development, he 
adopts it as his own. 

50. Acts of the pupil to re-in force rational institutions. 
The work of instruction in school should be so directed 
as to establish in the pupil only such tendencies as will 
re-inforce the activity of rational institutions. To lead 
a true life in the rational institutions means that one 
should be reliable in his statements, clear in his thinking, 
resolute in his will. It means that he should be obedient 
to the higher ideals of thought. Each institution, as the 
state, the family, the church, is assumed to represent the 
higher rational life of the individual. In order to make 
progress, the individual must harmonize his particular 
life with his larger life. Therefore, in the schools, the 
child should be given that information, those modes of 
emotional response and those habits that would equip him 
for effective, harmonious work in the institutions of so- 
ciety. It is evident that this principle bears directly upon 
both the second and the third aspect of self-determination. 
That is, the child becomes separative in establishing 
habits in himself, and then he unifies himself with the in- 
stitutions by cooperating Avith them. 

51. The function of the school to develop self-direction. 
The result of instruction in school should be a gradual 
increase of independence or self- direction in the pupil. 
In his study of a paragraph or in his solution of a prob- 
lem, he should work under the direction of the teacher 
in just that way which is best fitted to prepare him to ac- 
complish the work with least aid from the teacher. The 
questions should be put in such a way as to make him self- 



The Problem or Method 383 

reliant. They should require answers that can not be 
given by the immediate examination of the text. This 
principle emphasizes the fact that the self is not to be 
controlled by en^dronment, but rather by its own nature. 

52. The sense of limit. The necessary stimulus to educa- 
tion is the sense of limit. The child will not be interested 
in studying the nature of the adjective until he has been 
led to feel that without the power to use it he is hampered 
in some way. He will not be particularly interested in 
being prompt in attendance unless he is led to know that 
lack of promptness interferes with his progress. He will 
not endeavor to free himself from some lack in his ethical 
nature unless he is made conscious of that lack and is 
shown that it hinders the aims that he has. 

53. Extent of course of study. The course of study, the 
program for the day's work, as well as the treatment of 
a single subject or topic, should involve, to a degree, train- 
ing in the contemplation and the expression of truth, 
beauty and goodness. The child is a complex being, his 
nature being cognitive, emotional and volitional. There- 
fore, a complete education requires that the material 
dealt with should stimulate and improve him, in so far as 
possible, in all three of these capacities. It seems possible 
to have the investigation of the American Revolution, for 
example, contribute in all of these directions. Of course, 
in any case, the work will of necessity train one of these 
capacities predominantly. 

The principle implies that the teacher should reflect in 
order to determine to what extent the material being ex- 
amined will stimulate the child's intellect and his aesthetic 
and ethical activity. 

The contemplation of this principle may lead the teach- 
er to ask, for example, "Can the study of the adverb con- 



384 The Problem or Method 

tribute to the child's aesthetic and ethical training as well 
as to his intellectual development?" 

."Is the intellectual realm entirely isolated from the 
aesthetic and the ethical?" It is important to consider this 
because a person often speaks as if the child could be 
trained in a satisfactory way intellectually without any 
advancement as to his aesthetic and ethical nature. Is 
this true? 



APPENDIX 



The Problem of Method 



387 



APPENDIX I. 



1. The Growth of a Seed. 

A seed is formed in the pod or fruit of any plant only after fer- 
tilization has taken place. 

In general, fertilization means the transfer of the pollen from the 
stamens of one flower to the stigma of another flower of the same 
species, but in reality this process is much more complex. 



Anther 



Pistd 




Stamen < 



Oirary 




o . .. Pollen Grains 

o o 

....filament 



Fig. 2 
A pistil showing parts. 



Fig 2 

A stamen showing pollen grains falling from 
the opening anther. 

By the time a pollen grain is mature it contains at least two cells 
(a, Fig. 4) viz., the tube nucleus and the generative nucleus. These 
ceUs are not separated from each other by cell walls. 

When the pollen grain falls upon a ripe stigma it absorbs moisture, 
is stimulated by the sugar and other compounds there and so begins 
to grow. The poUen tube projects from one of the openings in the 
coat of the pollen grain and if properly located begins to extend down- 
ward through the loose tissue of the style (Fig. 3). The generative 
nucleus soon divides into two and by the time the end of the tube 
has reached the embryo sac (Fig. 3) the tube nucleus has disappeared 
and the generative nuclei have passed to the end of the tube. 

In the ovary of the pistil the female cell, the egg cell or megaspore, 
has been maturing while the pollen grain, microspore, or male cell 
was developing. 



388 



The Problem of Method 



The large cell in the female part of the plant is sometimes called 
the embryo sac (Fig. 5). At first this cell, for it really is a large 
cell, has but a single nucleus but this divides as the sac and its con- 
tents mature until there are seven cells, viz., two synergids, one egg 
cell or oosphere, one central nucleus or definitive nucleus and three an- 
tipodal cells (Fig. 5). 

When fertilization takes place, i. e., when the pollen tube has pene- 
trated the embryo sac, and liberated its two generative nuclei, one 
nucleus of which joins the egg cell and the other the central nucleus, 
a great change takes place. The antipodal cells and the synergids 
disappear, the central nucleus migrates to the edge of the embryo sac 
and begins to form the food matter of the new ovule and the egg cell 
becomes the young embryo of the new seed. 




J^o/ien 



<jrain 



Pollen tube 



..Antipodal cell 

Outer coat o/ o^ule 

Central nucleus of ernbri/o sac 
...Inner coat of ovule 

^y cell and male nucleus fu5iny 



Fig 5 

Pistil of a plant showing method of fertilization. 

Fig. 3 is an ideal section of a pistil cut lengthwise and shows the 
stigma, style, an ovule and the pollen tube. 

Fig. 4. Shows the development of a pollen tube. 
Fig. 5. An embryo sac fully matured with all its parts. 



The Problem or Method 



339 



Fig. 6. Union of the egg cell (nucleus) and male nucleus. 
Fig. 7. The young embryo not yet divided. 
Fig. 8. The embryo divided into four cells. 



Generative 

/^uc/eui-f-f. 
Tube Nucleus 



Development of the Pollen Tube 
d 




General/ fe Dlucleus. . .. I ::.-... X^ 
Tube Nucleus.. 




../yy cell, 
S^i/ner^tds. 




.Antipodal Celts. 



£rnbr</o sac 
. . Cenlral Mucleus. ..[... .©()' 



2^ sperm 
/ Nucleus 

/St 

. Mate t/ucleus 
or 
sperm Nucleus, 

Poller, TtLbe 





Fig 5 



Fiy.6 n^7 Fi^a 

2. The Constituents of a Drop of Blood. 

The constituents of a drop of blood of the size of one cubic milli- 
meter, i. e., one twenty-fifth inch square. 

Solids— the Corpuscles. 

a. The Eed. 

(1). 5 millions in actual number. 

(2). Composed of a basic stroma, and an iron-contain- 
ing pigment called haemoglobin. 

b. The White. 

(1). About 10,000 in actual number. 

(2). Each a complete living cell with cell contents and 
nucleus and of the very complex structure of proto- 
plasm. 



390 The Problem of Method 

c. The platelets. 

(1). About 20,000 in actual number. 
(2). Diminutive white corpuscles and of similar com- 
plexity. 

The Liquid Part— Plasma. 

a. About 90 per cent, water. 

b. Albumins (3). 

(1). Serum Albumin. 

(2). Paraglobulin. 

(3). Fibrinogen (the albumin of coagulation). 

c. Traces of dextrose sugar. 

d. Traces of fats. 

e. Long series of mineral salts in solution, especially those 

of Sodium, Potassium, Magnesium and Calcium. 



The Problem of Method 391 



APPENDIX II. 



Full Circuit of the Act of Special Sensing. 

1. "The nerve stimulation. The distal periphery of the sensory 
neuron imbedded in the touch corpuscle of — say the right fore-finger, is 
stimulated. The full nature of nerve stimulation is not known, but in 
the case of the touch-corpuscles, it is in large part, a mechanical 
compression of the nerve endings between the connective tissue fibers 
of the touch-corpuscles. 

2. ' ' The nervous impulse. This mechanical stimulus arouses impulse, 
the exact nature of which is still unknown. Whether largely chemical 
or altogether molecular needs further study. But we know that it is 
a wave, the speed of which can be readily measured, and which is in 
human beings normally not far from 100 feet per second. The transit 
of this wave can be easily detected by the electrical disturbance which 
accompanies the same. This wave of negative variation is explained 
at once by the general fact that all tissues in activity are electrically 
negative. Measurements of this accompanying electrical wave make 
it possible to determine the length and amplitude of the passing 
nervous impulse. 

3. ' ' The path of the sensory impulse. The impulse starts in the 
touch-corpuscle, passes along the nerve, and enters the cell body of the 
neuron. This is situated in the spinal-root ganglion. Here a slight 
added interim marks the transit of the impulse through the cell body, 
but of the inner physiological processes of this transit, little is known. 
The impulse then continues cephaled on the inner branch or nerve of 
the same neuron, and enters the cord through the posterior spinal-root 
ganglion. Here the nerve usually branches into a main ascending stem 
and a smaller descending stem, from both of which additional lateral 
branches arise. 



392: The Problem of Method 

4. "Sensory paths in the cord. Several courses are here possible. 
The impulse may spend itself mainly through a lateral branch and 
reach the dendritic terminal investing a motor cell in the anterior 
horn. This will produce a simple reflex of the cord. Or, instead of 
being reflexed directly, through the cord, the main force of the im- 
pulse may continue up the ascending branch, and disregarding several 
tortuous paths possible, pass upward through the posterior sensory 
column until it reaches the medulla. Here it ends in dendritic branches 
which invest the cell body of the superimposed sensory neuron. 

5. * ' The inter -neuronic gap. How the impulse leaps the gap from 
one neuron to another is not clearly known. It is not analogous to 
electrical conduction as absolute anatomical contact is not always 
present. Furthermore, impulses which will run in either direction 
along the course of an ordinary nerve, will only pass forward in the 
physiological direction at the junction of neurons. An impulse can 
not be made to leap from a motor cell backwards to the investing sen- 
sory dendrites. It seems probable therefore that the impulse created 
in the succeeding neuron is physiologically a new one, born within that 
neuron itself. What the exciting stimulus is that over-leaps the gap 
is not fully known. 

6. ' ' The second sensory neuron. The dendrites of the first neuron 
invest a new cell in the medulla, the ascending nerve from which im- 
mediately crosses to the other side of the median line and passing 
through the crux of the brain, ascends to the cortex along the Fissure 
of Eolando where its dendritic branches intertwine and anastomose 
with those of the cortical cells and so transmit to them the sensory 
impulse in the usual manner of related neurons. 

7. ' ' The area of conscious sensation and volition. In these cor- 
tical cells the phenomena of conscious sensation arise, of the physical 
basis of which, practically nothing is known, except the trivial obser- 
vation that an appreciable time is required for these cells to act, 
which enters as one factor into the person 's personal equation. Here 
also take place those complicated phenomena of psychology collec- 
tively called conscious volition. By what nervous processes the vo- 
lition is determined, physiology has no word of definite explanation. 
It is known only that a new motor impulse is created in these cortical 
cells which travels in the direct or crossed motor tract of the cord, and 
the distal dendritic end of the cortical neuron, invests a motor cell of 



The Problem of Method 



393 



the anterior horn of the cord, which second neuron extends to the 
proper muscle, and entering the sarcolemma of that fibre, incites in a 
way also not fully understood the contraction of the living muscle sub- 
stance. ' ' 

The following will aid in tracing the process : 




KmZf 



Fig. 



394 The Problem or Method 



APPENDIX III. 



The art of study 

' ' The woodsman who spends the prime of his life in the forest, hunt- 
ing information about pine lands, develops all the skill of an expert. 
He sees every pine, can estimate accurately the number of feet of 
lumber the land will yield per acre or quarter section, notes carefully 
the distances to the banks of streams, and the character of the land, 
w hether dry or swampy. He is very alert for everything that has a 
direct bearing on his business. Along with this essential informa- 
tion, and skill in finding and handling it, he has accumulated a large 
mass of collateral information. He thinks he knows the different 
kinds of trees in the forest well. He would resent an insinuation that 
he did not know all about elms. He can recognize one as far as it 
can be seen. But if he were required to give the information on 
which to base a scientific definition of an elm-tree, if he were asked 
to describe the peculiar qualities of the elm by which he recognized 
it he might be at an utter loss. He is what is called an impressionist. 
He knows the elm as a whole, that it is dift'erent from all other trees; 
but he may be utterly unable to give a good description of the mode 
of branching, the shape and character of the leaves, and the peculiar 
way in which the bark is cracked— the characters on which the im- 
pression as a whole depends. And if he fails, the reason is, that his 
attention was never fixed on each one separately. 

It may sound like a hard saying, but the great bulk of what we 
know belongs in the same class with the pine-hunter's knowledge of 
the elm. It is this kind of knowledge that makes boys and girls 
say frankly, ''I know, but I can't tell it"; and causes grown men 
and women to give somewhat more elegant apologies for the indefi- 
niteness of what they know. We cannot define the commonest things, 
though we may know enough to recognize them, and we may know 
what they are for. 

The reason for this is not far to seek, but much more difficult to 
overcome. Our knowledge of nearly all things never had its start 
from a sharp act of attention, followed by careful consideration and 



The Problem of Method 395 

association of this new knowledge with what we already know. Like 
Topsy, it was not born, it only * * growed, ' ' bit by bit, until we think 
we know a lot of things that we do not know at all. It was ''ab- 
sorbed." Such knowledge always lacks both accuracy and clearness 
of detail. 

Imperfection of voluntary attention is a general characteristic of 
the human mind. It is the chief cause of the infinite imperfection 
of our knowledge as compared, not with ideal knowledge, but with 
what it might actually be. 

A class of eight fairly bright, well-read young men was reading 
Irving 's Alhambra, and each in turn was called upon to define and 
distinguish the two words elegance and grandeur. Everyone made 
the attempt; no one felt that he did not know; but no one could do it 
satisfactorily. The saying from the primary grades, "I know, but I 
can't tell," was quoted to them, and they accepted it as a good 
description of their condition. A curious companion piece to this is 
the fact that in the same lesson occurred several words which none 
of them had ever seen before. These they had to look up carefully, 
and they gave correct definitions for all of them. They had all seen 
the words elegance and grandeur scores of times in their reading, and 
had often used them. When asked why they were content to leave 
matters thus when the very purpose of their reading was to study the 
style of Irving, they answered that they thought they knew. 

They depended on something that they never had. They never did 
know the meaning of elegance and grandeur and the distinction be- 
tween them. They felt something in connection with the two words 
and that was all. The reason for this condition of things lies near 
at hand. The attention had never been deliberately directed toward 
the meaning of either word. Not one of the class had ever studied 
carefully either word separately or the two together for purposes of 
comparison and discrimination. Their knowledge of the two words 
had, unconsciously and without effort, been absorbed, bit by bit, 
during a long period of time, from the various contexts in which they 
had been seen and heard. These students saw the distinction between 
the words "through a glass, darkly." Not one of them had ever 
attended to the elements that go to make up the conception of 
grandeur. 

The facts set forth in the preceding paragraphs have another im- 
portant lesson for the student. Not only was the knowledge of those 
young men very imperfect, but the chances, as shown above, were all 



396 The Problem or Method 

against their ever improving it. The two words with which they were 
more or less familiar and which they w^ere likely to meet again at 
every turn whenever they read good literature, were left without at- 
tention; while other words, which they had never met before and were 
never likely to meet again, they studied very carefully. This appar- 
ently strange performance is not abnormal, but perfectly characteris- 
tic of most people. 

Direct attention to the significance of those words, when they were 
first met in the student's intellectual career, would have resulted in 
an analysis of their meaning and an accurate understanding of what 
they stand for. If that had happened at the outset, every later re- 
currence of the w^ord grandeur would have increased its significance. 
Thought then could work upon it, the idea could grow. Every new 
context would add some new suggestion to the old meaning, because 
the word was understood. Without this clear understanding of the 
idea from the outset there is no nucleus to which new experience can 
cling, and it fades into nothingness again. It may be laid down as 
a mental axiom that knowledge of any subject cannot improve, no 
matter how much it is studied, unless strenuous attention is given to 
the fijst stages of that knowledge, so that there will be a nucleus 
around which the later additions can gather. 

If attention is not carefully concentrated upon the first steps it 
is not likely to be later; it is not easily fixed upon what is already 
' ' familiar. ' ' Our lives are full of the proof of this truth. Men and 
women listen to soul-stirring sermons and sing inspiring hymns with- 
out a twitch of muscle or a tinge of color in thought or feeling,— 
not because they do not believe them, but because attention has been 
withdrawn. The performance of these things has become habitual,— 
it is a mere beating of time. Steady attention to what is said and 
sung would result in a religious upheaval. Most of our reading is 
like this. The movement is mechanical; there is no thinking. The 
idea ceases to develop and the attention is withdrawn. Like the organ- 
grinder, we turn the crank all day— and are utterly deaf to the tune. 
This is the pit that the student falls into, and steep and slippery are 
the sides thereof. 

It is infinitely more difficult to make a healthy tree out of a scrubby 
little plant than it is to attend carefully to the plant from the time 
the seed is placed in the ground. It is the wrong start that ruins 
both trees and men. It is the wrong start that makes our knowledge 
hazy and worthless. A far-reaching interest in every detail is what 



The Problem of Method 397 

secures attention to what is done at every step, and attention to each 
detail, especially the first in the series, is essential to success. After 
a tree is once well-started, it develops resisting powers of its own. 
It can cope with conditions around it on its own account. And if 
one's knowledge of a subject is started right, by close attention, it 
will far more readily grow right thereafter. 

When the mind has once considered a subject even in the crudest 
and most haphazard fashion, it is not very likely to get reconsidera- 
tion. When even the most imperfect attention has once been given 
to a fact, it is never likely to recover from the effects of that im- 
perfection. ' ' 



Talks to Students on the Art of Study by Frank Cramer. 



398 The Problem of Method 



APPENDIX IV. 



Apperception. 

Man enters life as a stranger; he knows nothing of the world that 
receives him: it is to him a new, unknown country, which he must 
explore, which he must conquer. How is this to be donet Nature 
assails his senses with a thousand allurements; she sends the rays of 
light that he may open his eyes to the innumerable things of the 
outer world, she knocks upon the door of the human spirit with ex- 
citation of tone and touch and temperature and all the other stimu- 
lations of the sensitive nerves, desiring admission. The soul answers 
these stimuli with sensation, with ideas. It masters the outer world 
by perceiving it. 

This activity of the perceiving mind, however, explains another 
important fact. It is a well known experience that one and the same 
object seldom occasions precisely similar perceptions in the minds of 
different people. Of the same landscape the poet 's image would differ 
greatly from that of the botanist, the painter's from that of the 
geologist or farmer, the stranger's from that of him who calls it 
home. In the same way, one and the same speech is often understood 
in as many different ways as there are hearers. What does not the 
child see in his toys, the devout mind in the objects of its devotions! 

What does not the experienced reader of human nature see in the 
wrinkles and folds, the wilted and weather-beaten features of a human 
face? How much do the gestures, the play of features, the glowing 
or fading fire of the eye, tell him of the battles and storms of the 
soul? 

And the artist, does he not perceive in a work of art a thousand 
things that escape the closest attention of the ordinary observer! 

Has not each of us the sharpest kind of an eye for the objects 
with which our calling makes us better acquainted? In the voices of 
nature the youthful lover of birds, like man in the state of nature, 
kears the emotional and volitional utterances of related beings, while 



The Problem of Method 399 

the Malay says of his bamboo forest, from whose branches the wind 
entices the most manifold tones, *The forest organ plays for each his 
favorite tune.* 

In order that a sensation may arise, there is, as a rule, a fusion or 
union of its content with similar i'deas and feelings. With the assist- 
ance of the latter, the sensation is held in consciousness, elevated 
into greater clearness, properly related to the remaining fields of 
thought, and so truly assimilated. 

We call this second act in distinction from that of simple percep- 
tion or the reception of a sensation, apperception, or mental assimila- 
tion. This is a psychical process which has a validity beyond mere 
subjective perception, and is of the greatest significance for all knowl- 
edge, yes, even for our whole spiritual life. Let us see, therefore, the 
laws according to which the process is completed. 

Suppose we have the rare phenomenon of an eclipse of the sun. 
Kays of light of varying strength come from the lighted part of the 
sun's disk, and fall upon the retina of the eye. A physical process 
arising outside of the body affects at once our nerves of sight. Hereby 
the peripheral ends of these nerves are stimulated to an activity that 
is conducted as a nerve excitation to the central ends of the nerves 
and there causes a specific change (excitation of the ganglion cells), 
which is characterized as the release of the nerve-excitement. This 
is a physiological process, which in time and cause seems bound up 
with the physical one, but which is in its nature entirely distinguished 
from it. To these external processes, and conditioned and occasioned 
by them, is now added a pure inner activity, which seems to have 
nothing in common either with vibrations of ether or with nerve cur- 
rents; it is the re-action of the soul, a slight sensation. This is the 
psychical act with which the perception closes. We naturally receive 
from the continually changing disk a variety of sensations, which, 
united and related to the same oibject, give us a picture of the eclipse 
of the sun; this is a subjective perception. 

Only a new-bom infant, in so far as it may be supposed to see at 
all, could stop at this stage in the preception of the outer impression; 
he will indeed not be aware of all that is to be seen, so that he can 
take away none particularly. 

It is very different with the adult. He gains from the same phe- 
nomenon of nature a far richer, sharper, and clearer perception. We 
notice not only the gradual eclipse of the sun, but we recognize also 



400 The Problem of Method 

its cause. We see a dark disk enter the sun 's field of light and say 
to ourselves that this is the unilluminated side of the moon, which in 
its passage around the earth, is now passing between us and the sun, 
and whose cone of shadow hides from us the star of day. To this 
we add the comforting certainty, that all this has to do with right 
things, that the eclipse is proceeding according to known and fixed 
laws— a thought that goes far to remove a large part of the emotion- 
stirring power of this unusual occurrence. 

Whence comes this perception, so rich in content and clear in out- 
line? It has evidently arisen under the influence of the related thought 
content, with which we have met the outer impressions, and under the 
influence of the observations and knowledge that we have formerly 
gained through instruction, reading and personal observation of the 
heavenly bodies and their movements. It was with the help of what 
we already knew of this keenly expected natural event, and of similar 
reproduced ideas, that we created this new perception and placed it 
in an orderly position in the organism of our knowledge, so that it 
now forms a clear and definite part of the same. We Apperceived It. * ' 

Lange's Apperception. 



The Problem of Method 401 



APPENDIX V. 



The process in voluntary memory. 

In the case of voluntary memory under consideration, it is sup- 
posed that, while I am sense-perceiving the dry, crooked, curved branch 
of a tree in a forest, I remember the book having a red leather back, 
curved, about seven inches in length which I saw in an office, on the 
desk, at 9 o 'clock a. m., on the first Saturday of September. 

By introspection, I become aware that 1 am not re-acting the 
mental element denoting the width of the book. That is, I cannot 
remember how thick the book was. To be aware of this missing ele- 
ment is the first stage in an act of voluntary memory. 

The mind now constructs within itself the purpose to re-act the 
lacking element; i. e., the element denoting the width of the leather 
back of the book, red in color, etc. This comprises the second stage. 

The mind now decides upon the set of objects, suited to stimulate 
mental images which may initiate the spontaneous reacting of the 
desired mental state,— which set of objects it (the mind) will proceed 
to think about. For example, the set would include the leather back of 
the Bible, at home; the leather back of the dictionary; the leather 
back of my text in physics ; the leather back of the book on the desk, 
etc. — each being considered, of course, as to width. This completes 
the third stage. 

The mind next creates the mental states appropriate to the various 
objects of the set (backs of books considered as to width) mentioned 
in the preceding paragraph. Among the ideas which have been re- 
acted is the one signifying the width of the leather back of the book, 
red in color, etc. This ends the fourth step. 

I now recognize the mental element signifying the width of the 
leather back of the book, red in color, etc., to be the sought-for men- 
tal element. Hence, with this fifth and last stage, the act of voluntary 

memory is ended. 

L. E. G. 

27 



402 The Problem of Method 

The supposition is that I am in a forest and by an act of memory, 
I am remembering the red leather back of the book, seven inches long 
present in the office the first Saturday in September at nine o'clock, 
etc. 

I. The first stage in an act of voluntary memory is to become 
aware of the missing element. By introspection, I become aware 
that I cannot remember the thickness of the book, that is, I cannot 
re-act the mental element denoting the width of the back of the book. 

II. The second stage is the construction in consciousness of the 
purpose to re-act the lacking element denoting the width of the back 
of the book. 

III. The third stage is the act of deciding upon the set of objects 
which are adapted to stimulate the re-action of the missing element 
denoting the width of the back of the book. I decide to think about 
my dictionary, a notebook, and my literature book. 

IV. My mind reconstructs a mental state appropriate to each ob- 
ject, my dictionary, a note book, and my literature book, considering 
especially that the width of the back of the first is four inches, of 
the second one-half inch, and of the third one and one-quarter inches. 
The mental state appropriate to the width, one and one-quarter inches 
is the sought-for mental element. 

V. The last stage in voluntary memory is an act in which the 
mind recognizes that the mental state denoting one and one-quarter 
inches is the missing element denoting the width of the back of the 
book. M. B. H. 

The supposition is, that while I am in the forest sense-perceiving 
the curved limb of an oak tree, I become aware of the fact that I am 
remembering the book which I sense-perceive'd in the office, on the 
first Saturday morning in September, at nine o 'clock. Practically, I 
re-act my idea of the object as a whole, but as a matter of fact, I 
fail to reconstruct one of the elements of the former image. If this 
were not true, there could be no case of voluntary memory. 

In the first stage of voluntary memory, through the act of introspec- 
tion I become aware of the lacking element in the present memory 
image, as, for example, the element which signifies the width of the 
back of the book in the office. 

Secondly, I create in consciousness the purpose to re-act the lacking 
element, that is, I create in consciousness the purpose to re-act the 



The Problem of Method 403 

element signif;^ang the width of the back of the book. It is this step, 
in the kind of memory being discussed, which gives it the character- 
istic, "voluntary." 

In the third stage, I think about or decide upon such objects as 
are particularly adapted to stimulate the mental images, which may 
initiate the spontaneous re-acting of the sought-for mental state. 
Speaking objectively we may say;— I decide upon a system of objects, 
such as the width of the back of our family Bible, of the back of the 
book entitled, ' ' Shakespeare 's Twelfth Night, ' ' of the back of Mc- 
Laughlin 's American History, and of the back of Moody and Lovett 's 
English Literature. These objects may stimulate the re-acting of their 
appropriate mental images, which may initiate the spontaneous re- 
acting of the lacking element, namely, the element signifying the 
width of the back of the book in the office. 

In the fourth stage, I reconstruct the mental images appropriate 
to these objects which I decided upon in the third stage. In other 
words, I re-act my idea of the width of the back of our family Bible, 
my idea of the width of the back of ' ' Shakespeare 's Twelfth Night, ' ' 
my idea of the width of the back of McLaughlin 's American History, 
and also my idea of the width of the back of Moody and Lovett 's 
English Literature, in which there is an element which is the lacking 
element. In other words, there is an element, in the last created image 
appropriate to the width of the back of Moody and Lovett 's English 
Literature, which is identical with the lacking element, signifying 
the width of the back of the book in the office. 

In the fifth stage, my mind recognizes this element signifying the 
width of the back of the book to be the lacking element. With this 
recognition the act of voluntary memory is completed. 

A. J. 

Washington's First Inauguration occurred in New York City on 
April 30, 1789 on a portico of a certain building. 

I was asked to give the place and time of Washington's First 
Inauguration. The place included the city, the street, the building, 
and the part of the building. The time included the year, the month 
and the day of the month. In reply, I said "Washington's First 
Inauguration occurred in New York City on the portico of a certain 
building on April 30, 1789." 

1. The mental elements which denoted the month, the day of the 
month, and the city, were not re-acted at first in my act of remember- 
ing the time and place of Washington's First Inauguration. 



404' The Problem of Method 

2. The elements which denoted the street and the building were not 
re-acted at all. 

3. In my act of remembering the time and place of Washington's 
First Inauguration, the element, denoting the city, was not re-aeted 
at first. In the first place I became aware that I was not re-acting 
the element denoting the city. Then I resolved to re-act that ele- 
ment. I decided that in order to stimulate the re-acting of the ele- 
ment denoting the city I must think about cities. Accordingly I 
thought about Philadelphia, New York, Boston, etc. When I thought 
of New York, I recognized that the element, 'denoting that city, was 
the element that I was trying to re-act. 

4. To re-act the element denoting the street the following process 
would have to be employed: The mind would have become aware that 
the element, denoting the street was lacking. The mind would have 
then to decide what objects it must think about in order that the re- 
action of the lacking element might be stimulated; such as, the 
streets of Terre Haute, streets mentioned in history and, particularly, 
the streets of New York City. 

Then the mind would have to think about the objects it has de- 
cided upon. If, in this act of thinking about streets, the mind had 
thought of Wall Street, it would have recognized the element denot- 
ing Wall Street in the fifth and last stage of the act of voluntary 
memory. But if in this act of thinking about streets the mind had 
not thought of Wall Street but rather of something which suggested 
Wall Street, there would have been more stages: (1) the thinking 
of Wall Street as the result of the suggestion above named and (2) 
the recognition that the element denoting Wall Street is the lacking 
element. A. S. B. 

In a previous lesson I was asked to give the details of Washington 's 
First Inauguration as follows: The time— year, month, and day of 
the month; the place— city, street, building, and part of the building. 
My answer was that Washington was inaugurated April 30, 1789, on 
the balcony of (?) in New York City. 

The mental elements signifying respectively the year, month, day 
of the month, city, and part of building were re-acted spontaneously. 

The element signifying the street and the element signifying the 
building were not re-acted at all. 



The Problem of Method 405 

I do not yet remember on what street or in what building the 
inauguration was held, but should I by an act of voluntary memory 
remember the missing elements the process would be as follows: 

1. I would become aware of the lacking elements, i. e., the elements 
which signify respectively the street and the building. 

2. I would create in consciousness the purpose to re-act the missing 
elements. 

3. I would decide upon the set of objects I should think about — 
which objects would be suited to stimulate mental states one of which 
may either be the sought-for state or so like it that it will stimulate 
the re-action of the desired state. For example, I would in this case 
include other buildings in New York, other buildings where inaugural 
ceremonies have been held, streets I have heard of in New York, 
streets on which inaugurations are held, etc., in the set of objects 
to be considered. 

4. I would create mental states appropriate to these various ob- 
jects. In case one of the mental states is the desired one, I at once 
recognize it to be such and with this fifth step the act closes. 

None of the mental states re-acted in the fourth step may be the 
desired one, but some one state may be so like the desired one that 
the latter will immediately be re-aeted. Then follows the act of recog- 
nition that this is the mental element sought for, i. e., the element 
signifying respectively the street and the building in which Washing- 
ton was first inaugurated. 

li. E. G. 



406 The Problem of Method 



APPENDIX VI. 



Explanation of systematic memory. 

The supposition is that I wish to learn the first sentence of Lin- 
coln's Gettysburg address in such a way that I will know it per- 
manently and be able to reproduce the idea of it at any time with 
facility. I therefore plan to learn it in the way that will give me the 
most power in reproducing the idea of it. I decide that the best 
way to do this is to relate the ideas expressed in the sentence to be 
learned to ideas with which I am already familiar. As to relating the 
exact form of the sentence with other objects of my experience it 
seems to me that this would not be necessary except for the first and 
last parts of the sentence. 

For convenience in relating I now divide the sentence into four 
parts, as follows: (1) Four score and seven years ago, (2) our 
fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, (3) conceived in 
liberty, (4) and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created 
equal. 

I know that the address was delivered in the year 1863, and that 
the event to which Mr. Lincoln made reference in this sentence took 
place in the year 1776. I know therefore that had Mr. Lincoln used 
more common-place language in the first part of the sentence he would 
have said, '' Eighty-seven years ago." To this expression I relate 
the more poetic expression, * ' Four-score and seven years ago. ' ' There 
is here a two-fold relation,— one of likeness in meaning and one of 
difference in form. 

I now consider the second part of the sentence, ' * our fathers 
brought forth on this continent a new nation. ' ' I am already fa- 
miliar veith the fact that at the time of the delivery of this address 
a large faction of our countrymen were trying to bring forth on 
this continent another new nation. I relate the two ideas. This is 
a relation of likeness and difference. 

The next part of the sentence— ''conceived in liberty," is now to 
be considered. My understanding is that this phrase refers to the 
belief of the colonists that they ought to be free from the control 



The Problem of Method 407 

of Great Britain. I am familiar with the fact that the secession 
movement grew out of the doctrine of State's rights. I relate these 
two ideas. There is here a relation of likeness and also one of differ- 
ence. 

I now consider the last part of the sentence, ' ' and dedicated to the 
proposition that all men are created equal." I am familiar with the 
fact that the founders of the Southern Confederacy did not believe 
in that proposition and that the government which they established 
was not so dedicated. I relate the idea expressed in the proposition 
just quoted with the ideas expressed by the Confederates. This is a 
relation of difference. 

The last part of the sentence may be related in another way. I 
am familiar with the exact words of a certain part of the Declaration 
of Independence. To this I relate the expression ''that all men are 
created equal." This is a relation of likeness in form. 

W. W. 



408 The Problem of Method 



APPENDIX VII. 



WH4T TEACHERS WHO HAVE HAD NO SPECIAL STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY 
KNOW ABOUT REASONING. 

The conceptions of reasoning expressed are so incom- 
plete, hazy, and inaccurate as to be practically valueless 
as ideals to aid in training the children to reason. Yet 
they represent the average strength of teachers who have 
had no special psychological training. 

The statements are given without correction of errors 
in language or thought. They are answers to the follow- 
ing questions made by members of a class in psychology 
who had made no study of reasoning, viewed pedagog- 
ically : 

1. What is inductive reasoning ? 
a. What is the process? 

(1). Examples. 

2. What is deductive reasoning? 
a. What is the process ? 

(1). Examples. 

THE ANSWERS. 

1. The following has been my idea of inductive and deductive rea- 
soning: 

Inductive reasoning is reasoning from within, out, or more psy- 
chologically speaking, the mental activity occurs before the physical 
activity. In a problem of addition we think why we must add before 
we do the actual work of adding. 

Deductive reasoning is reasoning from without, in, or we think 
of the conclusion first and try to explain it afterwards. In an ad- 



The Problem of Method 409 

dition problem we would do the adding first and then endeavor to 
explain why we added. 

In inductive reasoning the thought process is the most important. 

N. A. 
Has taught 75 months. 



I. Inductive Eeasoning — Inductive reasoning is that reasoning in 
which we proceed by an examination of our notions of particulars or 
percepts to a notion of a general notion or concept. 

a. The process is that of a careful examination of the particular 
objects and infers that all objects of the class have those peculiar 
characteristics. 

(1). Example. Take a particular apple and find it has the 
attributes, being round, being juicy, being covered with a skin, being 
an enclosure for seeds, etc. After carefully examining several apples 
I would have formed the general notion of apple. 

II. Deductive Reasoning. Deductive reasoning is that reasoning in 
which we proceed from a general notion or concept to a notion of a 
particular, or percept. 

a. The process is a procedure from our notion of a general to a 
notion of the various particulars of that class. 

(1). Example. Take our notion of river as gained from a 
definition or some similar manner— a "body of water flowing in a de- 
pression through the land. Proceed to examine the Wabash Elver 
and see that it suits the definition, the White River, and see that it 
suits the definition, etc., etc. 

a. E. B. 
Has taught 56 months. 



1. Inductive Reasoning is a consciousness of the particular whole 
class and the abstracted attribute. You are also conscious of the 
creative activity, and you are also conscious of the results of the ac- 
tivity. You are further conscious that the two truths which you have 
discovered are the cause of the identity. 
a. Process. 
1. The child becomes aware of a word. 



410 The Problem of Method 

2. He abstracts the attribute of meaning and sees whether or 
not it is present. 

3. He classes it with other words. 

4. He analyzes. 

5. He judges. 

6. He infers that the word belongs to a certain class. 

2. Deductive reasoning is a consciousness of the identity of the 
whole class with the particular characteristic and the particular at- 
tribute with the whole class, and that this particular object is in 
identity with the abstracted attribute. I am further conscious that 
the two facts I have discovered are the basis of the ideality I have 
just discovered. J. M. B. 

Has never taught. 



Inductive reasoning is becoming aware of the identity of the un- 
known by means of the known. 

The process is to work out the relations or problems and from 
the work state the general principle. 

Example. In teaching the noun the teacher leads the child to see 
the attributes common to class nouns, and the identity between the 
particular word being studied and the whole class, and the child is 
then able to judge that the particular word is a noun. 

II. 

Deductive reasoning is reasoning from the unknown back to the 
known. 

The process is to name the object being studied and then to work 
out its various relations. 

Example. In teaching a noun the child knows that the object being 
studied is a noun and the teacher leads him to see the characteristics 
of the particular word and then the identity between the class nouns 
and the particular noun being studied. B. C. 

Has taught 23 months. 



The Problem of Method 411 

Inductive reasoning is reasoning from the particular to the general. 

Process— The mind becomes aware of the particulars, abstracts the 
common attributes and becomes aware these attributes are common 
to the general as well as the various particulars considered. 

Example. — 
Carlo is a dog. 
A dog is an animal. 
Carlo is an animal. 

Deductive reasoning is reasoning from the general and also of the 
sub-classes, or rather of the various special sets of attributes common 
to the sub-classes. 

Example. — 

Carlo is an animal. 
A dog is an animal. 
Carlo is a dog. H. E. D. 

Has taught about 80 months. 



Deductive reasoning is the outgrowth of judgment. We have two 
facts or judgments from which to work; one a general fact and the 
other particular; e. g.— 

Rain makes the ground wet; 

The ground is wet; 

Therefore it has rained. 

Induction is that act of reasoning in which we first recognize the 
particular object in a potential manner; then as differentiated; the 
important attributes are lifted out and examined; then to see the 
uniform activity which produced these attributes. 

A. Become aware of the particular object by memory, sense-per- 
ception, or imagination. 

B. Abstract an attribute. 

C. Become aware that this object is one of a class. 

D. Infer that this attribute was produced by the same mode of 
activity as the same kind of attribute which is found in all the mem- 
bers of its class; e. g., square. A square has the attributes of having 



412 The Problem of Method 

four straight lines joining in such a manner as to make four right 
angles. E. F. E. 

Has never taught. 



I. 

Deductive reasoning is that which begins with the general and 
works toward the particular. 

I wish to teach the Battle of Bunker Hill. I begin with the Revo- 
lutionary War showing causes and finally differentiate and analyze 
with the child until I have reached that particular battle. 

II. 

Inductive reasoning is that which begins with the particular and 
works toward the general. 

I first teach the child the facts about the battle of Bunker Hill 
and then show him the relation which this particular battle had to the 
Revolutionary War as a whole. M. B. T. 

Has never taught. 



I. Inductive reasoning. 
Process. 

1. I create a mental state appropriate to or become aware of 
some truth. 

2. I repeat this mental process with several related truths. 

3. I synthesize these related ideas and become aware of a general 
or principle. 

(1). Example.— The house is large. To teach the thought, the 
mind thinks the idea house j it also thinks the idea, "large house"; 
it breaks this idea up into two ideas and asserts the idea large of the 
idea house; i. e., the mind has the tJiought, ''The house is large," 
composed of the idea, ' ' The house, ' ' the idea * ' large ' ' and the idea 
of relation or agreement between these ideas. Hence we see that the 
thought is composed of ideas, and that every thought contains three 



The Problem of Method 413 

ideas; the idea about which the mind thiuks another idea, and the 
idea of relation, and an idea which the mind thinks about another 
idea. 

Inductive reasoning then is a process of reasoning in which a gen- 
eral is reached by consideration of the particulars of which it is 
composed. 

Deductive reasoning, 
a. Process. 

1. I create a mental state appropriate to a general truth. 

2. I resolve this general into its elements. 

3. I consider the elements separately. 

4. I reunite the elements and again form the general. 

(1). Example. — To teach the sentence. Definition: A sentence 
is a group of words which express a thought. 

The house large. 

The man is. 

The man running away. 

The horse is black. 
The expressions, * * The house large, " " The man is, " ' ' The man 
running away," are not sentences because they are groups of words 
which do not express complete thoughts. The expression ' ' The horse 
is black, " is a sentence because it is a group of words which ex- 
presses a thought. 

Deductive reasoning is a process in reasoning in which from a 
general truth particular truths are drawn. O. F. W. 

Has taught 7 months. 



414 The Problem of Method 



SERIES OF SENTENCES EXPRESSING THE STAGES IN VARIOUS ACTIVITIES. 



THE CONSTRUCTION OF A FOUR-INCH SQUARE. 

The point is resting. 
It moves to the right four inches. 
It rests again. 
A straight line appears. 
It is horizontal. 

The point moves perpendicularly downward four inches. 
It rests a third time. 
A second straight line is produced. 
It is vertical. 

It is perpendicular to the first line. 
The difference in direction forms an angle. 
It is a right angle. 

The point moves perpendicularly to the left four inches 
It rests a fourth time. 
A third straight line is formed. 
It is horizontal. 
It is parallel to the first line. 
It is perpendicular to the second line. 

The difference in direction of the second and third lines forms 
right angle. 

The point moves directly to the place of starting. 
A fourth straight line is produced. 
Here the point finally rests. 

FILLING A TEA KETTLE. 

I am standing near the kitchen window. 

I am looking out of the window. 

I know the teakettle is empty. 

I imagine the teakettle as filled. 

I go to the stove. 

I take hold of the knob on the lid of the teakettle. 



The Problem of Method 415 

I remove the lid of the teakettle. 

I continue to hold the lid in my left hand. 

I walk to the bucket of water. 

I find the dipper hanging on a nail. 

I take hold of the handle of the dipper near the bowl. 

I fill the dipper with water. 

I walk to the stove with the dipper full of water. 

I pour the water from the dipper into the teakettle. 

I walk to the water bucket again. 

I fill the dipper a second time. 

I walk back to the stove. 

I empty the water from the dipper into the teakettle. 

A third time I walk to the bucket of water. 

I refill the dipper. 

I pour the contents of the dipper into the teakettle. 

r place the lid on the teakettle. 

I hang the dipper up in its proper place. 

I return to the window. 

I again look out of the window. 

THE ACT OF SPRINKLING A SLATE. 

Edwin sits at his desk. 

He stands. 

He walks to the sprinkling bottle. 

He reaches out his hand. 

He takes hold of the sprinkling bottle. 

He turns. 

He walks to his desk. 

He stops. 

He turns the sprinkling bottle upside down. 

He throws water on his slate. 

He throws water on his slate again. 

He turns the sprinkling bottle right side up. 

He walks toward the blackboard. 

He reaches out his hand. 

He places the sprinkling bottle in the ledge. 

He turns. 

He walks to his desk. 

He sits at his desk. 



416 The Problem of Method 

AN ACT IN (iRAVITATION. 

A giiinea-and-feather tube is lying on the table. 

It is full of air. 

A circle of paper and one of brass are in the tube. 

They are of the same size. 

I pick up the tube. 

I hold it in my hand with the top up. 

I invert it. 

The force of gravitation pulls the paper and the brass toward the w 

center of the earth, ^M 

The air resists the downward movement. 

The brass displaces the air and falls rapidly to the lower end 
of the tube. 

The paper displaces the air more slowly than does the brass. 

It flutters in the air. 

It finally reaches the lower end of the tube. 

I turn the tube top end up. 

The force of gravitation pulls the paper and the brass toward the 
center of the earth. 

The brass reaches the bottom sooner than the paper. 

I screw a stop-cock to the bottom of the tube. 

I fasten one end of a rubber tube to the stop-cock. 

I fasten the other end to the air pump. 

I grasp the handle of the air pump. 

I move it vigorously up and down many times. 

This exhausts the air from the tube. 

I turn the thumb-screw on the stop-cock. 

This prevents the air from entering the tube. 

I take the rubber-tube off the stop-cock. 

I again invert the tube. 

The paper and the brass reach the lower end of the tube at the 
same time. 

A REPLY TO AN INVITATION, 

Edna is in receipt of an invitation to dinner. 
She remembers, one by one, all her engagements for the week. 
She finds that she has no engagement for the evening named in the 
invitation. 

She decides to accept the invitation. 
She goes to the writing desk. 



The Problem of Method . 417 

She selects a sheet of un-ruled note paper, black ink, and a good 
pen. 

She writes the following note: 

Miss Edna Crafton accepts with pleasure Miss Katharine Stanford's kind invita- 
tion to dine with her on Monday evening. 

She selects an envelope to correspond with her paper. 

She folds the note once. 

She slips it into the envelope. 

She addresses it. 

She places a stamp on the upper right hand corner of the envelope. 

She posts the note. 

A TEST IN CHEMISTRY. 

I place the oxygen generator on the table. 

I fill one-third of a test-tube with potassium chlorate and black 
oxide of manganese. 

I cork the tube and connect by rubber tubing with the bottles in 
the generator. 

I light the gas. 

I heat the tube gently at first. 

I gradually increase the heat. 

The heat expands the air in the tube. 

The air escapes in bubbles. 

The air escapes more rapidly in bubbles. 

I heat the tube until I have sufficient oxygen for my purpose. 

I cover one of the bottles with a glass slide so that the oxygen will 
not escape. 

I remove the bottle. 

I take a piece of magnesium ribbon. 

I put it into the flame. 

It burns with a bluish-white light. 

It combines with the oxygen of the air. 

It forms a white powder. 

This powder is oxide of magnesium. 

I take another piece of magnesium ribbon. 

I light it in the flame. 

I remove the slide from the bottle. 

I put the ribbon into the bottle. 

It burns with a blue light. 

It deposits a white powder. 



418 



The Problem of Method 



I compare this powder with the powder left from the first experi- 
ment. 

I conclude that the magnesium ribbon burns more freely in the 
bottle than in the air. 

I see that it burns more freely in the bottle since there is more 
oxygen there. 

I infer that in both cases the magnesium unites with the oxygen. 

THE ACT OF LAYING A BRICK. 

The mason stands beside the wall which he is building. 

He procures a trowel full of mortar from the mortar hoard. 

He spreads it evenly over the place where he intends to lay the 
brick. 

He gets another trowel full of mortar. 

He picks up a brick from the ground. 

He throws up a cross or header joint. 

He lays the brick on the wall very carefully. 

He probably taps the brick lightly with the handle of the trowel, 
or with the edge of the blade. 

This settles the brick into the correct position. 

He scrapes the mortar, which has been pushed out by the brick, 
from the side of the wall. 

He spreads the mortar, just gathered, over the top of the brick. 

He pauses in his work to speak with a friend who is passing. 

TRANSACTION ON SHORT CREDIT. 

James Smith, the grocer, sells John Jones ten pounds of sugar and 
ten pounds of salt on credit, the account to be paid in a short time. 
Mr. Smith turns to his day-book and makes an entry, thus 



Nov. 



John Jones, Dr. 

To 10 lb. Sugar @ 6c 
10 lb. Salt @ 2c 



60 



In the evening, Mr. Smith posts this account in his ledger, which 
in this case is a small indexed account file, with detachable slips. 

In ten days iMr. Jones calls to pay his account. 

Mr. Smith immediately opens his account file at the letter "J," 
and sees Mr. Jones' account. 



The Problem of Method 



419 



He takes out the slip, receipts it, an'd hands it to Mr. Jones, who 
thereupon pays it. 

Mr. Smith then turns to his cash register and registers 80 cents, 
counting it as a cash sale of the day. 

TRANSACTION INVOLVING AN INDEFINITE ACCOUNT. 

James Smith, the grocer, is asked by John Jones for credit for 
three or four months. 

Mr. Smith consents, takes his order, and enters it in his day-book, 
thus: 



Nov. 



John Jones, Dr. 

To 10 lb. Sugar @ 6c 
10 lb. Salt (qi 2c 



20 



80 



In the evening Mr. Smith opens an account with Mr. Jones in a 
large ledger in which he keeps all accounts which run indefinitely, and 
makes an entry, thus: 



Dr. 



JOHN JONES. 



Cr. 



Nov. 



To Mdse. 



Page 

Day 

Book 



80c 



Page 
Cash 
Book 



All succeeding orders are posted nightly to this same account. 

In three months' time Mr. Jones calls to pay his account. 

Mr. Smith turns to his ledger, states the amount, and receives the 
cash. 

Mr. Smith then makes out a bill and receipts it, giving it to Mr. 
Jones. 

He then takes his cash-book and makes an entry, crediting Mr. 
Jones' account in full. 

This Cash-book entry is posted in the ledger, and Mr. Jones' ac- 
count is balanced and closed up. 



A GEOLOGIC ACTIVITY. 



A granite peak stands upon the crest of a mountain range. 

The rock is made up of white crystalline masses of hard quartz, 
red crystalline masses of softer feldspar, and glittering gold-col- 
ored leaves of soft mica. 



420 The Problem of Method 

The rain and snow water soak into the pores of the rock. 

The water freezes in the pores of the rock and by expanding makes 
cracks in it. 

The water dissolves and carries away some portions of the rock, 
and thus loosens the undissolved portions. 

When the sun shines the rock gets very warm and expands; when 
the sun sets the rock gets very cold and contracts; the expansion 
and contraction break it up still more. 

The roots of trees penetrate the cracks, and as they grow in size 
force the sides of the crack further apart. 

The air goes into the rock with the water and rots and softens 
some of the material. 

The larger and more numerous the cracks become the more is the 
rock exposed to the attacks of air, water, heat and frost. 

As soon as a piece of rock, large or small, becomes loosened, grav- 
ity pulls it down the steep slope. 

The rain and melted snow run over the surface and wash away 
the loose fragments. 

In the course of thousands of years the granite peak crumbles to 
pieces and is carried away down into the valley. 

The stream at the bottom of the valley carries away the fragments 
of rocks that fall into it. 

When the snows melt in the spring the stream is a torrent which 
rolls and pushes along great stones and boulders. 

When the flood subsides the stream is able to carry only sand and 
gravel. 

As the sand, gravel and boulders are carried down stream they are 
knocked about and rolled over one another and against the rocky 
bed of the stream. 

The corners and edges of the sand grains and gravel stones are 
worn off; they grow smaller in size and become more and more 
rounded. 

As they go further down the stream the pieces of hard quartz change 
least rapidly, but the softer pieces or feldspar and mica are reduced 
to a fine soft powder. 

The quartz never becomes finer than sand. 

The stream is joined by other streams and becomes a river. 

The river carries along in its current the rounded gravel, the grains 
of sand and the fine, soft powder, now called mud or clay. 

As the river approaches the sea its slope becomes more gentle and 
its current slower. 



The Problem of Method 421 

As the current slackens it is less able to carry the coarser material. 

It first drops the gravel, then the sand, and finally is able to carry 
only the mud. 

At high water the force of the stream is greater, and it picks up 
again the sediment it has dropped, only to drop it again further 
down stream. 

The sediment is dropped and picked up again a thousand times, 
but at last is carried into the ocean. 

As the current of the river is gradually checked by the still water 
of the ocean, the coarser particles of sediment settle to the bottom 
and form a sand bar. 

The finer mud is carried further out to sea and settles to form a 
mud bank. 

Thus the tendency of the river is to sort out the coarser sediment 
from the fine, and to deposit all the sand in one place and all the 
mud in another. 

The velocity of the current varies from season to season and from 
year to year. 

The river at one time deposits sand and at another time mud, in 
the same place. 

The sediment is always deposited in nearly horizontal layers, one 
above another, and is alw.ays more or less assorted into layers of sand 
and layers of clay. 

Frequently the sand and clay are mixed together in the same layer, 
and in different proportions in different layers. 

The waves, tides and currents of the ocean transport and assort 
or mix up the river sediment and deposit it again in new forms and 
positions. 

Everywhere along the coast and for miles out to sea the waste of 
the land accumulates in beds of sand and clay. 

As the beds are piled on each other the pressure on the lower ones 
become greater. 

The sand beds are compressed and consolidated into sandstone, the 
clay beds into shale and the mixed beds into mixed standstone and 
shale. 

The pile becomes very thick and heavy, and with the ever-increasing 
load the crust of the earth under it is pressed down. 

The crust of the earth is not strong enough to sustain the weight 
and slowly sinks, forming a great trough. 

As the trough becomes deeper it is kept even full of sediment. 



422 The Problem of Method 

As the thickness of the sediment increases the upper surface re- 
mains near the surface of the Avater. 

The sediment sometimes becomes eight miles thick. 

As the beds of sandstone and shale sink nearer to the center of the 
earth they grow hotter. 

At a certain depth they become as hot as red-hot iron. 

The pores of the sandstone and shale are filled with sea water. 

By means of the great pressure of the beds above them, the high 
temperature and the water, the sandstone and shale become partially 
liquid. 

In the course of ages the mineral matter of which they are com- 
posed again crystalizes into masses of hard, white quartz, softer red 
feldspar and soft, glittering mica. 

The sand and mud beds have been converted into granite. 

The looseness and softness of the material which fills the trough 
of the earth-crust makes the crust weaker all along the shore of a 
continent. 

The pressure from the stronger earth-crust on both sides squeezes 
the weaker part of the crust into wrinkles and folds. 

The folds are slowly crushed together and slowly raised higher. 

The upper edges of the folds rise above the sea and are finally 
pushed up into new mountain ranges. 

Air, rain, heat, frost and gravity attack the rising land. 

The covering of sandstone and shale is finally stripped off, expos- 
ing the granite below them. 

Again a granite peak stands upon the crest of a mountain range. 

THE ACT BY WHICH AN ALIEN BECOMES A CITIZEN. 

Mr. Shannon comes to the United States from Ireland. 
He wishes to become a citizen of the United States. 
He presents himself before the District Court of the United States. 
He declares his intention to become a citizen of the United States. 
This declaration is recorded by the clerk of the court. 
He receives a certificate from the clerk. 
He returns to his home. 
He spends his time in work at his trade. 

He also makes himself familiar with the laws of the United States. 
He again presents himself before the court. 

He proves to the satisfaction of the court that he has resided five 
years within the United States. 



The Problem of Method 423 

He also proves that he has lived in the state one year. 

He affirms that he has borne a good moral character. 

He proves that he has been vs^ell disposed toward the constitution 
and government. 

He renounces allegiance to every foreign power, including that of 
which he was formerly a subject. 

He takes an oath that he will support the constitution of the United 
States. 

He receives his certificate of citizenship from the clerk. 

HOW AN ACORN BECOMES AN ACORN AGAIN. 

An acorn has just fallen from an oak tree. 

The acorn consists of a germ surrounded by a hard outer covering 
which serves for protection. 

The germ has stored within it large amounts of nourishment which 
it is to use in its growth until it shall have developed far enough to 
make its own food. 

The germ consists of a little stem, the caulicle, of two seed leaves, 
the cotyledons, and of the tiny plumule. 

The cold winds of fall and the snow and frosts of winter make the 
acorn lie dormant during these seasons. 

Approaching spring ushers in bright sunshine and warm rains. 

The warmth and moisture quicken the latent energies of the 
acorn. 

The germ begins to imbibe water, and swells. 

The insoluble foodstuffs stored in the acorn are converted into 
soluble ones by the energy of the germ. 

A dialysis of this material causes a flow of these foodstuffs to the 
growing points of the acorn. 

The continued swelling caused by all these changes bursts the acorn 
shell. 

Out of the cleft the growing caulicle protrudes. 

The caulicle rapidly elongates and penetrates the ground a short 
distance. 

On the underground portion of the caulicle small rootlets begin to 
grow. 

The seed leaves remaining in the shell furnish nourishment to the 
growing parts. 

The first leaves of the plumule appear above ground. 

The sunshine on the plumule leaves incites the production in the 
leaf of green chlorophyll. 



424 The Problem of Method 

By means of this chlorophyll the young plant forms the third set 
of leaves as well as the growing tip of the stem. 

On the growing tip new leaves appear in regular succession. 

In the axils of these leaves branches grow. 

By the continued growth of these parts the little germ becomes a 
small oak plant. 

A continuation of these changes through many years changes the 
oak plant into an oak tree. 

The oak tree bears small inconspicuous flowers. 

These flowers are of two kinds. 

The sterile flowers produce stamens in which many small powdery 
grains called pollen grains are found. 

The fertile flowers produce pistils. 

Each pistil bears two ovules. 

The wind carries some of the pollen grains to the tip of the pistil 
called the stigma. 

The pollen grains grow down through the pistil until they reach 
the ovules. 

They penetrate into the ovules and fuse with the egg cell. 

The egg cell of one ovule grows into a small germ. 

The other ovule becomes abortive. 

Each pistil now contains but one germ or seed. 

The germ develops large seed leaves or cotyledons and stores them 
with nourishment. 

The pistil forms a firm shell around the contained seed. 

The calyx of the flower helps to form this shell. 

The involucre around the base of the pistil forms a leafy cup in 
which the ripened pistil rests. 

The leafy involucre and the pistil are together commonly termed 
the acorn. 

The acorn receives nourishment all during the summer season from 
the parent oak. 

In autumn the acorn is fully formed or ripe. 

The autumn winds begin to blow. 

Again an acorn falls from an oak tree. 

SUGGESTIONS OF THE WORK. 

It is to be assumed that before entering upon the work of guiding 
the pupils in constructing a series, the teacher has clearly in mind, the 
nature of the entire activity, and also the form of the various sen- 
tences in which this activity is to be expressed, substantially. The 



The Problem of Method 425 

pupil is not assumed to know either. The work begins with the con- 
sideration of the action. In no case are the sentences to be given to 
the child. The pupils are actually to construct each series and the 
work is to be largely oral. 

The teacher should begin by indicating the purpose of the activity 
to be expressed. 

The thought underlying the first sentence of the series, is then to 
be worked out carefully. For example, in the series concerning the 
teakettle the child's attention should be turned to the entire action 
expressed by the sentence and then to the meaning expressed by 
''near", "window", ''kitchen", etc. The sentence which is finally 
constructed to express the entire action is to be settled upon only 
after careful comparison and discrimination concerning words. For 
example, the teacher should lead the children to think whether it 
would be more appropriate to employ "stands", or "am standing"; 
whether to employ " at ", " by " or " near ' ', etc. 

In all this, as above indicated, the sentence is not to be put before 
the children in its visible form. It is to be dealt with only orally. 
The exact form of the sentence having been decided upon, it is then to 
be made the property of each member of the class orally. In the 
exercises on this point the work of the teacher must be controlled close- 
ly by the language act ; that is, he is at all times to lead the pupil : 

1. To obtain the meaning (the object in language). 

2. To imagine the expression, (the expression in language). 

3. To think their correspondence, (the harmony, the correspondence 
in language). 

This work in mastering the sentence orally, involves everything 
under the pronunciation, enunciation, modulation, emphasis, etc. 

One by one, each sentence of the series is to receive substantially 
the same treatment. The series of sentences is to be so thoroughly 
learned orally, that the child can begin with the first partial action 
of the larger concrete activity, and both think the various subordinate 
acts in their true succession, and express these sviecessive acts by the 
corresponding oral sentences. 

The various natural divisions in the activity are to be noted by the 
pupil, and to be indicated in his oral expression. 

The foregoing deal with the actions and the corresponding sentences 
as a whole. This having been done, each pupil is to be made able to 
select the essential element of the entire action expressed in a sen- 
tence; to employ the word or words expressing it, and thus to move 



426 The Problem of Method 

through the entire activity, employing only the words asserting the 
action. In the series concerning the teakettle, the pupil should give, 
**aDi standing," ''am looking," "know," "think," "go," "take 
hold of," "remove," etc. 

This kind of work is undertaken in order to give the pupil the habit 
of selecting the central action in the entire activity, and of recog- 
nizing especially the vital element in the sentence— the verb. 

In conducting the work upon this and other features, it is often 
helpful to have the pupils assist in directing the work. That is, the 
pupils may at various times act as teacher, asking questions, giving 
directions, expressing the commendations or cautions concerning the 
nature of the work, etc. 

The foundation series of sentences constructed by the pupils should 
be, as a rule, in the form of the present tense, third person, singular, 
indicative mode. This is the natural expression for the child. In the 
series above referred to, the form worked out by the children should 
be: 

She is standing near the kitchen window. 

She is looking out of the window, etc. 

The pupils should be led to see in any given series the relation of 
means to end. This should be emphasized. The action expressed by 
the first sentence is a means to that expressed by the second. The 
action expressed by the second sentence is a means to that expressed 
by the third, etc. While this may not be true in every possible case, 
it is the general rule and the controlling thought in determining the 
order of the actions to be expressed. 

Not only is the action expressed in a given sentence a means tO' that 
expressed in the following sentence, but also the action in any sentence 
is the end or result of a series of subordinate actions. For example, 
the act of standing near the kitchen window is the result of a series 
of preceding actions all intended to bring about that end. In order to 
render the child still more accurate and discriminating in the choice of 
words, he should at least once during the study of each series be led 
to discover and appropriately to express the various actions leading 
up to this one action expressed by the sentence. 

In concluding these general suggestions concerning the work of any 
series, three thoughts are worthy of iteration: 

1. In considering any action to be expressed by a series of sen- 
tences, the teacher is to view the act as returning to itself. It is 
probable that any act in nature or in human life, viewed in its en- 



The Problem of Method 427 

tirety, would be seen to be, employing Hegel's significant term, a 
' ' return to itself. ' ' Work of this kind will accustom the child to this 
view of nature. 

2. Under all stages of work, the teacher is to be careful to present 
such actions, directions, and illustrations as are adapted to lea'd the 
pupil to: 

a. Think the object or meaning very clearly and distinctly. 

b. Imagine, remember or sense-perceive the expression. 

c. Think the correspondence of object and expression. 

This threefold movement of thought is the language act. It is the 
method in language, in so far as the pupil's mental process is con- 
cerned. As such it is to be constantly before the teacher in all lan- 
guage work. 

As before indicated, the language act in full, is, thinking the object, 
creating the purpose, knowing the expression, and thinking the cor- 
respondence between expression on the one hand, and purpose and 
object on the other. Since, however, the special purpose renders the 
object special, the purpose is always involved in the object expressed 
by language. For this reason, the language act is here spoken of as 
threefold. That is, it is the act of thinking the object, knowing the 
expression, and thinking their correspondence. 

3. It is very important that the sentences of any given series should 
be very clearly understood as to their meaning, and made completely 
the pupil's own orally, before moving out into the field of the derived 
work. 

It is evident that the series of sentences expressing any action, 
constitutes the bare frame-work for an organized composition. It is 
also clear that this composition when fully organized is of the nature 
of narration. It is further evident that the individual objects to be 
expressed in description, the general objects to be expressed in ex- 
position, and the relations giving rise to argumentation, are found in 
the material of each action. In considering the work under compo- 
sition : 

i. Attention will first be turned to several kinds of preliminary 
work. 

2. Succeeding this, the work of changing the series of sentences as 
a bare structure, into a piece of organized discourse, will be noted. 

3. In the third place brief reference will be given to the more sys- 
tematic work under description. 

Among the kinds of preliminary worh are the following: 

a. Under the guidance and suggestion of the teacher the pupils 



428 The Problem of Method 

may be led to select the expressions in the series of sentences known 
as subjective langvxige. In the series of sentences concerning the tea- 
kettle there are found such expressions as ' ' I know, " ' ' I think, " " I 
find. ' ' This kind of work should be slight at first, gradually increas- 
ing in exactness and importance as the children become more advanced 
in the work. 

b. Beginning as early, perhaps, as when in the third grade, the 
children should be led to consider the -figurative language based upon 
the series of sentences studied in the second grade, and also that based 
upon those studied in the third grade. This figurative language is 
based upon the separate words in the sentences, and also upon the 
central thought pervading the entire action. Some of the figurative 
expressions to be noted as arising from the series of sentences ex- 
pressing the action of filling the teakettle, are the following: 

(1). Based on separate words in the series concerning the tea- 
kettle. 

(a). In the sixth sentence. On talce.. "Take fast hold of 
instruction. ' ' Prov. IV-13. On lid. ' ' The kettle lid, on or off, and 
the pumper, give a very good picture of modern theory and practice. ' ' 
Thring's Theory and Practice of Teaching. 

(b). In the eighth sentence. On continue, ^'li ye continue 
in my word then are ye my disciples indeed. ' ' 

On hand. ' ' He was always reckoned a lively hand at a simile, ' ' 
etc. 

(c). In the seventeenth sentence. On walh. ''Oh! for a 
.closer walk with God, ' ' etc. 

(d). In the eighteenth sentence. On empty. ''I shall find 
you empty of that fault. " ' ' Pleased in the silent shade with 
empty praise. ' ' On water. ' ' Eemembering he had passed over a 
small water, a poor scholar when first coming to the university, he 
kneeled. ' ' 

(2). Based on the pervading thought, in the series concerning 
the teakettle. 

The main thought in this series may be duty. This mental attribute 
may be imaged as a person. It is so imaged in the following: 

"So nigh is grandeur to our dust, 
So near is God to man , 
When duty whispers ' Lo, thou must ! ' 
The youth replies, ' I can. ' ' ' 

Carefulness may be viewed as that with which one is mainly im- 
pressed in studying all the various phases of the action. An analogy 
may be discovered between this trait and a rampart. 



The Problem of Method 429 

Carefulness, in the image of the rampart, may then be spoken of 
in a series of sentences. 

c. Work with isolated sentences. This work does not always uae 
the sentence in the exact form in which it appears in the series. The 
aim of the work is to make the child more familiar with the exact 
significance of words and with the properties they possess, due to the 
expression of their meaning. The different steps in this work are here- 
with noted: 

(1). The sentence is changed into the form that will best lead 
the child to determine the significance of the words from their con- 
nection in the sentence only. For example, if the first sentence in the 
series embodying the action of filling the teakettle is used, instead 
of using it as it is, the teacher may place it upon the board modified 
as to the subject, thus : ' ' It is standing near the kitchen window. ' ' 

(2). The child is then required to imagine an appropriate en- 
vironment for the actor and the action. This is to be set forth in the 
form of a story, and written upon slate or paper. One part of the 
story is to be the sentence that was placed upon the board. These 
stories are then to be read, and, through the suggestion of the teacher 
and other pupils, to be modified, condensed, given greater unity, etc. 
One of the pupils might present some such story as the following: 

"Yesterday my mother was shopping. In passing one of the dry 
goods stores she saw a beautiful doll in the window. She bought it 
for me. I was very much delighted with it. I have been playing with 
it nearly all morning. I am now through playing with it until after 
dinner. It is standing near the Tcitchen window. This is not a good 
place for it. I must take it into the sitting room. ' ' 

Another might image a different environment, and give expression 
to it in a 'different story, thus: 

' ' This morning I found a young bird under the apple tree. It was 
too young to fly. It must have fallen out of the nest. The rain had 
been falling for more than an hour, and the little bird was very wet. 
I brought it into the kitchen and placed it under the stove. The air 
was warm there and it soon became dry. After a while it began to 
walk a very little. I then took it in my hand and put it on the shelf. 
It is standing near the Mtchen window." 

No doubt the stories as first presented upon the slates would be much 
more crude in form than these, and much more fragmentary. They 
would likewise have much less unity. 

(3). On the basis of the various stories the pupil should be led 
to see the significance of the different words. For example, it would 



430 The Problem of Method 

be shown him that the word, "it," might mean a doll, a bird, etc. 
(4). The children should then be led to notice what may be 
called the properties of the word, that is, they should be shown that 
the word, "it," means but one object; that it means the object spoken 
of; that it means the object performing the action, etc. Similar work 
should be taken with the word, ' ' window, ' ' and with the other words 
of the sentence.* 

d. A fourth kind of preliminary work is that in which the children 
substitute for any given expression other expressions having sub- 
stantially, though not exactly, the same meaning, and then decide 
upon the relative appropriateness of the different expressions. This 
work in substitution should begin with the verb, then pass to the sub- 
ject, and finally to the predicate. Thus in the first sentence the chil- 
dren might substitute for ' ' am standing ' ' the word, ' ' stand ' ' ; for 
" I, " the expression, ' ' the one who is speaking ' ' ; for * * near, " " by " 
or "at," etc. 

In each case the relative fitness of the different expressions is to 
be carefully considered. The work is important, because in an ele- 
mentary way it both makes a transition to rhetoric and lays the basis 
for an intelligent discussion of the different elements and words in 
the sentence when in later years scientific grammar is entered upon. 
One great difficulty that the pupil encounters in determining the force 
of the various expressions in a sentence, is his inability to imagine 
corresponding expressions for the expression under consideration. 

e. The four kinds of work indicated grow immediately out of 
the series of sentences. The fifth kind, now to be considered, changes 
from the series of sentences constructed by the pupils, to some finished 
selection of discourse. This finished selection is examined in order to 
find, in the first place, what may be termed the embodied series of 
actions, and the expression for it; and in the second place, to dis- 
cover the connective, iterative and explanatory sentences, the rhetor- 
ical features of the various sentences, and whatever else is involved 
in transmuting a bare succession of sentences, exhibiting a few suc- 
cessive actions, into an organized, finished selection in discourse. The 
following furnish material suitable to the explanation of the work in 
question : 

HOVi^ A PRESIDENT IS ELECTED. 

"Despite our boasted education as a people, and in curious con- 
trast to the tremendous interest we take in elections, it is doubtful 



*See work on Isolated Sentence'in " InlandfEducator," Vol. Ill, Jan., 1897, p. 298. 



The Problem of Method 431 

if one voter out of ten can accurately describe the process by which 
a President and Vice-President are elected. 

Commencing with the choice of electors on the first Tuesday after 
the first Monday in November of presidential years, the next step 
is the meeting of these electors at their several State capitals on the 
second Monday in January following the election. An act of Congress 
requires the electors of all the states to meet on the same day. At 
this meeting each elector casts his ballot for President and Vice 
President. He is at perfect liberty to vote for whomsoever he chooses, 
but in testimony to the high sense of honor which pervades the Amer- 
ican people it may be said that since the formation of the government 
no elector has failed to vote for the candidate for whom he was 
elected. After the votes have been cast, they are sealed up and en- 
trusted to one of the electors, who is designated by his fellows for 
the purpose, and by him are conveyed to Washington and delivered 
over. These sealed ballots are directed to the President of the Senate, 
who opens them in the presence of the House and Senate, on the sec- 
ond Wednesday of the following February, this joint session being re- 
quired by law. If it is found that any candidate for President has 
received a majority of the entire electoral vote he is formally de- 
clared elected, and the same is true of the Vice President; but if no 
one has received a majority for either of these offices the joint session 
dissolves and the House proceeds to elect a President and the Senate 
a Vice President. 

In voting for President the House is restricted to the three men 
who received the highest votes in the Electoral College. In the House 
each State is entitled to one vote. How this vote shall be cast is 
determined by a majority of the Congressmen from each State, It 
makes no difference how the State may have voted upon electors, a 
majority of the Congressmen may determine how it shall vote when 
the presidential election is thrown into the House. To elect, a ma- 
jority of the entire number of States is required. The same process 
is had in the Senate, with the exception that each Senator has a vote 
and only the two highest voted for in the Electoral College may be 
selected from. In case the House should get into a deadlock which 
should last beyond the 4th day of the following March, the Vice 
President chosen by the Senate would assume the presidential chair 
on that date, thus doing away with the rule so prevalent in political 
affairs that an officer holds until his successor is elected and qualified. 
The old President must step out, whatever may be the fate of his 
presumed successor. 



432 The Problem of Method 

The Constitution did not seem to provide the means of presidential 
succession which might be demanded under certain emergencies, and 
so the Forty-ninth Congress passed a bill fixing this succession as 
follows, in case of the death, resignation or disability of both Presi- 
dent and Vice President: Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treas- 
ury, Secretary of War, Attorney General, Postmaster General, Sec- 
retary of the Navy and Secretary of the Interior. It is provided, 
however, that before either of these may assume the presidency he 
must first have been recognized by the Senate as a Cabinet officer and 
possess in himself the constitutional requirements of a President. ' ' 

GOLD LETTERING. 

''The sign letterer who is putting a gold sign on a window, paints 
the letters upon the outside first, but these letters are only for a 
guide— the gold is put upon the inside of the glass. The gold leaf 
is so thin and light that the faintest breath would be enough to blow 
it away— it is carried in the familiar little books. 

The letterer brushes the inner side of the glass, back of the letter- 
ing painted upon the outside, with a .brush dipped in Avater contain- 
ing a trace of mucilage. Then with a wide and very thin camel's 
hair brush, which he first brushes lightly back and forth once or 
twice upon the back of his head, or perhaps upon his coat, to dry it 
if it needs drying, and slightly to electrify it, he lifts from the book a 
section of gold leaf sufficient to cover a section of the letter and 
places it on the glass. He repeats these operations until the glass 
back of the letter painted on the front is covered with the leaf. It 
may require three or four sections, such as can be picked up with the 
brush to cover the letter, or perhaps more, depending on its size and 
shape. When he has completed the application of the leaf to one 
letter he dampens the back of the next and proceeds with that in the 
same manner, and so on until the letters are all backed with the 
gold leaf. 

Thus applied the gold leaf overlaps the letters more or less on all 
sides. It is bright in color, like all gold, but it is not shining; it is 
burnished by rubbing it gently on the back— of course, it cannot be 
rubbed on the face, for that is against the glass— with a soft cloth. 
It burnishes, however, on the face as well as on the back. Then the 
letters are backed. The exact shape of the letter is painted over the 
back of the gold leaf to fix and protect it; and when the back is dry 
the gold leaf projecting beyond the outline of the letter is brushed 
off. It is not sought to save this projecting leaf; there is not enough 



The Problem of Method 433 

of it to pay for the labor that would be involved in gathering it to- 
gether. Then the outside lettering, which is done with paint that is 
but little more than oil, is rubbed off, and the lustrous gold lettering 
is revealed." 

THE DARK FOREST. 

In the midway of this our mortal life 

I found me in a gloomy wood astray, 

Gone from the path direct; and e'en to tell 

It were no easy task, how savage wild 

That forest, how robust and rough its growth. 

Which to remember only, my dismay 

Renews, in bitterness not far from death. 

Yet to discourse of what there good befell. 

All else will I relate discover 'd there. 

How first I entered it I scarce can say, 

Such sleepy dullness in that instant weigh 'd 

My senses down, where the true path I left; 

But when a mountain's foot I reached where clos'd 

The vaUey, that had pierc 'd my heart with dread, 

I look'd aloft, and saw his shoulders broad 

Already vested with that planet's beam, 

Who leads all wanderers safe through every way. 

Dante's Inferno, Canto I, lines 1-16. 

ON A FELLOW-PASSENGER ASLEEP ON A TRAIN, W^ITH THE POEMS 
OF BION AND MOSCHUS IN HIS HANDS. 

Wake, wake him not ; a book lies in his hands. 
Bion and Moschus live within his dream. 
Tired of our world he fares in other lands, 
Wanders with these beside Ilyssus' stream. 

Dull, even sweet, the rumble of the train; 
'Tis Circe singing near her golden loom. 
No garish show afflicts his charmed brain; 
Demeter's poppies brighten o'er her tomb. 

Now, half awake, he looks on star-lit trees- 
Sees the white huntress in her eager chase. 
Wake, wake him not— upon the fragrant breeze - 
Let horn and hound announce her rapid pace. 

Unbanished gods roam o'er the thymy hills; 
Calm shadows sleep upon the purple grapes. 
Hid are the naiads near the star-gemmed rills ; 
Far through the moonlight wander lovelorn shapes. 



29 



J 



434 The Problem of Method 

Gray olives shade the dancing dryad's smile; 
Flutes pour their raptures through that visioned stream ; 
Echoes like these our modern cares beguile— 
Soft-whispering music from the old Greek's dream. 
Songs of Night and Day, F. W. Gunsaulus, A. C. McClurg & Co. 

It will be noted that two of the selections are prose, expressing 
mere facts; and the two others are poetry, setting forth idealization. 

In order to offer an explanation of the work, the selection relating 
to the election of President and Vice President is taken. The other 
selections could be treated in a similar manner. 

In dealing with a selection in organized discourse, the first work is 
to discover the embodied series of actions. 

The second work is to construct the series of sentences r.>rpressing 
the stages of the action. In the given case these may ippear some- 
what as follows: 

1. On the first Tuesday after the first Monday in jS'ovember, in 
Presidential years, the qualified voters of each state choose the elec- 
tors for that state. 

2. The electors meet at their several state capitals on the second 
Monday in January after the election. 

3. At this meeting each elector casts his ballot for President and 
Vice-President. 

4. The electors then seal up the ballots. 

5. They direct them to the President of the Senate, Washington, 
D. C. 

6. They elect a messenger, usually one of their own members. 

7. The messenger carries the sealed ballots to Washington. 

8. He delivers them to the President of the Senate. 

9. On the second Wednesday of the first February after the elec- 
tion, the Senate and the House of Eepresentatives convene in joint 



10. The President of the Senate opens the ballots in the presence 
of both Houses. 

11. It may be found that one candidate for the Presidency has 
received a majority of the entire electoral vote. 

12. In that case he is formally declared elected to the Presidency, 

13. It may also appear that one candidate for the Vice Presidency 
has received a majority of the ballots. 

14. He is then formally declared to be elected to the Vice Presi- 
dency. 



The Problem of Method 435 

15. It may, however, be found that no one has received a majority 
of the electoral votes for the Presidency. 

16. It may likewise appear that no one has received a majority of 
the votes for the Vice Presidency. 

17. The. joint session in such case dissolves. 

18. The Senate proceeds to elect a Vice President. 

19. The House enters upon the election of a President. 

20. It may be that the House fails to elect the President before the 
4th of the following March. 

21. The Vice President chosen by the Senate, thereupon assumes 
the Presidential chair. 

22. It is possible that both the Presidency and the Vice Presidency 
may become vacant by means of death, resignation or disability. 

23. The forty-ninth Congress fixed the succession in such case. 

24. The act of the forty-ninth Congress established the following 
succession: Secretary of State; Secretary of the Treasury; Secretary 
of War; Attorney General; Post Master General; Secretary of the 
Navy, and Secretary of the Interior. 

25. The act provides that the one who becomes President in com- 
pliance with this law must have been recognized by the Senate as a 
Cabinet Officer. 

26. It further ordains that he must possess the constitutional re- 
quirements for the Presidency. 

The third kind of work is selecting the words that express the 
central action in each sentence. 

The fourth kind of work is the reconstruction of the sentences on 
the basis of the verbs, as, for example, on the verb of the first sen- 
tence, choose. 

(Who), voters choose. 

(More definite), qualified voters choose. 

(Still more definite), the qualified voters choose. 

(Fully definite), the qualified voters in each state choose. 

(What), choose electors, 

(More definite), choose the electors. 

(Fully definite), choose the electors for that state. 

(When— year), choose the electors for that state in Presidential 
years. 

(When— month), choose the electors for that state in Presidential 
years in November. 

(When— day), choose the electors for that state in Presidential 
years in November, on the first Tuesday after the first Monday. 



436 The Problem of Method 

The fifth kind of work is the further organization of the sentence, 
produced ,by 'deciding upon the order of the various expressions. This 
may place the last expression given above, showing the day on which 
the election is to occur, so as to bring it first in the organized sentence. 
A high degree of skill in language and power to construct it, may arise 
from a consideration of the various advantages accruing from the dif- 
ferent positions of the various expressions. 

The sixth kind of work is an examination of the language ac- 
companying the expressions revealing the series of actions. For ex- 
ample, study will reveal that the first sentence is a transitional sen- 
tence, in that it connects ideas of our education and ideas concerning 
our interest in elections (both subjects being assumed to be present 
in the mind of the reader), with our ignorance of the process by 
which a President and Vice President are elected. This first sentence 
is also explanatory, its purpose being to reveal why the writer pre- 
sents his thoughts concerning the process of electing the President 
and Vice President. In the second sentence the expressions, ''com- 
mencing with," and "the next step," are transitional. A sentence 
may be iterative, in that it may present activities a second time, etc. 
From this it will be observed that the main kinds of sentences re- 
quired in order to change the mere series of sentences into organized 
discourse are three: 

Transitional sentences. 
Iterative sentences. 
Explanatory sentences. 

In connection with each separate sentence, and also with the sen- 
tences expressing the series of actions, certain rhetorical features are 
always involved in organized discourse. These are shown in: 

Arrangement. 

Employment of subjective sentences. 

Employment of figurative expressions including both figures of 
speech and figures of thought. 

A rhetorical feature produced by the arrangement is shown in be- 
ginning the first sentence with ''Despite our boasted education, etc." 
instead of beginning it with ' ' One voter out of ten, etc. ' ' Among the 
subjective expressions are, "The interest we take," "It is doubtful." 
Among the figurative expressions are, ' ' The tremendous interest we 
take," "The next step," "High sense of honor," "Get into a dead- 
lock," "An officer holds," "Must step out." It will be noted that 



The Problem of Method 437 

many of the figurative expressions are also subjective expressions. In 
the expression, ' * The House proceeds to elect a President and the Sen- 
ate a Vice President, ' ' a figure of speech is found. One is also found 
in the enumeration of the members of the Cabinet, indicating their 
order of succeeding to the Presidency. When these rhetorical features 
have been discovered, it is important that the pupils be led to consider 
their effect. 

This finishes the treatment of the selection of organized discourse. 
Equipped with the new power arising from such work, the pupil is 
now able to turn to any one of the bare series he has previously con- 
structed, and transform it into organized discourse. In doing this 
attention should be given to several things : 

1. The order of the different expressions in any given sentence 
should be noted, and the advantage of any change brought out. For 
example, the pupils may be led to compare the following in reference 
to the first sentence in the series concerning the kettle : ' ' I am stand- 
ing near the kitchen window." ''Near the kitchen window, I am 
standing. " ' ' Standing near the kitchen window, am I. ' ' Under 
order should be noted in the second case, the order of the successive 
sentences. 

2. The work succeeding the consideration of order is an examina- 
tion as to the combinations that may be made. These combinations might 
appear as follows: ''I am standing near the kitchen window, look- 
ing out of it. " ' ' I know the teakettle is empty, and yet I imagine 
it as fiJled. " "1 then go to the stove and take hold of the knob on 
the lid of the teakettle, etc. ' ' 

3. The third kind of work is what may be called the elaboration of 
the series. It consists in the appropriate employment of transitional 
sentences, iterative sentences, subjective sentences, explanatory sen- 
tences, and the use of various rhetorical features, such as transposi- 
tion, figures of thought, etc. The following, prepared by students, 
may furnish sufficient illustration of this elaboration of the bare series 
of sentences. 

a. We can realize how much is to be done before our end is 
accomplished when we want to build a house, obtain a copy-right, or 
receive a degree at college, but how little do we realize the niany, 
many little acts that must be performed before we have accomplished 
one, even one of the least, of the acts in the sphere of the family, 
as for example, that of filling the teakettle. I will here call attention 
to one set of conditions under which this act once occurred. _ The 
cook, while waiting for her mistress, stood near the kitchen window 
watching the little birds bathing in the puddles of water which re- 



438 The Problem of Method 

mained after a hard morning shower. While standing there she was 
reminded of the teakettle she had left on the stove almost empty. She 
immediately imagined it as filled, and walked to the stove to remove 
the lid from the steaming teakettle. She held the lid in one hand 
while she walked to the bucket of water which was on the table. She 
reached for the dipper which hung in the usual place on a nail just 
above the bucket. She took hold of the dipper near the bowl, so that 
she would be less apt to spill the water, and filled it with water. 
Having filled the dipper, she returned to the stove to empty the water 
into the kettle. She repeated this .action three times, thinking the 
kettle would then be sufficiently full. And so it was. Then she 
replaced the lid on the teakettle, and hung the dipper in its usual 
place, for she was always particular that things should be kept in 
their proper places. After she had completed this she returned to 
the window and continued watching the little birds for her mistress 
had not returned from market. 

b. It is a cold December day and Mary is standing near the 
kitchen window, looking out upon a charming snow scene. She thinks 
that the little snow-covered fir tree on the hill lacks only candles to 
complete it, and she also thinks of her papa and mamma, who have 
gone to town on a mysterious errand. 

Her face wears a bright expression, for she remembers her mother 's 
parting words, "1 feel that I can trust you, iMary, to keep the fire 
bright and the kettle boiling." 

This thought reminds her that the teakettle is probably empty and 
must be filled at once. So she goes to the stove, and taking hold of 
the knob, lifts the lid from the teakettle. Still holding it in her left 
hand, she passes to the water-bucket and removes the dipper from its 
accustomed nail near by. 

Now, Mary is such a small girl that it is not easy for her to dip 
water without spilling it, so she grasps the handle quite near the 
bowl, to prevent such an accident. She fills her dipper, and returning 
to the stove, very carefully pours its contents into the teakettle. It 
takes three dipperfuls, so that her chubby arms ache by the time she 
has finished. 

She replaces the lid, hangs up the dipper, and returning to the 
window, looks again at the &• tree which is soon to bear candles, and 
waits patiently for the return of her papa and mamma. 

c. On a bright and sunny day I stand near the kitchen window, 
watching some birds as they pick up the crumbs. As I do this, the 
clock gives warning of the approaching dinner hour. I know that the 
teakettle is empty and at once imagine it as being full. I walk to the 
stove and remove the teakettle lid. As I hold it in my hand I walk 
to the water-bucket, and finding the dipper hanging on a nail above 
the bucket, I take hold of the handle of the dipper close to the bowl in 
order to carry the water more easily. I take one dipperful and empty 
it into the teakettle. I pour m two more dipperfuls and then the tea- 
kettle is full. Placing the lid on the teakettle so that the water will 
boil sooner, I hang the dipper in place again. I resume my position 
at the window and again look out. 



The Problem of Method 439 

d. It was a clear, cold day in November, and the bright fire 
in Farmer Jones' comfortable kitchen sent out a cheerful glow. Mrs. 
Jones hurried to and fro, for a great many things had to be done on 
this particular morning. Tomorrow would be Thanksgiving and a 
number of guests were expected. The farmer had gone into the 
village quite early to purchase groceries, and now Mrs. Jones was 
expecting to hear the sound oi old Doll 's feet on the hard frozen road 
at any minute, for she must have those things to finish her baking. 
She left the table, where she was at work, and was standing near the 
window looking out. Just then she heard a queer, sizzing noise, and 
remembered that the teakettle was empty. It must be filled, for she 
would need hot water to scald the turkey. So she hurried to the stove, 
took hold of the lid of the teakettle and removed it. Holding it in 
her hand, she walked to the water bucket which stood on the table. 
Mrs. Jones was a very neat housekeeper and always kept things in 
their proper places. Just back of the bucket hung the dipper on a 
nail. She took it down, and filling it with water, poured the con- 
tents, into the teakettle, all the while grasping the handle near the 
bowl, for she was so much afraid of spilling the water on her new 
carpet. This she did three times. She then put the lid on the kettle 
and hung the dipper in its place. Surely by this time Doll must be in 
sight, so she returned to the window again and looked out. Just then 
the horse's feet came clattering up the pike. 



440 



The Problem of Method 



APPENDIX VIII. 



OBSERVATION OF THE PSYCHICAL PROCESS IN A LESSON 

Form that may he used in recording results. 
J. State the object (i.e., that which receives the focus of attertion, 
that which is being known), in the following activities in so 
far as the process of learning the lesson involved them. The 
object of memory is that which the pupil remembers, the 
object of imagination is the modified object of which the 
pupil becomes aware in an act of imagining, etc. 

Perceiving the object as a whole 



1. Sense-perception ^ 



2. Memory . . 



3. Imagination 



Analytic perceiving 
Mediated perceiving 



Apperceiving 
Spontaneous . 



j Voluntary . 
Systematic 



Mechanical 

With present object. 



With absent object- 



Separative, or Productive. 
With language 



With picture, or externality of a work of art. 
TProductive 



Creative 



Interpretative 



The Problem of Method 

rProdvictive 



4. Language act, 



Interpretative 



441 



5. Understanding . 



Apprehension 



Distinction. 

Abstraction 



Discrimination 



Comparison 



Classification. 
As a whole. 



With respect to cause. 



With respect to effects. 



As to central meaning. 



'As to meaning of single object. 



6. Conception 



As to common attributes. 



As to creative activity. 



442 



The Problem of Method 
rimmediate 



7. Judgment . < 



Conditional 



Definitive (i. e., in form of definition). 



Identification 



8, Reasoning .... J 



Induction 



Deduction 



II. What was the characteristic process of the lesson? 

1. Give the stages in this process as involved in this lesson. 



Student Grade 

Date Subject. 

Teacher. 



INDEX 



I 



PAGE 

Abstraction Ill 

Action — 

Em,bodied iSeries 414 

Expressed by Predicate .... 366 
Activity 5 

Object Producing 353 

Admiration 367 

Aesthetic Feeling 9 

Analysis 329 

In Art of Study 394 

In Eeasoning 359 

Analytic Knowing 348 

Apperceiving 61, 398 

Apprehension 34, 120 

Assignment— 

Of a Lesson 308 

Attention 336 

To Kelation 346 

Behavior 12 

Criterion of 12, 379 

Development in 379 

Cheerfulness 364 

Choice 373 

Steps in 377 

Classification 34, 122 

Clearness of Distinction 341 

Complexity— 

In Growth of Seed 387 

In Drop of Blood 389 

Concept 355 

How Made Explicit 355 

Conception 35, 37, 132 



PAGE 

More Fundamental than Un- 
derstanding 146 

Educational Principles 147 

Consciousness 21 

Characteristic Fact of 5 

Of Central Characteristic . . . 343 

Conscientiousness 377 

Consideration of Wholes 340 

Content 354 

Copula, Expressing Eelation . . . 357 
Course of Study— 

Kange of Effect 383 

Covetousness 361 

Curiosity 366 

Deduction 43, 45, 180 

Less Fundamental Than In- 
duction 184 

Educational Principles 185 

Desire 372 

Devices in a Lesson 311 

Differentiation 315 

In Mental Acts 45 

Discouragement 364 

Distinction 34, 121 

Clearness of 341 

Effect, of Course of Study 383 

Ego 22 

Element, Mental 25 

Initial 74 

Emotion 8 

Energy, Generic 35 

Envy 361 



Index 



Ethical Training 380 

Examination, of Particulars . . . 359 

Of Reasons 351 

Extent 354 

Faith 362 

Feeling 8 

Intellectual 9 

Aesthetic 9 

Form for Recording Observa- 
tion of Lessons 440 

Freedom 320 

To Consider New Objects. . .346 

Generic Energy 35 

Grades in Knowing 347 

Hallucination 60 

Harmony of Mental Acts 342 

Hope 363 

Humility 361 

Idealization 349 

Value of 349 

Identification 40, 176, 358 

Hlusion 58 

Image 24 

Complexity of 25 

Function of 186 

Imagination 29, 90 

Mechanical 29, 90 



Creative 30, 96 

More Fundamental Than 

Memory 105 

Educational Principles 107 

Transition to Thinking 349 

Immediate Synthesis 52 

Induction 41, 45, 177, 179 

iMore Fundamental Than 

Judgment 179 

Educational Principles 179 

Initial Element 74 

Intellectual Feeling 9 



PAGE 

Intelligence 22 

Interest 371 

Jealousy S61 

Judgment 35, 38, 158 

More Fundamental Than 

Conception 171 

Educational Principles 172 

Knowing 17 

Law of 18, 201 

Process in 118 

Law of the Self 5 

Of Knowing 18, 201 

Language 116 

Objective 116 

Subjective 116 

Symbolic 116 

Language Act 31, 107 

Productive 110 

Interpretative 113 

More Fundamental Than 

Imagination 114 

Educational Principles 116 

Language Exercises 414 

Lesson- 
Form for Observation 440 

Essential Elements ... 319 to 334 

Limit, Sense of 383 

Logical Process in Reasoning. .359 

Love 367 

Malice 361 

Mediated Synthesis .... 10, 13, 54 

Memory 48, 73 

Spontaneous 48, 73 

Voluntary .48, 78, 401 

Systematic 48, 80, 406 

Educational Principles 88 

More Fundamental Than 

Sense-Perception 88 

Mental Element 25 

Mental Steps in a Lesson 309 



Index 



111 



Metaphor 30, 82, 292 

Method, Definition of . .5, 202, 212 

Difficulty of 203 

Essential Idea of 190 

In the External 190 

In the Psychical 190 

In a Branch of Study 261 

In Composition 263 to 305 

In Education 192 

In a Lesson 307 to 334 

Subject Matter 307 

Assignment 308 

Purpose 309 

Mental Steps 309 

Devices 311 

Of the Teacher 195 

Objective 218 

Subjective .' 218 

Eange of Knowledge in ... . 348 

Special 219 to 228 

The Three Views of 227 

Uses of the Term 229 to 260 

Mind 22 

Motor Factor in Education. , . .344 

Object 24 

Origin of Characteristics. . .351 
Structural Characteristics. . .353 

Objective Language 116 

Objective Method 218 

Objectifying Process 11 

Orderly Process 342 

Original Feeling 340 

Particular, in a Lesson 319 

Examination of 359 

Potential Knowledge 340 

Predicate, Expressing Action . . 366 

Presentation 26, 47 

Pride 361 

Principles of Teaching, 335 to 384 
Process in Eeasoning 357 



PAGE 

Logical 357 

Psychological 357 

In Spontaneous Memory .... 74 

In Voluntary Memory 75 

In Systematic Memory 81 

Purpose of a Lesson 309 

Eatiocination 34, 36 

Eeading, Artistic Phase of . . . .350 

Eeasoning 35, 38, 173 

Definition of 174 

Forms of 176 

Examples 408 

Eeinforcement of Eational In- 
stitutions 382 

Eepresentation 27, 71 

Eules of School, Source of ... . 381 

Eecreated by Pupils 381 

Scope of Subject 205 

Self 22 

Law of 5 

Names of 20 

Self Determination 335 

Self Direction 382 

Sense, of Limit 303 

Sensing 47 

General 47 

Special 48 

Full Circuit of 391 

Sense-Perception 49 

Fused 52 

Analytic 53 

Mediated 54 

Of Space Eelations 55 

Of Time Eelations 57 

Educational Principles 66 

Simile 31 

Soul 22 

Spirit 23 

Spontaneous Memory 48, 73 

Process in 74 



Index 



PAGE 

Step, Mental 382 

Characteristic 330 

Subordinate 329 

Subject Matter in a Lesson... 307 

Subjective Language 116 

Subjective Method 218 

Subjective Process 8 

Subjectfying Process 17 

Sullenness 365 

Syllogism 42, 44 

Symbolic Language 116 

Sympathy 360 

Synthesis 329 

In Eeasoning 359 

Immediate 52 

Mediated 10, 13, 54 

Systematic Memory 48, 80 

Process in 81 

Example 406 

Thought 118 



Transition to Thinking 349 

Undifferentiation 143, 314 

Understanding 33, 118 

More Fundamental Than the 

Language Act 130 

Educational Principles 131 

Universal in a Lesson 313 

Ungrounded Relations 357 

Unity 221 

Fused 222 

Differentiated 223 

Mediated 224 

Value of Idealization 349 

Verification 359 

Voluntary Memory 48, 78 

Process in 79, 401 

Wholes, Construction of 340 

Will 11. 

Wonder 366 



H 154 



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